Plotinus, Enneades

ἀλλ’ εἰ σημαίνουσιν οὗτοι τὰ ἐσόμενα, ὥσπερ φαμὲν πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα σημαντικὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐσομένων, τί ἂν τὸ ποιοῦν εἴη; καὶ ἡ τάξις πῶς; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσημαίνετο τεταγμένως μὴ ἑκάστων γινομένων. ἔστω τοίνυν ὥσπερ γράμματα ἐν οὐρανῷ γραφόμενα ἀεὶ ἢ γεγραμμένα καὶ κινούμενα, ποιοῦντα μέντοι ἔργον καὶ ἄλλο: ἐπακολουθείτω δὲ τῷδε ἡ παῤ αὐτῶν σημασία, ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ἐν ἑνὶ ζῴῳ παῤ ἄλλου μέρους ἄλλο ἄν τις μάθοι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἦθος ἄν τις γνοίη εἰς ὀφθαλμούς τινος ἰδὼν ἤ τι ἄλλο μέρος τοῦ σώματος καὶ κινδύνους καὶ σωτηρίας. καὶ οὖν μέρη μὲν ἐκεῖνα, μέρη δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς: ἄλλα οὖν ἄλλοις. μεστὰ δὲ πάντα σημείων καὶ σοφός τις ὁ μαθὼν ἐξ ἄλλου ἄλλο. πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη συνηθείᾳ γιγνόμενα γινώσκεται πᾶσι. τίς οὖν ἡ σύνταξις ἡ μία; οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς ὄρνεις εὔλογον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα, ἀφ̓ ὧν σημαινόμεθα ἕκαστα. συνηρτῆσθαι δὴ δεῖ ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάντα, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐν ἑνὶ τῶν καθ̓ ἕκαστα τοῦ εὖ εἰρομένου σύμπνοια μία, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον ἐν τῷ παντί: καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν δεῖ ἓν πολύζῳον ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἕν, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέρη ἕν τι ἔργον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἕκαστα ἔργα ἕκαστον ἔχειν καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα, ὅσον μὴ μόνον μέρη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλα καὶ μείζω. πρόεισι μὲν δὴ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς τὸ αὑτοῦ πρᾶττον, συμβάλλει δὲ ἄλλο ἄλλῳ: οὐ γὰρ ἀπήλλακται τοῦ ὅλου: καὶ δὴ καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει ὑπ’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλο αὖ προσῆλθε καὶ ἐλύπησεν ἢ ἧσε. πρόεισι δὲ οὐκ εἰκῇ οὐδὲ κατ’ ἐπιτυχίαν: καὶ γὰρ ἄλλο τι καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐφεξῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλο.

But if these [stars] signify what will be, as we say many other things too are significant of what will be, what would the producing [cause] be? And how [is there] order? For [things] would not be signified in an ordered way if particular things did not come about [in order]. Let it be, then, as if letters were always being written in the heaven, or had been written and were moving, while also doing some other work; and let the signification that comes from them follow upon this, just as, from one principle in one living being, one might learn one thing from another part. For indeed one might know someone's character by looking into his eyes or at some other part of the body, and [his] dangers and deliverances too. So those [stars] are parts, and we too are parts: different things, then, through different ones. All things are full of signs, and wise is he who has learned one thing from another. Many events are already known to everyone through familiarity. What, then, is the one co-ordination? For in this way [divination] by birds is reasonable too, and [by] the other animals, from which we take signs of particular things. All things must be linked to one another, and there must be one breathing-together not only in one of the individual things, well strung together, but much more and before that in the All; and one principle must make one living being of many living beings, and one out of all; and just as in each single one the parts have each received some one function, so also the individual things in the All each have their functions, and more so than these, in so far as they are not only parts but also wholes, and greater [ones]. So each proceeds from one principle doing its own [work], but one contributes to another, for it has not been released from the whole; and indeed it acts and is acted upon by others, and another in turn has come up to it and pained or pleased [it]. And it proceeds not at random or by chance: for something else [comes] from these too, and next in order, according to nature, another.

μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλως ποιοῦσιν οὐκ ἀκήρατα τὰ ἐκεῖ. ὅταν γὰρ ἐπαοιδὰς γράφωσιν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα λέγοντες, οὐ μόνον τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω, τί ποιοῦσιν ἢ γοητείας καὶ θέλξεις καὶ πείσεις λέγουσι καὶ λόγῳ ὑπακούειν καὶ ἄγεσθαι, εἴ τις ἡμῶν τεχνικώτερος εἰπεῖν ταδὶ καὶ οὑτωσὶ μέλη καὶ ἤχους καὶ προσπνεύσεις καὶ σιγμοὺς τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἐκεῖ μαγεύειν γέγραπται. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται τοῦτο λέγειν, ἀλλὰ πῶς φωναῖς τὰ ἀσώματα; ὥστε οἷς σεμνοτέρους αὑτῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι, τούτοις λελήθασιν αὑτοὺς τὸ σεμνὸν ἐκείνων ἀφαιρούμενοι. καθαίρεσθαι δὲ νόσων λέγοντες αὑτοὺς λέγοντες μὲν ἂν σωφροσύνῃ καὶ κοσμίᾳ διαίτῃ ἔλεγον ἂν ὀρθῶς, καθάπερ οἱ φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι: νῦν δὲ ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι σεμνότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἳ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μέντοι εὖ φρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐχ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσιν ἢ καμάτοις ἢ πλησμοναῖς ἢ ἐνδείαις ἢ σήψεσι καὶ ὅλως μεταβολαῖς ἢ ἔξωθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ ἔνδοθεν λαβούσαις. δηλοῦς δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπεῖαι αὐτῶν. γαστρὸς γὰρ ῥυείσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος διεχώρησε κάτω εἰς τὸ ἔξω τὸ νόσημα καὶ αἵματος ἀφῃρημένου, καὶ ἔνδεια δὲ ἰάσατο, ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τήκεσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ἀθρόως ἐξελθόντος, ἢ μένοντος ἔνδον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἔτι μένοντος, πῶς ἔνδον ὄντος οὐ νοσεῖ ἔτι; εἰ δὲ ἐξελήλυθε, διὰ τί; τί γὰρ αὐτὸ πέπονθεν; ἢ ὅτι ἐτρέφετο ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου. ἦν ἄρα ἡ νόσος ἑτέρα οὖσα τοῦ δαίμονος. ἔπειτα, εἰ οὐδενὸς ὄντος αἰτίου εἴσεισι, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ νοσεῖ; εἰ δὲ γενομένου αἰτίου, τί δεῖ τοῦ δαίμονος πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν; τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τὸν πυρετὸν αὔταρκές ἐστιν ἐργάσασθαι. γελοῖον δὲ τὸ ἅμα τὸ αἴτιον γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθέως ὥσπερ παρυποστῆναι τῷ αἰτίῳ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἕτοιμον ὄν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὅπως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅτου χάριν, δῆλον: τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἧττον καὶ τούτων τῶν δαιμονίων ἐμνήσθημεν. τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὑμῖν καταλείπω ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν ἐκεῖνο πανταχοῦ, ὡς τὸ μὲν παῤ ἡμῶν εἶδος φιλοσοφίας μεταδιωκόμενον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τὴν ἁπλότητα τοῦ ἤθους μετὰ τοῦ φρονεῖν καθαρῶς ἐνδείκνυται, τὸ σεμνόν, οὐ τὸ αὔθαδες μεταδιώκουσαν, τὸ θαρραλέον μετὰ λόγου καὶ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας πολλῆς καὶ εὐλαβείας καὶ πλείστης περιωπῆς ἔχουσαν: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῷ τοιούτῳ παραβάλλειν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντιώτατα κατεσκευάσθαι διὰ πάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν πλέον περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν ἡμῖν ἂν πρέποι.

But above all, they themselves in another way too make the [realities] there not pure. For when they write incantations as if addressing them, not only the psychē [soul] but also those above it, what are they doing but saying [that these are subject to] sorceries and charms and persuasions, and obey a word and are led, if any of us is more skilled at uttering such-and-such things in such-and-such a way: melodies and sounds and aspirations and hissings of the voice and the other things that are written to work magic there? But if they do not want to say this, then how [are] the incorporeal [moved] by sounds? So by the very means by which they make their own words appear more august, they have, without noticing it, taken away the august character of those [realities]. And when they say that they cleanse themselves of diseases, if they said [they did so] by temperance and an orderly way of life, they would speak rightly, just as the philosophers say; but as it is, by supposing that the diseases are daimonia [demons] and claiming they are able to drive these out by a word, and professing it, they might seem more august in the eyes of the many, who marvel at the powers of the magicians, but they would not persuade people of good sense that diseases do not have their causes either in exertions or surfeits or deficiencies or putrefactions, and in general in changes that take their origin either from outside or from within. Their cures show it too. For when the bowels have run, or a drug has been given, the illness has passed downwards and out; and when blood has been let, and fasting too has healed. Or [was it] because the daimonion went hungry and the drug made it waste away, and it sometimes went out all at once, or stayed inside? But if it still stays, how is [the patient] no longer ill while it is inside? And if it has gone out, why? What has happened to it? Or [is it] that it was being fed by the disease? Then the disease was something other than the daimōn [spirit-being]. Next, if it enters when there is no cause, why is one not always ill? And if [it enters] when a cause has arisen, what need is there of the daimōn for being ill? For the cause is sufficient to produce the fever. And it is ridiculous that, as soon as the cause has arisen, the daimonion should immediately come into being alongside the cause, as if standing ready. But how and for what reason these things too have been said by them is clear; for it was for this reason no less that we mentioned these daimonia too. The rest I leave to you to examine as you read, and to observe this everywhere: that the kind of philosophy we pursue, besides all its other goods, also displays simplicity of character together with pure thinking, pursuing the august, not the arrogant, having boldness with reason and with much security and caution and the utmost circumspection; and to compare the other [teachings] with such [a philosophy]; but that [the teaching] of the others has been constructed in a way most opposite in every respect; for it would not befit us to say anything more about them.

καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάλαι σοφοί, ὅσοι ἐβουλήθησαν θεοὺς αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι ἱερὰ καὶ ἀγάλματα ποιησάμενοι, εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἀπιδόντες ἐν νῷ λαβεῖν, ὡς πανταχοῦ μὲν εὐάγωγον ψυχῆς φύσις, δέξασθαί γε μὴν ῥᾷστον ἂν εἴη ἁπάντων, εἴ τις προσπαθές τι τεκτήναιτο ὑποδέξασθαι δυνάμενον μοῖράν τινα αὐτῆς. προσπαθὲς δὲ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μιμηθέν, ὥσπερ κάτοπτρον ἁρπάσαι εἶδός τι δυνάμενον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις πάντα εὐμηχάνως ποιησαμένη εἰς μίμησιν ὧν εἶχε τοὺς λόγους, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστον οὕτως ἐγένετο ἐν ὕλῃ λόγος, ὃς κατὰ τὸν πρὸ ὕλης ἐμεμόρφωτο, συνήψατο τῷ θεῷ ἐκείνῳ, καθ̓ ὃν ἐγίνετο καὶ εἰς ὃν εἶδεν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ εἶχε ποιοῦσα. καὶ δὴ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἄμοιρον αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνον αὖ κατελθεῖν εἰς τοῦτο. ἦν δὲ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐκεῖ ἥλιος — οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν γινέσθω παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου — ἐφεξῆς δὲ τούτῳ ψυχὴ ἐξηρτημένη μένοντος νοῦ μένουσα. δίδωσι δὴ αὕτη τὰ πέρατα αὐτῆς τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἥλιον τούτῳ τῷ ἡλίῳ, καὶ ποιεῖ διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κἀκεῖ συνῆφθαι οἷον ἑρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τε ἀπ’ ἐκείνου εἰς τοῦτον καὶ τῶν τούτου εἰς ἐκεῖνον, ὅσον διὰ ψυχῆς εἰς ἐκεῖνον φθάνει. οὐ γὰρ μακρὰν οὐδὲ πόρρω οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν καὶ αὖ πόρρω τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ τῇ μίξει, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν εἶναι ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ οὐ τόποις χωριστὸν καὶ συνεῖναι αὖ χωρὶς ὄν. θεοὶ δέ εἰσιν οὗτοι τῷ ἀεὶ μὴ ἀποστατεῖν ἐκείνων, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ψυχῇ προσηρτῆσθαι τῇ οἷον ἀπελθούσῃ ψυχῇ, ταύτῃ δέ, ᾗπερ καὶ εἰσὶν ὃ λέγονται, πρὸς νοῦν βλέπειν οὐδαμοῦ ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐκεῖ βλεπούσης.

And it seems to me that the ancient wise men, those who wished gods to be present to them and made temples and statues, looking to the nature of the All, conceived that the nature of psychē [soul] is everywhere easy to draw, but that it would be easiest of all to receive [it] if one were to fashion something sympathetic, able to receive some portion of it. And whatever is imitated in any way at all is sympathetic, like a mirror able to catch some form. For the nature of the All too, having made all things skilfully in imitation of those whose rational principles it had, since each thing had thus come to be a rational principle in matter, shaped according to the one before matter, linked [each] to that god according to whom it came to be, and to whom the psychē looked and whom it held as it made. And indeed it was not possible for [it] to come to be without a share in him, nor, again, for him to come down into this. That [god] was nous [intellect], the sun there (for let this serve as our example for the argument), and next after it, psychē, depending from nous, which abides, and itself abiding. This [psychē] gives its limits that border on this sun to this sun, and makes [it] joined there too through itself as intermediary, having become as it were an interpreter both of what [comes] from that [sun] to this and of what [goes] from this to that, so far as [anything] reaches that one through psychē. For nothing is far or distant from anything, and yet again [things are] distant by difference and by mixture; but it is possible to be by oneself, not separated by places, and again to be together while being apart. These are gods by never standing apart from those [beings above], and by being attached to the original psychē by the psychē that has, as it were, departed, and by this [psychē], through which they are also what they are called, looking towards nous, their psychē looking nowhere but there.

τὰς δὲ γοητείας πῶς; ἢ τῇ συμπαθείᾳ, καὶ τῷ πεφυκέναι συμφωνίαν εἶναι ὁμοίων καὶ ἐναντίωσιν ἀνομοίων, καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ εἰς ἓν ζῷον συντελούντων. καὶ γὰρ μηδενὸς μηχανωμένου ἄλλου πολλὰ ἕλκεται καὶ γοητεύεται: καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος αὖ. καὶ ὁ γόης ὁ πρῶτος καὶ φαρμακεὺς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν κατανοήσαντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις χρῶνται αὐτοῦ τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς γοητεύμασι. καὶ γάρ, ὅτι ἐρᾶν πεφύκασι καὶ τὰ ἐρᾶν ποιοῦντα ἕλκει πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὁλκῆς ἐρωτικῆς διὰ γοητείας τέχνη γεγένηται προστιθέντων ἐπαφαῖς φύσεις ἄλλας ἄλλοις συναγωγοὺς καὶ ἐγκείμενον ἐχούσας ἔρωτα: καὶ συνάπτουσι δὲ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἄλλῃ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ φυτὰ διεστηκότα ἐξαψάμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλα: καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι δὲ προσχρῶνται δυνάμεις ἔχουσι, καὶ αὑτοὺς σχηματίζοντες ὡδὶ ἐπάγουσιν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἀψοφητὶ δυνάμεις ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντες εἰς ἕν: ἐπεὶ ἔξω γε τοῦ παντὸς εἵ τις ὑπόθοιτο τὸν τοιοῦτον, οὔτ’ ἂν ἕλξειεν οὔτ’ ἂν καταγάγοι ἐπαγωγαῖς ἢ καταδέσμοις: ἀλλὰ νῦν, ὅτι μὴ οἷον ἀλλαχοῦ ἄγει, ἔχει ἄγειν εἰδὼς ὅπῃ τι ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς ἄλλο ἄγεται. πέφυκε δὲ καὶ ἐπῳδῆς τῷ μέλει καὶ τῇ τοιᾷδε ἠχῇ καὶ τῷ σχήματι τοῦ δρῶντος — ἕλκει γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὰ ἐλεεινὰ σχήματα καὶ φθέγματα — ἄγεσθαι ἡ ψυχή: οὐ γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐδ’ ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ μουσικῆς θέλγεται, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἄλογος ψυχή, καὶ οὐ θαυμάζεται ἡ γοητεία ἡ τοιαύτη: καίτοι φιλοῦσι κηλούμενοι, κἂν μὴ τοῦτο αἰτῶνται παρὰ τῶν τῇ μουσικῇ χρωμένων. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ εὐχὰς οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀκουούσης οἰητέον: οὐ γὰρ οἱ θελγόμενοι ταῖς ἐπῳδαῖς οὕτως, οὐδ’ ὅταν γοητεύῃ ὄφις ἀνθρώπους, σύνεσιν ὁ γοητευόμενος ἔχει, οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ γινώσκει ἤδη παθών, ὅτι πέπονθεν, ἀπαθὲς δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἡγούμενόν ἐστιν. ᾧ δ’ ηὔξατο, ἦλθέ τι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον: ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἢ ἄλλο ἄστρον οὐκ ἐπαίει.

And how [do] sorceries [work]? By sympathy, and by there being by nature a concord of like things and an opposition of unlike things, and by the variety of the many powers that contribute to one living being. For even when no one else contrives anything, many things are drawn and bewitched; and the true magic is the Love in the All, and again the Strife. And this is the first sorcerer and potion-maker, and people, having observed him, use his potions and spells on one another. For because it is natural to love, and the things that produce love draw towards one another, an art of erotic drawing through sorcery has arisen, of people who apply by contact different natures to different people, natures that draw together and have love lying within them; and they join one psychē [soul] to another, as if they were tying together plants set apart from each other. They also make use of figures that have powers, and by putting themselves into such-and-such postures they silently draw powers onto themselves, being within one [whole and acting] upon one. For if one supposed such a man outside the All, he could neither draw nor bring down by attraction-spells or binding-spells; but as it is, because he does not lead as if from somewhere else, he is able to lead, knowing by what way in the living being one thing is led to another. The psychē is by nature led also by the melody of an incantation, and by a particular sound, and by the posture of the one performing (for such things draw, as pitiable postures and utterances do); for it is not the faculty of choice or the reason that is charmed by music, but the irrational psychē, and this kind of sorcery causes no wonder; and yet people fall in love when they are enchanted, even if this is not what they ask of those who practise music. And one must not think that the other prayers either are heard by the faculty of choice: for neither are those charmed by incantations [charmed] in this way, nor, when a snake bewitches people, does the one bewitched have understanding or perceive it, but he knows, once he has suffered it, that he has suffered; but the ruling part itself is unaffected. [As for the one] to whom he prayed, something came from that one to him, or to another; but the sun or another star does not hear.

ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος πῶς ὑπὸ γοητείας καὶ φαρμάκων; ἢ τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ ἀπαθὴς εἰς γοήτευσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ λογικὸν αὐτοῦ πάθοι, οὐδ’ ἂν μεταδοξάσειε: τὸ δὲ ὅσον τοῦ παντὸς ἐν αὐτῷ ἄλογον κατὰ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν: ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔρωτας ἐκ φαρμάκων, εἴπερ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἐπινευούσης καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἄλλης τῷ τῆς ἄλλης παθήματι. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπῳδαῖς τὸ ἄλογον πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντεπᾴδων τὰς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεις ἀναλύσει: θάνατον δὲ ἐκ τοιούτων ἢ νόσους ἢ ὅσα σωματικὰ πάθοι ἄν. τὸ γὰρ μέρος τοῦ παντὸς ὑπὸ μέρους ἄλλου ἢ τοῦ παντὸς πάθοι ἄν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀβλαβής. τὸ δὲ μὴ εὐθύς, ἀλλ’ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ φύσεως. δαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἀπαθεῖς οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ: μνήμας δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τούτοις οὐκ ἄτοπον διδόναι καὶ θέλγεσθαι φυσικῶς ἀγομένους καὶ κατακούειν καλούντων τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐγγυτέρω τῶν τῇδε καὶ ὅσῳ πρὸς τὰ τῇδε. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο γοητεύεται ὑπ’ ἄλλου: πρὸς ὃ γάρ ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο γοητεύει καὶ ἄγει αὐτό: μόνον δὲ τὸ πρὸς αὑτὸ ἀγοήτευτον. διὸ καὶ πᾶσα πρᾶξις γεγοήτευται καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ βίος: κινεῖται γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἃ θέλγει αὐτόν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος Ἐρεχθέως δῆμος. τί γὰρ μαθών τις πρὸς ἄλλο ἔχει; ἢ ἑλκόμενος οὐ μάγων τέχναις, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀπάτην δούσης καὶ συναψάσης ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο οὐ τοῖς τόποις, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἔδωκε φίλτροις.

And the good man: how [is he affected] by sorcery and potions? In his psychē [soul] he is unaffected by bewitchment, and his rational part could not be affected, nor would he change his mind; but whatever of the irrational of the All is in him, in that respect he could be affected, or rather this [part] could be affected; but [he would] not [suffer] loves from potions, if indeed loving [requires] that the other psychē also assent to what the other undergoes. And just as the irrational is affected by incantations, so he himself, by singing counter-incantations, will undo the powers there. But death from such things, or diseases, or whatever is bodily, he could suffer: for the part of the All could be affected by another part or by the All, but he himself [is] unharmed. That [the effect comes] not at once but later is no departure from nature. Daimones [spirit-beings] too are not unaffected in their irrational [part]; it is not absurd to grant them memories and perceptions, and [to grant] that they are charmed, being led by nature, and that those of them who are nearer to the things here, and in so far as [they are turned] towards the things here, listen to those who call them. For everything that is directed towards another is bewitched by another; for that towards which it is directed bewitches and leads it; only what is directed towards itself is unbewitched. That is why every action has been bewitched, and the whole life of the practical man: for it is moved towards the things that charm it. Hence too the saying, "For fair of face is the people of great-hearted Erechtheus." For what possesses anyone to be directed towards another? Or [is he] drawn, not by the arts of magicians, but by nature, which gives the deception and joins one thing to another, not in places, but by the love-charms it has given?