Parmenides, Fragmenta

ἔχει δὲ οὑτωσὶ τὰ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναίρεσιν· μοῦνος . . . ἀκούων ἐπάγει μοῦνος . . . πολλὰ μάλα καὶ παραδίδωσι λοιπὸν τὰ τοῦ κυρίως ὄντος σημεῖα· ὡς ἀγένητον . . . πέδηισιν. ταῦτα δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυρίως ὄντος λέγων ἐναργῶς ἀποδείκνυσιν, ὅτι ἀγένητον τοῦτο τὸ ὄν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ προϋπῆρχεν ἄλλο ὄν· οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν. καὶ διὰ τί δὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερσν ἐγένετο; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῦ πῆι μὲν ὄντος πῆι δὲ μὴ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ γενητὸν γίνεται (neu–platonische Vorstellung)· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὄντος προϋπάρχοι τὸ πῆι μὲν ὂν πῆι δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μετ’ αὐτὸ ὑφέστηκε. Π. δὲ . . . ὧδὲ πως περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ γράφει· πολλὰ . . . ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ’ ἀγένητον. ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπφήναντο οῖον . . . ὄνομ’ εἰναι καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζονται. 39 vgl. Melissos 20 B 8 εἰ γὰρ ἔστι γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ . . . καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα φασὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. εἴπερ ἕν ἐστι ὁμοῦ τὸ πᾶν (5) καὶ εῖρας πύματον. εἰ τοἰνυν ὅλον ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ Π. λέγει πάντοθεν . . . τῆι ἢ τῆι, τοιοῦτόν γε ὄν τὸ ὂν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει. ὥστε οὐδὲ τῶι οὐρανῶι ἐφαρμόττει τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα ὥς τινας ὑπολαβεῖν ὁ Εὔδημός φησιν ἀκούσαντας τοῦ πάντοθεν . . . ὄγκωι· οὐ γὰρ ἀδιαίρετος ὁ οὐρανός, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὅμοιος σφαίραι, ἀλλὰ σφᾳῖρά ἐστιν ἡ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀκριβεστάτη. βέλτιον οἰητέον Παρμενίδην Μελίσσου εἰρηκέναι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄπειρον ὅλον φησίν, ὁ δὲ τὸ ὅλον πεπεράνθαι μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές’. συμπληρώσας γὰρ τὸν περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ λόγον ὁ Π. ἐπάγει ταυτί. . . . ἐν τῶι. . . παρελάσσηι. μετελθὼν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ὁ Π. ἤτοι ἁπὸ ἀληθείας, ὡς αὐτός φησιν, ἐπὶ δόξαν ἐν οἰς λέγει ἐν τῶι . . . ἀκούων, τῶν γενητῶν ἀρχὰς καὶ αὐτὸς στοιχειώδεις μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἀντίθεσιν ἔθετο, ἣν φῶς καλεῖ καὶ σκότος, 〈ἢ〉 πῦρ καὶ γῆν ἢ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀραιὸν ἢ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον, λέγων ἐφεξῆς τοῖς πρότερον παρακειμένοις ἔπεσιν μορφὰς . . . ἐμβριθές τε. ἀπατηλὸν καλεῖ τῶν ἐπῶν τὸν κόσμον τὸν περὶ τὰς βροτείους δόξας. καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀρχὰς ποιεῖ· ταῦτα δὲ προσαγορεύει πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ φῶς καὶ νύκτα ἤτοι σκότος· λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τὰ περὶ ἀληθείας μορφὰς . . . ἐμβριθές τε. — Nach Simpl. (Z. 3) anzuschließen an B 7.μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτηι δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι πολλὰ μάλ’, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ’ ἀτέλεστον· οὐδὲ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ; πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν· * * * οὔτ’ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσω φάσθαι σ’ οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ’ ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν,· οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί. οὐδὲ ποτ’ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς γίγνεσθαί τι παρ’ αὐτό· τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι οὔτ’ ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε δίκη χαλάσασα πέδηισιν, ἀλλ’ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ’ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ’ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ’ ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι. πῶς δ’ ἂν ἔπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν; πῶς δ’ ἄν κε γένοιτο; εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ’, οὐκ ἔστι), οὐδ’ εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι. τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος. οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον· οὐδέ τι τῆι μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι, οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ’ ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος. τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει. αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος τῆλε μάλ’ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. ταὐτόν τ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει. οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι· ἔσπι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές· [μὴ]* ἐὸν δ’ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο. ταὐτὸν δ’ ἔστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα. οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστίν, εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ 〈ἢ〉 ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἄλλο πάρέξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ’ ἐπέδησεν οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ’ ἔμεναι· τῶι πάντ’ ὄνομῖα) ἔσται, ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν. αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι. οὔτε γὰρ οὔ τεον ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ’ ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος τῆι μᾶλλον τῆι δ’ ἦσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἄσυλον· οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει. ἐν τῷι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας μάνθανε κόσμον ἔμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν (ὲν ὦι πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν)· τἀντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ’ ἔθεντο χωρὶς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, τῆι μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ’ [ἀραιὸν] ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῶι πάντοσε τωύτόν, τῶι δ’ ἑτέρωι μὴ τωὐτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ’ αὐτό τἀντία νύκτ’ ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε. τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω, ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι.

The lines after the elimination of what is not run as follows: 'Only . . . listening.' He adds 'Only . . . very many', and then hands down the signs of what properly is: 'that ungenerated . . . fetters.' In saying these things about what properly is, he clearly demonstrates that this being is ungenerated: for [it came] neither from what is, since no other being existed before it, nor from what is not, for what is not does not even exist. And why indeed would it have come to be then, and not earlier or later? Nor yet from what in one way is and in another way is not, as what is generated comes to be (a Neoplatonic notion); for what in one way is and in another is not could not exist before what simply is, but has its existence after it. Parmenides . . . writes somewhat as follows about the god: 'many . . . unshaken and ungenerated.' Others again declared the opposite of these views, such as '. . . to be a name', and all the other things that men like Melissus and Parmenides, opposing all these, firmly maintain. [On line] 39 compare Melissus 20 B 8: 'For if there are earth and water . . . and all the other things that people say are true.' If indeed the whole is one, 'all together' (5), and [has] 'an outermost limit'. If then it is a whole, as Parmenides too says, 'on all sides . . . this way or that', being such, what is has a middle and extremities. So what he says does not fit the heaven either, as Eudemus says some supposed on hearing 'on all sides . . . mass'; for the heaven is not indivisible, nor is it like a sphere: it is a sphere, the most exact of natural ones. One must suppose that Parmenides spoke better than Melissus: for the latter says that the infinite is a whole, the former that the whole is limited, 'equally balanced from the middle'. For having completed his account of the intelligible, Parmenides adds this: '. . . Here . . . outstrip.' Having passed from the intelligibles to the sensibles, or, as he himself says, from truth to opinion, in the lines where he says 'Here . . . listening', Parmenides too laid down as the elemental principles of things that come to be the first opposition, which he calls light and darkness, 〈or〉 fire and earth, or dense and rare, or same and other, saying, right after the verses quoted earlier: 'shapes . . . and heavy.' He calls the order of his verses about mortal opinions 'deceptive'. For he too, in the part concerned with opinion, makes hot and cold principles; and he calls these fire and earth, and light and night or darkness; for after the part on truth he says: 'shapes . . . and heavy.' (According to Simplicius, line 3, to be joined on to B 7.) Only one account of a way is still left: that it is. And on this way there are very many signs: that, being ungenerated, it is also imperishable, whole, single-born, unshaken and without end; nor was it ever, nor will it be, since it is now, all together, one, continuous. For what birth of it will you seek? How, and from where, did it grow? * Nor will I let you say or think [that it grew] from what is not; for it cannot be said or thought that it is not. And what need would have roused it to grow later rather than earlier, starting from nothing? So it must either be completely, or not at all. Nor will the strength of conviction ever allow anything to come to be from what is not, beside it. For this reason Justice has not loosened her fetters to let it come to be or perish, but holds [it] fast. The decision about these things lies in this: it is, or it is not. And it has been decided, as is necessary, to leave the one [way] unthinkable and nameless (for it is not a true way), and that the other is, and is genuine. How could what is then be in the future? How could it come to be? For if it came to be, it is not, nor [is it] if it is ever going to be. Thus coming to be is quenched, and perishing is not heard of. Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike; nor is there any more of it here, which would keep it from holding together, nor any less, but it is all full of what is. Therefore it is all continuous: for what is draws close to what is. But unmoving in the limits of great bonds it is, without beginning, without ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have been driven very far away, and true conviction thrust them off. Remaining the same and in the same, it lies by itself, and so stays fixed there; for mighty Necessity holds it in the bonds of a limit, which encloses it all around. Therefore it is not right for what is to be unfinished; for it is not lacking; [not] being so, it would lack everything. Thinking and that for the sake of which there is thought are the same. For you will not find thinking without what is, in which it has been expressed; for nothing else 〈either〉 is or will be apart from what is, since Fate has bound it to be whole and unmoving; therefore all things will be a name that mortals have laid down, trusting them to be true: coming to be and perishing, being and not being, changing place and altering bright colour. But since there is an outermost limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally balanced from the middle in every direction; for it must not be any greater or any smaller in this place or in that. For neither is there what is not, which might stop it from reaching its like, nor is there a way for what is to have more of what is here and less there, since it is all inviolate; for, equal to itself on every side, it meets its limits uniformly. Here I end for you my trustworthy account and thought about truth; from here on learn mortal opinions, listening to the deceptive order of my words. For they made up their minds to name two shapes, one of which they ought not [to name] (in this they have gone astray); and they distinguished them as opposite in body and set signs apart from one another: on one side the ethereal fire of flame, gentle, very [rare,] light, the same as itself in every direction, but not the same as the other; and that other too, by itself, the opposite: unknowing night, a dense and heavy body. This whole arrangement, seeming as it does, I declare to you, so that no judgement of mortals may ever outstrip you.