XV.
Translator’s note for this stretch
In 2.1 a line of the printed apparatus ("Ma = Codex Matritensis 4679 olim N-49, P = Parisinus gr. 2998") has intruded into the text and has been left out. In 4.2 (§5) ἄλλως ἄξιον μῶν is evidently corrupt; translated as ἄξιον ὑμῶν, "worthy of you". The syntax of the long sentence in 4.1 (§4) and of the opening clause of 9.1 (κινήσας οὖν καὶ τοῦτον, εἴ τις) is loose, and the renderings are approximate. In 8.1 the edition's supplements <ὃν> and <ἂν> are translated.
There is a law that there be a prize for a good life, and Cephalus and Aristophon contend against each other for it. Cephalus [speaks].
I have never been tried before you on a charge, men of Athens, and may I never be, for I have lived in such a way as to give not even an informer a pretext for accusation or blame. But this trial, held over virtue, I would not think beneath me, since a guilty man contends over punishment, as Aristophon does, but a good man over a reward, as I do.
Now, men of Athens, it is pretty much the case that one and the same thing is both a source of pride for me in regard to my whole life and a disadvantage in regard to the present trial, while for Aristophon the opposite holds: it is a defect in his whole character but an advantage for the contest before you. What then is this? That I, never having come into the law court before, have no experience of contests of this kind, whereas this man here, being tried almost every single day, is well trained in the courts. If the honour is for skill in pleading, the better man is the one who has managed to beat off what seemed the gravest charges; but if, as the law says, it is for a good life, the better man is the one who has not even come under evil suspicion in his whole life.
Now even if some gratitude were owed to this man by you (though I for my part do not know for what, since he himself prides himself not on having done the people any good but on not having suffered harm at the people's hands), even if he has in fact been of some use to you, he has had sufficient [return]. How many times you saved him when he was in danger of losing his civic rights or his country, and sometimes even his life, so that he turns out to be in your debt besides. But I, who in no contest have needed your goodwill and kindness, may fairly obtain them now that I ask for the first time. And since, as you hear, the blameless life alone is just and good, while the life spent always in contests and fears is not comparable to it, the judgement of which is better is easy for everyone, even for one who knows neither of us personally.
Nevertheless those who do not know the outcome, but have learned just this, that one has been tried many times and the other not even once, without knowing the policy of each, might perhaps think that the one who is active in public life and entangled in many affairs has for that reason also fallen into many charges, and that it is no wonder if someone who makes himself accountable to all his enemies, drawing envy upon himself from the things for which he is esteemed and through all the things Aristophon now alleges, is brought to trial; whereas about me one might hold the opposite opinion, that living as a private man, as is likely, I have slipped out of the public eye and escaped the informers' notice in the obscurity of my life; and one might consider the man who loves danger sometimes even useful, in that he does not shrink from saying or proposing what is needed, while I might be thought to win the prize for my life, having lived blamelessly to this day, but to have contributed nothing to public affairs. And indeed this is how things stand: neither is it a great thing for one who lives for himself and does not touch public life to remain free of charges, nor is it a thing worthy of punishment, or indeed of honour, for one in public life to escape many charges.
5. What then is both hard to attain and in any case worthy of you, if it is achieved? If someone, men of the jury, presiding over public affairs, among the first to answer the call "Who wishes to speak?", serving as envoy whenever needed, legislating where the occasion requires, handling public funds, clashing, as is likely, with everyone in public life, envied by some for the things for which he is praised, alone keeps his life free of danger in a dangerous course of conduct, and prosecutes those he catches doing wrong while no one brings any countercharge against him: this is the great leader of the people, this is the man beyond expectation, to whom all men, privately and publicly, grant that he conducts public life well, obeying him in common and not indicting him individually; to him they bear witness with one mouth by their very silence, the well-disposed, the ill-disposed, the whole people, the orators, the informers.
Such a man, then, am I for you. For it is not the case, as he claims, that he, because he has been in public life, never stops being tried, while I by fleeing public affairs have also fled prosecution. Having taken one and the same road at first, the one straight to the council chamber and the Pnyx, rivals in the same craft and competitors for the same things, we have shown ourselves unlike in like circumstances, which is the clearest test. To go through each of our political acts would take a long speech, but the sum of the matter on which the trial now turns is this: Aristophon proposed many motions, and against each one there was an indictment; Cephalus proposed no fewer, and nowhere an accuser. He handled public revenues: audits, auditors, trials. I was put in charge of the administration: no informer was found so bold, any more than anyone prosecuted the famous Aristides for embezzlement. We came back from an embassy: I was led to the Prytaneum, he to the law court. The war ended according to the foresight of each of us: I was crowned, he was dragged off to prison. The same throughout our whole public careers. For him this fine life is unlivable, always trembling for himself, living a hare's life; but I, without keeping silent on a motion, without swearing off an embassy, neither in proposing something burdensome nor in opposing what pleases, gave not even a handhold to those by whom Aristophon knows himself to be prosecuted on every pretext. Are our lives, then, nearly alike?
7. Being clever from habit in legal matters, he plays the sophist with something like this: "I have been tried many times and won, but Cephalus not even once. Will you then prefer him to one who has been tested?" As if he had contended in the many courts over meals in the Prytaneum, not over the ultimate penalties, and over seeming good, not over seeming not the worst. And yet even if he had been tried against others over a reward, this would count for nothing for him against me until he had been set beside me and judged better than I. And if, having been prosecuted many times by me, he had escaped many times, not even so would he have shown himself good, but me an informer.
But if it was neither against the same man nor over the same things, let him not bring charges of vice into a contest of virtue, unless he alone is to acquire the finest things by the most shameful; he is so far from rightly receiving a prize on account of his evil suspicions (let them be called suspicions) that, even if he offered something else worthy of a reward, he would fairly be prevented because of this, that his charges outnumber his claims to pride. Therefore certainly no reward should be granted him for having been tried many times, nor even for some other good deed; he ought, even if [someone] cast his countless trials in his teeth as a reproach, to hide his face; and I myself would not, by the gods, have reproached him with his indictments, if he had not been priding himself on his own misfortunes.
So, having yourself stirred up this contest too, if anyone did, out of love of danger, and being on trial even now, come, do you claim to have received a vote for virtue if you were not judged the worst of all men? No one is just because he is not a thief, nor patriotic because he is not a traitor; nor, in a word, is the man not utterly wicked good in every way. Virtue would then be close to vice, if escaping the one meant acquiring the other. Great, indeed total, is the gap between things that stand at opposite poles. Do not mix the unmixable, nor treat acquittal on the worst charges as testimony to the best way of life.
At any rate, if the man released from punishment is to obtain a reward, then today too the man who fails to win the honour will be punished with death. And if merely contending for a prize is more distinguished than not being a competitor at all, then escaping a penalty is also more honourable than never being accused. So just as the man not worthy of a reward is not for that reason worthy of punishment, so the man not worthy of punishment is not for that reason worthy of a reward. Since for such a man, not paying the penalty he risked is itself a great reward. You keep your civic rights, you have your life, you see the sun: these are the honours of acquittal. Or is it not shameful that the same man in the same city should yesterday, and the day before, and long ago, and always, face account for bribery, treason, or one of the most terrible crimes, but today be crowned for virtue, and that the same people should be listeners then to the accusation and now to the proclamation? For what court is not full of your disgraces? All of them are at leisure for this man alone, they have been built for the life of one man, and they are not enough for the accusations. He is called by one name in one place and another elsewhere: here thief, there lawbreaker, scoundrel everywhere.
These are the names of your virtue, these are the proclamations you have. He never keeps peace or truce. He all but forces the courts to sit for him even on the holy days. For lest he escape his indictments, he changes the charges; lest they acquit him, they keep him for another trial. What happens is a postponement of punishment, not a release. One case has not yet reached its end, another has begun. Against one he has filed a counter-charge, against another he enters a special plea. For one he swears an affidavit for delay, another he contests. He knows one road, from court to court. Before offering a victory sacrifice he is praying about the undecided indictment. He receives evil upon evil, and he has no sense of his past deliverance because of the fear approaching. Perhaps even now he is under indictment; for I do not busy myself with this man's troubles, nor do I envy his daily life of danger.
Translator’s note for this stretch
§12 'σῶστρα': reward for rescue. §14 'ἐπωβελία καὶ πρυτανεῖα': the one-sixth penalty (an obol per drachma) and court deposits; 'πρυτανεῖα' here means court fees, not the Prytaneum. The clause 'οἷς τοῖς ἡττᾶσθαι σιν οὐ δ’ ἡτισοῦν' is garbled; read as 'τοῖς ἡττηθεῖσιν οὐδ’ ἡτισοῦν'. §15 'Cadmean victories': proverbial ruinous victories; 'Adrasteia': Nemesis. §17 a word (τίς) appears lost before 'γὰρ ἐτόλμησε'. §18 'μήτε... κρίνει': text uncertain, rendered as 'the affairs... judge'. §20 'φιλαέτιον' read as φιλαίτιον, 'lover of accusations'.
I would have been ashamed to be praised as many times as this man exults in being accused. I would have expected anyone rather than him as rivals, those who had once or twice fallen under evil suspicion; but you were not content at having thrust off so many fears. You do not bow before the jurors. A fine reward you pay them for your rescue, you who even demand further payment for the things for which you were saved, a novel benefactor in return for benefits received, and you treat the courts with arrogance, [saying,] "And what do I care about trials? Let whoever wishes indict me; he will be the cause of a reward for me."
Socrates, though he had done no wrong, provoked the jurors, because he mockingly proposed for himself the penalty of maintenance in the Prytaneum. And I did not say this wishing to liken him to Socrates (how could I?), but showing that his arrogance deserves anger; for who would not pray to fall in with an informer, if he is to count the accuser's wickedness as his own virtue? And what will prevent kidnappers who have been arrested, and temple-robbers, if they are acquitted, from being invited from the prison to the Prytaneum?
For he opens the road for everyone and lays down a novel law, this too deserving an indictment: that those tried should, by a single vote, either die or be crowned. And where is there such a law? Among the Locrians the speakers propose laws with a noose [around their necks]. Although the gratitude, if he prevails, could be equal in weight to the greatness of the fear, they do not place a crown on the head of those who drew it out of danger after the noose; he is content that he goes away alive. And our laws too, after the acquittals of those who have been tried, do not measure out honour to them, but penalties to those who failed to convict: the one-sixth fine and the court fees, and if he does not even get a fifth of the votes, he is disenfranchised. Now if those who accused you incurred these penalties, you have reaped two benefits: suffering nothing yourself and seeing your enemies [punished]; but if they got off unpunished, consider whether the jurors did not condemn them for malicious prosecution, but turned the charges back on you. And how would it be reasonable, in cases where no harm whatever has come to those defeated, that you should receive a reward on top of having won?
15. Do you not know, you adviser of the people, that for anyone with even a little shame it is preferable to be convicted in one case here than to escape many, and to be condemned for small matters than to be suspected of such great ones? You glory in your daily Cadmean victories, but I bow before Adrasteia; for set against [yours] my life, which has never been put to trial. I have had no charge, greater or smaller. And not being tried is itself a judgment of virtue: being clean of blame, never coming even near unjust suspicion, and that while moving among those engaged in politics.
For indeed not even any private citizen goes unscrutinised, even if he is not tried; many people investigate even those who escape notice, even if they do not catch them in the assembly, closely watching the rest of their habits: where each man's living comes from, with whom he lives, with whom he walks. The city is a great court for everyone's daily pursuits. But when a man conducting public affairs too is free of charge and beyond reproach, will you wait for a greater test than this? And if this were the second or third year since I came to the platform, this time would not be trustworthy or a guarantee; but if from the day I was approved as an adult I have devoted myself to the people, and have administered nothing that was not done well, and have been accused of nothing by anyone (and yet I too have some enemies, fewer than this quarrelsome man, but still there are some, some aggrieved at being thwarted by me, some wishing to be ranked before me, some envious), yet they find not even the shadow of a charge, do I really seem to you unscrutinised?
I would not be proud of not being tried if I were a private citizen, for it is no wonder that a soldier who stays out of range is not wounded; but if, going to close quarters with dangers and exposing myself to the people's uproar, the informer's envy, the chances of fortune, I am invulnerable to slanders no less than the story says Ajax was to iron, how is this not something to be proud of? Even about Miltiades the malicious found something to say; they accused the incorruptible Pericles of theft, and Thrasybulus, who gave the people back their laws, of illegality; but me (and may no envy meet me for this) no enemy has brought to trial, no law, no envy, no informer, no speechwriter, no rumour except the finest about me. I am unstained by shameful talk and superior to the envy that follows the distinguished. For who has dared to utter a voice against me? Who [has dared] to open his mouth, though many decrees have been proposed by me, and no small sums administered? How many laws? How many embassies? Overseer of works, superintendent of the dockyards: there is nothing I have not done alone.
For my part, if this seems to you something to be proud of, having been tried many times, I say that I too have been tried many times, not in the way of those thought to do wrong, perish the thought, but in the way of good men. Many are my courts. The councillors: before them I win with my preliminary decrees. The Pnyx, where I persuade those in assembly. And in the courts themselves others failed to convict. And the greatest [court] is in the affairs themselves, which judge speakers neither out of enmity nor out of favour; but as the man handling them arranges them, so they also appear: good if they are well done, bad if they are so.
My political acts are such that not even Momus, as they say, would find fault with them. And if I must show that I have been acquitted on each charge: I am acquitted of illegality, since though I have proposed [decrees] no one has indicted me; of misconduct on embassy, since though I have often served as envoy I have not been accused; and on each charge, so that I may be rid of this ill-omened talk as quickly as possible, in that you have never judged anything against me. So in the thing this man is puffed up about, I too am acquitted, more evidently, of every charge; but Cephalus's distinction this man could not claim.
And you defeated so-and-so the slanderer and so-and-so the lover of accusations, but I defeated malicious prosecution itself, since none of those who practise this art has dared even to look me in the face. And by a wide margin I defeat those whom you overcome by a contest. This is a soldier's secure victory too, when the enemy will not even endure coming to blows with him; and for an athlete the victory is purest and beyond excuse when no athlete strips to face him, having yielded even before the trial because of the evidence of his superiority. For the one who is despised as an equal or inferior, even if he should prevail, would seem to win by luck rather than strength; but the one whom nothing withstands has won by the very vote of his opponents that he is unrivalled.
Who, then, would prevent a soldier from setting up a trophy who without a battle, by fear alone, has routed the enemy, or begrudge the crown to athletes who win without a contest? Shall I too not be crowned, unrivalled, having scattered all the malicious at once by the integrity of my conscience, having sewn shut the mouths of the spiteful, turned aside slanderous tongues, and bridled baseless malicious prosecutions and false charges?
When does the city rule Greece without dispute? Is it not when all willingly yield first place to her? But the many contests against many and the charges from the Greeks brought the fortification of Decelea against her and pulled down her walls. Therefore now, obeying policies such as mine, she has conducted herself among the Greeks not quarrelsomely nor rashly, but safely and blamelessly, having been the first to swear to herself, after the civil strife, 'I will not bear grudges,' so as not to fill her civic life with trials and evils, considering continual lawsuits in a democracy no less a misfortune than oligarchy. So the people too imitated my way, or rather I imitated the city's.
23. But even now, today, if no one were contesting the honour with you, you would not at once take it and be gone; and since you have found the man ranged against you, you risk, besides not obtaining it, also departing judged the worse. Of small account indeed is the risk for the man undisputed in virtue to win. But since you are contentious, come, let me make use of the [judicial] law. And what does it order? That the majority [of votes] prevail. And now whoever receives the most will take the prize.
Translator’s note for this stretch
23: στικῷ νόμῳ is corrupt; rendered as 'judicial law' by sense (majority vote). The sentence μικροῦ γε <λόγου> ... κρατεῖν is obscure and the rendering is tentative. 28: the words καὶ πρὸς τίους are corrupt and could not be translated, marked [...]. 30: τοῦ θέντος is probably corrupt (perhaps for 'the defendant'); translated by sense. 33: the infinitive clause 'It is therefore...' is incomplete in the Greek, apparently continuing an implied 'it is not right'.
So then: all the Athenians say that I conduct public affairs well. No one has thought me worth even a trial; but many have condemned you, you who pride yourself on not having been condemned. First, the accusers: if one gathered them alone, they are enough to fill the Heliaea. So many have testified against you and condemned you by an open vote. Second, those who testified against you, another full court. Nor, then, do even those who control the vote all acquit this man, for he is let off by a few votes and often by one, but I alone by all.
25. And there is something I have long been considering, and though I hesitate to say it I am compelled: that I see your victories are not free from suspicion, and I hear many saying: 'Aristophon alone is always a defendant. Did no one who saw him doing wrong indict him? Was the orator so contemptible to them? Were they not deterred even by seeing the earlier ones defeated? It cannot be. They would not have dared unless they knew something. How, then, does he escape them all? He is clever, persuasive, witty; he turns the charges into laughter, he dissolves the anger of the court, he brings up generals to plead for him, he calls in his wife and the whimpering [children], who have been taught by habit to supplicate as well. By these means he fends off paying the penalty for his wrongs.' Such things they babble, perhaps not true, but they suspect them, since whenever he has been convicted in advance in everyone's opinion, and 'now he will not get away, condemned beforehand', then against everyone's hopes he escapes.
And the worse things they say about him I would not repeat: that some come into court by agreement, have sold the case, and accuse in a way meant to give way and slacken; that others were set up by him from the start, seizing the courts in advance; and they say that the witnesses present have been bought, and some of the jurors bribed, and everything of that kind. For he need not be shown to have done things deserving death, but enough not to obtain the reward.
Against me, however, no one could name anything else discreditable, nor any of these things: neither that I deceive the jurors, I who act in silence, nor that I buy off those who would accuse me. For if there were a fixed number of those who undertake to accuse, as in a *symmoria* [tax-group], it would be possible to buy them and do wrong with impunity; but if it is open to all to impeach, indict, denounce and bring to court anyone at all, I surely did not buy all the Athenians. For however many I persuaded to keep quiet, more would have been left to accuse me. And if some had indicted me and then dropped it and let it go, the malicious could have suspected: 'They settled, they sold out.' But as it is, how could I have persuaded those who never appeared?
28. And if you say that the people in the city are fond of accusing, and that this is why you have often been tried, you make my merit greater, if even among such men I remained free of charges; but if they seem to you to overlook wrongdoers (let it be whichever you wish), and that is why they do not prosecute me, then what sort of man must he seem who even among the easygoing and negligent is always facing charges? One of two things, then, is necessary: either you, through an excess, if I may put it so, of goodness, have made even the quiet ones eager for risk, or [have made] those naturally fond of accusing [...], or I am so good as to seem so even to the informers. For if we did not live in the same city, there would be an excuse: that you live among censorious men, while I am lucky in having mild fellow citizens; but if under the same laws, in the same agora, we have not found you the same, the nature of the citizens is not the cause, for it would be one and the same toward both of us; rather, our differing characters made you, too, not alike toward each.
29. You, then, may shape the citizens in words as you like, either quick to accuse or slow to it, for both are in my favour: if they are not prone to anger, because you provoked even them; if they are hard to please and bitter, because I pleased even such men. But what you seem to me to be, and what all men will testify, I will not hesitate to say frankly. You seem implacable as far as readily suspecting and accusing the blameless, which is why there are so many trials in Athens; but once you enter the court you are easily led and kindly to all. If someone denies [the charge], you believe him, you always lean toward the man on trial, you pity him, you shed more tears than the defendants, you save him. And in a way this happens with good reason. For privately each of you is either bitter or malicious or has some other human failing; but gathered together in one place, laying aside each his individual character, you have become the Athenian community, and with your juror's token and staff you have taken on the humanity inborn in the city.
Among such men, then, it is easy to accuse even those who do no wrong, and easy to pity even those who err. For you let defendants go as though they had suffered what they feared to suffer, considering fear a sufficient corrector. So it is not being saved after trial but not even coming under accusation that counts for much among these men. For in Lacedaemon, and wherever men are slow to accuse a citizen but harsh in judging, it is easier to escape accusation than to be let off unpunished; but in Athens, where trials are countless and punishments easily counted, the many acquittals belong to your goodness, not to the virtue of the defendant, while for no accuser to rise up against a man belongs to his own just character, just as mine is self-sufficient, with no orator, no witness, no court contributing anything to its repute.
31. And one might justly add this: being saved after trial has happened to countless men among you in earlier times, even to those one would not have expected. You acquitted Oedipus after he killed his father, and Orestes who killed his mother deliberately. In such company is Aristophon saved. And yet they did not ask for a reward, not even the son of Agamemnon who had defeated goddesses. Nor could one count how many you pitied and saved though they were not clean. And for this reason you alone hold Pity to be a god. But not being tried while in public life is something no one could produce as having happened to anyone before me. And things are precious not when they are shared by many, but when they are special to those honoured, like the honour itself.
32. Since I think you would see the difference between the two lives most clearly by examining it in your own case, for each man deliberates best about his own affairs, I will put it to you. Tell me, by the gods, if someone offered you the choice of taking the life of either of us: to be in impeachments and indictments all your life, to hear the worst things said in the middle of the courts, to be gripped by ceaseless worries from day into night, to tremble for your life, to call on advocates, to supplicate jurors... 'Heracles, will you not stop cursing us?' Do you hear them answering? Leave this man's fine life to the averting and protecting gods, and may you never even have experience of it; but in its place, mine, as well regarded and conspicuous as that of any public man, but as safe and blameless as the life of any private citizen, a life that has never heard blame and is full of praise: who would not pray to have it for himself and his children?
Since, then, you ask the gods for the finest things and pray to be spared the opposite, and when you wish your children to be fine and good men you pray against their living as Aristophon does, and pray with me that they live as Cephalus does, you have, with the gods as witnesses, preferred my life. It is therefore, besides being neither just nor pious to cast a vote contrary to your request to the gods, to make your prayer, as one might say, a second oath as to how you must judge.
34. And it is not only by you, from the things each of you wards off or prays to have regarding his own affairs, but also with Aristophon as judge that I win. Stand up here and answer me. When you first entered public life, did you pray to the gods never to stop being tried, or to succeed without danger? And what? Are you glad of what has befallen you, or do you regard it as a misfortune? For if you asked even the gods for the most dangerous indictments and are glad they came, you are most fond of danger and wicked on that account, if you alone find pleasure in being ill spoken of and in rolling about the courts, where we consider even those who frequent them on others' business busybodies. But if, as often (and you can always see it before the Eponymous Heroes: 'So-and-so [indicts] Aristophon for theft' or 'for treason'), you lament even to those you meet: 'They hate me; where else does the indictment come from? None of them lets me even breathe. What end will there be to this evil? Cephalus is fortunate', and you cry out to the jurors and are seen winning pity from the frequency of your danger, how is it that for things you resent as evils you ask a reward as for goods?
And you call me fortunate, yet you declare your own life, over which you grieve, better than the one you count blessed. And those who will accuse you, the causes of your fine life, you would most gladly ward off, if you could; but are you forcing yourself to show that things whose causes you hate are fine? And indeed, if gratitude were owed to you by these [jurors] for your many trials, gratitude would also be owed by you to your accusers. For they have been the originators of this good thing for you. But you bear a grudge against them all, you hound them as enemies and do them harm. So much do you consider them the causes of the greatest good!
Translator’s note for this stretch
35.1: 'if gratitude were owed to you by these' is elliptical; the sense of the subject (jurors) is supplied. 35.2: the text is unsettled around 'ὅς]' and the supplement '<ἀφείθη τῆς αἰτίας, ἐγὼ δ᾿>'; translated as restored. 37.2: 'οὐδὲ]' seems an editorial mark; 'πολλάκις σε κἀγὼ παρῃτησάμην' taken as 'I too begged you off'. 46.1: 'οὕτως ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ὤν, ἑτέροις ἠγνοημένος κριταῖς' appears corrupt or lacunose; rendered literally and marked [...]. 47: the main clause of the 'some... others' contrast lacks a verb; 'choosing' supplied.
36. Therefore by common opinion, by the facts, by the judgements you hold about each of us, by Aristophon's own reasoning, by every [test], my life is the better. And in general, what is the goal for those who have been acquitted? Is it not to return to blamelessness? Is it not to seem like those who have never been charged? Nothing else. Aristophon, then, asks this from others and achieves it with difficulty after many fears; but I have my acquittal from myself, and I am, and seem to all to be, such a man as he struggles to seem. The good fortune that comes to him after victory, that is my life. Then, though he wishes to seem like this [man] and cannot (for even if he escapes his trials, he cannot get the state of not having been tried), he says he is better than him, a man whose character is in dispute [better] than one agreed by all to be good. He was released from the charge, but I have escaped it; he was judged blameless, but I was never accused.
If the contest were about which of two men was healthier, would you not prefer the one who was never ill? Or the one who falls into many diseases of every kind, and recovers through medical treatment with bitter drugs and surgery, and before being cured of the first begins another illness again, and, to put it in a word, is under treatment all his life and dies hard right into old age? Apollo, he would be better off dying of the first disease, staying in it, than experiencing one affliction after another. The best condition of the body, then, is that which needs no doctor, and of the soul that which does not appeal to a juror; for the courts are the surgeries for the diseases of the soul. Being constantly worn down in them, this man, even under the knife, has never yet been fully cured, but only seems so; while I am whole, healthy, in no need of compulsory medicine.
38. And one would not put even a man accused once on a level with one never accused once, if a body that has been ill and cured is also worse than one that has never been ill; much less is there any comparison between this man and me, he who lies before those who bring indictments as a common target, on whom all the orators practise. There is no one who does not speak against him, and the young lads begin their rhetoric with accusations of him. Set our lives side by side briefly. No accuser will convict me, no, none, of being charged with the smallest things; you were charged with the greatest. Nor did I seem to err even by chance; you were suspected of deliberate wrongs. They often deliberated whether to let you live; no one deliberated even about accusing me. I was praised; you were charged. I was crowned; you were in danger. You were tried; I was judging. You supplicated; I pitied. Often I too begged you off.
39. Against this, then, he forces three arguments: first, that I was not tried by him, so that I have not been accused as far as he is concerned; second, that not meeting an accuser is good fortune, not any virtue; third, that he himself, using unrestrained frankness and not shrinking even from danger, naturally continues to be on trial, while I conduct public life more cautiously. I must answer each of these.
40. To 'You did not indict me', the fact that he did not indict me either might seem to be equal for equal; but this is not equal: no one else indicted me either, whereas nearly everyone except me has indicted him. And if it is a proud thing not to be tried by one man, how much more honourable is it to be tried by no one?
41. As to the point about Fortune, see how moderately I will speak. I suppose Fortune to be the cause of every good thing for men, and that nothing at all is achieved by us when the goddess stands aside, since even winning in the courts is not a matter of skill alone, unless some good fortune is added. And I grant Fortune the lead even in choosing the better course. But I see that all men are honoured for the things in which they are fortunate, and honours belong to successes, for both general and orator, while the unfortunate miss out on rewards as well. It would be absurd, then, if you honour as successful the man who admits he is unfortunate. Yet neither is this man unfortunate involuntarily, but through meddlesomeness and rashness in his public conduct, nor is my being free of charges from others and from you a chance find, but [comes] from foresight, if anything does, and from care over what should and should not be said. Fortune sets her seal on the safety of my counsels.
Those things are prized among men which have been both well planned and have reached the end intended, while those which miss in their planning, or fail against intention, fall short both in choice and in fortune. But you think it an unplanned windfall to guard against an enemy's malice and an envious man's jealousy, as if exact foresight had no part in it. Many watch me too, men whose habit is to grab at evil at random as if clutching air, and they look closely for any weak spot. For because I alone of those who have taken part in public life at Athens have not been tried, they envy the very novelty of it and compete over who will indict Cephalus.
Why then do they not dare? Counting over my public acts, they can find nothing blameworthy, nothing near it, nothing even plausible enough to be believed, though untrue. Come, let us take something from my private pursuits. Even in my household affairs they see nothing at all, of things they might charge, fit for censure. My life is inaccessible to them. That is why they keep silent even against their will. But Aristophon, even if he has not shamelessly dared any wrong, or one caught in the act so as to be convicted at once, seems to attempt certain things through secret means and to be a villain by the art of escaping notice. Let none of this, men of Athens, be true, I do not wish it either; but what the accusers reckon on when they are confident of persuading, and what leads them on to accuse, I will tell you.
Aristophon has not manifestly taken bribes, but he has spoken like a man who had. He does not have the stolen goods of theft in his hands, yet he has provided signs of it. He did not speak openly against the laws in so many words, but not in keeping with them either. With these hopes they bring him to court, as not far from seeming wicked. For no one is so fond of accusing as to bring a baseless false charge against a man wholly spotless and guilty in nothing, nor is a city so easygoing that it lets go unpunished even those slightly suspect; rather, informers are too bold to wait for clear proofs, but too cautious to prosecute those entirely blameless.
That is why the same men are easygoing toward me but eager to accuse him, just as among walls, the enemy bring siege engines against those that can be taken, but do not even try the impregnable ones. So it seemed to them, but they did not find, clever though they are, engines with which to take me. Indeed I repelled even their plots by the trustworthiness of my character, while his accusers you beat back, like good allies, since, as far as his own policy went, he would long ago have been taken by siege.
This is the good and bad fortune of each of us. For each man is first his own good or bad spirit in what he chooses, badly or with moderation. So I, being myself, unknown to other judges [...]. Fortune keeps bold accusers away from me. What of this man? Not considering according to the laws what will benefit those who vote, but how, when he comes forward, he will please and gratify whom he wishes and hurt his private enemies, throwing himself into obscure management of money, doing other things by which he comes under suspicion, and in sum, being Aristophon, let him make false charges against Fortune! Such a man calls accusations upon himself.
47. And the speech has more or less arrived at a reckoning of how each of us conducts public life. It is like this. Political conduct being divided into these two kinds, some through excessive caution [choosing] the quiet life, as most do, others, out of boldness, rushing to say and propose everything without [asking] 'what is good?', as this man does, and the former, living privately, neither help nor harm, while the latter, being headstrong like him, overturn cities: I, taking the middle road of public life, neither so timid as not to say what I should, for that is shameful, nor so reckless as to say what I should not, for that is ruinous to the whole state, but addressing the people on just what is timely and having escaped the excess on either side of those mentioned, the idleness of the one and the meddlesomeness of the other, seem to myself to have hit on the good itself, which in human pursuits stands in the middle between the extremes of excess.
But he calls good counsel caution, disparages reasoning as hesitancy, gives recklessness the pet name of courage, and finds fault with safety as cowardice, not knowing that nowhere is rashness a virtue. Not even in pursuits that seem to belong to daring, such as seafaring and war: let no helmsman contend against contrary winds or fight a sea battle with the waves when he can wait for the proper seasons and favourable winds, for in this way he saves both the ship and those sailing in it; and let no general lightly hazard his army or rashly stake everything on a throw, where it is better [to win] without a battle. For it belongs to a soldier, and a hired one at that, to throw himself away lightly, but to a general and a leader of the people to plan with safety.
Translator’s note for this stretch
50.1: 'καὶ μή, κριθείη <ἂν> δι’' is evidently corrupt; the gap is marked [...] and the sense given is approximate. 'ἴχοι' read as ἔχοι. 51.1: 'πάντως ι τις γράψεται, τί οὖν βούλεσθε πράγματα' appears corrupt (stray 'ι'; the question may be misplaced); translated as it stands.
Who destroyed our men at Amphipolis? Cleon's unreasoning boldness. Who [destroyed] those in Sicily? Alcibiades in his boldness. But if they had listened to Nicias, who foresaw what was coming, these things would not have happened. For the orator must also be a prophet and take care for his own safety; for the community too would wish to be set right in this way, when he is seen to provide for his own part. If they had listened to far-sighted leaders of the people, they would not have adopted such proposals. As it was, men like Hyperbolus and Cleophon, orators like this man, thinking neither of the community's safety nor of their own, led the city out into those disasters.
A general perhaps needs boldness too, but the orator [is valued] for advising better than another; for his skill lies not in arms but in reckoning what is advantageous. And one who does not foresee the things from which he himself would incur danger would hardly consider what is safe for you. So if he brings dangers upon himself and [...], the whole city would be put on trial for its survival; but I, having nowhere brought down either myself or the public, have by my faultlessness gained freedom from blame.
Show beforehand what kind of men you want those in public life to be: far-sighted, safe, having reckoned out what must be done, or bold, heedless, improvising in public affairs themselves. For whatever the prizes are given for, that is what all men practise. I do not beg for the reward, as this man does in the law courts. For where the question is not about misfortune but about honour, one should win goodwill not by pity but by justice. I will say one thing and step down: his reward, whatever he asks for, someone will certainly indict—why then do you want trouble?—but mine no one will, since no one [has indicted] me either.