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Contra Felicianum Arianum De Unitate Trinitatis [Auctore Vigilio Tapsense]

Augustine, Saint

Latin source · English translation · 12,094 words · about 61 min

English only in this reader. References follow the selected source edition. “Whole work” means every line of that edition, including any gaps or fragments. Author attributions may be uncertain.

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head

ONE BOOK AGAINST FELICIANUS THE ARIAN, ON THE UNITY OF THE TRINITY, RESTORED TO VIGILIUS.

Translator’s note for this stretch

Several evident scanning errors corrected silently (e.g. 'rancor' for 'fateor' in 1.3, 'med itemporis' for 'medii temporis' in 1.19, 'ho- 1110' for 'homo' in 1.15, 'cujuslibettri' in 1.17). 1.7: the contrast is between masculine 'eumdem' (the same person) and neuter 'id' (the same thing/substance). 1.21: 'as that man says' is an unidentified quotation (perhaps Cicero). 1.25: the final clause ('ne idipsum non medium tam constet esse quam tertium') is obscure and possibly corrupt; rendering tentative.

1

CHAPTER ONE. – You have wrung from me, dearest son, that, not forgetful of my priestly office, I should write something on the Unity of the Trinity, which is always the perfect and supreme God. When I, aware of my own weakness, kept excusing myself, you demanded it of me in many ways. You asserted that the religious receive an account of the common faith, and that priests ought not to deny it to the faithful. Otherwise the faithful, not receiving it, might begin to be easily deceived by unbelievers; or else, when priests do not grant what is desired, the heavenly treasure might seem not to be spent on the members of Christ, but in some way hidden in the earth as a barren skill. So I confess myself won over by these persuasive reasons, lest I seem to hand people over unarmed to the evils that oppose them, while they are not equipped with the defence of truth against the unbelievers. But in questions of this kind a certain obscurity is often met with in continuous discourse. So it seemed best to me to set down, within the brevity of the present little book, the conversation recently held between me and Felicianus, with the initial letters of the names written beforehand to distinguish the speakers.

2

CHAPTER II. — For when we were sitting together a few days ago, he said: "Among the other things in your disputations that often offend me, I think nothing worse than this: you hand on the precepts of the faith to the uninstructed in such a way that you lay down the law to those you talk with, not from a reasoned understanding of the matters, but rather from a kind of display of testimonies. Everyone knows how boorish this is, not to call it crafty. First, if the one being taught already believes the books, he complies and does not resist; otherwise he must contradict the very testimonies thrust on him as proof, no less than he contradicts you. And so this seems to me the better way of teaching: first the reasoned account of the faith is given without testimonies; then, once [the listener] has been convinced by reason, the path is polished with the Scriptures answering to it. And rightly so: for if the testimonies are proved by this, that they are not without reason, then reason can suffice by itself, since it seems to establish even them only through itself. But if the contrary, who can submit the neck of a rational faith to irrational testimonies, even if they are claimed to be divine? I admit I would tolerate that way of disputing in others, whom the necessity of inexperience, since they cannot stand on their own, forces to take refuge in what belongs to others. But in you I will in no way at all put up with it, because I see that you lack neither eloquence nor knowledge of the faith."

3

Then I said: "Do not think I am so led on by my own praises as to do injury to the saints who went before. Nor will I ever presume on wisdom of speech, lest the cross of Christ be emptied (1 Cor. 1:17. See Bede, as commonly printed, on the same passage.). Content rather with the authority of the Scriptures, I strive to obey simplicity rather than bombast. 'But,' you say, 'one is better taught by reason than by testimonies.' What then? What reason can you bring, if you proclaim the childbearing of a virgin, if you do not deny that sight was restored to the blind, if you show that the buried returned from the dead? If, then, the reason for these things is incomprehensible and yet their truth is evident, in matters of faith it is easier to believe testimonies than to track down reason. But since you distinguish these two not altogether inconsistently, as you do not omit testimonies even after putting reason first, I confess that in this disputation I will follow what you yourself have approved."

4

CHAPTER III.— FELICIANUS: "Then," he said, "since we are at leisure, let us come to the question of your *homousios* [of one substance], which has often been discussed not only between us but also among our forebears. And so that the conversation does not stray too far, take on yourself, as you usually do, the role of the one who puts the questions, and inquire of us, who will in turn give an account of our faith to those who ask."

5

Then I said: "Tell me, is it true, what I hear you say, that the Son is not at all *homousios* with the Father?"

6

FELICIANUS: "It is true. Nor can I be persuaded that what is begotten is the same as what is unbegotten, lest I seem to proclaim the same one as Father who is Son."

7

AUGUSTINE: "That is not so: for it is not even in my mind that the unbegotten is the same one as the begotten, but rather that the unbegotten is the same thing as the begotten."

8

FEL. "And how do you not say that the unbegotten is the same one as the begotten, if you think both are one and not another?"

9

AUG. "I notice that you have not attended at all to the force of the words. For when I say both are one, I do not in any way separate the substance of the true Father and the true Son; and when I do not proclaim the Father to be the same one as the Son, I distinguish the person of each, preserving the property of each. So if you ask about substance, the Trinity itself is one God; if about person, the Son is another."

10

FEL. "And how do you say both that [he is] the same, and that the Son is another?"

11

AUG. "The same," I said, "by communion of substance; another by the property of person."

12

FEL. "I do not know how there is believed to be one substance, when it is not said to be one person."

13

AUG. "It is not one person," I said, "because one is said to have begotten and the other to have been begotten; and yet the substance of the one born and of the one begetting is not different, because [the one born] is taught to have come forth not unlike the one generating."

14

FEL. "I would like you, please, to clarify what you have said with an easier example."

15

AUG. "In incomprehensible matters, examples are not at hand for one disputing; yet as far as can be done, I will not fail you in this respect either. See, then: a human father has a human son. What is common to both is that each is a human being; yet it seems proper to one that he is son, to the other that he is father. For in both the person is distinguished in such a way that their common humanity is not denied: one begets, the other is begotten; but both the one who begot and the one who is begotten are equally called human."

16

CHAPTER IV. — FEL. "I would certainly like you to tell me this: is the begotten separated from the unbegotten by a beginning, or not?"

17

AUG. "Not even this is admitted by the truth of spiritual understanding, that the Father should be separated from the Son by the intervention, I do not say of time, which consists of days and nights, but of an interval of any age whatever."

18

FEL. "If this is so, you are admitting two unbegotten. And how is the one thought to be the person of the Father and the other of the Son, when both seem to be merged through the meaning of a shared 'unbegotten'?"

19

AUG. "In this, indeed, your forebears weave a sophism of no small malice; yet with the help of the Trinity itself it must be undone by catholic simplicity. For I say the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten; and yet I do not therefore fail to proclaim that the begotten is coeternal with the unbegotten. I teach that the Father is unbegotten only in that he did not proceed from another; that the Son is begotten in that he did not come to be from himself. To be born is not common to both; not to beget is not common; and yet it is common that the one is not torn from the other by the intervention of any intervening time. So if you ask what is proper to the Father, it suffices that he alone has no father; if to the Son, it is enough that he has no offspring. But we say the deity of the Father and the Son is one and coeternal."

20

FEL. "As far as I am concerned, I do not see what you are now concluding. For although you contend with me with Aristotelian subtlety, it cannot be that you distinguish him who was begotten from him who begot by no priority of intervening age."

21

AUG. "I know indeed, as that man says, in how difficult a place the discussion stands; yet we have nothing to fear, who through the help of the Holy Spirit bear witness to God. What, then, shall we say? Is there anything in the Father that is denied to be unbegotten, or not? If there is, let him be called unbegotten not wholly but rather in part; otherwise the Son did not begin to exist from a point in time. For if the fatherhood of the Father did not begin, a beginning of the offspring cannot be found. If a beginning of the offspring is asserted, the fatherhood of the Father will not be shown to be eternal. And how will it stand that you teach the Father to be wholly unbegotten, you who think the very name of fatherhood had a beginning, when you say the Son began in time, before whose existence the Father cannot be said to have been called [Father]?"

22

FEL. "I am not so foolish as to put time before the Son; but it is certain that a beginning is assigned to the begotten."

23

AUG. "What then? Do you say there was nothing between the Father and the Son?"

24

FEL. "Exactly so."

25

AUG. "How, then, do you deny that the Son is coeternal with the Father, when you admit there is nothing between the Father and the Son, unless that very 'not-between' were established to be as much a third [thing] [as a middle]?"

26

CHAPTER V. — FEL. "Since you hem me in with the art of disputation, I will briefly set out what was said by our forebears. For whenever the beginning of the Son and the eternity of the Father are discussed, they say: 'There was when he was not, and before he was born he was not.'"

27

AUG. "As far as I can see, the error of wrong belief remains and only the words have changed. For you said: 'There was when he was not.' Do you mean this 'was' to refer to an age, or to the Son? If to an age, that is, as a kind of stretch of eternity before the Son's birth, see: you necessarily slide back into the earlier blasphemy, since you insert a kind of third, time, between the Father and the Son, and say that before the Son there was the Father and time, after these two the Son, after these three the Spirit. And if we admit that the Son could not be begotten without time, see how far-reaching the things we are saying are. For if the Son is not without time, then certainly he must not be said to have been begotten except in a place. Once this is admitted, let place too be called in some way coeval with the Father, before the Son and the Holy Spirit. But if it is so, that the Son could not be born without place and time, in what place or in what time do you say place and time were made? If in none, see: time and place could be made without time and place. If in some, that very thing seems to be time and place, and in its origin likewise place and time are required. But if something could be made so far without time and place that you teach neither that place was made in a place nor time in time, I do not know with what rashness you contend that the Son could not be born without these, who, according to sound faith, is taught to have made both place and time. But enough of this; now let us return to what you proclaim was said by your forebears. 'There was,' you say, 'when he was not.' If you refer this 'was' to time, see: time is before the Son; if to the Son, the Son never was not; for he already was when the Son 'was not', since by him time is said to have been made. 'But before he was born,' you say, 'he was not.' Who, I ask, was not before he was born? If the Son, see: by that very understanding time is said to have existed before the Son. But if there was no time before the Son was born, it follows that the Son must be called coeternal with the Father, between whom and the Father there is said to have been no time; especially since, among other things, as the Evangelists testify, the Son is said to have made time as well. But perhaps someone may think it was said of the Father: 'There was when the Son was not.' The words that follow do not fit with this meaning, where it is said, 'And before he was born he was not': for the Father, always existing of himself, cannot be said even by you to have been born, since he is not taught to have arisen from a beginning; and 'There was when the begotten was not' cannot apply to the Father.

28

FEL. "Since, in my opinion, you weary me not a little with words that contend with unexpected subtlety, I therefore ask that, if it can be done, you show by an example of some thing or other that what you are trying to teach is possible. For I cannot otherwise believe, though overpowered by the force of your speech, that the begotten is coeternal with the Father, unless you say that both are begotten, or that both are father to themselves."

Translator’s note for this stretch

Line 33: 'lice' read as 'et' (or 'hic'); 'nisi ut... fecerit/efficere' construed as 'only in that'. Line 39: 'nisi perpetua gratia fecerit' lacks an object; rendered 'unless perpetual grace prevents it'.

29

AUG. "Since you drive me to examples of incomparable things, let us therefore see what the power of fire is, from which there is always brightness, always heat. Both are born from it, and yet the fire is not on that account found to any extent without either of them. These three do not beget one another, for fire and heat are not begotten from brightness, nor fire and brightness from heat, but brightness and heat are always begotten from fire. Since this is so, do you see that even among creatures something can be born, and yet no time be shown in which that from which it was born could have been found without what was begotten? If, then, we perceive these things by visible examples, why should we not proclaim similar things of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, at least as regards their common and undifferentiated eternity? For it is not therefore necessary that we call the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit equally unbegotten, because we say that none is separated from another by an intervening age: since also among other things certain things are shown to be begotten, and yet not on that account either equally begetting, or existing without one another. But what use is it to gather many of these, when from the testimony of a few one may judge the rest as well?"

30

CHAPTER VI. — FEL. "Since you throw into confusion my view, founded on the authority of the preceding fathers, by a new art of disputation, I would therefore like you to tell me what you think about the nature of the Son of God, that is, about the substance itself. For if, as you are accustomed to say, he is *homousios* with the Father, he is in some way father to himself; otherwise he cannot be consubstantial with his begetter. For one of our people used to mock the opinion of the *homousios* thus, saying: 'If the Son was brought forth not from outside, but from that very same [being], the one has in some way been divided into two, since the begetter is said to be nothing other than the begotten.'"

31

AUG. "While you say that we contend by Aristotelian art, you yourself seem to have fled to the snares of the dialecticians. But these things can in no way frighten us, who trust in the truth of the faith. What then? You say, I suppose, that the Son could not have been born from the substance of the Father, lest we seem to divide the unbegotten Father by the generation of the Son. If that is so, he is wrongly believed to be the Son, who is proclaimed not as begotten from the Father, that is, not from that very same [being], but as made from outside among other things. So that this may be easier to understand, I will explain it as best I can. Of sons, some are adopted, others natural. Those who are begotten are sons from the beginning, always and properly; the others are at first strangers, afterwards sons, when they are taken into the family by adoption. To which, then, is the Son of God to be compared? If to the adopted, he will be like us in the Father's sight; if to the proper sons, he must be said to have come into being from the substance of the begetter. 'But the paternal substance is divided into two,' you say, 'if the Son is begotten substantially from the Father alone.' How foolish this is, even visible things themselves teach us. For who, even among fleshly fathers, was ever divided by begetting? But if this division does not happen even within the condition of the body—for no one has begotten a son in such a way as to lose half of himself—do you say that the Son could not have been born with the Father's integrity kept intact? But why say more? To those who search into the birth and origin of the Son of God these [possibilities], unless I am mistaken, present themselves: that is, that he is either from the Father, or from nothing, or from another, or from himself. Let us see, I ask, what follows from these. If from himself, he is not rightly called a son, who is proclaimed not born but unbegotten; if from nothing, he is shown to be a creature with the rest, not the author of creation; if from another, he is proclaimed the son not of him in whom we believe, but of some unknown father or other. But if beyond these four no fifth can be found, and of these, three can by no means be proclaimed because of their evident blasphemy, it remains that he was begotten substantially from the Father: because, as we said, neither can a fifth be found, nor can any manner be taught among these except the first; seeing that he is called neither a creature, nor the son of another father, nor unbegotten like the Father."

32

FEL. "As if I had proclaimed either a fifth beyond these, or any of those three: I who say that the Son came to exist not from the substance of the Father, yet in such a way that I do not deny that he was begotten by his will."

33

AUG. "By the very logic of it you are thrust into one of the aforesaid. For when we inquire about the substance of the Son, whom you do not confess to have been begotten substantially from the Father, without doubt you contend that he was made from nothing, among other things: since we say that even corruptible creatures came to exist only in that God both willed them through his ineffable dispensation and was able to bring them about through his singular power; for we know both that there was a will by which it pleased God, and a power by which [all] possibility is subject to the Lord."

34

FEL. "So the Father's power is not sufficient for the existence of the Son?"

35

AUG. "As if I were arguing about the Father's power, and not about the truth of fatherhood itself! Or did he prefer to be called Father by one whom he willed to be like not himself but creatures? And therefore you must confess that the Son came to exist from the substance of the Father, if he is both born and God; or else deny him alike to be Son and God, if he was created not from the paternal substance but from none, solely by the working of the Father's will and power, as also in other creatures."

36

CHAPTER VII. — FEL. "Since you compel me by necessity to a confession of this kind, I will not keep silent about what our forebears are accustomed to say. For they say that the Son is a creature, but a perfect one, and one that can rule over all creatures."

37

AUG. "I am glad indeed that you have betrayed by open confession the inmost poison of irreligious preaching: yet you set forth nothing that seems worthy of belief. For a creature is the substance of any corruptible thing whatever, brought about through the will of almighty God out of what does not yet exist, or once did not exist, so far as it is in itself. Let us see whether this definition applies to the Son of God. For the Son, in that he is, was brought forth in the truth of an undifferentiated nature; he who was born not unlike from him who is, that is, from the begetter. And therefore, unless I am mistaken, this is the first distinction between the Son and a creature: that he is begotten substantially from the Father; a creature is brought to completion not from the substance of the maker, but from his will and power alone. The latter is corruptible by nature, unless it has been preserved by grace; he is incorruptible, who by being born is seen to have an incorruptible substance from an incorruptible Father. The Son is in all things like the Father; the creature unlike its maker. He [passed] not from what is not into what is, and therefore never from what is into what is not; it [passed] from what is not into what is, and therefore, as far as it is concerned, returns by the condition of its origin from what is into what is not."

38

FEL. "I do not see what you are wrapping up in the secrecy of this obscurity; and so you will do well if you explain more intelligibly what, in my opinion, you have said incomprehensibly."

39

AUG. "I said, I tell you, of the Son, when I distinguished him from the definition of a creature, that he [passed] not from what is not into what is: which is as if I said, he was not made from nothing. And therefore never from what is into what is not; that is, he is never to be dissolved into nothing, from that very thing which he is, by the property of his nature. But a creature [passes] from what is not into what is: by which it is shown that it was brought forth from nothing. And therefore, as far as it is concerned, [it passes] from what is into what is not; that is, it is to be turned into nothing by the quality of its nature, unless perpetual grace prevents it. Therefore the Son, who is taught to be substantially everlasting, will never not be; and on this account, as by his own [property], he is rightly recognised as to be separated from the condition of all creatures, which were made through him."

40

CHAPTER VIII. — FEL. "Although you dazzle my understanding with a new subtlety of things, I still do not know on what grounds you say that the Son is coeternal with the Father: since both by the common manner of speaking and by the law of nature the begetter seems to be prior to the begotten."

41

AUG. "If we judge the author of nature by the laws of creatures when we declare that the Father is earlier than the Son, why do we not say, by the same law of nature, that the Son becomes stronger than the Father with the passing of time? For the one does not lack growth as he is born, and old age brings the injury of weakness upon the Father. But if reason itself does not accept this, let us set aside in God the law of bodily understanding, so that we do not call the maker like his works: especially since from what is evident among us we can also show what is hidden. For just as a mother, without precedent, bore her own author, so the Father must be believed to have begotten, in a way that cannot be told, one coeternal [with himself]. From a mother was born one who already existed before; from the Father, one who was at no time lacking. Let faith believe this, and let understanding not inquire into it, lest it either think a thing incredible because it has not found it, or, having found it, refuse to believe it is unique. For see: Christ was born of a mother, and yet his mother's chastity was not diminished by contact with a man. A virgin gave birth because a virgin conceived; and, without the order of things being kept, Christ took an intact body from the intact body of his mother. If, then, he is taught to have been born from a body according to the flesh in a new manner, without any precedent, what wonder is it if he did not proceed from the Father according to the custom of human birth? The Son, begotten of her alone, did not diminish his mother's substance, and we know that the body of the son was born without harm to the body of the one giving birth: and is the incorporeal Father believed to have diminished his substance when [the Son], brought forth substantially and incorporeally from that same [Father], is said to be begotten? Therefore, if we weigh the nature of things with understanding as our guide, let us grant [him] a beginning, if we do not deny [him] an end. Otherwise, let us say that the Son has no beginning precisely because we confess him to be everlasting not by grace but by nature. In sum, greater and lesser can be said in three ways: that is, in age, in form, in power. In age, as an old man [is greater] than a boy; in form, as a tall man than a short one; in power, as a strong man than a weak one. Let us see whether any of these applies to the Son. For he is not lesser in age, since it is agreed that he existed as a beginning from the Father, the beginning; nor in form, since it is not right to proclaim him anything other than God; nor in power, since we know that the whole [universe] was brought to completion by him."

Translator’s note for this stretch

Line 44 ends in a corrupt reading ('per. ,''niL.'); it is rendered as 'perveniret' (would reach), which the sense requires. In line 47, 'actus in profundo non mersit' is obscure. It is rendered 'moving upon the deep, did not sink', referring to the walking on the water. 'Spuii' is read as 'sputa' (spittings). 'UDO' is read as 'uno'. 'Monas' (monad) is kept as in the text.

42

CHAPTER IX. — FEL. "I want to know how the Father's dignity passed over to the Son, and yet the offspring's lowliness does not flow back to the Father."

43

AUG. "Examples from everyday things teach us that these [sufferings] are not now said [of him] according to [the common] nature. For see: let us imagine some king, and a king's son who has laid aside the insignia of royal majesty, takes up the clothing of a subject soldier, and, for the sake of a fixed plan of his father and the safety of his companions, endures the insults of rebels. Because it is certain that a share in royal power passes down to him by birth, is it therefore certain that the injury done to the son reaches the one who begot him, not through a feeling of sympathy, but by the very property of the suffering? It is not so, because it is certain that the father was not born from the son, but the son from the father. And therefore we say that everything which belongs to the communion of nature is alike between them; but that is proper [to one] which is recognised to have befallen one person by accident. So the Son, by being born, has in common with the Father all that the Father is; but the Father does not have in common with the Son whatever [the Son] himself has specially suffered. That a man was born of a man is not common to both; rather it is a special accident, which, as a rule, without prejudice to the common nature, neither is taught to have in the other. The father's substance is one, his person one. When this [person] begot, the one who came into existence from it is without doubt recognised as not different but another; [a person] which is taught to be nothing other than the first, since it is taught to be both common and proper: common, I say, by the unity of substance; proper, by the distinctness of person. Since, then, the one that was born exists in itself, whatever befalls it does not necessarily pass over to the begetter, in the way that whatever is agreed to be proper and substantial to the begetter reaches the one born. For the care, sickness, poverty, death and lowliness of the offspring are not referred back to the Father in the way that the Father's divinity was conferred on the Son by the generation itself. This does not happen because, although [the Son] was begotten like [him] from one substance, that is, the Father's, yet since it now exists in itself, whatever is brought upon it from outside is called not common but proper. If, then, this is the condition of the human race, that the substance of sons is never changed so far into something else from the one who begot them that it cannot be the same, though another; while, though many things happen to the son from outside, the nature nonetheless remains common: what is it fitting for us to believe about God and his Son? What is it proper to proclaim? Although their nature is not unlike according to the simple glory of undivided majesty, yet a body was specially assumed by the Son, so that he who could suffer nothing in the divinity of the common substance might be humbled in the weakness of our flesh. A man, the son of a man, does not assume another nature, and although he suffers in the same [nature] which is common with his father, he still does not pass the injury on to his father: and is God the Father believed to have been passibly humbled in the Son, when [the Son] is believed to have endured the faithlessness of the Jews not in that same [nature] which is common to both, but rather in ours, which he alone took up? In sum, what, I ask, was it that hung on the cross? What is it that the spear is said to have wounded? Passible flesh, or the substance of the deity? If you, a profane preacher of the incorporeal, take [it to be] the majesty, you are seen to believe in a corruptible God; if passible flesh, this is not common with the Father, so that through it that cross could touch him."

44

CHAPTER X. — FEL. "While you sweep away like a torrent everything we have said, you are plainly preaching two christs, not one. And not without reason; for if the divinity suffered nothing at all in him, Christ according to the man was another; otherwise, through the affection of the common deity, the suffering itself would reach even to the Father."

45

AUG. "It is not so; for I neither confuse nor divide our Saviour. I do not confuse, lest I proclaim either incorporeal and imaginary flesh, or a carnal and mortal deity; I do not separate, lest I seem to introduce one offspring of God the Father according to the flesh and another according to majesty: because the same Son of God both proceeded from the Father without beginning and deigned to be born in time of a virgin. Impassible in what is his, he suffered in what is ours, when he deigned, from the womb, to clothe his incomprehensible majesty as if in a garment of flesh. The Mediator's person is one, not his substance one: one person, I say, lest Christ be not one; not one substance, lest, with the Mediator's dispensation removed, he be called the son either of God alone or of man alone. So I do not, in Christ, extend the assumed flesh by the everlastingness of the divine generation, nor do I confine the immeasurable deity within the age of a bodily birth: because the same one who in divinity is the author of things is in the flesh the redeemer of men; the same one who is impassible in himself suffered in the body; since, born truly like each begetter, he so expressed the property of each nature that it is agreed both that he took true flesh from his mother and that he has an undifferentiated deity from the Father. With these joined into one person by the incomprehensible dispensation of the Mediator, he kept for each what is proper to it, but joined what is another's to what is proper: he kept what is proper, in that he did not lose the immensity of the deity and did not reject the weakness of the flesh; he joined what is another's to what is proper, in that the same and inseparable Christ is both killed by the property of the flesh and, by the property of the deity, is not held among the dead below. By the property of the flesh, Life tasted death; by the property of the deity, he rendered the flesh everlasting. It is therefore not rightly said, 'The Father suffered in the Son,' since the Son suffered in the flesh which he does not have in common with the Father. So the flesh was glorified by majesty, while majesty is taught to have been humbled in the flesh. But we are bound to proclaim both, not of two christs, as you think, but of one and the very same, whom we know, after the virgin's childbirth, as God and man."

46

CHAPTER XI. — FEL. "If, then, Christ was born of a virgin, how is he said to be coeternal with God the Father?"

47

AUG. "On this we have, indeed, a different dispute against others as well; and therefore, lest the explanation of the truth be more difficult, we shall first set out the cause of the error. For, starting from one source of bad belief, they split, as it were, into two ravings of dissimilar understanding. For it is common to both to proclaim one birth of Christ, not two. But some accept, by the definition of their own dogma, that principal [birth] by which God was born of God before all things; others accept only this [birth] by which he proceeded as man from the virgin; and these, by the consequence of the badly sown seed, have fallen into a pit of like blasphemy. For see: those who do not believe that he was born of the virgin overturn, as if by a kind of blindness of Jewish unbelief, all faith in the Gospels, all benefit of Baptism, all the preaching of the Apostles, and in sum all the authority of the New Testament. And therefore they must not be thought to have known even the majesty of the Son of God, since they have rejected the mystery of the Mediator, by which the Father willed him to become known to the nations. But those who contend that he was born not of the Father before every beginning, but in time by the virgin's childbirth, have not learned [that he is] the Creator of all things, the Lord equal to the Father in omnipotence and majesty. For how will he be thought to have made all things, when it is certain that everything existed before his birth? Or how is divinity to be professed of him, when individual things were made before he was yet born? Or how is his divinity believed to be everlasting, when it is proclaimed to have come about not always, like the Father's, but in time? These too, then, in a way deny the mystery of the Mediator, by the necessity of what follows; because they do not proclaim Christ as born God and man, from eternity and from time, from power and from weakness, the Son like the Father, from the Father before all things, and from his mother among all things the true, not imaginary, son of man, in plain fact, not by semblance. Hence they must not be thought to know God even in the flesh, since they do not think he was begotten of the Father before the assumption of the flesh. You see, then, how between these, though the middle steps differ, the beginning and the end of the error are taught to be the same. We, on the contrary, so defend both births that we do not remove either by affirming the other: for we neither condemn the temporal birth by the everlastingness of the first, nor confine the eternal one within the brevity of this temporal one; knowing the inseparable offspring of the true God, and afterwards the most true flesh of this true offspring; not confessing that Christ's divinity began when the virgin conceived, nor that the flesh began when, by a birth that cannot be told, that monad, without the interval of any intervening time, begot a monad differing in nothing, except that it is taught to be a monad. His omnipotent majesty did not shrink from the voluntary weakness of Christ, nor did bodily weakness extinguish his omnipotence. I know that the divinity of the Son of God descended to the dead below by the property of the flesh; I know that the flesh ascended to heaven by the merit of the deity. It is not proper to God that he felt hunger; but it is proper to God that he satisfied so many thousands of men with a few loaves. It is not proper to the flesh that he walked dry-footed over the roaring waves; but it is proper to the flesh that he endured spittings, blows and scourges. Yet it is one and the same Christ who both bore insults so many times and, moving upon the deep, did not sink. On this account, in the Mediator of God and men, we confess that the deity was affected by the injury of the assumed body, just as we know that the flesh was glorified by the majesty of the deity. Therefore Christ died, who also rose again: yet he did not accomplish both from one [nature], but each from each, being himself perfect in both, while one and inseparable he accomplished things so different: with one he tasted death, with the other he raised the dead; and so, as true Mediator of both, he showed himself God and man, with neither a doubled person nor a confused substance. The Son of God entered the virgin's womb so that he, already begotten before, might be born again; he took up the whole man, he who already had from the Father the fullest deity. Not unlike his begetter, since he was born everlasting from the eternal; not unlike man, since he is born of a mother to die. Yet the same one is both eternal in what is his and destined to die in what is ours, since he holds both from himself and loses neither through the other. And so Christ was born from God and man not imperfect, but most full in diverse properties, just as each human being is taught to be complete from soul and body. The body is not one man and the mind another; although the mind is one thing and the body another, yet one and the same man is taught to be both body and mind. Again, body and mind are not one and the same thing, because from both one man is made. For these neither confuse the substance in the unity of the person, nor double the person by the diversity of substance, since one man is recognised to have come into being from them. They do not lose what is proper to them; but because they have come together into one inseparable [whole], things common seem to be made out of things proper. The mind in the body is affected by the body's pains, the body is wearied by the mind's thoughts: and yet one of these is proper to the body, the other to the mind; but when it befalls one man, it seems common both to the body and to the mind. So, after the virgin's childbirth, there was not one son of God and another of man, but the same Christ was the son of God and of man. And just as in one man the mind is one thing and the body another, so in the Mediator of God and men the Son of God was one thing and the son of man another; yet from both there was one Christ the Lord. Another thing, I say, by the distinction of substance; not another one, by the unity of person."

48

CHAPTER XII. — FEL. "In what went before you had indeed compelled me to believe in Christ's birth from his mother without loss to his eternity. But things wrung from us against reason by force of speech cannot stay with us for long. So when I look back with anxious attention at my own proposition, I do not yet seem to have found in what you have said what I am looking for. For I do not know how you teach that he was born in time, when you say that he was already coeternal with the Father. To be born is a kind of motion of a thing that does not exist before it is born, bringing it about by the benefit of birth that it should exist. From this it follows that Christ, who already was, could not be born; and if he could be born, he did not already exist."

Translator’s note for this stretch

Line 49: 'si originem animantis potentia! requiramus' is read as 'potentiae' (the animating power). Line 51: 'Aut intelligere causam putandus ea anima' is read as 'putandus est animae' ('to understand the soul's case'); 'insipientissimam' is rendered as given ('the more foolish'), though the sense of the comparison is somewhat strained. 'Prob dolor' is read as 'Proh dolor'.

49

AUG. "By a novel curiosity in questioning you drive us to inquire into incomprehensible things, and so what you ask can be explained only by some outlines of examples. Allow me, then, to put forward as if it were affirmed a matter that belongs to another question. Since I now bring it forward not as my own belief but to show something else, do not conclude that in it I am setting out what I believe; rather, suppose that I believe it for the present, so that you may more easily understand what I shall say. Let us imagine, then, as many hold, that there is in the world a universal soul, which by an ineffable motion gives life to all seeds in such a way that it is not compounded with the things begotten, but itself supplies life to the things that are to be begotten. Now when this soul has come into the passible womb to form matter for its own uses, it makes one person with itself of that thing which it is agreed does not have the same substance; and as the soul acts and the matter undergoes, one man comes to be from two substances, while the soul is taught to be one thing and the flesh another. And so we acknowledge that the soul is born from the womb, the soul which we say, on coming to the womb, conferred life on what was conceived. It is said, I say, to be born from the mother because from her it fitted a body to itself in which it could be born, not because before it was born it did not exist at all, as far as it itself is concerned. And here, if you attend to the force of the words as an observer of everyday speech, we are setting out contraries and proclaiming things that fight against each other, yet what we say in them is agreed to be true. We know that the soul is born with the body from the mother's womb; but we also see the soul proclaimed as prior to the mother. In the son the mother begets a soul; and yet in the mother herself too nothing lives but the soul, without which she who begot could not herself exist. So if we seek the origin of the animating power, it is prior to the mother, and yet again it seems to be born from her together with the offspring: prior, I say, is the soul, through which the mother was animated; prior is the mother, through whom the soul too is seen to be born in the son. But the mother did not turn the soul into flesh, nor change the flesh into soul; rather, the one Creator of flesh and soul and of the whole man brought forth animated flesh from the mother's womb. Through the dispensation of a proportion that joins diverse things in one and the same man, he both joined each to the other in an indissoluble unity and confused neither by sharing in the other. So, then, and indeed far more incomprehensibly and sublimely, the Son of God was born from his mother by taking up a perfect man, he who by his singular omnipotence is for all begotten things not only the capacity but also the cause of being born. According to the man, I say, God was born of a virgin, in the way in which the mind is taught to be born with the body: not because the two are one substance, but because from the two comes one person; the body is not one man and the mind another, but body and mind are one man. So, after the virgin's childbirth, there was not one son of God and another son of man, but the same Christ was the son of God and of man. And just as in one man the body is one thing and the mind another, so in the one Mediator the son of God is one thing and the son of man another; yet the son of God is the same one and not another than the son of man, although he is son of God by reason of one thing and son of man by reason of another. We do not say that the Son of God began from the beginning of the flesh, lest anyone believe the deity temporal; we do not acknowledge the flesh of the Son of God as eternal, lest we think that he took up not the reality of a human body but some image. For the reality of the flesh does not consume the majesty of the Son of God, nor does the immensity of the deity consume the reality of the flesh, while the one shines out by his own powers and the other is shown in our weaknesses. But the one inseparable Christ is both humbled in what he assumed and glorified in what is his own, since he does not disdain to be subjected to injuries, and he keeps his equality with the one who begot him. Mary therefore both bore and did not bear the Son of God: she bore him when Christ was born from her according to the flesh; she did not bear him when the Son came forth from the Father without beginning. She bore him when from her the Word came forth as flesh, to dwell among us (John 1:14); she did not bear him when in the beginning was God the Word, who gave origin to all things. Do not, then, fix the origin of God the Word by the virgin's childbirth; do not call the body begotten of the virgin coeternal with the deity. For the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. 2:5), is by his first birth coeternal with the Father, by his second a sharer in our time; in the former he is the author of time, in the latter a sharer in an age of life."

50

CHAPTER XIII. — FEL. "Since you have treated the mystery of the Mediator with clear reasoning, and sufficiently for anyone to believe, I therefore ask that you have it explained to me what we should also think about the soul of Christ. For it has always been handed down by our forebears that the very presence of the Son of God animated Christ's body in place of an ordinary soul, and that it did not need the addition of a living spirit, since the fountain of life dwelling in it could confer on it the fact that it lived."

51

AUG. "We could indeed teach from the testimonies of the divine books what is laid down on this question by the definition of catholic authority. But since we have now decided to discuss everything not by the evidence of books but by reason alone, we will reserve the records of the Scriptures for another time, and treat the inquiry into the soul just as was done above. So that this may be done more easily, let us briefly inquire, setting down only one reading from the Apostle, what was the reason for our Saviour's taking up a man; once this is found, we shall pass without any difficulty to the things that follow from it. From the beginning, then, God made man of body and soul. He transgressed the precepts of the law, and after laying hold of the forbidden tree he received what was in a way a sentence of capital punishment. He could return to the state from which he fell only when restored by the grace of his maker, by a kind of right of *postliminium* [the right of a returning captive to recover his former status]: just as someone who of his own will has thrown himself headlong from a height had in his own power what he did, but it is certain that his falling is no longer subject to his own choice. So he who fell by his own fault rises by another's kindness. Yet he is not to be said not to have fallen by his own [fault] because he is known to rise by another's [kindness]; nor to have risen by his own because it is certain that he fell not by another's. But of this elsewhere; now let us return to our subject. The venerable Paul, then, says that Christ was born according to the flesh for this reason: that as through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, and so it passed through to all men, in whom all sinned. And a little later: But not as the offence, so also the grace. For if by the offence of one many died, much more has the grace of God and the gift in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ abounded to many. And not as through one sin, so also the gift. For judgement [was] from one to condemnation, but grace from many offences to justification. For if by the offence of one death reigned through one, much more shall we, receiving the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness, reign in life through the one Jesus Christ. Therefore, as through the offence of one [it came] upon all men to condemnation, so also through the righteousness of one upon all men to justification of life. For as through the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many are made righteous (Rom. 5:12, 15–19). Christ, then, came to save what had perished (Luke 19:10). Let us first see, then, what it is that perished through the transgression of the first-formed man, and from this we shall easily be able to know what the Lord could save by coming. We must therefore ask who received the Creator's law: for he without doubt sinned who despised the precepts, and he despised the precepts who committed what was forbidden. Now Scripture says: The Lord commanded Adam, saying, Of every tree that is in paradise you shall eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat of it; on the day you eat, you shall die the death (Gen. 2:16). Let us ask now, then, whether the whole man received this law. For if, as is contained in the book of Genesis, he received it when already complete in body and soul, then the whole man sinned by transgressing; and if the whole man sinned by transgressing, the whole man then perished by the fault of his sin. But if the whole man perished, the whole man needed the Saviour's kindness; and if the whole man needed the Saviour's kindness, Christ by coming saved the whole man; and if by coming he saved the whole man, he took up not a body without a soul, but body and soul, of which the whole man consists, and by which he is seen to have sinned before. For if, when the whole man sinned, Christ took up only his flesh, then the soul has remained even now bound over to the penalty of that first transgression without any hope. If that is so, I do not know what the person of the Mediator has conferred on us, if it did not redeem the better part of us entirely, but took up flesh, brute in itself, which without a soul could not even perceive his kindness. I should like, however, to ask preachers of this kind why the dispensation of the Mediator took flesh and left out the soul: unless perhaps either, knowing it to be innocent, it did not believe it needed medicine; or, thinking it foreign to itself, it did not grant it the kindness of redemption; or, judging it wholly incurable, it could not heal it; or it cast it aside as worthless and seemingly fit for no use. Two of these are the folly of a blasphemous spirit's unbelief against the very Creator of the whole man: for by the first they have believed him powerless, by the second not the God of all. For how is he shown to be almighty, if he could not heal the soul in its desperate state? Or how is he the God of all, if he himself did not make our soul? By the other two, in the one the soul's case is not understood, in the other its worth is not measured. Or is he to be thought to understand the soul's case who strives to separate it from the sin of voluntary transgression, when it was equipped with the faculty of implanted reason to receive the law? Or how does he know its nobility who says it was despised for the fault of ignobility, with the flesh preferred to it, which is agreed to have been formed not by the breath of God, like the soul, but from the mud of the earth? But if none of these things is rightly thought of the soul, let us believe that our Redeemer took up the whole man, lest the everlasting kindness should seem in some way to fall short for our soul. Oh, the pity of it! 'Christ,' he says, 'took up only flesh; he did not seek the soul.' Here, if as an observer who knows things you attend to the origin of each, the substance of the soul is the more precious; if you attend to the guilt of the transgression, its case is the worse because of its understanding. But I know Christ to be perfect in wisdom and I do not doubt that he is most loving: by the first of these he did not despise the better [part], the one capable of prudence; by the second he took up the one that had been more wounded. For it neither befits wisdom, of two things equally its own, to love the more foolish more, nor befits perfect love not to have helped the one in greater need."

52

CHAPTER XIV. — FEL. "I confess that I have understood, and I do not deny that I have approved, everything you have said in what precedes, which was said not only reasonably but also truthfully. But I do not know in what way the divinity of Christ is said to have felt death. On this I do not know whether you said something obscurely, or whether, through slowness of mind, I could not follow what was sufficiently said. For I would not dare to believe that that fountain of life, from which all things have the fact that they live, during the three days in which the body lay in the tomb, fell so far from the property of its own nature that, if it is right to say so, with its senses buried it lost all movement of living substance, and for the redemption of the human race abandoned not only the Father but also all the adornments of spiritual glory."

Translator’s note for this stretch

The speaker label 'Alc.' in line 53 is taken as a misreading of 'Aug.' (Augustine as interlocutor). In line 53 'nun hoc credimus meruisse' is read as 'non hoc'; the sense is uncertain and the text may be corrupt. 'permitkb t' is read as 'permitteret'. In line 54 the reference 'Luc. XXIII, 45' is given as printed; the verse is Luke 23:43.

53

AUG. "Far, far from the faithful be that suspicion, that Christ felt our death in such a way that, as far as lay in him, life lost life. For if this were so, how could we say that anything was able to live in those three days, if we believe that the fountain of life had lost [it]? The divinity of Christ therefore felt death by sharing in the human condition which it had taken up of its own will; it did not lose the power of its nature, by which it gives life to all things. Thus in the tomb it did not abandon its flesh by dying with it, just as in the virgin's womb it formed it by being born with it. And so in both cases the Lord willed both to be born and to die, not compelled by another but of his own will, so that it is agreed that he endured what he himself did: not therefore not suffering because he himself was doing it, nor therefore not doing it because no one else was enduring it. For if you consider the mystery of the Lord's incarnation, with the co-operation of the indivisible Trinity preserved, he is in this humility both author and work for himself: the same is author, since he is born of his own will and suffers of his own will; the same is work, since, though no other compels him, he alone nevertheless undergoes both. He made flesh in his mother's womb: you have the author of the work. He himself deigned to be born in it: you have the work of the author. Yet there is one person, with the property of each substance preserved, both of author and of work. Thus, then, he died without life departing, just as he suffered without power perishing. 'No one takes his soul from him, because he has power to lay it down, and power to take it up': here too you have the author of the work. 'He lays down his soul for his friends' (John 10:18, 17): you have the work of the author. To conclude this with a general definition: whenever Christ suffers anything in the flesh, it is the work of the author; but since he undergoes this very thing by his own power, no other compelling him, he himself is the author of the work. So the divinity did not come to Mary by movement from place to place, but by the ineffable manifestation of its power it both filled the mother's womb, to be begotten [there], and did not deprive the whole of the fullness of its substance. It did not leave the Father when it came to the virgin, being everywhere whole, everywhere perfect, since the simplicity of what is incorporeal admits no division, and fullness does not know the name of part. He was therefore, at one and the same time, wholly in the underworld too and wholly in heaven: there suffering the injury of the flesh, here not leaving the glory of the deity. He was among those below as the resurrection of the dead; he was above the heavens as the life of the living. Truly dead, truly alive: in him the taking up of mortality received death, and the divinity, preserved, did not lose life. Whenever, then, you consider these things which were humbly endured by Christ, recognize him as the author of a voluntary passion. So it will come about that, while humility is ascribed to the one suffering and power to the one acting, the same Christ is shown at one and the same time to be weak when he suffers and almighty when he acts. But so that you may not believe that we still admit some insensibility in the death of the Son of God, it is not out of place to investigate what is to be thought about death. In it, without doubt, our life abandoned the body but did not perish; for the soul in departing does not lose its own force, but lets go what it had given life to, and, as far as lies in it, it causes the other's death but does not itself receive it. It causes it, I say, by not giving life to what it leaves, not by losing the fact that it lives. And so the death of a man is nothing other than the setting of the flesh: when the force of the life-giving power has withdrawn from it, it returns to the earth from which it was taken, having lost the senses which it did not have of itself. 'But,' you say, 'death is the contrary of life.' I grant it; but not of that kind of contraries which destroy each other by the opposition of an existing substance, but rather of those which, when they befall anything, cannot indeed exist together, but are produced by the possession and the privation of one substance only. As, for example, we explain night and day: for these too are explained to be contraries of the same kind, since there appears to be a substance not of both, but of one only. For see, we say it is day when the sun is above the earth; and the sun is agreed to be a substance. When, the course of daytime completed, it has withdrawn from the view of human sight, by departing it soon makes night. It makes it, I say, by withdrawing the abundance of light, not by receiving into itself a substance of night. And so the one substance of light is seen to make both night and day, but not in one way: for it makes day when it comes, night when it withdraws. Hence we often confound the division of the Manichees, not only irreligious but also foolish, by which they try to separate good things from evil as from equally existing substances: showing them the greater light, by which we know day comes to be, and pressing them likewise to show us what would be, if one may say it, the greater darkness, by which we might believe night too comes to be substantially. But more on these elsewhere, who through the folly of their blasphemous doctrine seem to assert non-existing things in place of existing ones, consequences in place of principles, or common things in place of contraries. If anyone not deprived of the eyes of faith examines these, he confounds all their contrivances by easy reasoning. So, as we had begun to say, the soul, no differently from the sun, gives life to the flesh when it has come, and causes death when it withdraws. And lest anyone think it is consumed by the death of the body, let him hear what the Lord defines on this in the Gospels with general authority: 'Do not fear,' he says, 'those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him who can kill both soul and body in the gehenna of fire' (Matt. 10:28). It is agreed, then, that the body is killed while the soul survives, and therefore it does not necessarily follow that souls are consumed by the slaughter of bodies. If this is so, even after the death of the body there is life nonetheless in minds. And if this is rightly thought of each one of us, how is the fountain of life alleged to have lost its power of giving life because of sharing in human death? 'But,' you say, 'both soul and body can be killed in the gehenna of fire.' This does not tell against us, first, because that death appears to belong not to [our] condition but to crime: for, guilt removed, we are told not to fear men, who, though they can [kill] the body, are said to be unable to kill the soul. Next, because this is said to be possible for God alone, concerning whom we believe that his only-begotten Son, by communion of nature and equality of power, did not deserve this. The Saviour therefore took up the condition of our death, but not so as to make it worse by allowing it, beyond custom, to dominate the soul; but rather so as to prove that it does no harm to the soul, equally, of all the just, and to life."

54

CHAPTER XV. — "But let us suppose, though the Gospels protest, that souls perish: is there not nevertheless in our Saviour, though he did not repel death from these, a third and special [element], the majesty, which human death could not touch? To sum up, let us see: placed on the cross, what did he promise? 'Today,' he says, 'you will be with me in paradise' (Luke 23:45). 'Today,' he says, not after three days, when I shall have raised my flesh from the rest of the tomb; not when I shall have shown in myself the firstfruits of the future resurrection. Of what majesty do we think this voice is? Of mind or of body? But no one is unaware that the body was in the tomb: it remains that this voice belongs to the divinity or to the mind. But someone says: 'We believe this is the voice of the divinity, not of the soul of Christ.' And what do we take [to be meant] in the one to whom it was promised? 'Today,' he says to the thief, 'you will be with me in paradise'; yet common death shut in his body until the future resurrection. It is the soul, therefore, to which the Lord promised and granted this. If, then, when the body has died, the soul is at once called to paradise, do we believe anyone still so impious as to dare to say that the soul of our Saviour was consigned to custody among those below during those three days of bodily death? 'And who else,' you say, 'is it that groaned as Christ did when the passion was at hand, saying, "My soul is sorrowful even unto death" (Matt. 26:38)?' Sorrowful unto death, because of the condition of the flesh he took up; not after death, when fellowship with the deity pledges blessedness. This death is not the beginning of grief but its end: the scourges of the just do not begin after it but cease, since they lay aside the hindrances of unstable matter, and now grasp their author in the contemplation of fuller understanding."

55

CHAPTER XVI. — "So," you say, "the Son of God neither endured death in his soul nor felt it in his majesty? What then were you saying it was that he endured?" He certainly felt and endured [it]; but by sharing in another's affliction, not as a wound properly his own. He felt [it] as all feel it who, while the flesh dies, live in their minds; not as the impious, who, as the same [Lord] says, are killed in both by the fires of gehenna. Some indeed also define common death in this way, saying that it is nothing other than when, among the different things whose agreement makes life, a disagreement has arisen between them, as if through a kind of separation. If this is the death of a man, which does not consume what is joined but divides it, while it restores each part to its own origin, what shall we now say of the Saviour's soul? Not to mention the indwelling divinity and his singular righteousness, surely, by the common lot of dying, it could leave the body during those three days in such a way that it could not itself perish utterly.

Translator’s note for this stretch

XVI: 'participatione morbi alicui' is evidently corrupt; rendered as if 'alieni' (another's affliction); possibly 'mortis alienae' was intended. Other scanning errors silently corrected (e.g. 'deliniunt' = definiunt, 'nus' = nos, 'parens' = patens, 'Aiolo' = homo, 'pennam injustiae' = poenam injustitiae, 'vitu' = vim, 'zizamis' = zizaniis).

56

CHAPTER XVII. — "Then," you say, "neither the soul nor the divinity of Christ was among those below." It was, I say: nor do I see how he could otherwise have raised his own flesh, if I were to declare that the power of God was not among those below, as though he were absent. Yet let no one therefore think that we proclaim a local presence of God, when we say these things of him because of the manifestation of a particular work, [namely] that he who was nowhere lacking was somewhere. As to the flesh he lay dead in the tomb; he was raising the dead in the underworld; he was giving life to all things in heaven. He did not leave the world when he ascended to the heavens, nor desert heaven when he came to earth, but at one and the same time he, whole, filled the whole; and if somewhere he was more evident by the manifestation of his works, he denied the unworthy recognition of his presence, but did not bring about the absence of his boundless deity.

57

CHAPTER XVIII. — Do you wish to know what I think about this death of the Mediator? Of all the things I have scattered in the preceding pages under the pressure of the questions arising, this is altogether the conclusion: I believe that the Son of God died, not according to the penalty of unrighteousness, which he did not have at all, but according to the law of nature, which he took up for the redemption of the human race; by that death of which it is said, "Who is the man who will live and not see death?" (Ps. 88:49), not by that of which Isaiah says, "But the dead will not see life" (Isa. 66). [He died] by that death which by nature is common to all, not that which is particular to the wicked. Let us suppose, then, that there is in this in a certain way the force and power of a seed, by which he both restores souls by his soul and, as judgement draws near, raises up the flesh of all of us by his flesh: while, giving life to all things through the working of his own deity, from the single grain of the man he took up he is to render to the Father a countless harvest. Then he will separate the crop from the tares (Matt. 13:30), when he begins to render their reward to the just.

Source and licence

Translation
Contra Felicianum Arianum De Unitate Trinitatis [Auctore Vigilio Tapsense]: AI translation (Claude)
Translator / model
Claude (AI-generated) · claude-opus-5-5
Publisher
Classica Codex AI translations, 2026
Source edition
tmp730.tmp730.opp-lat1
Source statement
Translated by Claude (claude-opus-5-5, Anthropic) from the library's tmp730.tmp730.opp-lat1, from Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina (CC BY-SA 4.0), one English line for each line of the original. The whole work is translated. It was chosen because no English translation of it could be found.
AI disclosure from the release
An AI-generated translation of the whole work, checked against the original by a second AI only in samples. No specialist has reviewed it.
Licence and required credit
CC BY-SA 4.0, as its source requires: credit Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina and this AI translation, and share adaptations under the same licence.

A search that found no English translation is not proof that none exists. Check significant readings against the original and specialist work.

Text and notes are presented verbatim from release v1.3; this site adds layout, navigation and reading controls. Square brackets mark supplied English; […] marks gaps; asterisks mark retained-language terms. Notes describe a stretch beginning at their reference.

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Release v1.3 · Translation updated 2026-11-13