THE TEN CATEGORIES
Translator’s note for this stretch
Many scanning errors silently corrected (e.g. 'ariis mentis' read as 'acies mentis'; 'cur' as 'cor'). Heading of ab3 reads 'CAPUT I' in the scan; evidently Chapter II. In line 1, ξάνθός αἴθριος vel δῖος taken as horse names (Xanthus, Aethrius, Dius). In line 2 the first of the four Greek terms (presumably καθ' ὁμοιότητα, 'by likeness') is lost in the scan, marked [...]; the sentence 'proportio enim sui similitudo nominis videtur adjuncta' is obscure and rendered literally. In line 3 'vicinio percipimus' is unclear (perhaps 'by proximity' or 'by sight'), marked [...]; 'homonyma lege vel dixcrit, vel detoxerit' is corrupt, perhaps 'legerit... dixerit... tetigerit', rendered tentatively.
EXCERPTED FROM ARISTOTLE.
CHAPTER ONE. — On speech, and how widely the meaning of *ousia* [being, substance] extends.
Since all knowledge and the teaching of the various arts is handled only through speech, yet no one, my son, however powerful in any field, has been found who was willing to treat of the origin or first principle of speech itself. For this reason the diligence of the philosopher Aristotle is to be admired: eager to discuss everything, he began with the examination of speech itself, which he knew had been passed over by all and was necessary to all. He therefore taught us that of these eight, which the grammarians call parts of speech, only that one is rightly called a part of speech which indicates something and marks it with a word. And so, on Aristotle's authority, we ought to accept only the noun and the verb as parts of speech; the rest are made from these, and ought to be called the joints of speech rather than its parts. For the noun shows the person, the verb what each one does or undergoes. Next, under the same teaching, we ought also to notice by what economy speech, narrowed little by little through stages, has caught and enclosed all that exists in a single word. For although the naming of mortals is varied and countless, and so wide a variety of names cannot be grasped, yet when you have said the one word 'human being', you know them all. So too with the rest: for instance, that horse Xanthus, Aethrius or Dius, or this one or that one. And although the range of these names too is infinite, yet when someone says 'horse', he will point out all of them. And if someone gives names to lions or oxen, as is commonly done, the knowledge of each individual stretches out without limit and the edge of the mind is blunted; but when you say 'lion' or 'bull', all of them everywhere fall under one name of [their] nature. But the power of speech, which had bound the infinite kinds produced by nature's variety into single words, seemed to have done too little unless it also narrowed these into one and enclosed them in a single name. And so it called the human being, the wild beast and the horse 'animal', giving to all a name that would hold them all. No less did it mark briefly, out of an endless display, the things that are without soul: for although there is the tree of the nut, of the chestnut, of the acorn and of the apple, and the other countless kinds of shrubs, by calling them 'plant' it bound all of them with a single, common word. Likewise it called the various stones used for ornament, in short, 'gems'. Finally, although it had amply provided for this by uniting kinds scattered here and there under a specific mark, yet, embracing whatever exists in one vast name capable of the infinite, it said *ousia*, outside which nothing can be found or thought. This is one of the ten categories. It is agreed that they are called categories because they cannot be recognised except from their subjects, as 'being said of certain things'. For who could recognise what a human being is unless he set some human being before his eyes, as a subject for 'human being'? But lest, as the treatise proceeds, in which many examples are needed, the same names be repeated for teaching, and it often happen that the much-used examples of Hortensius, or the higher one of human being, or the superior one of animal, or the loftier one of *usia*, should lapse into tedium, it bent other words to these, which philosophers might use in discussion: thus it called Hortensius, the nut tree, the horse Xanthus and the like, *aisthēta*, *atoma*, *enarithma*, *kathekasta*: *aisthēta* because they are perceived by touch; *atoma* because they cannot be divided and cut: for who would believe that Hortensius can be cut into parts? If that happened, Hortensius would no longer exist; *enarithma* because they are of one number; *kathekasta* because they are singular: for these cannot be duplicated in any one thing. Next, the higher things, that is, human being, horse, lion, tree, the discipline calls *eidea* or *ideai*, as being parts of a genus and forms of things. Then the superior things, that is, animals and plants and gems and stones, it named genera, from which the parts or forms arise. Yet these same genera can also be called species or ideas, because they have something loftier, namely *usia*, from which they seem to arise and be born. But *usia* itself, above which there is nothing, they chose to call a genus
CHAPTER II. — On equivocals and multivocals.
With these things thus set out, Aristotle, about to approach those things which, conceived in the mind, can be signified and shown, left aside for the time being those matters that concern the theory of words, since it has come about in the use of language that many things are named by one name and one thing by many names. To the things that one name embraces the discipline gave two terms, calling some of them homonyms, others synonyms. Homonyms are when several things receive a common name but are separated in the account of that same thing, as a painted and a real human being. For in this the name is the same; but if you go back to the definition or account of 'human being', these are found to be unlike. For when you have said that a real human being is an animal that is capable of laughter and admits the power of reason, since you cannot say the same of the painted one, they are necessarily found to be unlike. As a rule, moreover, we ought to take it that every name, even a proper one, which can be common with others is called a homonym; as 'Cicero' is not one person but several. But if, leaving the name aside, you wish rather to show by signs who this Cicero is, who another, who a third, different signs must be stated for each, so that you call one fat, another thin; or one is called tall, another short; one of fair complexion, another dark. These, then, since they differ in reality and are joined only by name, are called homonyms: united by the word, distinct in the account of the thing. Synonyms, however, are things joined both by name and by their account, as is 'animal': for this can be said of a human being, a horse, a wild beast and birds. An animal is what takes food, what is mortal, what is moved by sense. Now let us come to those things which, each single, are usually signified by many names. Aristotle, however, as was said above, passed over this part, because he thought he should discuss the things signified, not the things that signify. In these, however, the question turns not on things but on names. These are likewise divided into two parts, some being *polyōnyma*, others *heterōnyma*. Polyonyms are when many names signify one thing and no reason is given for the difference between the names; as *ensis*, *mucro*, *gladius* [all words for 'sword']: for why these signify one thing with so many [names] can be neither discerned nor defined. Next, heteronyms likewise hold single things by many names. But in these the diversity of names has a reason, as in 'human, earthly, mortal': 'human' from humanity, 'earthly' from the earth, in which all things are born, 'mortal' from the necessity of death. It is clear, then, that in these the origin of names is sought, in the former the origin of things; for which reason, leaving these aside, Aristotle preferred to set in motion a treatment of the former. So let us return to homonyms, which are divided into two parts: for either they arise by chance or they are born of human will. They arise by chance when by some accident someone receives a name like another's; by will, when the likeness of name is affixed by the deliberate intent of the one who gives it. Of those that are born of intent or will, there are four kinds, [...], *kat' analogian*, *aph' henos*, *pros hen*: as the Latin language also states them: likeness, proportion, from one, towards one. Likeness is, for example, when a painted and a real human being are linked by likeness alone. Proportion is what the Greeks call *kat' analogian*: as we call the heart the source of an animal, so we call the spring the source of water; for to proportion a likeness of its name seems attached. 'From one' is when, from medicine, we speak of a medical instrument, medical knowledge, medical practice, a medical precept: from one [thing] they descend into all. 'Towards one' is, for example: that drink is healthy, this doctor is healthy, that instrument healthy. For all these seem to reach towards one thing, namely health.
CHAPTER III. — What Aristotle is doing in the Categories.
But many are accustomed to raise the question about which things Aristotle chose rather to begin his treatise: first about the things that are, second about the things that are perceived, third about the things that are said. In the first place are all the things that nature has brought forth; in the second, those are perceived whose images we form and store in the mind by seeing; in the third, those are said by which the things impressed on the mind are brought out. For what someone conceives in the mind he declares with the tongue following after. But as our Themistius, the learned philosopher of our age, holds, Aristotle begins to treat of the things that are perceived, which he himself calls by the Greek name *sēmainomena* or *phantasiai*, that is, images of things settled in the mind; but since he has proposed to discuss things perceived, he will necessarily also speak both of the things that are and of the things that are said. For things perceived arise from the things that are, which we perceive [...]; and a showing of things perceived will be lacking unless they are shown with the help of the things that are said. Therefore, although he will later define separately the things that are, we ought nevertheless to take the discussion as a mixed one concerning the three. For he who speaks of things perceived both draws on the origin of things and calls on the aid of speech. He therefore raises a superfluous question who says that one ought to investigate why Aristotle at his beginning chose, or spoke of, or [treated] homonyms, if he was going to treat of the things that are perceived, since it is clear that nothing can be said except what has been perceived, and nothing can be perceived unless there is a thing from which an image is taken by looking.
CHAPTER IV. — On denominatives. Paronyms differ from homonyms.
Translator’s note for this stretch
Line .4: 'ab uno, id est ὁμοὑ' is odd; one expects ἀφ' ἑνός ('from one'), as in the previous chapter; the Greek is probably garbled. 'malitia/vitiosum': the sense of the argument suggests vitiosus agrees in meaning but not in name. Line .5: 'moveregressus' read as 'movere gressu' (move by walking). 'υποϰειμένω̣' read as ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. Line .6: 'ct or stionibus' is corrupt; probably 'quaestionibus' or 'calumniationibus' (objections); 'do subjecta grammatica' read as 'de subjecta grammatica'. Line .8: 'fisus' read as 'risus'; the definitions of genus, difference and species ('secundum multa et differentia ... specie/numero') are rendered literally and are somewhat compressed in the Latin; 'Numquidnam ... dici potest' taken as a question expecting 'no'.
Having learned these things, then, let us look at paronyms, which are set in the middle between homonyms and synonyms. They cannot be called paronyms unless they hold in themselves something drawn from both, that is, unless they are seen to have in common both the name of homonyms and the matter of synonyms. For example, when we say 'wise' from 'wisdom', or 'doctor' from 'medicine', the same likeness both of activity and of name is seen in the doctor as in medicine. It is rightly called a paronym, therefore, because it has received its name from elsewhere. But so that paronyms and those homonyms that are said 'from one' (that is, *homou*) may not seem the same, we ought to recognise this difference. Paronyms are indeed homonyms among themselves, because of the likeness of name, but they are called paronyms of that name from which they have received their name. For instance, from 'wisdom' we may call a man wise, or a plan wise: these are homonyms among themselves, but paronyms of wisdom itself. It must be observed, however, that they have a change in the last syllable, and that paronyms do not end in the same way as the things from which they draw their origin end. Thus with *medicina* [medicine] and *medicus* [doctor], *medicina* closes with some letters and *medicus* with others. Unless paronyms have this difference, and unless they are linked with synonyms by matter and with homonyms by name, they are called homonyms rather than paronyms. Thus if from 'malice' we say 'vicious', it agrees with synonyms in matter, but differs from homonyms in name. For 'vicious' and 'malice' are not alike, although they are understood with the same sense. But if from *malitia* [malice] one says *malus* [bad], both agree rightly. They are not changed in the last syllable in this way, however, if from *sapientia* [wisdom] we say *verba sapientia* [wise words]. Here, since no syllable has been changed, the name of paronym is excluded. Hence it is clear that these and things like them ought rather to be joined to homonyms. We should also know that words are either simple or else combined. Combined are, for example, 'a horse runs'; simple, when these are separated and spoken singly, as 'horse', 'runs'. But I think enough has now been said about the things that are signified.
CHAPTER V. — Substance and accident.
It remains for us to relate how Aristotle treated the things that are. They are, then, those that we either perceive by the senses or gather by mind and thought. By the senses we grasp the things we come to know by seeing, touching, hearing, tasting or smelling. By the mind, as when someone sees a horse, or a human being, or any animal you like: although it presents itself as one body, he nevertheless understands that it is composed of many parts. For one part is the head, another the feet, and others the rest of the limbs; in the head itself the ears have their own parts, and the tongue has its own. These single parts too have in themselves many things that can be divided and separated: as flesh is one thing, hide another, veins another, sinews another, hairs another. These things, then, to which our senses cannot penetrate, we gather by mind or understanding. We also consider, and come to know by the attention of the mind, that a human being or another animal grows, grows old, now stands, now moves with its gait; at one time is troubled by cares, at another rests with a mind free of care; at times enjoys health, at times suffers pain; changes from black to white, and from white to black in colour; from unskilled to skilled, from untaught to taught; from tame to wild, from fierce to tame. Since, then, among the things that are, some are gathered by the senses and others by the mind, learned men preferred to separate these by proper names. That which is discerned by the senses they chose to call *ousia*, and that which is gathered by the working of the mind and is often changed, they chose to name *symbebēkos*, that is, accident. And since the things that befall are known to be in the abiding *usia*, they chose to call the *usia* itself *hypokeimenon*, that is, 'underlying', and 'not in a subject'; but the things that befall they said were *[en] hypokeimenōi*, that is, 'in what underlies'. Without doubt, however, we must recognise this: as we say *usia* is prior to accidents, so we must judge the *atomon* or *kath' hekaston*, that is, this man or this lion, to be prior to the things that are common, or called by the common name of animals.
CHAPTER VI. — What is said of a subject, and what is in a subject.
Aristotle returned again to the things that are signified, to show in how many ways the things that are are usually signified. Of the things that are, then, some are signified of a subject and are not in a subject, as 'human being'. It is signified of a subject, namely of some particular human being: for 'human being' could not be said unless there were someone of whom it was said. But it is in no subject, since it is itself *usia*, which we said above is never in anything underlying, since it is itself what underlies the rest. Others are neither in a subject nor signified of a subject, as Cicero is: he is not in a subject, because he is *usia*; nor is he signified of any subject, since he holds a name arising from himself and cannot be understood from elsewhere. Two things pertaining to *usia* have been stated as to how they are signified: of these the higher is called *koinon*, that is, common; the lower *kath' hekaston*, that is, singular. Now we must say how the things that belong to the accidents are signified. Of these, then, some are in a subject and are signified of a subject, as knowledge or colour. For they are in some subject, that is, in a soul or a body: for there can be no knowledge unless there is a soul underlying in which it is contained; nor could knowledge be signified except of an underlying [branch of knowledge such as] grammar. Nor could any colour exist except in an underlying body, nor be signified except of some underlying colour. So it comes about that they are both in a subject and signified of a subject. Others among these same *symbebēkota*, that is, accidents, are in a subject but are in no way signified of a subject, as this [knowledge of] grammar, or this white colour: they are in a subject, a soul or a body, but they are not signified of a subject. For their name does not depend on anything else, but they are designated by their own special name. Among these too, we call the higher accident common; the lower, where there is now a definite thing as a part, is called *kath' hekaston*. But so that Aristotle should not be thought to pass over anything unclear, and give occasion for objections, he wished to treat more carefully what is 'in a subject', and to define what it is, so that the way would be closed to cavillers. He defines, then, 'in a subject' as that which is in something else, not as a part of it, and which can never exist without that in which it is. This definition was added because it could be said that a finger or a foot is in a subject, that is, in the body. He therefore excluded this by a careful definition, saying that that is in a subject which is not a part of that in which it is: and it is agreed that a finger or a foot is part of the body. Next, cavillers could say that water or wine is in a jar as in a subject; but his learned definition does not allow this to arise, adding that that is in a subject which cannot exist without its subject: and there can be no doubt that wine or water can be elsewhere, without the jar in which it was. Meanwhile at this point we ought to notice by what art a definition is arranged. First it must stretch out over a vast range, beginning from the genus; then, running gradually through the parts, it must arrive at that in which alone is found the thing being defined. Just as those who make statues first choose a huge stone, then, gradually reducing it and cutting away what is superfluous, arrive at forming the face and limbs: so a definition, beginning from the genus and gradually shedding the generality of its words, strives to reach the proper resting-place of the thing to be shown. But let us return to our subject. The discussion was about how the things that are are signified; and since much has now been said about them, we must hold this as a rule: that all *kath' hekasta*, or *enarithma*, or *atoma*, or *aisthēta*, that is, this man, or this horse, or this tree, cannot be signified of a subject. But if these same are among the accidents, that is, this colour, this discipline, they can be in a subject: for, as was shown above, no accident can exist without a subject. We have been taught, then, how we can recognise both the subject and what is in a subject.
CHAPTER VII. — What a genus is, what a species is.
Next Aristotle teaches us by what reasoning we may also recognise the things that are signified of a subject. Among these the special point is this: that the same things are found in the subject itself as are in what is signified of the subject. For as 'animal' is signified of a subject, a human being or a horse, so 'human being' must also be signified of a subject, some particular human being: and Cicero is both a human being and an animal. Whatever, then, can be predicated of 'animal' is also predicated both of 'human being' and of Cicero. Therefore the things found in what is signified of a subject must also be found in what is the subject: as if you say, an animal is what takes food, what is mortal, what is moved by sense; and 'animal' is signified of the subject 'human being'; the same things, then, must be said of 'human being' as were said of 'animal'. Then whatever has been said of 'human being' is also said of Socrates. And it is certain that Socrates is subordinate to 'human being', and 'human being' to 'animal'. Whatever, then, is said of the things that are signified of a subject will also be predicated of those we call the subjects. As a rule, those things are signified of a subject which cannot be known through themselves: as 'animal' cannot be understood except of an underlying human being, so 'human being' cannot be grasped unless it is discerned of some underlying human being. Now, since he is going to speak of the genera, species and differences of all the categories, it seems we should first examine what a genus is, what a species, what a difference. A genus, then, is what is shown and signified, as to what it is, of many things differing in species, as *usia* is. We say *usia* of everything; but this common name is divided by species when we say 'animal' or 'stone'. So it comes about that things joined, as it were, in one word are separated by species. A difference is what is predicated of many things differing in species, not as to what it is, but as to of what sort it is, as with animal: walking, flying, aquatic, two-footed, four-footed. Genus and difference, then, are signified of things differing in species; but by the genus one can know what a thing is, by the difference of what sort it is. A species, which some also call a form, is what is predicated and known, as to what it is, of many things differing in number, as 'human being' is. This name embraces all human beings, and it seems to do what a species does, which is predicated of a particular human being who contains number in himself, as this is the first, that the second, the other the third. But to show these three by one example: the genus is 'animal'; the difference, 'two-footed', 'four-footed'; the species, 'human being', 'horse'. And as there is no genus that does not have a difference, so we should not conceive of a difference that will not have species: thus black and white do not have a difference, because they do not send out species from themselves. For what other species of white or black can be found? Since, then, what a genus is, what a difference, and what a species, has been distinguished, let us come now to Aristotle's statements. For by his teaching we have learned that genera which are different from one another can have neither the same differences nor the same species. For the species and difference are one thing when it is asked what a thing is, another when it is asked of what sort it is, another when it is asked how much it is: as, if you want to state a difference of 'animal', you may say 'flying', 'two-footed', 'walking'; if a species, you may say 'human being' or 'bird' or 'horse'. Can the same difference or species be said of 'discipline' too? No, because the genera are different, 'animal' and 'discipline'. For 'animal' belongs to the category of *usia*, 'discipline' to the category of quality. Finally, those genera that are joined to one another in mutual association (*epallēla*) have the same differences and the same species, as *usia*, whose species is 'animal'. But that same 'animal' is a genus for the rest, and so it is called both species and genus. Since, then, here two genera hold each other in turn, which Aristotle too named *epallēla*, they have the same differences: as if you say that *usia* is an animal, mortal, two-footed, capable of laughter; you can say the same of 'animal': an animal is a mortal human being, two-footed, capable of laughter; you can say the same of 'human being'. It is certain, then, that in genera joined to one another the same differences and species are found; but that in different genera this cannot happen.
CHAPTER VIII. — On the predicaments in general.
Translator’s note for this stretch
Greek in this section is badly garbled in the scan. 'τιϰὀν' is evidently a truncation of ἐρωτητικόν (interrogative), rendered as such; the four Greek formulas for 'in it alone and in all' etc. are reconstructed from the Latin equivalents. 'ab in Hunni' read as 'ab in omni'. In line 2, 'jacere' (lying, i.e. position) stands where Aristotle's list has 'keisthai'. The chapter heading for IX and 'Usia proprie' are run into the end of line 2 in the edition and are translated there.
Aristotle returns again to the things that are said, although we said above that the one cannot be treated without the other. For whoever says something says it about what is; and what is cannot be understood by another unless it is said. Of those things, then, which are said without any combination, whatever is said singly signifies either *usia*, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or lying, or doing, or being affected, or where, or when, or having. These are the ten categories, of which the first is *usia*, namely the one that supports the other nine. The remaining nine are *symbebēkota*, that is, accidents. Of these nine, some are in *usia* itself, some outside *usia*, some both inside and outside. Quality, quantity and lying are in *usia* itself: for as soon as we have named a *usia*, either a man or a horse, we must notice [that it is] two feet long or four feet long; either white or black; either standing or lying. These are in *usia* itself, and cannot exist without it. Others are outside *usia*: where, when, having. Place does not belong to *usia*, nor time, nor being clothed and being armed; rather they are separate from *usia*. Others are common, that is, both inside and outside *usia*: relation, doing and being affected. Relation, as greater and lesser: for neither can be said unless the other is joined to it, than which it is greater or lesser; for this reason, then, they have one thing in themselves and another outside themselves. Likewise doing is outside and inside: as no one can be said to strike unless he strikes another; or to read, unless the reader himself is one thing and what he reads another. So, then, this is both in *usia* and outside *usia*. Being affected likewise: for no one can be struck or burned unless he is affected by another; for this reason this too is both in *usia* and outside *usia*. These, then, when they are single, affirm nothing; but when combined they make some utterance out of themselves, either *prostaktikon*, or *euktikon*, or [*erōtē*]*tikon*, or *klētikon*: to show these too in Latin speech, either a command, or a wish, or a question, or an address. These four kinds, as it were, of utterance are meanwhile left hanging and simple, and therefore half-complete. For it is not yet understood either what the command is, or what the wish, or what the question, or what the address, unless there is added the *apophantikon* kind, that is, the declarative, which has in itself a certain assertive sense, which either adds or takes away something: which Aristotle called *kataphasis* and *apophasis*, as: 'this heaven revolves', 'this heaven does not revolve'. Finally, the declarative itself, which we called *apophantikon*, is either false or true. Therefore, leaving aside those four, which belong rather to grammarians or orators, Aristotle made mention of this apophantic kind, which concerns philosophers. CHAPTER IX. — On *usia*, or substance. *Usia* in the proper sense.
What are called secondary *usiae*.
Having set out, then, everything that seemed necessary for those who were going to dispute, he had to define the categories one by one. But since *usia* could not be defined according to the art, which prescribes that a definition, so that it may extend more widely, should take its beginning from the genus, and *usia* itself has no genus, since it supports all things, he chose to define it through its parts, so that what it is might be known not only from its definition but also from knowledge of its parts. That, then, is *usia* properly and principally so called which is neither in a subject nor signified of a subject, as this man or this horse. The genus and the species, that is, 'animal' and 'man', are called secondary *usiae*. He says, then, that these are named secondary substances because that one is superior which is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. And the genus and species are called secondary substances for this reason, that they alone indicate the first. As, if someone does not wish or does not know [how] to say 'Socrates', he may say 'animal' or 'man', that is, the genus or the species; and when these are said, what Socrates is is recognised; but if he says something else, either 'runs' or 'walks', nothing can be recognised. It is clear, moreover, that what is signified of a subject has in common with what is the subject both the name and the account of the name; as 'man' is signified also of some subject man, and you will find not only the name but also the same account in the subject as you can find in what is signified of the subject. Then, of the secondary *usiae* themselves, the species is superior to the genus: for the species is nearer to the first *usia* than the genus is. For if someone wishes to show what a first *usia* is, he will show it more easily if he names the species than if he names the genus. As, if someone wishing to speak of Socrates leaves out his name, he signifies him better if he says 'man' than if [he says] 'animal'. For by 'animal' we can recognise both a horse and an eagle. Then, just as first substances underlie all things, and all things are supported by them, so too the species [underlies] the genus, and therefore it is more *usia* than the rest. We must also see that what we think is only a species is not also a genus: as, if someone says 'animal', he has also said a genus. Then if he says 'man', 'horse', 'fish', 'bird', shall we declare that all are only species? For while 'man' and 'horse' are plainly species, 'fish' and 'bird' are genera and species (for there is not one form of birds and of fishes); for this reason, then, they are called both species and genera. But those which are only species, such as man, horse, eagle, bull, are *usiae* with equal force. For as man is *usia*, so too are horse, eagle and bull, each in its own kind. Having gone through, then, the parts by which *usia* was defined, he wished to define it in another way also, by showing what must naturally be found in it. For the things that are in each thing are either in it alone and in all of it, or in it alone and not in all, or in all and not in it alone, or neither in it alone nor in all. The Greeks call these *en monōi kai en panti*, *en monōi kai ouk en panti*, *en panti kai ouk en monōi*, *oute en monōi oute en panti*. As, if someone wishing to define man says he is capable of laughter: this is both in him alone and in all. For man alone laughs, and laughing is natural to all [men]. Second, in it alone and not in all: as if someone defining man says he is capable of a discipline; this can indeed be found in man alone, yet not in every man: for not everyone has learned some discipline. Third, in all and not in it alone: as if someone defining man says that man is that which walks and which takes food: this is indeed in every man, yet not in man alone: for cattle too take food, and wild beasts run. Fourth, neither in it alone nor in all: as if someone, in the definition of man, says that man is what is white; this is neither in him alone nor in all. For neither is man alone found to be white, and not an ox or a horse, nor is every man white. There are two, then, that point out some way for inquiry, and two that cannot signify anything definite. From what is neither in it alone nor in all we can recognise nothing, since it is general. The other, in all, not in it alone, has no difference, and for that reason is likewise to be rejected. Two remain which by definite signs will be able to show that in which they are, that is, in it alone and in all. For there can be no doubt that, when you have found it, you may declare what that is in which it is known to be. The other is in it alone, not in all: not indeed of the same force, yet it must necessarily be sought for defining a thing if the first cannot be found. Now, then, to mark out *usia*, he begins arguing from 'in all, not in it alone', when he shows that there are secondary *usiae*, which he says are secondary for this reason, that what [is found] in the first can be found in them. Then he says that this is common to every *usia*, that it is not in a subject. Since, then, neither the genus nor the species is found in a subject, it is clear that these must be named secondary *usiae*. Then he shows from this too that genus and species are secondary *usiae*: that all things that are in a subject can sometimes have in common with what underlies them only the name, but not also the account. But genus and species have with their subjects, that is, with some man, a definite sharing of both the name and its account. Having shown the secondary *usiae*, then, that is, genus and species, there remained only the difference, which, to one considering it more carefully, seems to be as it were an accident. For when 'two-footed' or 'mortal' or 'rational' is said of 'animal', it is not what it is but rather what sort it is that is shown, and therefore it seems to hold the force of quality. But since the difference arises first from the genus, and so the species follows, it ought not to be counted among the accidents. And so Aristotle said it was mixed in its signification, but decided that by its force it should be counted among the *usiae*: for he declares that the same things are found in it as are found in the other substances; that is, that it can have, with its subject, a like name and account. For when we call a man 'walking', we can find in the subject both the same word and the same account of it: for Socrates is both a man and walking. Similarly he goes through the rest, varying the argument, showing that some things are in *usia* which it alone and all of it has, some which it alone and not all, some which all and not it alone, some neither it alone nor all. Since these are clear in Aristotle himself, it seemed superfluous to set them out: especially as this discourse has resolved not to translate everything written by the Philosopher, but to explain more plainly what seemed obscure to beginners.
CHAPTER X. — On quantity. Nothing is contrary to a quantity. What are called contraries.
Translator’s note for this stretch
'quam in circulo' (than in a circle) is obscure; the sense may require a different reading (e.g. 'in loco'). 'quae coelum gravia sunt' appears corrupt; rendered 'all things that are heavy'. 'grando milii granum' read as 'grande milii granum'. 'actus actuum' is odd and rendered loosely. Near the end the text plays on *aequalis*/*par*: the author seems to say quantities are called *par/impar* (which in Latin also means even/odd) rather than *aequalis/inaequalis*; the English distinction is approximate.
So, *usia* having been described, since it could not be defined for the reasons I mentioned above, the order of necessity called for the definition of the accidents. The first of these is quantity, and not without reason: for when we see something, we must estimate how great it is. But how great it is cannot be found unless it is gathered by applying a measure. If, then, leaving breadth aside, someone wishes to measure length alone, this is called length without breadth subjected to measure. Not that there is any length that lacks breadth; but that someone measuring length alone is said to measure [it]. But breadth measured together with length is called *epiphaneia* [surface]. And if depth too is joined to the measurement, all these together make up a body. We do not, however, take this in the way we usually take a natural body, so that we may not seem to return to *usia*. Next, we also measure the place in which something is situated. Time too is subjected to measure: for when something moves, by that very motion we must also have a measure of time, when we say that it arrived in the first, or second, or third year, or month, or day, or hour, or moment. In this way, then, the quantity of each thing is gathered. Of quantity itself, one kind is continuous, another separate. Continuous are the *grammē* [line], the *epiphaneia*, body, place and time. For in these a measure cannot have boundaries of individual parts. For as soon as, fixing a point in the middle of a line, you have given as it were a definite boundary of measure, that boundary becomes common to both parts made by dividing the line, so that it is uncertain to which part the boundary appears to be attached: so closely does each part cohere and is joined to the other. The *epiphaneia* too, for a similar reason, is called connected and continuous. Indeed, if someone wishes to divide it, he must place a line in its middle: and when this line, which divides the *epiphaneia*, has made two parts out of it, that line begins to be the common boundary of those two parts: for it is so connected with itself that it is not apparent in which [part] the boundary seems fixed. Similarly, if someone wishes to cut a body, the boundary of the body to be divided must be a line or a surface; for the very cut, which the line makes together with the surface, must descend into the body: and therefore it is uncertain, whether line or surface, to which part they have given the boundary, since, when the body is divided, a surface must be found in each part. And therefore a body is continuous, in which the boundary of the two parts to be made is common. The account of time is also similar: if we wish to give it a boundary to divide it, let us say 'now'. But 'now' is so blended between past and future time that it is uncertain where it ought to be separated. Place, moreover, just as it surrounds any body and is occupied by the parts of the body, so is divided by a common boundary, just as the body too is divided: and therefore it must be called continuous like the rest. Separate, on the other hand, are number and speech. For who does not notice that one is separated by its own boundaries from two, two from three? And in speech the individual syllables are separate: for they are set apart by nature and by number, when we call one short, another long, and [speak of] one or two. Clearly, then, what we have said both belongs to quantity and ought to be called separate. Of these quantities there is also another difference: for among them some are those whose parts have position, from which it can be recognised which part is joined to which; but others are those whose parts cannot have position. By position I mean when we see the right, left, upper, lower, front, back, far, near of each thing. Those, then, whose parts are joined to one another in evident position are these: line, surface, body, place. For whether you have made parts in a line, or in a surface, or in any of these by placing boundaries, although they seem continuous and joined to one another, still one can notice bodily which part is where, what it is next to, and to what it is joined. But those whose parts do not have position are these: time, number, speech. For when we say 'one', speaking of the number itself alone, not counting something bodily, we do not see either its right or its left: indeed, since it is only in a word, in sound, and in no body, it cannot show a position of its parts, unless perhaps we speak of order, in that two follows one: but position, at any rate, cannot be found in these. Similarly also in time and speech, especially since these seem to slip away at once: when you have spoken, time too runs on; and speech, when it has not yet been spoken, is not; and when it has been spoken, does not appear. It is clear, then, that these three do not have a position of distinct parts. Properly, then, only these that have been mentioned are called quantities; but if any others besides these can be found, they ought to be placed among accidents. For there are some things which befall the accidents themselves, as if we say 'much white'; it is called 'much white' not because the white itself is immense, but because the surface on which the white is is seen to be large. It is clear, then, that when we say 'much white', the white, which befalls it, is estimated from the quantity of the surface. Similarly, when we speak of long actions, they are called long not because the actions are immense, but the quantity of the actions is estimated from the measure of the time in which the actions are contained. We must, however, recognise this special point, that nothing is contrary to a quantity. For to a surface, or a line, or two cubits, or three, nothing is contrary. Unless perhaps by some error we should think 'much' and 'little' are contraries, not noticing that these ought to be transferred to the number of those things which are called relations. For nothing is called much or little unless it has been compared with another. For when we call a mountain small, we indicate that the other, with which it is compared, is larger. Or when we say 'a large grain of millet', by comparison with its own kind, in which something smaller is found, we show that it is larger. And therefore it is clear that much and little, large and small, get their name when compared with something. Nor does the one who thinks much and little ought to be joined to quantity err in this alone, but also if he supposes they are contraries; which cannot happen at all. For if, deceived by some error, we call these contraries, it will come about that contraries appear to occur in one thing at one and the same time. For one thing can be called both larger than a smaller and small beside a larger at one and the same time: which neither the nature of things allows nor reason itself permits. And therefore the opinion of those who believe these are contraries must be rejected. Nor can contrariety be seen in quantity any more than in a circle. For the ancients said that above and below were contrary to each other because of the distance between heaven and earth, asserting that, from whatever side one turns, earth is beneath and heaven above. For as we contemplate the nature of things, the earth, which appears to be in the middle, is everywhere below: for even our antipodes, who are said to plant their footsteps opposite to ours, have heaven above them. It is plain, then, that the earth is always set in the lower position. Then the physicists also add this argument, that the earth is contrary to heaven by difference of place, that is, the one always up, the other down, because all things that are heavy are naturally carried to the earth, whereas those that seem lighter must be raised toward heaven. Hence, then, they said heaven and earth were contrary to each other, because natural necessity placed the one below and the other above. From this reasoning, then, the definition of all contraries seems to have been established. For those things are called contraries which, though they are of one and the same genus, are yet separated from each other by a great distance. But those who assert this ought to notice that these should rather be joined to the things called relations. For 'above' cannot be said unless 'below' has also been designated. But if some like to cavil, above and below can be seen rather in the category called 'where': for when we say above and below, it is recognised where something takes place. But these things, as we said, belong to chatterers: we, for our part, ought not to believe that a contrary is admitted in quantity. Meanwhile, on the occasion of this treatment, one may notice that natural above and below is one thing, and that which is relative to us another. For the natural cannot be changed, but ours is changed by people moving: so that if someone who was in a lower place climbs to a higher, or wishes to descend from higher to lower, everything that was before is changed for him, since to one descending the things that had been lower are seen as higher. This too is in quantity, in all of it indeed, yet not in it alone: that it does not admit more and less, which is called in Greek *mallon kai hētton*. For when we say 'two feet long', we cannot call one two-foot thing more or less [so] than another. For the second two-foot thing is so in the same way as the first. But if one should be larger than another, it no longer takes the name 'two feet long' but that of another measure. Nor does number admit more or less, since to call three more or less three is madness. And time cannot be more or less time than time. It is plain, then, from what has been set out, that more and less cannot be found in quantity. But the property of quantity, which is found in all of it and in it alone, is this: that all its [instances] are called equal or unequal. As number [is called] even and odd; a number is not called 'equal' if it is even, or 'unequal' if it is odd. And similarly all its [instances] are called not 'equal' or 'unequal' [in the sense of likeness], but *paria* or *imparia* [equal/even or unequal/odd]. Other things, however, which do not belong to quantity, we call like one another rather than equal: so that white is said to be like white, or not like. For this word [equal] seems specially fixed to those things that are in quantity.
CHAPTER XI. — Relation. When [a thing] is called relative. Opposites.
Translator’s note for this stretch
The Greek list of terms is garbled in the scan ('ίξιν, διάθεσιν, ,θέσιν,αίσθησιν'): the empty slot between the commas presumably stood for ἐπιστήμην (knowledge); marked [...]. 'Περί τσῡπρόςτι' read as περὶ τοῦ πρός τι; 'ϰαθέϰαστον ϰϰθέϰαστον ϰ́ναϕέρεται' read as καθ' ἕκαστον πρὸς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεται. 'nec is- Baria' read as necessaria; 'in Une quanti' as in fine quanti; 'vicaria in sciet mutatione' as vicaria in se mutatione; 'huic nim cæteris' as huic cum ceteris. 'Inducte' taken as inducta/inducendo ('by bringing them in'); uncertain.
The third of the categories is the one reckoned in Latin *ad aliquid* [to something], in Greek *pros ti*. And indeed it was not the order but the needs of the treatment that made this one third: for after quantity, quality was to follow. But since at the end of quantity it seemed that certain things of that same genus could be transferred to relation, he necessarily chose to rank this category, which had been fourth, as third, so that, once all things had been examined and shown, [and] which belonged to which, the confusion that frequently arose might be resolved. Aristotle, however, begins not from his own definitions but from the definitions of those who before him tried, wrongly, to define relation. Yet we ought to hear these things as though necessary to the treatment. For the philosopher shrewdly both gives them help and seeks a remedy for the badly laid-down definitions, intending later, by stating his own view, to reject everything that has been improperly defined concerning the relative. We call relation, then, that category which is said to be what it is from another, without whose association it could not exist, and whose whole force comes down from conjunction with another: as double is called double of a half, greater is called greater than a lesser, like is called like to a like. It is plain, then, that relation consists not by its own force but by conjunction with another. In the same way are to be taken the other things known to belong to the same category, such as state, condition, discipline, position, perception. Aristotle named these *hexis*, *diathesis*, [...] *thesis*, *aisthēsis*. For these too depend on another. Since a state is called the state of some thing, and a condition the condition of someone toward something, and knowledge and position and perception are understood by a like reasoning. But let it not trouble us that certain things are said to belong to this category which seem also to be joined to quality. For state and condition and knowledge and the rest that were mentioned with them seem to belong most of all to quality. But we ought to notice the difference by which these two categories, that is quality and relation, or *pros ti* and *poiotēs*, are separated from each other. For whenever knowledge is called knowledge of some thing that is knowable, and perception is called perception of a thing that is perceptible, then we ought to take it as relation; but when knowledge or discipline is said to be not of some thing but of a man, we ought to recognize quality. This is the difference for the present, although if we wish to define properly this category which is called relation, so that it may be separated from the others (for it seems to run into all of them), we must define it in another way, so that error may not always arise for those who consider too little. A thing, then, is truly and properly called relative when both that which is joined and that to which it is joined are found under one rising and setting: for instance slave and master — both either exist together or together do not exist. For when you have spoken of a master, a slave necessarily exists too; but when you have removed the master, no slave appears either. Likewise double and half either destroy or display each other: for when a double appears, a half is born; when the double perishes, the half cannot remain either. And likewise, if there is no half, there is no double; but if there is a half, a double too will necessarily appear. Specifically, however, and as a rule, so that this category may be more clearly discerned, this is the way by which we ought to note that a thing is not rightly called relative unless *kath' hekaston pros kath' hekaston anapheretai*, that is, a singular is referred to a singular. Since when we say 'double', we undoubtedly say not 'double' generally but this double specifically, and we call it the double of this half. And therefore the category of relation is truly present whenever, for example, we say that Socrates is very like Chrysippus in face. Otherwise, how shall we show either who is like or to whom, unless we indicate by person both who is like and the one to whom he is like? But there are some who would raise a superfluous question against this definition, asserting that something can be found that is said relatively which exists before, and afterwards there arises what ought to be named from it; so that these two would seem to be joined to each other neither in rising nor in setting: and they give the examples of the knowable and knowledge, asserting that the knowable existed before and knowledge of it followed afterwards. For example, among geometers the *grammē* or the circle existed before, but knowledge of them was grasped afterwards by the wise: and therefore the knowable existed before, in which knowledge could be found. By this argument, then, they show that there are many things of this category to which rising and setting do not seem to be common. For they contend that the example of the perceptible and perception stands by a like reasoning: since perceptible things existed before. For the elements of which every body consists existed before any body arose from them in which perception might exist. By these arguments, then, they show that the definition of the category called relation has not been rightly fixed. Those who look too carelessly at the nature of things are accustomed to assert these things. For all things that exist are said to exist either by natural potency or by the operation of doing, which the Greeks call *dynamis* and *energeia*. If anyone will separate these and not confuse them by any association, he will understand that what is said relatively cannot exist without the other of which it is said to be. For to the knowable, or the circle, knowledge was associated at the very rise of its nature. For as soon as the knowable began to exist, it had knowledge of itself, but this was not yet shown *energeiai*, that is, in operation. So knowledge of it did not begin to exist when it began to operate, but arose with the knowable itself; the operation followed afterwards. For we must distinguish the beginning of the operation: for then we can see that knowledge was brought forth together with the knowable, but its operation appeared afterwards through the investigation of the wise. These [objections] repelled, the best definition of things referred relatively is that they always either perish or are born together. We should certainly keep in memory that not all things said relatively are referred in the same cases to the things to which they are joined; but some are coupled with the genitive case, some with the dative, many with the ablative. With the genitive, as slave of a master, double of a half. With the dative, like to a like, equal to an equal. With the ablative, perceptible — perceptible by perception, knowable — knowable by knowledge, and other things of this kind, which in various cases make use of association with another. Present, moreover, in this category, in it alone and in all, is that between two conjoined things which depend on each other there is a reciprocal conversion, which in Greek is called *antistrophē*. As double is called double of a half, and half half of a double, and slave [slave] of a master, and master [master] of a slave. It appears, then, that these coupled things convert in turn by mutual reversal, provided that this conversion is done knowingly and carefully. For if these words are converted unskilfully, great confusion arises: as if someone should unskilfully say 'wing of a bird', it is a foolish conversion. For not every wing is a bird's: since there are some wings that are not birds', as of cicadas, flies, and other animals which nature has formed in a like way. But if someone says 'the wing of a winged thing', the conversion is, so to speak, valid. At this point it is pleasing to open up certain darknesses that tend to emerge from the likeness of the categories. Since when we say 'wing of a winged thing' and 'head of a headed thing', we seem to place parts of *usia* among accidents. For a wing is without doubt a part of *usia*, as is a head or a hand; and if these are referred relatively, there will seem to be no distinction between *usiae* and relation. So that all confusion may be removed, then, we must note how relation has been truly and properly defined. For its definition runs thus: that that is called relative whose being depends on another, and which must singularly, that is *kath' hekaston*, convert by mutual exchange. Whoever considers this will find that neither the wing of a winged thing nor the head of a headed thing can rightly be called relative: for as we say 'wing of a winged thing', we cannot in the same way say 'winged thing of a wing', or 'headed thing of a head': whoever said that would be laughed at. For the winged thing's being does not come down from the wing; nor does the wing consist from the winged thing. And likewise the headed thing does not consist from the head, nor does the head seem to consist from the headed thing. But what is truly called relative can be converted in turn, as we said above: master is master of a slave, and slave is slave of a master; and again, when the slave is taken away there is no master, and when the master is removed no slave appears either. But a winged thing can exist even when a wing perishes; and again a wing can exist when the winged thing perishes. Once the definition of this category has been considered, then, a way of distinguishing the confusion that arises from likeness can also be found. In the same way we can separate this category also from the likeness of opposites. For opposites too — Aristotle calls them *antikeimena* — present a certain likeness to this category: since hot and cold seem joined to each other by an association of opposition; but we call hot not hot of the cold but opposed to the cold; and we call just not just of the unjust but contrary to the unjust. Aristotle indeed, as we said at the beginning of this category, sets out many examples which seem to belong to it not under a fixed form, wishing to censure from their consequences the faults of the others who chose to define it otherwise. In short, he set down both virtue [as relative] to vice and knowledge to ignorance, as if relative, and said that they can receive a contrary, not because the matter requires it so, but so that by bringing them in he could show the faults of those discussing [it]. For these, as we explained above, are to be judged opposites rather than things said relatively. To me, however, as Aristotle himself also holds, this category seems able to admit more and less — not all of it, indeed, nor it alone. For we can call something like to anything, and more like, and less like. But this, as I said, cannot be found in all things that are relative. For one cannot be called more a father or less a father; nor less a son or more a son; nor less double or more double. But let it not deceive us into thinking that it is relation whenever, for example, we say 'whose horse', or 'whose timber', or 'whose estate': for these, which indicate the owner or the person of the possessor, are not to be reckoned things said relatively. We have explained this category as far as we could: though it seems to have so great a mixture with the others that Aristotle himself too did not easily find how to distinguish it — so that even a long and protracted re-treatment of it would not be unbecoming.
CHAPTER XII. — On quality. The four species of quality. State. Condition. Natural capacity. Affective qualities.
Translator’s note for this stretch
Line 2: 'AlIgorius' read as Agorius, probably Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, credited with a Latin version of Aristotle. The Greek 'άπό τη̃ς τη̃ς, άρετό;' is garbled; read as ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀρετός. 'calidatio et frigidatio' rendered 'heating and cooling' as the author's coinages for θερμότης/ψυχρότης. 'durum… dure saltat' translated 'stiffly'; sense uncertain. Line 3: 'excusare' and 'excusent' are taken as 'are exempt from'.
Now let us treat of quality, according to which the things that exist are called qualified. Many, however, ask what quality is and what the qualified is; these are easily separated. For we call sweetness, harshness, whiteness and blackness quality. But the qualified is understood whenever we call something white, or sweet, or harsh, or black. Aristotle, however, used 'qualified' for 'quality' and 'quality' for 'qualified' indifferently, and for that reason we too, following him, have taken them as alike. They hold this category more difficult than the others because it seems to run into all of them more readily than the others do: for example, it is found in *usia* when we say 'a grammatical man'; in quantity, 'a white or black *epiphaneia*'; in relation, 'a prudent father', 'an excellent son'; in acting, 'he dances stiffly'; in being affected, 'he bears wounds bravely'; in place, 'a dark place'; in time, 'a hot month' or 'a cold one'; in lying, 'he lies face down' or 'face up'; in having, 'becomingly armed'. It will therefore take no small prudence to separate by keenness of mind quality, which is almost blended with the others. Its species are four in number, which Aristotle set down as genera, namely because each of them also has its own species. When this happens they are called subaltern, which the Greeks called *hypallēla*. So the first genus is state and condition; the second, natural capacity; the third, affective qualities or affections; the fourth, forms and figures. Aristotle called these *hexis kai diathesis*, *physikē dynamis*, *pathētikai poiotētes kai pathē*, *schēmata kai morphai*. A state is a condition of the mind that persists for a long time: as are virtue and discipline, which are valued for their persistence and the length of their duration, unless perhaps illness of the body, or a weakness brought on by chance, cuts them off. A condition, on the other hand, is a changeable impulse of the mind, or a light desire, which is wiped out in a short time. So a state can be seen to be a condition too; for a state begins from this, and if the condition itself persists, a state is born. But a condition cannot be seen to be a state; for if it reaches a state, it will not keep its own name. At this point it is not out of place to settle in a brief treatment a question often asked, and to show what distinguishes virtue from discipline. It is surely this: that discipline dwells only in that part of the soul which is called rational, whereas virtue embraces all parts of the soul and governs and rules the whole soul by its command, so that it both tames anger and removes desires from the mind — which discipline is by no means able to do. Natural capacity is whenever someone seems either able or unable to do something by nature: as, for example, very often when we have seen the bodies of boys and studied their limbs, we pronounce something about the future, and say that they will be boxers or runners — not because they are already engaged in this art or pursuit, but because by the build of their body they seem likely to carry these things out more easily. Similarly we call healthy or sickly those who either easily or not easily take on illness. For in the same way natural capacity is noticed in these too, which makes them either more often subject to illness or keep lasting good health. Hard and soft too, when said, show natural capacity. For hard is what by firmness of nature does not easily admit its own destruction; soft is that in which the nature is looser and not sufficient to repel contraries. The third genus or species of quality is affective qualities and affections, which are of this kind: harshness, heating and cooling — for so it pleases me to render *thermotēs* and *psychrotēs* — and whiteness and blackness. These are called affective qualities not because they are affected in any way, but because they produce an affection. For honey, to be sweet, has not been affected by sweetness, but produces a sweet affection in those who taste it. Whiteness and blackness, and what lies between them, that is redness and pallor, are more properly called affective qualities: for these arise only from an affection of the soul or of the body. For that someone grows dark is an affection of the body; that he grows pale or red is one of the soul, which, when it cannot bear the shame of something disgraceful, pours an abundance of blood into the outer parts of the body as if to screen itself, and so it comes about that we blush from excessive shame. Pallor too arises from a similar affection of the soul, when, struck by excessive fear, it flees to the inner recesses of the heart and the blood follows it, so that the body, which is in view, deserted by the blood, turns white. Philosophers affirm this affection of the soul to be so real that even if pallor or redness persists continually in the body, they assert that it has come about from a similar affection. If, therefore, these qualities persist in the body, because we are called qualified according to them, they too are reckoned affective qualities; but if they have existed for a short time, so as to depart quickly, we rather call them affections. For if someone has been angry for a time, or blushed, or grown hot, or grown cold, and is soon to return again to his natural state, he cannot be called ruddy or irascible or hot or cold, if he was affected by something for a time. So the distinction between affective qualities and affections will be this: that affections, arising for a time, are easily changed, while affective qualities, according to which we are called qualified, persist permanently. Let us now treat the fourth species of quality, in which are forms and figures: figures are assigned to inanimate things, forms to animate ones. For we designate figures when we say triangle, or square, or cone, or cylinder, or sphere; forms, when we assert that some people are handsome or ugly. In the same genus of quality are curvature and straightness. For we venture to translate *euthytēs* and *kampylotēs* in this way. For from these something is called straight or curved. Smoothness too and roughness, and rarity and density, from which we designate rare, dense, smooth and rough, are indeed joined to the number of qualities, but they admit another interpretation. For dense seems to show an excessive compression of the joined parts; rare, on the contrary, that in which, with frequent intervals, the joining of the parts seems looser. Moreover smooth seems properly to show that in which the position of the parts is so fittingly and evenly arranged that none of them stands out beyond the measure of another; rough, on the contrary, is produced by a discrepancy of the joined parts: for nothing produces roughness but the inequality of the parts, so that one is longer and another lower. And for this reason some want to join these to another category, which among the Greeks is called *keisthai*, among us 'lying', or, as Agorius, whom I count among the most learned, would have it, 'situation'. For it is clear that each of these consists in the position of the parts that make up the body: nevertheless, when we say smooth or rough or dense or rare, we indicate qualified things, and all that has been explained about them above seems to pertain to the interpretation not of the word but rather of the nature; for which reason reason compels us to count these too among the qualified. From these qualities, then, which we have enumerated, qualified things are named *parōnymōs* [paronymously], as smooth from smoothness, dense from density, and the rest like these. But it often happens, though rarely, that qualified things do not descend *parōnymōs* from their quality, as from virtue one cannot say 'virtuous' but 'temperate' and 'diligent'. Nor indeed in Greek is [a man] called *aretos* from *aretē*, but *spoudaios*. Hence it appears that qualified things exist even when, as often, the derivation of paronyms is neglected. So much for this: now that we have explained the diverse species of this quality, let us look at its consequences and its property. And first, there is no doubt that qualities admit contrariety. For who doubts that illness is contrary to health, injustice to justice, heat to cold, good to bad, the educated in letters to the uneducated? But you will not find this in every quality: for nothing can be contrary to pale, or dusky, or square, or triangle. So it will not be unhelpful to give a certain rule by which one can notice which qualities do not admit contrariety. It will therefore be known to the learned that those qualities which are intermediate between contraries, and those which arise from forms and figures, are wholly exempt from contrariety. I called 'intermediate between contraries' such as dusky and pale: for these two arise from whiteness and blackness and are intermediate between them; whiteness and blackness themselves are contrary to each other, but to dusky and pale nothing is contrary. It is clear, then, that intermediates between contraries have no contrary. Moreover, quality that consists in form or figure knows nothing of contrariety. For what could anyone set as contrary to a square or a triangle, to a circle or a cone or a cylinder? As a rule, then, let us hold that quality receptive of contrariety can be neither all [quality] nor it alone. Nor should this be omitted, that we know that among contrary qualities the one is under the same category under which the other is found: as injustice is contrary to justice; justice is a quality; therefore injustice too is a quality. Likewise whiteness is a quality; hence blackness too must be a quality. So it comes about that, as a rule, contrary qualities are always bound by the same category. Meanwhile, as we seek what is the property of quality, since admitting contrariety belongs neither to it alone nor to all of it, let us search out something else. For I see that quality admits more and less, that is *mallon kai hētton*, in itself. For we can say more white, or more black, or more musical, or less musical. But this too can be found neither in every quality nor in it alone. For who could call one prudence more prudent than another prudence, or one whiteness brighter than another whiteness, or one learning more learned than another learning, or something more a triangle than a triangle, or more a square than a square? For if it is a triangle, it cannot be more than a triangle; or if it is more or less, it will no longer be a triangle. Yet it seems good to separate and distinguish those qualities which admit more and less from those which are exempt from this degree of comparison. Let this then be the rule: that the qualities themselves cannot admit more and less, but the things that come from them, when compared, can admit more or less: as no one can call eloquence more eloquence or less, but the one who is called eloquent we can call more or less eloquent than others. It is clear, then, that more and less can be found in qualified things, [but] can never befall qualities. Figures too, as was explained above, do not admit more and less: for if you add something to a circle or take something away, it will no longer keep the name of circle, and will pass into the name of another figure. It has thus been clearly shown which qualities admit degrees of comparison of this kind and which seem to be foreign to them. It remains for us to investigate the property of quality, which among the Greeks is *idion*. For *usia* has this property, that being singular and one in number it admits contraries in itself — I said 'admits', not 'has' contraries. For we should remember that, when we treated of *usia*, we said that nothing is contrary to it. So as its property is to admit contraries, that is, now health, now sickness; and that of quantity, that is *tou posou*, to be called equal or unequal; and that of *tou de pros ti*, relation, to be *antistropha*, that is, to convert into each other, as if their nature were joined together: so also this is the property of quality, that all qualified things are called like or unlike. For sweet to sweet, and white to white, and foolish to foolish, and smooth to smooth, and hot to hot are properly called like or unlike. For if they are said otherwise, they will not have their proper designation. But lest some be troubled in reading because condition and state and discipline, which were placed among things said relatively, that is *en tōi pros ti*, are also connected to this same quality, we give this distinction: that they are joined to the category of relation when they are genera, but when species, to quality. For example, if you say discipline, which is the genus of the others, it is to be referred to relation: for discipline is called the discipline of a learnable thing. But if you say music, music is a species of discipline, not a genus, and is to be connected to quality: for we cannot speak of the music of the musical, but of the discipline of the musical. Similarly condition and state are connected now to relation, now to quality, according to genera and species. For if you call a condition or state, that is *diathesis* and *hexis*, one of a genus, that is of discipline, they are referred to relation; but if you call a condition or state one of a species, that is of music or grammar, we ought to recognise [them as] qualities. Although Aristotle himself too, great in genius, almost conceded to this mixture, and said it could happen that what belongs to quality is likewise referred to relation; and that it is not unfitting if one thing is included under the name of two categories.
CHAPTER XIII. — On acting and being affected.
Translator’s note for this stretch
Chapter heading XVII: 'post prœdicamentis' read as the post-predicaments. Ch. XIII: 'genere esse conjumeta qualitate discreta' read as conjuncta. Ch. XVI: 'mulier libere maritum' read as habere. Ch. XVIII: 'malum bomo' read as bono; 'ἒνδειαν ϰαὶ ὑπερολὴν' read as ἔνδειαν καὶ ὑπερβολήν; 'μειονξίαν' as μειονεξίαν; 'στιρησις' as στέρησις; 'άναθησίαν' as ἀναισθησίαν. 'non insuasibiliter' (ch. XVII) is a rare word, taken as 'not unpersuasively'.
Everything has now been said that pertained to the four greatest and most difficult categories: now the order reminds [us] that after quality a treatment of acting and being affected should be held. These two seem to descend from the source of quality: for that which makes [something] hot must itself be hot, and we know that the hot is something qualified. Similarly, what becomes hot receives a quality by its own being affected: and he who teaches, when he teaches, is a teacher, and makes a pupil; and each, whether teacher or pupil, is qualified: and other things like these, when considered, show that these two categories are rightly treated after quality has been set out first. Many have said that these two, acting and being affected, cannot occur except in things that are contrary. For that which is sweet does not make [anything] sweet except what was not sweet. For if what is affected were sweet, it would by its own nature have no room in which to receive the sweetness of another; it is necessary, then, that what is affected not be sweet, so that it may receive another's sweetness: and therefore, since what acts is sweet and what is affected is not sweet, they are said necessarily to appear contraries. Some have held otherwise, asserting that these can be found only in things that are similar and placed under the same genus; and that nothing can be affected or act unless it acts on something similar or is affected by something similar. For sweet and bitter, or hot and cold, though they seem contraries, nevertheless, since they fall under the same sense, they maintain are similar. Finally they say that no account of being affected or acting can hold between things that are foreign and wholly distinct: for example, what will number do in the bitter, or what could whiteness suffer from number? But let this be the dispute of others: for us let that rule suffice, so that we know that acting and being affected are joined in genus and distinct in quality. For the hot, which imparts its heat to the cold, is under the same genus as the cold too; but what is hot differs in quality: and the learned man, when he teaches the unlearned, is under the same genus; but he is distinguished by quality. It is clear, then, that acting and being affected are similar in genus, contrary in quality. But these two, as we said above, seem so joined to quality not only in order but also in nature, that they admit the same things that we said quality admits. For they do not reject contrariety, which quality admits; and they admit more and less, of which we said quality too is receptive. As for the property of these categories, which in Greek is *idion*, since Aristotle himself also omitted it, let the reader not seek it from us either.
CHAPTER XIV. — On lying, or situation.
It follows that we speak of lying, or of situation, as some think [it should be called]: this category seems already to have been treated among things referred to relation. For what lies, lies placed: and the placed belongs to position, and position to the placed. For which reason, as Aristotle himself, whom we follow, also did, let us pass on to other things.
CHAPTER XV. — On where and when.
Where and when seem to be place and time, though they are not; rather they are in place and time: as 'at Rome', 'in the senate', 'before the third hour', 'after the month of March'. These, as we have said, are in place and in time, not place and time. Accordingly, as being clear and needing no treatment, Aristotle too passed over these categories; and we shall do the same. For concerning time and place there is an old and great question among the highest philosophers, some holding that these are corporeal, others that they are to be reckoned as without bodies.
CHAPTER XVI. — On having.
We are said to have something in more than one way. For as far as we gather by treating [it], under this word there are, as it were, eight species. The first is whenever we have something in the mind, as justice, chastity, injustice or lust. The second, whenever we are said to have something in the body, as whiteness and blackness, variegation, or the other things that inhere in the body through quality. The third descends from quantity, whenever we are said to have a length of four or five feet. The fourth, when we are asserted to have something not in the whole body but in a part of the body; as a ring on a finger, shoes or buskins on the foot. The fifth species is when we are said to have something not in the body but around the body, as is a garment and all clothing. The sixth, whenever we are spoken of as having the parts of the body themselves, as hands, feet, head, or the rest that are in the framework of the limbs. The seventh place is whenever some vessel is said to have grain or wine. The eighth grade of having is that which seems to show our possession or ownership, when someone is said to have a house or a farm, or the tombs of his ancestors. These are the modes of having, which we have comprised in a set number; if anyone can find [one] beyond it, the fault will not be our sloth, since the Philosopher himself left free judgement to those who inquire. Many of the learned, indeed, reject that word, and maintain that it is used improperly when a wife is said to have a husband, or a husband a wife, or a father a son, or a son his parent; because they assert that what has the one having [it] cannot be had: but they think it more correctly said that a husband belongs to a wife, or a wife to a husband, a father to a son, a master to servants. For they contend that the force of this word lies in this, that it cannot signify both having someone and being had.
CHAPTER XVII. — On the post-predicaments.
At length, having crossed as it were the straits of a great sea, we have finished the number of the categories, not unpersuasively, I think, for the learned, and clearly enough for those who wish to learn: but certain things remain which forbid us to touch the end of this book. For in the individual categories contrariety was treated, when we said which admitted a contrary and which rejected it. Yet no treatment has so far shown what the contrary itself is: and certain words still remain whose force and proper sense ought to be explained. For which reason let us pass to the necessary treatment of opposites.
CHAPTER XVIII. — On opposites. Three species of contraries.
There are four species of opposites: for one thing is opposed to another, first, either in the form of the category which is called relation; second, or in the manner of contraries; third, or of those concerning which a having or a privation is said to be about us (here indeed we should take 'having' from the verb 'to have', not, as we defined above, that a state is a certain lasting disposition of the mind); in the fourth way, when we either affirm or deny something: for example, let us set out an example from those that are called relatives. The first [kind of] opposite appears [as] the double to the single, or a father to a son. Let the second, the example of contraries, be bad to good. The third, of those that are spoken of by having and privation, as blindness and sight. The fourth, of those in which there is negation and affirmation, as 'he runs', 'he does not run'. The distinction between contraries and relatives is evident to those who consider [it]: for things called relatives are named from what is opposed to them; for the single is the opposite of the double, and the double the opposite of the single: but contraries have what they are called from themselves, and do not need another. For who would say 'the bad of the good', or who 'the good of the bad'? This, then, is the lucid and clear distinction between these two species which come from opposites. Contraries themselves are divided into three species: for either they have a mean, that is, they have something between them; or they are without a mean; or, as reason has found in certain cases, they have a mean indeed, but its name does not appear, unless it is made up from the negation of each opposite. Those with a mean, then, are these, white and black, between which, since pale or dusky can arise, these opposites are called mediated. In those that are mediated, it is not necessary that one of the two opposites be found in a body: for if it is not black, it can be dusky; or if white is lacking, pale can be found. But of those opposites which are not mediated, one of the two must necessarily occur, as is health and sickness. Of these there is no mean, because human bodies must necessarily hold either health or sickness. But those which have a mean indeed, though it lacks a name unless it is formed from the negation of the opposites, are these, just and unjust: there is something in the middle, but it has no name; and so the negation of each opposite creates a name for it, so that we call that which is in the middle neither just nor unjust. Now let us go over more carefully those opposites which arise through having and privation: for in these it must be observed that both are in the same matter, in the same place, at the proper time. Blindness and sight are in the same matter; for they consist in seeing and not seeing. They are also in the same place; for both blindness and sight have their place in the eyes. Most of all, however, the fitness of the time is required in these: for no one is rightly called bald unless at the time when he ought to have hair he does not have it: nor can anyone call toothless, whom the Greeks call *nōdos*, an infant to whom tender age has so far denied teeth. For privation, which in Greek is called *sterēsis*, has this force, that it shows that someone had something by nature and does not have it. Among these things we should remember that it is one thing to be sight and blindness, another to have sight and to be deprived of it; lest, if we judge these to be the same, the reasoning should seem confused. But if anyone thinks this doubtful or too little certain, let him notice what follows each thing. For if the blind and blindness were the same, both would be said of one [thing]: but we say a man is blind; yet a man cannot be called blindness: it is clear, therefore, that it is one thing to be blind, another to be blindness. Nor are affirmation and negation the same as the things that fall under affirmation and negation. For an affirmation or negation is a word affirming or denying something; but the things found under them are different, as is 'Socrates is discoursing', 'Socrates is not discoursing'. Yet all are likewise held to be opposed to one another. Sometimes, however, evils are opposed to evils, whenever the means between contraries are good, as is deficiency and excess, which the Greeks call *endeia kai hyperbolē*. For between these two evils opposed to each other, moderation is sought as the mean. Following this reasoning the Peripatetics said that the virtues are means, so that they called more than is just *pleonexia*, less than is just *meionexia*: between which evils they placed justice in the middle. Similarly, between cunning and dullness they placed prudence; between lust and insensibility, which the Greeks call *anaisthēsia*, temperance is set; between timidity and rashness, courage. Thus reason, searching thoroughly, has found a certain hidden kind of opposites, so that sometimes evils are found to be contrary to evils. But Aristotle explained more fully and in many ways the properties and differences of these four species which come from opposites: for us, however, let it suffice to have set out both genus and species, lest, occupied with minuter matters, we wear down the necessary ones with tedium.
CHAPTER XIX. — On the prior.
Translator’s note for this stretch
XIX: 'non inultum' read as 'non multum'; 'polius' as 'potius'. XXI: 'dpetorcs' read as 'doctores' (teachers), uncertain; 'claminatione' as 'examinatione'; the Greek list is garbled in the scan and restored as *alloiōsin poiotētos*, *tēn kata topon metabolēn*. The gnomon 'in the shape of a half-circle' is as the text stands and is geometrically odd. XXII: 'nostra memoria' taken as 'of our time'. The final conditional clause ('si te non dissimilem nostri ... cupiditas retentaverit') makes poor sense as printed; a reading such as 'nisi' ('unless desire for other things ... has held you back') would give the expected sense, and the translation given is literal and uncertain.
One thing is said to be prior to another in five ways: the first of these is when we say that someone is older in time. The second way is that in which something arises from a prior thing, but when the prior perishes the second perishes, while when the second perishes the prior remains unharmed. So one is naturally prior to two: for two arises from it, but two cannot exist without one, while without two the standing of one remains. And when two exists, one must exist, but when one appears, no necessity compels two to exist. In the third way a certain order makes one thing prior to another, as we find in the disciplines and the liberal arts: for in grammar the prior thing is to learn the forms and names of the individual letters, then to come to know the joinings of syllables, then to take in the notion of words: last of all we must take up the use of speech, for the sake of which we come to know all its parts, as members running before it. And in rhetoric the place of the prior is similarly set: for first we deliver the proem, then the narration, after that the refutation, then the confirmation; last the epilogue is placed. With these examples, then, let it suffice to have shown the third mode of the prior. The fourth mode is not very plausible, and is set out by Aristotle himself as something he disapproves of: as when the common people are accustomed to call those better or more distinguished in fortune 'prior'. But in my opinion the force of this [sense of] prior has been rejected. These are the four modes of what is called prior: but a certain more hidden fifth is added, whenever, of two things which convert with each other, that one is rather [prior] which makes the other be: so, for example, if there is a man, we rightly call him a rational, mortal animal capable of laughter. And if this definition of man is true, it is true that there is a man. So each converts with the other, that is, both that the definition of man is true, and that the man of the definition is true. But since the definition could not be true unless the nature of man first appeared, therefore of these two, which we said convert with each other, man holds the place of the prior, whose existence expresses the truth of his definition.
CHAPTER XX. — On 'simultaneous'.
It follows that we should express the proper sense of the word by which we say that certain things are simultaneous. For reason seems to require that after the treatment of the prior we should discuss those things which are affirmed to be simultaneous. Things are called simultaneous, then, in three ways: when any things exist or appear together at one time, so that neither of the two is prior or follows the other, but the rising of both seems to be common, as heat and brightness in the sun. The second place belongs to those which are naturally simultaneous, yet neither of them provides for the other: for example, if we set down the single and the double, they must be naturally simultaneous, but neither does the double make the single be, nor does the single produce the double. At this point we ought not to be confused, lest, since when we were treating things said in relation we said that to be a relative is what depends on another, we seem now to be treating [the matter] against what was defined above. For we argued that all things said in relation are said from another, not that they are from another: nor is there any error, if one examines more carefully the weight of our words. The third place is whenever things flowing from the same genus seem to be simultaneous by nature, but are distinguished by species: nor do they provide anything for each other in what they are said to be, as is animal; the genus is the same, but the species are widely distinct. Nor does anything winged grant to the footed that it should be, nor the footed to the winged, nor in general does one supply any substance to the other in what it is; and none is prior to another, but all arise together, sprung from animal, that is, from one genus.
CHAPTER XXI. — On motion.
Every change, which in Greek is *metabolē*, comes about in three ways: either from non-subject into subject, as is rising or birth, which the Greeks call *genesis*; or from subject into non-subject, as is perishing or corruption, which the Greeks called *phthora*; or from subject into subject, as is motion, which in Greek is called *kinēsis*. But motion itself also has three species, that is, increase, diminution, alteration of quality or of place. These were called by the Greeks *auxēsis*, *meiōsis*, *alloiōsis*, or *phora*. For they wished alteration with respect to place to be called *phora*, which we too have preferred to call 'transition', following the teachers. But this order, which we have at present set out with careful examination, as though differing from that book which is called the Categories, Aristotle himself also expounded in the books on nature; in the Categories, however, following brevity in teaching, he did not hesitate to take the species for the genus, that is, motion for change: so that he said six species were subordinate to motion as though to a genus: *genesis*, *phthora*, *auxēsis*, *meiōsis*, *alloiōsis poiotētos*, *tēn kata topon metabolēn*. These we have called in Latin rising, perishing, increase, diminution, alteration of quality, transition of place. These six species are distinguished from one another by every account: unless perhaps to someone understanding too little learnedly, alteration of quality, that is *alloiōsis*, should seem to occur also when the others exist, so that when something is born, or perishes, or grows, or is diminished, alteration too should then be said to have taken place. But reason teaches that this is false: for things which grow or are diminished are changed in quantity, not altered in quality. For alteration properly belongs to quality. We must remember, however, that change is one thing and alteration another. For change is the genus, alteration a species subordinate to motion, which we have called a species of change. Finally, so that the distinction between them may be clear, let us set down a geometrical example. If you divide a larger square, which is drawn, by lines running through the middle into small squares, and afterwards take one small square away from it, you have diminished the larger square: but if in the place of what was taken away you add a gnomon, which is set in the shape of a half-circle, you have given back to the larger square more than you had taken away: and this belongs to quantity, not to quality, and is attributed to change rather than to alteration, and so they differ very greatly from each other. Now difference in all things comes about in three ways: either in matter, or in workmanship, or in both. In matter, if there are two similar rings, and one is gold, the other silver; in workmanship, if dissimilar rings are made from gold; in both, if a ring is gold and a stylus silver. It is clear, then, that these species of change are joined to one another neither in matter, nor in workmanship, nor in both: indeed, they are so separated that some of them even seem contrary to one another. For who would doubt that *phthora* is contrary to *genesis*, that is, perishing to rising, and diminution to increase? Alteration too, whether of quality or of place, though not of the same number of species, nevertheless has something which seems contrary to it. For alteration of quality is when something becomes black from white or white from black, which are manifestly contrary to each other. Alteration of place too, which we have called transition, admits the contrariety of upper and lower, and therefore it is evident that it too has contraries.
CHAPTER XXII. — Conclusion of the work.
These are the things, dearest son, which, having attained them by continual labour, since the teaching of Themistius, the outstanding philosopher of our time, was not lacking to us, we have turned from Greek into Latin for your benefit; that is, so that from these too you may receive the good fruit of the study that proceeded from us, if desire for other things, which are slippery and empty, has held you back [as] not unlike us. For we have omitted nothing in this book which could either delight those already learned, or instruct the unlearned more clearly.