Fragments that seem to belong to the first book.
Translator’s note for this stretch
Fr. 1 is supplemented by Kemke from Plato, Laws 669B, which the edition prints with it; the restorations follow that model. In fr. 3 (pap. 424) line 8 'χαιτοϲϲ' is unintelligible and left untranslated; several lines there are too damaged to render. Fr. 13B line 3 'ϲυνεπικοϲμθῖν' read as ϲυνεπικοϲμεῖν ('add as ornament'). Fr. 10 (IX 71) line 1 restored ἀνδρεῖα may be 'manly [things]'. In XI 80 fr. 12 the subject of 'admits' and 'wrote' is not named in the surviving text. Damon in fr. 9 is presumably the fifth-century Athenian music theorist.
IX 69 fr. 1
. . . . to be concerning mu-
sic]. For of caution . .
. . . . to need most
of all] images. For [if one] err[s,
] one is harmed most gravely
in] character, [and it is] a task . . . .
. . . . . to perceive, because
poe]ts are inferior
to] the Muses. [And they] themselves
would not] compose melodies
and rhy]thms fit[ted
to slaves] and unfree
men, and] again would not
combin]e both [the voices of] men
and of instru]ments, all
sounds]? . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
but poets] heavily such things
interweav]ing and jumbl[ing
together]? . . . . . .
. . . . . tearing apart rhythm
on the one hand and figures of
spee]ch, bare words . .
. . sett]ing [in metre], and melody [in turn
agai]n without words, us[ing
lyre]-playing and pipe-playing,
in which it is indeed very
hard] to recognise, when [produced] without words,
rhyth]m and harmony,
] what [they mean
and wha]t they resemble among the [worthy
] imitations, [but . . .
. . . . tha]t such a thing [is full
of much boo]rishness, [all of it,
insofar] as [it is fond of] speed . . . . . . .
Plato, Laws II 669B: 'For since it is celebrated more than the other images, it needs the greatest caution of all images. For whoever errs in it would be harmed most gravely, welcoming bad characters; and it is very hard to perceive, because the poets are inferior to the Muses themselves. For they would never err so far as to give men's words a women's figure and melody, or, having composed the melody and figures of free men, to fit rhythms of slaves and unfree men to them; nor again, having laid down free rhythms and figure, to give a melody or words contrary to the rhythms; nor would they ever put together in one the cries of beasts and of men and of instruments and all sorts of sounds, as if imitating one thing. But human poets, heavily interweaving and jumbling such things together irrationally, would provide laughter for all those men who, as Orpheus says, have come to the season of delight. For they see all these things jumbled together; and the poets further tear apart rhythm and figures from melody, setting bare words into metres, and melody and rhythm without words, using bare lyre-playing and pipe-playing, in which it is very hard to recognise, when rhythm and harmony arise without words, what they mean and which of the worthy imitations they resemble. One must rather assume that everything of this sort is full of much boorishness, insofar as it is very fond of speed and unfaltering dexterity and bestial sound, so as to use pipe-playing and lyre-playing other than to accompany dance and song; and the use of either bare would be utterly unmusical showmanship.'
unpublished papyrus 424 fr. 3 (upper part of the column)
. . . in the pleasures . . .
. . . not . . .
. . . . . . . bu[t only to some fe]w
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . of the temperate
. . . . . . . . . m]usic, but of the . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . that one
. . . . . . . . . . of the one swe-
et, of the other c]old and un[pleasant
. . . . . . . . .
lines 6–7 perhaps: of the [orderly] music, but of the [disorderly]?
Plato, Laws 802B: 'Those chosen as examiners of these, not younger than fifty years, are to make the selection: whatever of the old poems seems adequate they are to admit; whatever is deficient or wholly unsuitable, the one they are to reject altogether, the other to take up again and rework, enlisting men skilled in poetry and music, using their powers of composition, but not yielding to their pleasures and desires except in a few cases, and expounding the wishes of the lawgiver, so as to arrange dance and song and all choral performance as far as possible according to their own judgement. Every disorderly pursuit concerning music, once it takes on order, even without the sweet Muse being set beside it, is ten thousand times better; the pleasant is common to all. For if someone lives from childhood to the settled and sensible age in temperate and ordered music, hearing the opposite he hates it and calls it unfree; but if raised in the common and sweet sort, he says its opposite is cold and unpleasant.'
IX 73 fr. 14
. . . . . . . by some reasoning and
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . towards
. . . . but since the [part]s are
those [from] which our nature
is] composed, both [bod]y
and soul, . . . . . . it is the task
that a power has been established
for e]ducation: for the bo-
d]y gymnastics, for the
s]oul music, through which, both
together, are harmonised with
one another the . . . . of the soul
IX 72 fr. 13 A.
only the last letters of the lines survive: l. 2 use- 3 pastime 4 -ing, make 5 as it happen- 6 natural 7 by Zeus, the 9 ridic]ulous if 10 will appear.
IX 72 fr. 13B
the pre]servation [or] the [guarding
of virtue. And [some] add
as further ornament . . . . . . . . . . .
fitting some . . . . . . .
so music . . . . .
. . . follow . . . . . . .
in whatever way . . . . .
. . . preserving the . . . . . . [fr-
om what has been set out . . . . . . .
this is not . . . . . . .
it, cause . . . . . . . . .
IX 72 fr. 12
. . . . . . to the same thing . . . . . .
and it moves another emotion; fr[om
t]hese it is clear . . . . . .
by itself . . . . . . . . . . . .
may not come about . . . . . . . . . .
producing emotions . . . . . . .
. . of virtue . . . . . . . . .
it adds further . . . almost;
and that in few [cases] the exercises
in matters of the virtues
become decisive. For it is necessa-
ry] that in the lesser and
the similar, as with elements,
. . . . . . . . . it hap]pens
IX 71 fr. 11 A.
only the last letters of the lines survive: 4 -to have, not 5 and favour 7 such as of the rhy[thms 8 of melodies 10 to inquire 11 no] teach- 12 led on 13 spont]aneous
IX 71 fr. 11B
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . [rhy-
thm and musi[c . . . . .
as having some . . .
to prevail . . . . . . .
m]ost . . . . . . . . . .
to grow . . . . . . . .
the like, just as . . . .
some things applied . . .
of the substance from which . . .
enjoyments an[d . . . . .
and in general . . . . . .
will be] most intense
. . . and at the same time also . . . .
IX 71 fr. 10
. . . . ma]nly. But [other things] . . . .
an[d] licentious and al[together] s-
hameful, as they call them, as though
it brought along such
dispositions. For perhaps they would
not even appear, if they did not
exist in] truth; nor at any rate would one appear
more skilled in medicine without [some]
medical knowledge, nor more skilled in horseman-
ship without [some] knowledge of horses
XI 78 fr. 10
l. 8 music- 16 towards ... 21 actions 23 man- 25 and the 27 not the same 29 in the soul 30 similar 32 for indeed 34 and towards this 35 to say 36 music
into that of the soul. For
this . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
and protective of
the disposition, [and] that
each fights as an ally
of which the emotions . . . . .
XI 79 fr. 11
little can be read: l. 4 eac]h ... 5 suit- 6 very much of the 8 what has been sa[id 10 since also the 11 form itself 12 and with many 13 to happen, not 14 they th]ink that 16 of seriousness 17 those who pl[ay
XI 80 fr. 12
. . . . . to har]m . . . . .
. . . . . . . and to bene[fit
. . . . . . that the seriousness
of the an]cient lawgi[vers
]? . . . incidentally . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . and to abstain
. . but [music] itself by itself
through under]standing of both the har[mo-
nic] and the rhyth[mic,
he ad]mits it is useful [for
educ]ation
. . . . l]iving . . . . . . .
. . . to con]tribute to education . .
. . . . . and he wrote . . .
. . . . . of . . . education . . .
IX 70 fr. 9
When some-
one] inquir[ed whether it will bring
som]e virtues or some
pleasures], . . . he brings forward Dam[o]n
. . . . . . . . the musician
. . . . . . . . almost to think, he
says, just as] himself: that it is fitting
that the boy, singing] and playing
the lyre,] not only
IX 70 fr. 9 B
the first letters of the lines survive: l. 8 complete 9 the vi[rtue 10 so then 11 wrote down 12 and in the 13 he says 14 wis- 15 v]irtue 16 and towards 17 and named 18 likewise 19 and those
IX 70 fr. 8
. . . . . the things concerning the . . . .
and the things that come with pleasure and [pa-
Translator’s note for this stretch
The text is very fragmentary and heavily restored by the editor. In 18.6 'δειθυραμβικοὺϲ' is read as διθυραμβικοὺϲ. In 25.1 the numbering '20 διαθε' is probably a misprint for 26. In 27.14 Ptolemy and the piper Ismenias are as the editor restores them; κέλευϲμα is the rowers' time-call. In 28.5 'ἀκατ . . .' could not be construed.
in meet[ing . . . . . . . . . . si-
nce of our own d . . .
not from outside but from . .
we have the causes; [and of the
common things, that [music] too is one;
for all [Gr-
eeks and barbarians [u-
se it, and at [ev-
ery age, so to speak. [For already
before having reason
and understanding, [the
power of music reaches [us] . . . . . . .
IX 69 fr. 7
[that] by gymnastics [we are taught] to move usefully and
to keep still in body, [gym-
nastics also
making the senses assigned to these
discerning; and by
painting the sight is taught
to judge well many
visible things, and of mus-
ic the necessary part . .
. . . of these to have, and the other [a]l[so
most of all, if one applies attentio[n
. . . . . uses [it]. To seem
IX 68 fr. 6
lets go, and the . . .
. . . . libation . . . . . .
being . . .
of the rest . . .
and after . . . . .
having said that he would join . . .
towards human . . . . .
music, that it ch[an-
ges somehow the . . .
and by nature to all . . .
. he says, tha[t . . .
are disposed . . .
b]y the same . . .
. . . . wonderful . . .
. . not clear
IX 67 fr. 5
laying down a law
that a[ll] should use it and
no[one] should [inn]ovate, and that the
disposition [now] . . . . . . ing
had departed from . . . . . .
And if one were to com-
pare the dithyrambic styles, that of Pinda-
r and that of Philoxe-
nus,
great would be found
the difference of the characters
displayed, though the
style is the same. And con-
cerning the other styles . . .
XI 77 fr. 9
. . time, [with] the Mantineans and La-
ce]daemonians [and Pel]la-
ne]ans taking the lead,
for among these fi]rst
and most of all
the most exact care
was given to su[ch
practices [and to the
rest of music . . . . .
. . . so to be and . . . .
. . t]his from one another
. . . . in sa[v]agery
IX 66 fr. 4A
. . . . . . through the . . . from
. . . . of such, then,
. . . . training and
. . . a]ssembled, gre-
at a]nd noble . . . .
. . . . so that also to make [it]
one's ow]n and to lay hold of
. . . . such
. . . . no longer lea-
ves room for those who op-
pose [the view] that there will not be
that which will receive [it]
. . . . of the customs and
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . and the
IX 66 fr. 4 B = XI 76 fr. 8
. . . not . . . . . . . . .
by another, and that he had a[gre]ed with
him that some things need natu[ral] per-
ception, others scien-
tific: hot
and [c]old [need] the natural, while
the attuned and unattu-
ned [need] the sci[enti]fic. [And that
another, yo[ked] with [su]ch [perception]
and accompany-
ing it [for the] most part, by which
we pur]sue [the accompany-
ing pleas[ure in e]ach of the
objects of sense, being [pleas]ure and [pa-
in] . . . . the same
not . . . two perceptions, mixed,
[con]cerning the under-
ly]ing object agree, for example that [it is]
. . . or h[ar]sh, but concerning the
ac]compa[ny]ing pleasure
a]nd p[ain] disagree
. . . . . . . . . . . to come about and
. . . . . . . . . . . to happen
. . . . . . . . . . . . concerning music
IX 65 fr. 3
someone into such a disp[osition
might be moved by it . . . . .
. . . is by the fi[tt-
ing melody, since n[ot all
will be moved alike
by the same [melody], or [that it can] some-
one's [spi]rit that is darting and [rus-
hing towards [wh]atever [so-
othe and bri[ng] to rest,
or di[vert]
and turn [it] towar[ds an-
other impulse from anothe[r, and
lead the existing d[isposition
to increase or dimin[ution;
in general . . . . . . . . . .
all music . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . n]or if [something] imitati[ve
. . . . to accompl[ish] this
it i]s [able], which
IX 64 fr. 2
. . . and in the third [book] he has spoken
at greater length, and especial-
ly abo[ut] music directed to the divi-
ne, not demonstrati-
vely but historically and expla-
natorily, and it will suffice to cut short the sum-
mary.
A]nd lawful and se[r-
ious] music, he says,
was arranged first for the sake of
honour
to the divine, and then for the education of the free;
and that [it was directed] to the
div[ine], the very names
signify, both 'beholding'
and the] 'beholder' [and] the 'theatre'
XI 75 fr. 7
Where this belongs I do not know. A few words are visible: 1 mixing 2 of [the things] said 4 the [flute-play]ing 5 [of one] listening 13 perhaps: to the listen[ers . . . of mus]ic a great quanti[ty . . . of stri]kings and mel[odies . . .] sometimes happen 17 the whole theat[re] 18 blaming 19 [that it is] nothing 20 to be about to . . . . . [a quanti]ty of str[ains] 22 to whistl[e] 23 and sometimes 31 for indeed seem- 35 and towards the 39 theatre 40 but [not] us 41 hear[ing] 44 to others
XI 74 fr. 6
l. 3 a strong em[otion] 4 akin 5 perhaps: . . . . . concerning the beg[etting of children] the [so-called ep]ithalamium, in which also 8 of fine things and 9 much and 10 again 11 in the failures [. . .] of love itself 13 and of every 24 thin]king 25 towards the fail- 20 dispos- 28 to the reputable
. . nome]s, both the one for war-
like] activities and the one
for] gymnastic and ath-
letic [ones], in old times
to a greater extent, but now to a lesser.
For gen]erally for war-
like [activities] even now the great majority
of the Gr]eeks use what is on the trump-
et],
and some also that on the pip-
es; and for athletic contests
too] they sig[n-
al with] the trumpet the war nom[e,
whiche]ver they [may] have, for the [mo-
st part; and in] the pentathlon
for] the jump and the do[uble
race] it was done with the pipe
IX 63 fr. 1
. . . f]or the hand-gesturing
. . . . . . . . . . . . the same-named
. . . . and the Argive]s also for
the w]restling [ap]ply the pip[e].
And mu-
sic was applied also t[o] the choral
move]ments, both of the gymnopae-
dic and the armed [dances], and of
these dramatic ones, tra-
gic and satyric and co-
mic. Now the fine-
st] of these, the tragic,
. . . . . . . . . of e]ach . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . an]d the satyri[c
XI 73 fr. 5
l. 1 end: of every kind 2 material 3 of war 4 the [pow]ers themselves
. . . . . the prophesied
of one's own from above,
that] melody by nature [has] something st[irr-
ing] and inspir-
ing] for actions,
and that] it is told in myth that Or[pheus
by enchant]ing moved the stones,
that is, n]ot those but [those
who la]bour [he] encou-
raged; th]erefore Ptolemy too
ord]ered, for those unable
to] haul [a ship] down, Ismeni[as
to p]lay a rowing-[ti]me on the pipe.
And [music] not] only [rouses] souls
to [actions] but also
bod]ies. At least when a boy
was pi]ping [a]nd some
musical melody . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l. 23 the fac[e] 25 underlying 26 to fai[l] 27 of shape 28 to sing 30 the melody of the 32 wis- 33 poem-
XI 72 fr. 4
and to [gatherings . . . . to be
called forth [both men and wo-
men an[d youths in their prime
to effemina[cy . . . . . Aga-
thon's . . . . . . . . . . [the
comic poets . . . . . . . . . . .
and of Democr[itus. Nican-
der, [who not only . . .
displayi[ng] . . . . . . . . . .
taug[ht] by deeds . . . . but
also . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
Translator’s note for this stretch
Highly fragmentary text; many supplements are the editor's conjectures and are translated as marked. 1.28.35–37 quotes Homer, Odyssey 14.464–465. 1.30.34–36 quotes Pindar (fr. 109). 1.30.7–8: the words before the break are unclear in the papyrus. 1.31.51–52: Archilochus fragment. In 1.31.44 πρὸ〈ϲ〉 is an editorial correction. In 3.9.3 ἀ]νθρμπιν is evidently ἀνθρωπίνην, a scanning error, rendered 'human'. In 3.6.11 the restoration is doubtful.
perhaps: b]ut m[usic is ab-
le [to console
the [misfortunes] in l[ove
. . . . . . . . . . .
love . . . . . . . . . . . [wicked-
ly] for many [becomes a kind-
ling]. [That] the s[ong con-
tribute[s] to[wards erotic
virtue, [is shown fit-
tingly] also [by] one [of the Mu-
ses], Erato . . . . . . . . . . . . .
and he think[s] it [helps also]
towards sympo[tic vir-
tue]; for of lo[ve and in gen-
eral] of erot[ic matters . . .
VIII 142 fr. 1
[nor] was [there] found [a more fitting]
for free [men] . . other relaxa[tion]
and amusement than for one to
sing, another to play the lyre, another
to dance. For even if someone does not
practise [it], wine call[s him out]
'to [sing], [however] very shrewd [he be,
and] to [laugh] softly
and] to dance'; th[ese things]
to do . . . . [by ne]cess[ity, but
of no other pas[time] . . . .
pap. ined. 424 fr. 5 and XI 71 fr. 3
[entertainment of the soul] || privately . . .
among the lyric poets, as many as
have usefully devoted themselves to
music; for not badly does
Chamaeleon point out that
the comic poets hint at some such
thing about the . . .
. . . using the appellations
of [lo]ves(?)
and sometimes . . . . || but to all
the peculiarity of these. And [music]
has also something proper for f[riendsh]ip.
For since it was shown [to contribute] to love, a[lso]
towards its end || [the] argument must
prevail. Further, since towards [drinking-
parties, also t[o] their end
[it] again appears [to contribute to] friendli-
ness; and if to this, [also]
to friendship. [And] besides,
it relaxes the [soul] [and
cheers it]
. . . . . and Terpand[er
according to an or]acle . . . .
singing [at] the common meals
stopped the [Lacedae-
monians] from their disorder. And about Stesichor-
us too it is related that, when the
. . . . were drawn up against each other, [al-
ready] standing in their midst he sang
an exhort]ation, and recon-
ciling [them] through his song, [into
calm] he brought them [over]
; nor for what purpose . . .
. . the [line] written by Pin]dar: 'the
common [weal] let one of the citizens, in fa[ir weather]
setting'] and that of Sopho[cles
in the] Epigoni
VIII 142 fr. 2
. . . . [to ar]range songs, so
that not only in common
. . . . . [to have] something [suit-
able] for honouring the gods, but also
according to the differences of the [divini-
ties] different ones for different [gods]. [Song
is] also . . . . . [useful]
for] [understand]ing. For de[fini-
tions] and divisions and [demonstra-
tions in] harmonics [very] many . . .
. . and according to another . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . some study . . . . . . . . .
pap. ined. 424 fr. 4 and V. H. XI 70 fr. 2
. . . . having observed some
of the] things said in some [works]
about f]itting song and
unfitt]ing, and about mas-
culine and] soft characters, and about
acti]ons suiting and
unsuit[ing to the char-
acters] proposed, which admit-
tedly are not far remov-
ed from] philosophizing and . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . he says no more . . . . .
. . . to be clear that for
all] parts of life
music is [useful, and
that] the devotion to it [can]
dispose u[s] appropriately
towards several vir-
tues; and it seemed to him, [to-
wards] all. From what he cites
from Dic]aearchus one could take as much
as he wants] for the present
thesis, [or] that the an-
cients thought the singer wise too,
so that it is clear
from the [singer] left with Clytaem[nes-
tra]; and
. . . . . they say [he] knew, wh[oever]
hears any of these; through which indeed
it is agreed and by more
is maintained] that besides its other
powers] song also
puts a stop to [factions] and disturban-
ces, as in the case of
men] and animals
they are seen to be calm-
ed; and so Archilo-
chus says: 'charmed is whoever
is] by songs.' . . . . . . . .
. . . when in the . . .
. . . a tumult arises, of the
sweet]est some songs
. . . to begin, then into the . . .
. . to become, and the end of the . . .
. . . . ; thus according to
. . . . the matter at hand, then
Fragments that seem to belong to the third book.
VIII 143 fr. 3
both by nature and by convention
having been distinguished, it comes about.
But to neither of
song and rhythm
VIII 143 fr. 4
Only the beginnings of lines survive: l. 4 'and of the breastplate'; 5 '. . . to the son[gs and the] rhythms the things . . . having [no ar]ticulation is nothing'; 9 'that we have'; 10 'and to the one saying . . . emphatically'; 13 'of Xenophantus . . .' (the piper Xenophantus is mentioned by Plutarch, Demetrius 53, and Seneca, Dialogues II 4.6); 14 '. . . and what was said ab[out the] games.'
VIII 25 fr. 24
Little is legible. l. 7 'through the'
its end . . through . . . . .
. . pleasure and towards . . . .
. . amusements was intro[duced? . . .
. . and recently . . . . . . . .
VIII 24 fr. 23
A. ll. 2–3 'to the philoso[phers]'; 10 'musicians'; 11 'and indeed the songs'; 12 'destroyed'; 16 'to music'
B. l. 7 'philoso-'
VIII 23 fr. 22
l. 6 'and rather'; 9 'even if we posit'; 10 'in philo-'; 12 'without trustworthiness(?)'; 16–17 'philosophers in virtues(?)'; 18 'bad'; 19 'common'; 24 'of the soul'; 25 'and towards . . .'
XI 92 fr. 23
[nei]ther towards Dionysus nor
towards this [goddess]. He dreams
then about each of them, [that]
excessive magnitudes of sounds
and pitches and rhythms
driven along together dis-
turb and cause
astonishment, at times also drag-
ging the mind irrationally,
but for the [most part] of the external a[nd
according to other [sup]positions(?) . . .
VIII 22 fr. 21
. . . more appropriate . . . .
. . . . . . but to those coming upon . .
even if it brings on no sys-
tems of that kind . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . sw]eetness in particular
both of voice and of pitch . . .
. . . . and of rhythm vul-
garly] loosened and [sense-
less] to call it, but the simple
and un]sweet [to be] thoughtful . . .
. . . which also in the case of the
the poetic . . . . . [pas-
times](?) some have . . . .
. . . . and also
'to call' written above the line
Perhaps there follows:
XI 92 fr. 22
. . . and with the homonymies which
they themselves for the most part
twisted together both in the har-
monies and in the melodies
and rhythms, as in the preceding
book I was showing. And
life bears witness to what is
said, presenting many who, in
the melodies and rhythms they praise,
are constantly occupied, yet utter-
ly wretched, while refined
[are many] among those [at home] even with the [melodies] being driven
out . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perhaps there follows:
VIII 21 fr. 20 and XI 91 fr. 21
pipe-playing [and lyre]-playing
. . . . . . . . . .
human . . [pas]time
. . . . . . . . . .
. . however much . . . . . . .
. . continuous practice simply . .
. . to all things in mus[ic]
rather . . . . . makes . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . and of the teach[ers
and] of the [com]peti[tors
. . nothing such as he writes . . .
. . . but to the . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . to live happily [pre-
pa]ring. But
indeed] the Muses we do not know [to be
by all] agre-
ed to have re-
mained virgins, but Orpheus a[nd Rhe]sus and
the Sirens and some others some
say were born of them, so they have
handed down. And if it be
granted on some argument as plausible, [then]
weaving and
hunting [must] be called pro-
ductive of temperance, because
Athena and Artemis
have been told in myth to be virgins.
But if one must jest, add-
ing nonsense, not only musi-
cal but also wise were
the Muses, some[one] will say, as
XI 91 fr. 20
. . . might turn; and as again
. . . . to plead in support
. . . . easy(?), saying
. . . . that the one who juxtaposes is
. . ., those then regarded as
wise practising this
kind. Of temper-
ance, however, it is now the special task
the fit]ting and unfitting
among] men to dis-
tinguish, but music very
far . . . is removed from
meddling in these things . . . . . . .
VIII 20 fr. 19
Translator’s note for this stretch
Text is fragmentary throughout; many renderings rest on the editor's supplements. 3.20.8 ἐφόρων may be 'ephors' (Spartan magistrates) or 'overseers'. 3.21.1 θείας could also belong to a compound ending in -θεια. 3.13.12 ἔμθεά read as ἔνθεα ('inspired'). 3.27.15 μέ[νον] is uncertain and the sense of the line unclear. Editorial headings and Latin notes ('sequitur fortasse', 'pauca leguntur') are rendered in English.
. . . . . . rouse the spirit
. . . they bring, since particularly
for the Bacchic frenzies of the prophets
song [is naturally suited] —
. . . and . accustomed
and [having been] sung in
to those who rave in Bacchic frenzy (sic)
. . . . . . . these
and pleasing too
. . . , some of whom in divine possession
are partly settled
in character, partly beside themselves
. . . . . . pious and fals[e
on behalf of the best
. . to those in Bacchic frenzy . . .
yes, by Zeus, melody qua melody
and furthermore harmony and [the]
Perhaps there follows:
XI 90 fr. 19
such things can produce beliefs
about the divine of such a
kind that through them people are
naturally driven to orgiastic frenzy; nor [does it lead] to
the works of Athena and of Ares,
which are not even [theirs], just as
the Bacchic [works] are not [the works] of those gods
to whom some assign them; but it
leads to these through suppositions
. . that have become second nature, that there is
. . . surely they do not incite
. . . some inspired things by melodies
to be called forth . . . . . .
Perhaps there follows:
VIII 18 fr. 17
. . . they practised, [and] it
for dances and for spectacles
they used throughout the year
and everyone. Nor does it itself
. . . rouse the spirit; . . .
for [then] the [sound] of trumpets
would have [this effect]. But as it is, of deer
. . . some more cowardly
. . . of all the . . . .
. . . but as it is, in some . . not
always and everywhere; nor
in assemblies and temples
and processions and the funeral
processions of the dead does any
such excitement arise.
But otherwise, when [the trumpet] sig-
There follows:
XI 90 fr. 18
nals to bring on the war [call],
as it is ordered, everyone whose
task is to fight, having done the things by
which he will be fearsome to the
enemy and will spur on his friends with him,
rushes to close quarters;
and for some, also because
such a sound joins them
in battle, and
gives an encouraging signal, from
supposition there is roused excite-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII 15 fr. 14
. . . . . . . . . . . . of Aeschylus
. . . . . . . . . . . . of Ares he said
. . . . . . . . . . . the popular
. . . . . . . . . . . . courage, not
that which the philosopher claimed. And
all the other virtues
which he mentions [as] such
the things adduced do not show
. . producing, which . . . . . .
. . of them, that philosophy
. . . . . . . . practis . . . . . . . . . .
. . and will show; not indeed
. . concerning the Lacedae-
monians, when [the signal] for battle
There follows:
XI 89 fr. 16
is given, that they use pipes and
lyres, there is no further need to say.
But that Tyrtaeus was taken on by them
and preferred
on account of music seems to be
unattested, since practically all
. . . agree
that he was summoned from Athens
in accordance with an oracle . . . .
and . . . know that
he was a poet, and through poems
containing noble thoughts
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII 16 fr. 15
Little can be read: line 6 'and daughter-'; 7 'because fitting'; 9 'of the temperate'; 10 'show-'; 12 'morbidly(?)'; 13 'to be able'; 14 'unworthy, such as'; 15 '. to be carried'; 16 'of others, nor'; 17 'the opposite'; 18 'as far as'; 19 'enumerat-'; 20 'but their own'; 21 'daughters, nor'; 22 'to citharodes'; 23 'handling(?)'
XI 89 fr. 17
. . through these, Ion
in what he has said about Achilles,
even if he can be
reconciled with what is not false,
as bearing vulgar witness, we
reject, and still more
because he spoke as a poet and musician;
nor do we attend to these
without proof; and the Lace-
daemonian, because [he was] king and
Spartan, even if perhaps they
attribute to him things not
thought out . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII 14 fr. 13
the ancients and . . . . . . . . . . . .
to toil at, not . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . more useful . . . . . . . . .
the bodies for . . . .
. . . fine, accustomed . . . . . .
by rhythms but also . . . . . .
grace . . . . . of bo-
dy, some of the ephors . .
they bring, and on the . . .
and they try . . . . . . . .
but the rest of life . . . .
. . . . through neither of these,
neither the first, which for none
but humans
came about, nor the . . . . .
having received . . . . . . . . . .
. . these of the . . . . . . . . .
of the toil . . . . . . . . . . . .
of the [matter] concerning the . . . . . . .
XI 88 fr. 15
of divine . . . and of brightening . . . .
. . . irrationally and without
demonstration, as if forced . . . .
. . . to making movements of hands and
feet and the other limbs
rhythmic and
ordered. And seized
also by delight in the melody
and by sight, they used
the motions of the . . . . .
well-rhythmed again . . . . . . .
they did something and . . . . . .
VIII 144 fr. 5
nothing of what is needed happens to the
body; but softness of
body [we understand] not [as] the same as diffi-
culty and hardness, but
[as] the same as resistance, we under-
stand; the one comes about through wax,
the other through an oar or
mattock, irrational . . . . .
. . . And softness of soul, if
in capacity it shrinks back out of
laziness and cowardice, is meta-
phorically so termed, and hardness
in turn, if it is applied
to a disposition of endurance and
strength . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII 19 fr. 18 = VIII 145 fr. 6 A
. . they say also
parts of the soul
they arrange . . . . . . . .
. . . of the . . . neither
for the kinds of the ancient(?) melo-
dic composition . . . to consider
the matters of music, but
[music] highly perfected
towards its end, nor
that [of it] from these and
towards these, as they say, is ar-
ranged, since much folly is
displayed and
seen in saying that one
part of it is settled
and ordered, and another
[tends] towards the licentious and grandeur
emotional(?) . . .
Perhaps there follows:
XI 88 fr. 14B = VII 186 fr. 1
moderation and . . . . . and
the harmonies . . . . .
of these distinguished . . . . . and a
pitch proper . . . . .
to the underlying emotions
and melodic composition and rhythms
and the rest to have been given according to . . . .
. Therefore in . . . .
with them . . . . the . . in
us dispositions . . . one
to be middle and stable,
another . . . . . and
VIII 145 fr. 6 B.
next . . . . . . . . . . .
of body to preserve(?)
gymnastics . . . . . .
. . . let it be granted . . . . . . . . of the
soul music alone
or most of all educates(?)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . par-
ts(?) of the soul . . . . . . .
towards one another . . . . . . . . . .
to be . . . . . . . . . . . .
There follows:
VII 186 fr. 2 = XI 87 fr. 13A.
gymnastics . . . . . but as a plaything
. . . . to contribute
something to . . . . . and that the
parts of the soul must be proportionate
. . . to be, and to the
bodily; it has been stated also
indiscriminately, but in a discriminating
way not at all. . . . And still
more . . . For neither
is there . . . . .
proportion . . .
of the soul . . . one another
and conflicts
There follows:
VIII 17 fr. 16 B = VIII 147 fr. 8 A
manner music, along with
any of the pleasant things
that tickle the senses.
And those who say that we are made gentle
by music,
our souls being softened
and their savageness
removed, one would consider exceedingly
simple-minded; for only
the reason that teaches that no
. . . or terrible
fabrication has nature brought
forth, and that of what it has brought forth
that nothing is of great
account, . . . end, abiding, perfectly
does this. But by cutting short
it relieves proportionately; but plea-
XI 87 fr. 13 B
sure does not . . . . . . . . . . . .
XI 87 fr. 13B
Only the beginnings of the lines survive: 2 'nor pain-'; 5 'greatest'; 6 'pain'; 7 'these'; 8 'they are able'; 9 'of what sort then'; 10 'since'; 12 'stability'
VIII 147 fr. 8B = VIII 17 fr. 16A
. . . . . . . . . . . . . and other
to the . . . . . . . let him laugh
still more, and one might
despise those who claim
that music . . . harmonised
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . mixed . . . . . . . . .
Translator’s note for this stretch
The text is extremely fragmentary throughout; many lines give only isolated words. Lines with Latin editorial summaries ("pauca leguntur", "nimis exile fragmentum", "extremae modo uersuum litterae exstant") are translated as summaries of the legible words. "lepuntur" in 47.1 read as "leguntur"; "ὁμπλογῴην" in 49.2 read as "ὁμολογοίην"; "ἑκάϲ[οτ]τε" in 48.5 read as "ἑκάϲτοτε" (repeatedly, each time), here given as "from each" — the sense could also be "each time". In 41.15–17 the restoration μακρὰν ... ἀνάϲταϲιν is uncertain; "return"/"restoration" for ἀνάϲταϲιν is a guess. In 37.6–7 the bracketed μὴ makes the sense difficult.
to fashion and to bring [it] into rhythm
and to mould . . . . for concerning
rhythm . . . . . that which is properly
similar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . trainers
of boys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to the
the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . voice
rhythm . . . . . . . . . . intelligible
upon the soul . . . they . . . neither
XI 87 fr. 12
. . . . . . and to sing a melody
. . . . . . to sing a melody
. . . . they think fit
. . . . to the [one who tunes?] the lyre
. . similarly, the
soul that is harmonised
. . . . . . and equipped
. . . . ordered
. . . . such things . . .
. . . . hinting at
. . . . dexterity and
. . . . . . . and of the
VIII 13 fr. 12
Little can be read: line 6 "better"; 8 "the fitting things"; 10 "to the"; 12 "cause" . . . 13 "of the [relation] to these"; 14 ". . . and towards"; 15 ". . . being useful"; 16 ". . . . . . . . but to music
". . . . no more than
to cookery would we admit
intelligence; things which also with regard to the
of the unharmonised . . . .
. . . and disordered
changes, we shall say that . . .
XI 86 fr. 11
. . . . . . . . . for neither
. . . that, when the . . . had laid down
. . . of music, it brings
even a kind of licentiousness
to them, this man, by what he said,
showed it to follow that
it is possible for opposite [states]
to be stirred by opposite [things].
For he too holds that
some things urge on to licentiousness
and also turn away . . .
. . . such things; so then
. . . accustomed to licentiousness
VIII 12 fr. 11
. . . . . . . . . . . . music
. . . . these things, which he says
[are] opposite, through both
. . . concerning the soul
. . . . . . . . . and . . .
. . . . . . . one or the other of it
. . . . . . but if indeed
. . . I said before that
. . . . . and the opposite
to reconcile with this . . .
. . . . . . . and a divergence
to come about into opposites
from opposites, nor what he says
[about] limit and order in
VIII 146 fr. 7
. . . . . . . to practise
rhetoric together with voice-training.
And in private, of [its] having been
admirably regarded . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
nor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
of the beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . in . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I fear lest the opposite . . .
of the majority among the women
themselves rather, and with men
likening . . . . . . . . . .
So, if they rightly grant, taking [it] over
as . . . . . . . . . . . .
towards virtue . . . . . . . . . . . . . en-
joyment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
rather from . . . . . . . . . . . . .
of the for the sake of the . . . . . . . . . . .
those things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
to speak of the soul . . . . . .
of the body into . . . . . . .
. . . . of the melodies . . . . . . . . .
VIII 186 fr. 3
. . . Theophrastus . . .
. . . towards virtue, and to
children only, but perhaps
. . . . co-operating [with] flattery
. . . . appears better
. . . . . having been studied
. . . . and naturally . . .
. . . . he rejects. And that the
melody of the body is something
. . . . . . . . . . . . . and that of the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . good order
VIII 147 fr. 9
. . to fashion . . . .
. . . . . of words and concords
. . . . . . of melodies and rhythms
. . . . . . . revealing . . . . . . .
. . . praising music
because it makes
those who come to it
good; but if also the . . .
good, akin to these
VIII 148 fr. 10
. . . . For I do not say that nothing
of it pertains to
exertion, but everything to relaxation
and delight — even if I do not hold
that it is imitative,
I shall not also do away with
what seems [right] to me. For that, in turn, I am fighting
against the truth when I say this
Theophrastus is far from
establishing, when
he writes that it is unreasonable [to say]
that music does not move at all and bring into
rhythm
souls, since, as he
said this . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII 148 fr. 11
A very slight fragment. Line 3 "and what was said before"; 4 "appears" . . . . . . "neither naive nor reasonably
VII 187 fr. 4
. . because, just as foods
concerning grain have power towards health and
disease,
so it will be said that music too
has [power] both towards virtue and vice;
and besides, by Zeus, it is not
unconvincing to everyone that, just as
irrational things have powers of motion
in . . . irrational [beings],
so irrational melodies have [them]
XI 84 fr. 8A
Only the last letters of the lines survive. Line 1 "useful"; 2 "the lawgiver?"; 3 "guard"; 5 "but not"; 7 "use of instruments"; 8 "him into the frenzied [man?]"; 10 "he thought fit . . . music"
VIII 11 fr. 9B = VIII 149 fr. 12 A and XI 84 fr. 8B = VII 188 fr. 6
VIII 149 line 2 end "us"; 3 "clever"; 4 "the system"
because of the pleasure? he calls the whole
. . . in . . . . . . from
those who discovered and
practised [it] with love,
to take up. But when, in reply,
he divides the things that belong
to the good in potency,
it is signified that some are for
the practice of virtue, others
accompany [it], others are
pursued for the preservation or guarding of
virtue, others
help to adorn some people,
and that for some the return
is very far off, for others
incidental. But he falls down,
however, . . . . . . the thought,
also in mixing together
the natural virtues with those
of reputation, things which
we are under no pressure to articulate. But
music . . . would not even delay
to . . . to bring forward.
Indeed, that to accompany
the good preserves
virtue . . . to apply
he says not . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII 149 fr. 12 B = VIII 11 fr. 9A and VII 188 fr. 7 = XI 84 fr. 7
of melodies . . . . . . . . such . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . of good things . . .
not . . . . . . . but of pastimes?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . to play
to play . . . . . . . . . . . play
not . . . . . . . or because of it
. . . . . . . . . and because of
it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . again
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
if . . . . . . . . . . . . but if
. . . . . . . . combinations, not
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . stands . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . but destructive
of . . . . he himself in the
reply to what has been said. And
again he brings round once more the effortless
proofs, that [music] is rather
serious pursuit, not merely
play, according to [the music] he himself
declares to be music.
But so that we may not seem to overlook
what he says with confidence
about seriousness, with which he thinks
[music] is occupied . . . . . . . . . .
then . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
of the soul . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII 11 fr. 10 = VIII 149 fr. 13A
. . . . . . nor that, if for the sake
of play alone music
were taken up, one should
practise it at random, not so that
we may sing in tune with the strings,
since this was once [thought]
ridiculous and professional
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . but what is called
singing to the strings
. . . . . not to harmonise
there follows:
XI 85 fr. 9
For if . . . . . . . . . . . .
or that for the sake of this . . . . . .
first, that of the . . . . . . . .
only is it ridiculous . . . .
. . . and to call the . . . . . .
professional . . . . . . .
second, apart from the . . . .
. . . choosing . . . . .
through it entirely . . . . . . .
to make, what is the . . . . for the sake
of which is pursued . . . . . . rather
still hunting . . . . . . .
VIII 149 fr. 13 B
Little can be read: line 6 "indeed by itself"; 7 "and by use"; 8 "for the free" . . . . "unseemly, nor otherwise"; 10 ". . . then, upon"
XI 86 fr. 10
to teach some things, and others . . .
. . . I cannot, knowing that philosophers,
insofar as they are philosophers,
are not musicians;
but hearing these people say each time
that music alone
is knowledge of good and
bad melodies and
rhythms, and of fitting and
unfitting ones, I hesitate to assign
the study . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . to educate
there follows:
VIII 150 fr. 14
. . I would let go, but I would
agree that these are philosoph[ical]
. . . . . [I] falsely [claim] nothing
. . . . . . . . . . . perceive
. . . . . motion, or also of that in
to be, the knowledge of these?
comes about just as . . . .
of smells and flavours by the
perception, [so] entirely by that of hearing,
as of those [it comes] by that of sight
and of touch — I am content with
[saying] that the philosopher, insofar as he is a philosopher,
will be unable to recognise [them];
and taking this, I add
that much more will the
layman in both be ignorant of all
the excellence and the
difference of melodies and
of rhythms. Perhaps, then,
someone will say also . . .
. . . philosoph- . . .
Translator’s note for this stretch
Extremely fragmentary throughout; only connected sense is translated, gaps kept as '. . .'. Headings giving papyrus and fragment numbers, 'sequitur' ('there follows'), and the apparatus lines listing isolated legible words ('us.' = line) are rendered as such. 53.9 δόνταϲ read as δόνταϲ = δόνταϲ for δόνταϲ/δόνταϲ (likely δόντα〈ϲ〉, 'granting'). 63.10 ἐνθουϲιαϲτικαῖϲ ἐπιτάϲεϲιν: sense of the construction unclear as the sentence breaks off. 68.2–5: 'they renamed' (μετωνόμαϲαν) placed by sense; the subject and object are lost.
. . . philosophical . . .
. . . wis- . . .
There follows:
VII 187 fr. 5
. . . pleasures . . . [neither
as in the [work] of a philosopher . . .
that music itself becomes something
theoretical [of melodies]
good and bad [and]
fitting and unfitting,
nor that it, but rather philosophy,
educates through music.
And of the philosophers it will
happen to those who began
first to learn
music . . .
one must learn . . .
the learning . . .
VIII 151 fr. 15
. . . differs in . . .
. . . and if it wishes . . .
. . . to produce impulses and
[that] there are choices affected by emotion,
together with capacity, because . . .
. . . is. But that the emotions are
the starting point for acquiring these
choices and the
capacities, for courage
confidence, for
temperance shame
and orderliness, and other [emotions] for
other [virtues], is absurd to
concede. For no one will grant
that such emotions are starting points
for acquiring the capacities mentioned,
but virtues, or of the
There follows:
VII 189 fr. 10
. . . the confidences and the
shames and orderlinesses
and such emotions he
names. And the impulses, through which
. . . they acquire the capacities,
not only saying that actions come about
from emotions proper,
but also from the
likenesses, he does not see [this]; thinking indeed that through
likeness a melody
has certain virtues arising in [it].
And still more the . . .
. . . courage . . .
There follows:
VIII 151 fr. 16
each . . .
. . . and . . .
with pleasure, which has such
power, that characters are
somehow shaped in rhythm through the
emotions, so that the real [characters] too
are so disposed. There is no need
to dwell further on what follows,
but, granting
him the greatest [point], that for the impulse
towards fine things there is
rejoicing at what one [ought]
and loving what one should, leaving aside
what lies between . . .
. . . but that music . . .
. . . to lead forward . . .
There follows:
VII 189 fr. 8
to contribute, as . . .
to pleasures, no more
assigning [it], than the use of
cookery and perfumery.
Nor that, even if any of these is of some benefit,
it is not because [it moves]
to a change of emotions, by
which and through which we are said
to be of a certain kind — no, by Zeus, [but]
not even in sleep, as
he says, the . . .
most quickly according to it . . .
. . . from a similar melody . . .
. . .
For nothing beyond nature,
and no wonder, as if . . .
XI 82 fr. 4
. . . and the imitations
. . . somehow to lead and move
the emotion. So since we have shown
that the claim that music imitates
the things mentioned, and that what it imitates
contributes something
to virtue, rather than
together with the [arts] vastly more imitative,
is false,
we shall not accept . . .
. . . music
XI 83 fr. 6
Where it should be placed is uncertain
for since these . . .
music makes . . .
already having sense . . .
. . . to act by itself . . .
having come about, use . . .
of the child, age . . .
to be laid down . . .
for . . .
. . . positions . . .
in the case of the others . . .
VII 189 fr. 9
line 5: being struck with amazement; 8: on the one hand; 9: pure
VIII 10 fr. 7
line 2: that nothing . . . to write, unless . . . differing . . . encompassing the things towards . . . but we also the . . . it alone . . . that neither ever nor until now . . .
VIII 10 fr. 8
line 2: name; 3: through which he; 4: these not; 5: to those received; 6: preparatory
. . . for the sake of, has nothing more
persuasive than the often
advanced assertions.
For it is said that music
produces a capacity
for grandeur and . . .
. . . emotions, and again arranges [them]
for good order and of the . . .
. . . for into all . . .
VIII 152 fr. 17
. . . and [if] a fine discourse were not
preferred . . . all other
vice . . .
. . . and fit for discussion, for
those who heard it themselves, the discourse
and . . .
XI 83 fr. 5 A
line 1: to be; 3: which boast; 4: they are able; 6: apart from the; 7: pleasure; 8: has some; 9: use; 10: to have said; 11: is not
VIII 9 fr. 6 = VIII 153 fr. 18 A
most appropriately
the imitation
of rhythms
he has shown
and others . . . assertion
about . . . For if
it always remained . . . through these
what he thinks, and prepared
what it provides through
likeness, perhaps he would have extended
[it] . . . through things pleasant
to all and sought
by every race
naturally, and neither from
teaching nor from habit, but
as it were spontaneously. But
since it has been shown
by us often that not
. . .
There follows:
XI 83 fr. 5 B = VII 190 fr. 11 A
. . . happened to such a
. . . to delight
us . . . to all
appropriate . . . to strengthen
. . . the impulse of these
. . . by no means is it
naturally able to produce, it will not
be granted that it follows.
But indeed not even in the frenzied
intensifications of enthusiasm,
when the soul is unbounded and
disturbed, . . .
VIII 153 fr. 18 B = VIII 9 fr. 5
. . . the things of hearing . . .
more, and inasmuch as . . .
far less than the
necessary things of taste.
And to those of touch
not even . . .
. . . in emotions
themselves . . . just
as . . . seems to produce a kind of
divine possession, he
overlooks that . . . the
great and harsh sounds
of the divine . . .
. . . the soul . . .
There follows:
VII 190 fr. 11 B = XI 82 fr. 3
and they disturb [it] in combination
with opinions, while the
peculiarities of drums and bullroarers
and cymbals and of certain
melodies and rhythms,
and, through instruments of a certain kind,
the whole, in combination
with wicked suppositions,
drive into orgiastic frenzy and lead to Bacchic
madness, and that mostly
women and
effeminate men . . .
There follows:
VIII 154 fr. 19
. . . through counselling words
. . . of divine possession or . . .
. . . come about, but through melody
itself and sweetness
conveying nothing at all
of such things. And some
are brought back to a settled state from
divine possessions by being
piped to, in a way, not because the melody
brings such great
power, for how
is it possible to remove
dreadful opinions by the mere
impact of sound? [Rather] by
its having been handed down
as though this were a sign
of having been calmed by a divinity
and . . .
VIII 8 fr. 4
. . . and by us . . .
. . . besides this . . .
. . . it is unpersuasive that . . .
. . . irrational towards . . .
. . . or of qualities and . . .
. . . of sound to settle . . .
. . . of chance, of folly
. . . absurd suppositions
existing, to change . . .
. . . much more . . .
. . . writes, just as . . .
. . . of indisputable things . . .
. . . of the hungry . . .
VIII 154 fr. 20
and some also . . .
[having] it, some [they called] seemly,
others temperate and
courageous, others base,
[they] renamed . . .
by nature the
fact that the conversation is suited,
revealing also the speaker;
and there were also foods and
drinks . . .
and noble . . .
Translator’s note for this stretch
Most of this stretch consists of tiny, mutilated fragments; only isolated words could be rendered, and many lines are untranslatable sequences of letters (given as '. . .'). Editorial lines in Latin (fragment numbers, descriptions, 'us.' = lines) are rendered in English. 77.12 ἰδ[ίᾳ ('of itself') is uncertain. 78.2 'pap. 434' conflicts with the heading's 424; the edition's error is kept. 78.26 Κλεαν- is taken as Cleanthes. 4.1B.4: the restoration εὐϲχήμονοϲ ('decent') seems to contradict φορτικῆϲ; 'indecent' (ἀϲχήμονοϲ) is adopted as the likely sense. 73.7 '(sic)' marks the edition's own query on γεγόναϲιν.
and licentious . . .
. . . and many . . . [to
these] and to others . . .
. . . nature . . .
VIII 8 fr. 3; VIII 155 fr. 21 A
. . . in the case of common [things]
. . . writing the
. . . already, perhaps
. . . signified
. . . that the listeners
. . . says . . . affections . .
toward . . . we
hold . . . saying that the affections
of the body and of the
soul stand in like relation to
one another, both in their powers
and in their causes and in
what comes about from them. And
this, which . . . having established
. . . and such
things . . .
VIII 155 fr. 21 B
An excessively slight fragment.
Lines: 1 "it . . . under-"; 3 "virtue"; 5 "pleasure-"
XI 81 fr. 1
Almost nothing can be made out.
Lines: 5 "deception"; 6 "according to the argument"; 7 "as one may say"; 8 "would never"; 9 "such a thing not"
XI 81 fr. 2
of [things] being plastered on, or being
smeared over, or not
properly being added in some other way,
bodily . . .
removing . . .
vices. Nor . . .
. . . that even more . . .
affections someone; for neither . . .
does he strike out the . . .
. . . but also . . .
VIII 156 fr. 22
Lines: 2 "that the . . ."; 3 "would . . . child-"; 4 "readily"; 5 "accept-"; 6 "the causes"; 7 "but that the . . ."; 8 "altogether . . ."; 9 "leading"; 10 "readily to be deemed worthy"
by those born by nature
concerning nature, as
he says, pre-eminently; nor
[that] the [poet-
ic art is] the first wisdom, [and that] the first wise men
were the poets (sic) — could he
establish [this], or
that it is metrical rhetor-
ic. And earlier he said
unmetrical not . . .
VIII 157 fr. 23
and the pleasure . . . [Greek]
in relation to speech . . .
of the most Greek [people] them-
selves, he says that such
a fine and wonderful thing
[they] consider [the enhar-
monic] melody . . .
. . . and of the nature [produced] by
it, which also . . .
to produce the . . .
for why need one say . . .
VIII 158 fr. 24
Lines: 2 "benefit"; 5 "to apply and to assist the mind"; 9 "not even in sleep"; 13 "however, to harm"
. . . about them and the serious-
ness of the ancient law-
givers . . . we have often
spoken about them. But if this itself
were present, the understanding of what is
well-tuned and ill-tuned and
rhythmical, it is shown to be no more
among the things worth
mentioning and useful for
the education that assists in
living, than is the [understanding]
of seasoned and unsea-
soned food and perfume.
Nor indeed, when a melody is
applied to the . . .
. . . does it bring benefit . . .
VIII 159 fr. 25
. . . apply-
. . . insofar as the
. . . all men
. . . for if indeed also some of the irra-
tional animals, it is incomprehensible
. . . and this he swept along together
with it . . . beyond cavil . . .
. . . to learn
. . .
Aristoxenus . . . sight
and hearing, saying that [they]
have become the authority over
thought, and more divine than
the other senses, not on-
ly because of being deluded . . .
. . . nothing, but also because . . .
. . . to advance and to edu-
cate and wholly blame-
. . . to make . . .
. . . who would, against . . .
. . . took, and because
of vice wholly blame-
less to render, and because of the
. . . coining of words . . .
VIII 7 fr. 2
Where it stood is uncertain.
Lines: 7 "to attach"; 12 "the virtues"
. . . that it is necessary for the one singing
and playing the cithara . . .
. . . not only courage
to be displayed and tem-
perance, but also justice
VIII 7 fr. 1; VIII 160 fr. 26 A
VIII 160. Lines: 2 "justly"; 4 "cause"; 6 "like a colour"; 8 "toward"; 9 "to have been thrown"; 10 "reception"; 11 "a source"; 12 "more"; 13 "measure . . ."; 14 "of the . . ."
Line 18: "benefit . . . and en-
tices toward the recep-
tion of the . . . having shown
that [melody] not at all apart from the poem
has come to be, and has
led forward . . . and has nurtured
all virtue and education
and understanding; but that even
now it is of any use at all for
character, we have detected to be false,
not . . . all . . .
Unpublished fragments of papyri 424 and 1576
Apart from what I have given above I could extract nothing. Perhaps others will dig out more.
Pap. 434 (upper parts of the columns)
fr. 1
. . . only . . .
they would be ashamed, he says . . .
in every respect well-ordered (?) . . .
nor in any of the subsidiary [matters] . . .
subsidiary [matters], unless also . . . [harm-
ful] . . . serious . . . [harm-
ful things] they have pursued eagerly . . .
. . . this . . .
stupidity; and others also . . .
. . . something about it not . . .
. . . but as also . . .
. . . city . . .
. . . just as . . .
. . .
fr. 2 A
. . . for if indeed . . .
. . . into . . .
of sounds the . . .
. . . to say
of the serious [man]
. . . not know-
. . . even if . . .
. . . for Clean[thes]
. . . although . . .
. . . completely
fr. 2 B
education . . .
not toward temperance [a sus-
pect] nature . . .
toward courage . . .
and the [saying] "to the Muses" . . .
. . .
. . . and . . .
Pap. 1576 (lower parts of the columns)
fr. 1
. . . and toward . . .
first . . .
was with and . . . [in gen-
eral] toward . . .
of the soul to be . . .
of melodies . . .
if indeed also toward . . .
and toward . . .
. . .
. . . nor . . .
. . .
striking . . .
and restraint . . .
. . . intensified
a certain pitch . . .
and Pythagoras . . .
more [seduc]tive . . .
. . . call . . .
a pipe-girl . . .
. . .
. . . the . . .
. . . and this one . . .
fr. 2
. . .
powers . . .
. . . ancient
and . . .
but the opposite . . .
. . . and of the
. . . foreign . . .
. . .
. . . the . . . of the
. . .
. . . into . . .
for of the fine . . .
being healthy
. . . and the base . . .
. . .
. . .
. . . to say and
walking, that . . .
. . . governed
the finest
of music . . . found
. . . and . . .
and to some
fr. 3
. . . of others and . . .
. . . the one not . . .
. . . and many [things]
. . .
. . . of music
. . . and the so-called . . .
. . . of some . . .
. . . and . . .
. . . such . . .
. . .
. . . and . . .
. . . without not
. . .
. . . praise . . .
. . . concerning marriages
. . . for the begetting of children . . .
. . .
. . .
. . . someone . . .
. . .
. . . and . . . bride- . . .
. . . for being
fr. 4
. . .
. . . for not
. . . which he says
. . . city . . .
. . . toward
. . .
. . .
. . . not
. . .
. . .
. . . they say
. . . cities . . .
concerning the
. . .
. . . of the . . .
. . .
. . . of them
. . .
. . . the
. . . poe- . . .
. . . signi- . . .
. . . and
. . . and . . .
. . . and
. . .
. . . temperate . . .
. . . of some
. . . and the and
. . .
. . .
and . . .
. . .
. . . and . . .
. . .
. . . and
. . .
toward . . .
. . . not . . .
. . . in . . .
toward . . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
fr. 5
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . to come about.
. . . of other
. . .
. . .
unmanly . . .
orderly, bold . . .
of those who know . . . into . . .
. . . divide . . .
rather into . . .
. . .
. . . and of the
. . . other now . . .
. . .
boastfulness . . .
. . . bold . . .
. . . of the . . . him . . .
. . .
. . .
fr. 6
of the more and . . .
and often . . .
toward and just as . . .
if indeed as . . .
only the [works] of . . .
. . . and Hesiod . . .
and the [works] of the . . .
. . . later as . . .
having gone on . . . the . . .
. . .
. . . nor . . .
. . . and of the . . .
PHILODEMUS, ON MUSIC, [BOOK] 4
col. I A
Little can be read: 6 "the souls"; 9 ". . . and of the"; 11 "of music"; 12 "I play the buffoon" (?); 13 "or singing" (?) (papyrus ειτλλων); 17 "if it matters at all"; 21 "yes, by Zeus"; 29 "weariness"
[that] in drunkenness and surfeit
musicians and music-
lovers feel weariness and toil
toward the reception of decorous
and vulgar move-
ment, it being proper to them,
but not the reverse.
But he [says] that he finds no
Translator’s note for this stretch
Heavily damaged columns; many restorations are Kemke's. 4.2.30–36: the identity of the 'more natural-minded' group and the object of 'declaring spurious' (νοθίζοντες) is uncertain. 4.4.14 '(ου-' read as μου-. 4.5.1–5: wordplay deriving θεωρεῖν, θεατής, θέατρον from θεῖν 'run' rather than θεῖον 'divine'. 4.5.32 ἀπαρχὴ τοῦ γένους: sense uncertain ('first-offering for the family/offspring'). 4.6.12–13 the supplement 'they cease' is conjectural; 4.6.25 lacuna.
music that produces nobility
of character and seriousness, so
that it does not even draw
this along with it
through the practices, nor
[...] soul [...]
[...] it has been said [...] [both the things] of the
musician and those of the poet [...]
from a faculty concerning
perception grasp
the qualities of the things they
apprehend, and the
pleasures and annoyances
arising from them, the one [perception] being
natural, the other scien-
tific. For by the natural and
irrational [perception] is judged [...]
[...] its [nature?]; but by
the scientific [...]
[...] rather [...]
[by] the evident things [...]
[...] most readily; and in accordance with rea-
son also the [...]
which he says is evident
has been taken. For [people are] similar
in perception with respect to disposi-
tion: it is not that they agree that the
underlying object is bad,
but whether it is annoying or delight-
ful, on that they disagree;
rather they make the same
judgment. And indeed in the case of these
[senses], owing to certain predisposi-
tions, it is possible that varying
perceptions occur,
but in the case of hearing there is not
any difference at all, but
all form similar
apprehensions of similar melodies
and the plea-
sures they receive are similar,
so that even about the enhar-
monic and the chromatic [genus]
they differ not according to
irrational perception but
according to opinions: some, as
those similar to this man [do],
claiming that the one is
solemn and noble and
simple and pure, the other
unmanly and vulgar
and illiberal; others calling the
one austere and despo-
tic, the other gentle and persua-
sive; both [groups]
attributing what belongs to neither,
while the more natural-
minded [bid one] take what appeals to the ear from
each, bid-
ding [so], and so [holding] that none of the attributes
attached belongs to either
by its own nature,
and declaring [them] spurious. Ana-
logous things [hold] also for rhythms
and melodic compositions. And it is quite
clear that music,
even if it is most varied [...]
[...] being present
[...] appearances of character
never produced [...]
[...] since they are
established as unvarying. And
for this reason the musician who seeks
such understanding by which
he will be able to discern
how certain kinds of perceptions
will be disposed, seeks knowledge of non-
existent things
and teaches what bears on this
in vain, since
no melody, insofar as it is melody,
being irrational, either rouses the soul
from an unmoved and quiet
[state] and leads it toward
the natural disposition in character,
or from a darting and
rushing [state] toward whatever it may be
calms it and brings it to rest,
nor can it turn [it] from one im-
pulse to another,
nor [bring] the exist-
ing disposition to increase
and decrease. For neither is
music imitative,
as some dream,
nor, as this man [says],
does it have likenesses of character that are not imita-
tive, yet altogether
display all the qualities of character,
such that in them there is
the magnificent and the base
and the manly and the
unmanly and the orderly and the
bold, any more than
cookery does. Therefore neither in
themselves do they differ, nor
in their mixture with one another
[do they produce] dispositions opposed to one
another, so far as concerns
auditory perceptions,
which belong to craftsmen
alone. What he says about
[...] motion
[in
another place we shall examine.
Now about the honouring of the divine through mu-
sic, it has been said
sufficiently also be-
fore, and some things will be said again,
but let this much be said
now too: that the divine
needs no honour, but
for us it is natural
to honour it, above all with pious
conceptions, and then also
with the things handed down by ancestral custom
to each of
the individual [peoples] (but mu-
sic has not been handed down). There-
fore it does not follow that
it is useful to individuals,
but, if at all, the
public. And even to this neither
every form of it nor
whatever amount is taken up
elaborately [...]
[...] by [...] and not
by all but by some
Greeks, and at certain
occasions, and [...] now
through hired men.
And one will say that many skills,
on this argument, help toward
honouring the divine, and
indeed much more so,
with far greater purchase being made, and
continually, music
having already, at least for such purposes,
been given up except in
the contests. But indeed
long ago at the Olympic [games]
most of the giving was not for melodies
and instrumental playing.
[...] watching and spec-
tator and theatre and
one might say were named
also from 'running' [theîn]: 'watching'
and 'spectator' and 'thea-
tre'; for 'the divine' [theîon] shares
with them no more than 'running' does;
and that the spectacles assembled
for the honour of the gods were adopted,
but not
music, which is at least auditory;
rather, these were named from
seeing with the eyes and with the
mind.
Since enough has also been said
about being educated through music,
let us say these same things about
encomia:
that they were produced by poems,
but not by the things belonging to
music as now examined,
and by them cheaply
and senselessly for those
praised; and this is
common also to rhetoricians and
to prose writers generally,
common. And to weddings
both cooks and craftsmen
are brought in, and
it is the poems, not music,
that provide the use mentioned
by him
in wedding songs; and a small
first-offering for the family
was made among some, but not
among all, and for those marrying,
not for the others too, if
indeed marriage could be called simply
a good. But now
that wedding songs have been almost
entirely abolished,
that we are worse off
no one would grant.
And indeed erotic pas-
sion [is] neither holy but [...]
[...] has been
said even by this man to be
turbulent, nor are the things he says
come about through music
accomplished [by it] but by the poems,
nor is love helped through
music and poetry,
but by most [of them] and
in most people it is inflamed. And
the things he says happen in love
affairs
demonstrate each [point], and when reason
attends to them, entirely.
And dirges, moreover,
happen to be poems,
and on the whole to do nothing to
heal grief, but
sometimes to check it, mostly
to intensify it, and indeed
with the writers
vying for this; and good
order and decorum
do not follow from them,
but the opposite,
[people] being provoked to [...],
while music
does not even admit [it]. But
enough about the
help toward wars
has been written earlier; other things
will be said against
other philosophers. The
kind of athletic contests
is not practised by all,
and we seek a common
usefulness
and [one] for each; nor does it have
any good on the whole, nor
is it assisted by the trum-
pet [...]
[...] of illiberal [people]? experi-
Translator’s note for this stretch
Text is heavily lacunose; many restorations are Kemke's. 'Diogenes' is presumably Diogenes of Babylon, the Stoic opponent. 4.7.10–11: sense of 'for the most part composed' for women is uncertain. 4.8.15 'those who haul down' (καθέλκουσιν) likely refers to launching or hauling ships; the Ptolemy meant is unidentified (probably a Ptolemaic king). 4.8.18–20 construed as 'when the musicians stop, the workers no longer accomplish'; uncertain. 4.9.29–30 καθέλκονγων, ϲώμαγα read as καθελκόντων, σώματα. 4.10.2 Crexus: a dithyrambic poet, poem unidentified. 4.10.20–21 the 'honour' clause is uncertain. 4.11.19, 4.11.29 partly illegible.
ence, and very base
and shameless [...]
and even in matters concerning athletic con-
tests, even if I agree that we
are delighted by it; and that,
if dancing were removed
from dramas, we would have
nothing less, since there was
nothing in any of them
contributing to what is noble and high-minded.
And for women, even if the po-
ems were for the most part com-
posed [for them], I am so far from
thinking that anything useful re-
sults through music for
nobility and temper-
ance and orderliness, that I
am even persuaded that the teaching is very risky
and suspect,
lest it should give much occa-
sion for licentiousness
and disorder, raving in Bacchic frenzy,
of which I shall remind [you] somewhere as I pro-
ceed. But now, passing on, I say
that of the [arguments] collected by
Diogenes [...] from the start?
[...] that melody has something mov-
ing and inciting
to actions: if he says it has
been introduced by thought,
for that reason it is not op-
portune to examine [it]; but if,
as we call fire burn-
ing by nature, because it has a burn-
ing nature,
so too he deems melody [to be moving], then, yes,
by Zeus, he lies greatly.
For to be incited
to actions is to have an impulse
and to choose, but
melody, not exhorting
as speech [does], is not conceived
as producing choice [...]
to weaken [...] saying that it pro-
duces eagerness.
For indeed, having defined melody, he
said that it is moving by nature.
Now in support of so dull
a supposition he seems to
have drawn in the fact that for those who row
in ships, and for those who reap,
and long since for those who work
the wine, and for many
others of those who carry
out laborious tasks, some of the instru-
ments are added as accompani-
ment; which this man writes Ptolemy also
did for those who
haul down [ships]. But it is not that
melodies move and incite
to actions, nor that
when those who provide the music stop,
the workers then no longer
accomplish [the task]
and without music are less a-
ble; rather it is because they become relaxed
toward the toil and
toil more lightly through the ad-
mixture of pleasure. And if
we understand that Orpheus [is] not, through the excel-
lence of his tunefulness,
told in myth
to charm stones and trees,
as even now we
are accustomed to speak hyperbolically,
but [if] for the trireme-pipers,
like the Stoic, we by analogy
make [one] set over the build-
ers, we shall say [it is] for these reasons,
not because of this man's drivel.
And it is charming not only to
say that melody disposes souls
in some way, but also
bodies, as he added
[...]
the things relating to the body [...]
[...] perception [...]
[...] therefore also [...] he ought,
[...] the body being disposed [...]
having shown, to have added the more para-
doxical [point], saying 'not on-
ly the body
but also the soul does it in some way dis-
pose.' Nevertheless it is worthy of won-
der how from what he
says it is shown that [it disposes] bodies too.
For the face
shaped like that of
singers moved and in-
cited [them] to the activity
of song; melody did not move
the body and dispose
it in some way, unless melody is
the shaping. And that the
painter hit the like-
ness when the citharode
sang, he wants to attribute
the success to the melody,
but this [success] be-
longs to the soul rather than that
of the haulers; for it shows
them as having taken on strength,
which is bodily;
so he ought to have switched [the examples],
and through the painter
to argue that the soul is moved,
and through the
haulers that the
bodies too. Besides,
one might very gladly ask
what likeness, with song contributing,
he painted that he
was unable [to paint] before; for surely
he did not think that melody
makes people more skilful,
or he was blessed in his
understanding. And he adds to these
marvels other
portents, saying that [melody] is more
moving than rational
thought [...]
[...] and the only
[...] the poem of Crexus,
though not inhar-
monious, appears much more solemn
when melody is added,
and that the hymns in
Ephesus and those sung by the
choruses in Lacedaemon
will produce nothing com-
parable when [melody] is removed —
he thought it sufficient for a
proof that it moves more,
having reckoned nothing be-
forehand: that easily against him
one will say that melody makes nothing
more distinctive toward solemnity and rational
expression, but only
adds pleasure
to the hearing;
another, that because of the honour additionally assumed
[to be given]
to gods and men, not
because of melody, does
the change appear; another
perhaps that this too happens,
but that the thought of the poem
being sung also
[...]. And the fact that by the
ancients music was
honoured — for a layman and
uneducated person to
consider it a proof of its usefulness is for-
givable, but for an educated man
and still more for a phi-
losopher it would be a great reproach
to adduce [it]. Prophecy too
is by the Stoics deemed
worthy of honour, and countless oth-
er things that provide no
good, and some
even utterly wicked, brought forward
and by philosophy
not honoured [...]
[...] the perceptions
[...] deemed worthy
[...] of more serious [men]
[...] but on the contrary, as much as possible?
music, advancing as far as
the drinking parties.
But for one who thinks the many
always mad
it is utterly impermissible
to have recourse to the judgements
of them. And by those who have recourse [to them]
music must nonetheless be re-
jected
because of the later
neglect. Nevertheless the
poetic [element] is joined [to it],
and the things interwoven made music
conspicuous,
and because of the plea-
sure [...] and the entertain-
ment, but not because of the things
babbled in connection with these was it
approved when taken up; nor otherwise
[was] the demonstration of the main
point [made]. And perhaps even earlier
it seemed useless to others. For if
they say music [comes] from the Muses,
to whom they refer all edu-
cation and all the arts
[...]
[...]
Translator’s note for this stretch
The papyrus is heavily damaged throughout; much of the text rests on Kemke's restorations, and many lines are fragmentary. In 12.1 βαρβ[...] cannot be restored securely. In 16.31-32 the sense of 'not their own' (αὐτῶν) is inferred. The closing lines (17.8-11) are uncertain; the construction of 'not [calling] Homer...' depends on the following lines. 'Persaeus' (14.13) is presumably the Stoic Persaeus of Citium.
[...] and for all
necessary to acquire,
nor do I say that Themistocles did not
acquire [it], although he was
both most prudent and most
skilled in generalship, having heard [it],
if indeed also [...]
[...] some barbarian [...] blunting
spirit and voice
in wine, and saying that it is a sweet
dessert
at dinners, this
to speak as though some melodies
rouse
and tense the mind
toward company
and fitting
conduct. Now the fact that by
the ancients [music] was adopted also for the
upbringing
of children, for the preliminary sketching
of virtues, has already received discussion,
except perhaps for piety,
toward which we would gladly have heard
from him what conceptions
[music], contributing [to it], at least in
its musical kind, sketches
out. And as for [the claim that it contributes] also to the
[virtue] of men, so that even then
it is active, how the comic
poets bear witness, I
ask. For they praise only having been
musically educated, and the not [having been]
they revile, and they exclude [it] from the
elections; of which things
the one has happened, but the other
can in no way, they being children
and young,
be said [...]
so; for toward the manly
virtue to come they
were giving a preliminary shaping. For why need one
speak about the philosopher's
considering the assertions of the most
buffoonish, as more trustworthy than
himself, to be
proofs? [...]
[...] to have been con-
demned and to have been
wicked, the philosophers of that time
and the others whom
they punished. Passing over,
then, what has been said about
temperance and
courage, since it has received
discussion, let us proceed to the matter of
loves.
First, then, when erotic desire is
an evil and a great one,
as indeed the
Panhellenes understand, to consider [there] to be an erotic
virtue
is laughable
beyond measure; then again, to think that
melodies cooperate toward the right
conduct of love, when they
lie in the quality of sound
alone, while [love],
by the reasoning that teaches
its futility and harmful-
ness and insatiability, is driven
to fury and exasperated
to the point of folly,
and not to see how much
occasion it has given toward disorder
and licentiousness, to which pas-
sion it seems to be a match,
music, by nature;
and besides this, as shameless
fittingly if
[...] of free
men with the names
he wishes to attach love,
and Timotheus
on account of the
[that some are] fitting for the noble, and others for
courtesans, is not [a matter] of nature rather than
of empty
arrangements; nor did this man set out examples
of such things, but
only of thoughts —
by mere assertion he dragged in "also
the melody" — nor did he show the young
being corrupted by the melodies
of Ibycus
and Anacreon and
the like, but by their
thoughts; for the words Persaeus
spoke of, with these they
enfeebled [them], if at all. But melody, being a con-
comitant of the quality of
sound, cannot be a cause.
Therefore not by melodies
equally but by words
and thoughts are pleased
the beloved too,
if they wish, we shall agree;
and that Aristophanes
shows the ancients
using an affected [voice], as
the old men did, with the voice,
and with their eyes pandering
themselves, not with
melodies; but if he said [it] of these,
we tell him to go weep;
for these neither toward the things
he names, as though having [them] undisputed,
do they arouse, as far as in them-
selves lies, nor toward intercourse
[...] both men and women
and young men in their bloom
toward effeminacy; for neither
did this man nor the comic poets
show anything of Aga-
thon and Democritus
of the kind, but only
say [it]; nor did Nicander nor
[...] establish this through
the [...], but misled,
if at all. And indeed not even
is music able to console
the misfortunes
in love — for such a thing belongs to reason
alone — but it makes [people] heedless
by distracting [them], just as
sex and drunkenness do; but if
it chooses poems, let
it be granted, and that Philoxenus, if he
hinted at this, was not entirely
false, just as Menander [was not]
in calling it a wicked
kindling for many,
by giving certain
occasions. But as for Erato,
I ask, how [her name] was said to show
the contribution of what is properly called
music to erotic
virtue,
rather than of poetry
or better still of philosophy,
for all things are indeed
dedicated to the Muses; and
[how] suggesting desire
and not fighting
against the passion? For I pass over
that every impulse and
desire was by the an-
cients called love,
and that this is a most foolish thing to
consider for the taking up of education,
and that not at all
to maidens is fitting the
love only later
so called; if indeed
it were proper to hang also on na-
mes, also
on these, which some lover per-
haps assigned, like the rest,
according to his own pre-
dilections, [we would] be persuaded that they are
divine, or in any case
so named. But
since music does not appear to cooperate
toward erotic virtue,
it is clear that
neither [does it] toward what he says is proper
to it, the convivial
[virtue], and symposia in general;
but I hold that neither is there the so-
called convivial vir-
tue, nor, at least, the one to be
fashioned by these people out of
prudence, and perhaps
it does not even occur among the pru-
dent; nor that loves suit
symposia, since they are
disruptive and joyless and
divisive of those who
are together. That music, how-
ever, is proper
to symposia, even what is in
Homer duly indi-
cates. Therefore, granting further also
that one should relax and play
in them, I will not grant
that there is no more
fitting relaxation for free men,
and play, than for one
to sing, another to play the cith-
ara, another to dance, or that those
who do these things are better,
even in music
of the kind for listening, not
[their own performing]. Nor will I agree
that wine necessarily
elicits [this], and that the
prudent do everything
that he says
so as to behave not awkwardly but harmoniously.
And this too
has been said with good sense, that
even laymen are charmed
by its familiarity,
and indeed bring in
performances at symposi-
a, but [he] falls short in not
[calling] Homer and Hesio-
d and the other poets
of metres and melodies;
For let the drinking-parties that use
Translator’s note for this stretch
The text is heavily restored and in places obscure. 17.12–16: the sense of 'colours' and the construction are uncertain. 18.34–36: 'τοῖϲ ἀδιανοήτοιϲ' may mean the Spartans are 'witless' witnesses or witnesses to 'unthinkable' things. 19.4 'Πέρπανδρον' is read as Terpander. 21.16 'ἀφετεουϲ' is read as ἀφετέουϲ, 'to be dismissed', which is uncertain. 21.29–30 and 21.39 are lacunose. 'Diogenes' here is presumably Diogenes of Babylon.
the [works] of these men be better;
but how does [he] use music better
when he brings in poets but not musi-
cians, at least those of metres?
And in the rest
of life, accordingly, for certain
periods, even if not throughout,
more or less, as this man wrote,
a varied pastime
is provided by the musicians,
accepting [this],
we shall say that the variety and the greater part
come about from the things combined
[with it], not
from music
itself; and whatever he might write
about entertainment being specially
provided among
the melodic composers and receiving
attention from Chamaeleon,
almost all [of it] belongs to
thoughts and is poetic
colouring. Again
we say, since for
love we would find music in no way
use-
ful, nor for friend-
ship [would we find it] fittingly applied
[to
drinking-parties, granting that it suits
them, but not setting down that the only
end of these is friendli-
ness,
but also certain other things, for
pleasure, not for that, [we will say] it is use-
ful, we shall agree; so
not for friendship either; and of these
each is evident: both that
we, listening
to music, are disposed
delightfully, and that never anything
have they been aware of, conducive to
friendliness and friendship,
that they have gained from melodies and rhy-
thms. Nor do these things
relax and cheer the cheerless,
but the thoughts combined with
them [do], but on the con-
trary they are sung
and, when heard, reach
people who are all relaxed
and cheerfully disposed.
Nevertheless, even if it relaxes and
makes cheerful, just as the enjoy-
ment of drinks and
foods and every pleasure [does], of friendship
and concord we would not con-
sider it the cause, nor that by this
alone, and not by other things, in
our cheerful moods we
most of all become disposed to reconcili-
ation. The Spartans
we do not accept as witnesses
to things without understanding,
[saying] that they even had a Pythian oracle
to send for Tha-
letas, and when he had arri-
ved, they ceased from their discord;
if indeed they testify, and did not
merely follow those who fabri-
cated the ancient [tales], and musi-
cians; for others contradict
[...] boast-
ing through a dedica-
tion, if indeed he dedicated it so in-
scribed, as these people say.
Nor are we persuaded that Ter-
pander, in accordance with an oracle,
was summoned to put an end
to civil strife, even if very
many of the music-mad agree
about this,
and this man almost alone
represents him singing at
the common meals. For indeed it was fit-
ting for the philosophers to have out-
lined in what way
irrational melodies can stop
a rational dispute, [and] so
to persuade [us] that the [songs] of Thaletas and
Terpander had stopped those [disputes]
of the Laconians; or to ac-
cept that the Sybarites were
ordered by Apollo
to have some sent-for
cooks and
perfumers, and still more
that all, if they feast,
mostly agree. But
indeed, even if we accept that the god
gave the order
and that the Spartans became of one
mind when [the singers] had arri-
ved, it is easy [to see as] much more plau-
sible that he, choosing to dis-
tract [them] with musical entertain-
ments, also
ordered these things above all
to happen, and through words
sung, being persuaded that
they would be turned by those [singers],
and that they, whatever
they were ordered to do, all of it
would remember as [from] a god and
would bring [the strife] to a stop in the end,
[and] granted the inscrip-
tion perhaps
[...] contests
Terpander delighted, and that the
Laconians, choosing not to dis-
obey the oracle,
and perhaps also led on by reason,
laid aside the strife.
But indeed both the [story]
about Stesichorus is not accu-
rately recorded, and the Pinda-
ric one, whether it ended the discord,
we do not know; but if either
happened, it was through words
composed poeti-
cally that they persuaded, not through melodies,
and they would have reached [them] even more
if they had dissuaded in prose. For
fear of illegality did not restrain them, as
they say [it did] Solon,
[who] about Salamis, as if mad,
gave counsel
through elegy. And the song from the Epi-
goni — we [could] outline
another interpretation no less
plausible, but we let it
stand as this man did, with
the comic writer's comment
— is mythical.
So, passing to what he writes about pi-
ety, we say
that if, because the divine is
honoured through music
by the many,
we shall think music akin to pi-
ety, we shall also think
the cook's art and
garland-making and
perfumery and bread-ma-
king, and further farming, buil-
ding, painting, sculp-
ture, most of the
crafts [akin to it]; [it] would be passed over
better by philoso-
phers, and especially by these, since
through it not a single one is honoured,
because according to the Stoics the
many, being enemies to the gods
and fools, the true
honours of the mightiest they have not even dre-
amed of; and besides
this, because through the po-
ems rather does the hon-
our come about, while the melody makes
a small addition. And that Pin-
dar thought so, when
he said that, about to sacrifice, he would compose a dithy-
ramb; and indeed also the comic poet
who assigns melodies to each of the go-
ds; but if
otherwise, they are to be dismissed
along with the others among the musicians who at least tal-
k nonsense; unless
Diogenes was perhaps persua-
ded also by [the claim] that different gods
accept different melodies
and that particular ones suit each.
And why should one wonder at the rest
of his [claims]? For he thinks that for under-
standing it is useful
that definitions and divisions
and many demonstrations
exist in harmonics, just
as that [...]
any of these or [...] re-
maining otherwise, and by that very fact dia-
lectically to attain
something of what is set out by mu-
sicians not unintelligently and
laughably; or
since many empirical skills make use of these,
concerning which
it will be possible proportionately
to devote oneself to all [...]
[...] useful [...]
Translator’s note for this stretch
Line 22.1: the opening letters εαν are the end of a lost word. Line 22.5: τὴν ἀπὸ φρονήσεως is elliptical; the noun understood (devotion, or benefit) is uncertain. Line 22.23: the edition's ἢ[ε] is doubtful; read as ἤ 'or'. Line 22.36: ἀνταποδιδόναι τὸ μέλος, 'rendering back the melody', may refer to performing or reproducing a melody; the sense is uncertain. Line 22.39: φρονε[...] is broken off; it may be a form of φρονεῖν or φρόνησις.
[...] he will find such [arts], even if
they do not lay claim to these things,
and some even profound; but not
to all of them will he think it right to devote
himself. But if [he means the devotion] that comes from wisdom,
he will show nothing of the [pursuits] of
musicians toward this
contributing more than the
refinements of the other [arts].
And in saying that, to the critical [art],
a similar kind of theory
is held by lovers of music,
not only is he unaware that, in so far
as, supposing that in melodies and rhythms
there is a fitting and an unfitting
and a beautiful and an ugly,
he was leaving them a critical
theory, but also that, in so far
as there was any such thing, he was not
assigning to the philosophers
the judgement; and, by Zeus,
in so far as the critical [art]
or something similar to it
music had, as he used to say, not
to these but to the so-
called critics was he con-
ceding [it]. And to poetics also,
when he writes that it is analogous
both in imitation and
in invention generally:
in imitation
he could not have shown it, and in
invention, not to this [art] more
than to the other arts.
With respect, however, to shaping
and rendering back the melody,
let there be something in it similar
also to grammar.
For why must one [...]
let us grant it to delivery and
Translator’s note for this stretch
Line 4.23.1: the referent of αὐτῷ is lost in the preceding gap. The Diogenes sentence (4.23.27 onward) is grammatically incomplete; its main verb presumably followed the clause ending at 4.24.9, so the English is somewhat restructured across 4.24.4–9. 4.24.22: ἐ|λ]άλουν is read as ἐλάλουν, 'chattered'. 4.24.39–41 are largely lost: only 'of the craftsmen' and a form of πλεονεκ- ('overreach') can be read.
to the actor's art. And let us say that, if
all these things have the evident
affinity to quick-
wittedness and intelligence, it must
be made apparent to us
that one should also be devoted to
those arts, and to painting
and sculpture. For these
too have analogies to these [faculties]
and many other things
akin to intelligence, and so do many
other arts. But
Archestratus and his followers,
saying that the philosophical part of
music is what concerns the nature of the voice
and of the note and of the
interval and similar things,
were quite insufferable,
not only because they embarked on a most
alien inquiry
and childishly
chattered about these things, and
uselessly for knowledge,
but also because they declared
the study of these things alone
to be music. What, however,
Diogenes says, that, having
observed what was recorded
by Heraclei-
des about fitting and unfitting
melody, and about manly
and soft characters, and
actions suiting
and not suiting the
given characters,
we should consider music not far
removed from philosophy,
in that it is useful for very many things
in life,
and that the devotion con-
cerning it disposes [us] appro-
priately toward
several virtues, or rather
toward all of them: this we set out
in the third book of our
notes, and we also showed how full
of nonsense are the things said by others
in a related way.
Laughable, then,
has also turned out to be the view about jus-
tice held by some.
For it is not even
conceivable that sounds which move
only the irrational hearing
contribute anything to a disposition
of soul that contemplates what is ad-
vantageous and disadvantageous
for our communal life with one another,
and that chooses some
and avoids others,
through the theorems we are accustomed to
outline. And the
arguments appear similar to the
demonstration. For if
Plato had said that it helps toward justice,
we would have expected a proof
from him.
But as it is he says, differently, that the just is
analogous to the musical [man],
not that the musician is just,
just as neither [is]
the just man musical, nor
that either assists the other
toward its own
knowledge. And perhaps
he would have said that the just resembles
the shoemaker and the painter
and every expert in an art
[...]
[...] of the crafts-
men [...] overreach[ing] [...]
-ly must be understood as said of the
Translator’s note for this stretch
Col. 25.5–6: 'as are lawsuits, sights' is obscure; the text may be corrupt. Col. 25.27: lacuna after 'through the'; the word is unrestored. Col. 25.36–40: too fragmentary for connected sense. Col. 26.15: 'boorish' rests on the restoration ἀγροικευόμεθα. Col. 26.37: 'conclusion' renders ἐπιφορά; the sense is uncertain.
unjust and unmusical [person].
And indeed music is neither lawful
by nature
nor lawless, as are
lawsuits [and] sights; nor, when we transgress
what some have prescribed
concerning it, as [concerning] those,
are we troubled; [rather] we are
benefited; nor by abiding [by it]
are we well served, but we are
harmed. If then it is found to
assist in nothing towards some
of the virtues, neither
will it contribute to all of them, because
of their inseparability from one another.
Otherwise it does not [follow], even if these coexist
with one another, that what also
assists some virtues
must assist all. The
philosophers did not all
suppose that it is useful either
for all [virtues] or for some,
nor did those who said so
prove it. Those who attempted [it]
sought to confirm this through
the [...]; [but] neither
did all learn [it], nor did those who
learned [it] seem [to think] it to be
something necessary for the virtues.
And of those who did not learn [it],
if anyone, either old or after
the age of boyhood, wished
to learn, he played the buffoon, or,
having the wits of an infant, was not
very wise, and [...]
[...] and to one idling [...]
[...] and in this way [...]
sought (?), and not [...]
not to become a late learner [...]
it has been said concerning every
virtue, things both vulgar and worthless
and then contradictory, and much
more so among some. Nevertheless,
not even insofar as [they are] poets
would they know these things, let alone
insofar as [they are] musicians. And by their
thoughts, not by their melodies
and rhythms, do they benefit. These
are dragged in to no purpose, or rather
they even distract, when combined,
from following the
thoughts.
I have heard some saying
that we are boorish
in supposing that melodies and
rhythms without meaning
are said by some philosophers
or by sensible
musicians to turn [people] to virtue,
since these men
hold that melodious and rhythmical
speeches bring this about,
and Plato
even expressly; [and saying] that, as if they were uneducated,
we fight against the
philosophers; and they wonder
that we call the composer of instrumental
pieces a musician, and
deem it right that
musicians teach meaningless things,
or are unwilling [to call] Pindar and
Simonides and all the
lyric poets
musicians. But I
think such people have slipped away
from the conclusion, and
have taken them to be small-minded
and to say nothing
to the point: first,
that [...]
these things are capable of moving the emotions,
Translator’s note for this stretch
Text heavily damaged; lines 27.27–27.30 and 27.38–27.40 largely illegible and translated only in fragments. Supplements such as [φωνῶ]ν at 28.29 and [παιδ]ευόντων at 27.21 are the editor's, some marked doubtful. In 28.5–9 'bare' (ψιλοῦ) likely means 'unadorned [prose]'.
and so are the genera of the scales,
and indeed also the instruments,
as both the proofs and in general their
arguments make clear,
in which for the most part they do not even
touch on the
thoughts [expressed], though sometimes, recalling
what is produced
by each, they make it clear, so
that it would have been better for one of them to
say that this was [merely] an opinion
and not, attaching their own cleverness
to those [people],
to call us boorish;
second, that they thought
it was enough for those
who busy themselves with melodies and
rhythms
if the embellishments that sometimes come
from those who educate
and exhort
and assist towards
virtue should be recognised. And
third, that what is signified
through the words they never
rejected, and [...] to do
[...] they themselves
all [...]
have passed over [...] the things
sometimes applied as embellishment,
sometimes put forth by themselves —
at one time, we say, by themselves,
at another time taken apart from the words
with which they are combined —
contribute none
of the supposed [effects]. But if
not earlier [...]
now to us [...]
[...] revile [...]
unless they wish to say the same as
what is in Cleanthes, who says
that poetic
and musical examples are better,
and that, while the discourse of philosophy
is able adequately to proclaim
things divine and
human, yet, since it does not have,
bare as it is, words fitting
the divine magnitudes, metres and
melodies and rhythms
come closest
to the truth of the
contemplation of divine things — than which
nothing more ridiculous is easy to find.
"For it is not that the thoughts do not
benefit, but when they are set
to melody the exhortation comes
from both together; for indeed
from the thoughts themselves
it comes about in no small measure, but with
the melodies it is greater." But if
someone is fair-minded, he will say
it is equal, and if he is bluntly
truthful, [that it is] slackened, both
through the pleasure and through
the distraction caused by
this and by the grandeur and
the [voices] and the
peculiarities, and because
the words are uttered continuously and
not in the natural way, and because of
the places and the occasions in
which we listen, and for
many other reasons. And indeed
there would be no one who
would not burst out laughing
on hearing someone, with song and some instruments,
giving advice
or [offering] consolation to those
grieving [...]
[...]. For not even if one of the trag-
Translator’s note for this stretch
Column 30 is badly damaged in lines 1–7 and 25–26; only fragments are translated. Lines 4.29.16–17 are garbled in the edition (a supplement 〈καλεῖν μουϲικούϲ〉 is inserted); the sense seems to be that Aristoxenus, nicknamed 'the musician', calls instrumental composers musicians. In 4.29.23 the '26' is a stray line number. 'ἱλαρωκέναι' (29.29) is a supplement. Line 4.30.27 is not text but the edition's critical apparatus (variant readings or supplements keyed to line numbers), rendered as such.
edians or comic poe-
ts [said] this would we put up with it,
although he comes closer to madn-
ess, let alone
if a citharode [did]. For I pass over the fact that,
with everyone conceding
the benefit, it turns out no differe-
nt for the musically trained
than for the untrained, which is why they per-
suade [people] to take up
the learning. Now then I say
that composers of instrumental pieces too
[are called musicians] not by me alone, but
also by common usage and by
Aristoxenus, whom they nick-
name 'the musician', 〈call musicians〉, and
that musicians both
put forth what is without meaning, as
the [pieces] on instruments and the
warblings, and that when
they put forth words, they
furnish what is added
to the words; and not only that the
circle of Simonides
and Pindar were mu-
sicians, but also that they were musi-
cians and poets, and that
insofar as they were musicians they delighted,
and insofar as poets they com-
posed the words, but perhaps
do no good even in this respect, or alto-
gether little; and not only
the musicians, nor
more so, but all a-
like who are edu-
cated. So however someone [was]
call[ed] [...] the whole [...]
[...] from thoughts
bare melodies and the rhythms
[...] I say [...]
[...]
[...] by the [...]
called out [...] always.
And often they met with as much
[...] to those who have paid attention
uneduca[ted?] [...] has been
talked nonsense, by whom it was once said,
about the likeness to the heaven-
ly bodies too. For let it be
granted that the motion and distance
of sun and moon
correspond to that of the notes,
and the zodiac to the
division of the monochord: the
kinship is not demon-
strated, because many things
that are put forward with some correspondence
are as far apart as can be.
And to discern this difference
existing in the heaven
seems to provide nothing useful
toward the
acquisition of virtues or
the correction of character, nor as
[...] but as [...]
[...] is so, nor [...]
[apparatus: 27 'but'; 28 'does not undo'?; 29 'therefore many'; 34 'about the gods'; 35 'rather'; 38 'intervals ... him'; 40 'even'; 41 'by much']
[...] by some otherwise(?); nor
Translator’s note for this stretch
Text heavily damaged throughout; many restorations are the editor's and some are marked doubtful. 4.31.22 is the edition's apparatus of readings for lines 26–29, not continuous text. 4.32.16: 'ὑποκρινομένου[ου' shows a doubled syllable, read as ὑποκρινομένου. 4.32.31–33: μειμητικάϲ = μιμητικάϲ; μι[ι]μ- = μιμ-; 'music-like' renders the restored μουϲικῇ παραπληϲίοιϲ ('similar to music'). The construction of 4.32.30–39 is uncertain.
thus the things of virtue(?) [...]
[...] to both
arts. But then, if
[their] products for ease
are of use [...]
[...], music does not,
by analogy with these,
straightway also have the
study of celestial phenomena. For no one,
not even of the ancient(?) musicians,
came to know these things, nor, having investigated [them],
demonstrated [them]; but what they say
from certain Pythagoreans
some, having received [it] in succession,
recount. But if, according
to the converse argument, it has been
shown that those ignorant of how
things in the heavens stand
are straightway also, of musical theory,
truly blind [...]
[apparatus: 26 'so many ... knowledge'; 27 'music-'; 28. 29 'melodies ... soft-']
soul [...]
But if someone [...] all things
[...] provides, and the [...]
the soul musical. [...]
[...] through [...]
alone [...]
[...] to have said [...]
such things [...]
makes, and soft- [...]
in souls, but by the [...]
[...] and more [...]
pitch [...] without
interruption [...]
[...]
[...] but the dispositions
themselves [...] by themselves
and not by those
came about. And it is seen
also from plain
evidence that neither of the competitors
do those who express these things
have the aforesaid
vices, nor of the laymen
the cultivated ones, not to speak
of the wise and the philosophers,
just as neither do those who, while such things
are being acted, overhear
[them], and still less those who listen,
since they become accustomed neither to words
that are shameful nor to gestures
nor to sentiments(?).
And yet, if these things
of voice [...] are by nature [...]
[...] to the characters
themselves [...] almost
[...]
[...]
[...]
they think [...] will seek [...]
cithara-play- [...]
But if someone thinks that both syllables
[are] imitative, and that for the most part by
music-like
imitations and gestures
and displays there are straightway worn down
and melted away
the spirited part, and that this
unchangeable wis-
dom is by the most precarious [things]
pulled about [...]
and that [people] are similarly affected, because
Translator’s note for this stretch
33.6: καταϲτήϲει ('will render') completes the clause of 33.1–5. 33.36–37: lacuna; the verb of the second 'many' clause is lost and has been supplied conjecturally. 34.10: π[λὰ] read as πολλὰ. 34.15–16: the subject of 'promoted' (προήγαγον) is unstated, presumably the Athenians and Greeks. 34.39: 'δύο λαβεῖν' ('to take two') does not construe clearly here; the text is probably corrupt or wrongly restored, and the line is left untranslated in part.
[...] souls compassionate
and sympathetic and wholly
gentle, in place of those disposed in the
opposite way,
it will render [them]: it is idle, then,
to talk such nonsense, when it is evident
that no more than smells
and flavours do these melodies which
they speak of produce [these effects], nor their
opposites. And it is a falsehood,
on the part of those by whom it is said, that it alone
of the arts benefits
completely. For indeed farming
and weaving and house-
building and statecraft
and many others [do so]; and these
one might say benefit
necessarily, by helping against necessary
ills, whereas it delights
only naturally, not
necessarily. And by
that argument philosophy,
since it benefits few, would also
become worse than music and many
paltry skills.
It is foolish too
for those who have learned it to insist
on its great usefulness
on the ground that they also
impart it to children.
For they are able to boast
and to be
mistaken. And many say
that it does not improve
the ungifted at all, nor [...]
[...] and many [take it up] because they think
it fitting for
the refined to share in it, and [say] that
[they] have shared in it.
And Damon, if he said such things
to the real Areopag-
ites and not to
fictitious ones, was deceiving [them]
ruinously. Nor is it surprising
about it that among the Athe-
nians it was honoured, and among all
the Greeks, and was deemed worthy of the same [honours]
as victors at the sacred games.
For many other things [were honoured that were] worth-
less, and many great
evils too. And philosophy
because it has not obtained
prizes at all, it would be time
to dishonour. And because of the things bound up [with it]
they promoted [it] great-
ly. And of the [music] praised by these men
they grant not a single
[point]. This has been discussed
in part here as well,
and more fully in the second
of the notebooks.
Moreover no god
became the inventor of
music, nor handed [it] down
to men, but
they learned it in the way
we explained earlier.
Reason and wisdom
and the educational sciences
no pious person considers [to be]
Hermes and Athena
and the Muses. But if
reason or calculation introduced
music, then it is not on that account
useful, since [it introduced] also the worst
things. And if they claim that reason
and wisdom and the educational
sciences [...] two [...]
let them state the causes.
But if gods invented music
and gave the other arts,
[them], while others hymn [them] as having given
Translator’s note for this stretch
The text is lacunose at 4.35.40–42; only isolated words survive there. At 4.36.20–23 the restorations τὰϲ, τἆλλα and ἔργον are queried in the edition, so the sense of that sentence is uncertain. At 4.35.13–17 the reference of 'the two [points] before it' and 'the last' depends on lost preceding argument.
this alone.
For I pass over the fact that many even of
the absurd things have been brought in as having been
taught by gods. Yet
they have even told in myth that Athena
came to hate the pipes,
and that
Hermes handed
the lyre over to another. And this
too, against the one who says that gods
make use of music,
let it be taken as said in jest; and let the two [points]
before it be transferred [here],
and let it be said that none [of them] is
musical. And apart from
the last, let the same things
be applied also to those who extol [music]
on the ground that [gods] rejoice in being honoured
through music,
namely that [gods] have no
need of such things, nor
fall under them, and
that to admire on these grounds
even the worship of the barbarians
is absurd for Greeks
— for barbarians too think to honour
gods through these things —
and that the lawgivers and
statesmen perhaps went
astray in making this a custom,
and that it has been held that, just
as we are delighted by it through hearing,
so are those [gods] too,
but in no other way at all,
and the other things about [its] having
nothing proper to piety
that have been said up
to now. And the heroes neither
were sons of gods [...]
[...] rather than [...]
[...] practised
to admire and
to practise [it] is vain, and what has been handed down
by poets
is not credible. Otherwise,
they ought to state the causes for
which they were taught music
and to show them
as reasonable. It is evident, then,
that those who became musicians
were not well-born
nor fortunate, but
certain craftsmen and
servants at feasts, unless
those who told these things
invented some; and of the
great [heroes] one or a second [at most],
using the cithara and
song to a moderate degree,
and all accepting
these things for the sake of pleasure. For the
actions of good men
and their other thoughts
fall to a different task.
Democritus, then,
a man not only the most given to natural inquiry
of the ancients
but also, of those whose history is recorded,
less than none
inquisitive, says that music
is rather recent, and
gives the cause, say-
ing that it was not necessity that separated it off,
but that it arose from what was
already in surplus.
[...] and it seems
Translator’s note for this stretch
The papyrus is fragmentary; restorations follow the edition's brackets. Line 37 'ἀπρέπειαν' is marked doubtful in the edition. Lines 6–7 (τὰ δύϲγνωϲτα μὲν ἁπάντων ὅϲῳ ϲυμφορώτερα) are syntactically uncertain; the rendering is tentative. Line 8 has a stray period after καὶ, omitted. The sentence at line 40 continues into the next stretch and its sense is incomplete.
that even the meanest things were held in hon-
our at the beginning, as [one would expect]
among more brutish men, but later
among the more intelligent
the things hard to understand, [though] of all [things]
they are [the] more useful in proportion.
But [it is a mark] of small-minded men and
of those who have nothing worth mentioning
with which to pass the time
themselves — for why need one say [that it]
will make [them] happy? —
to toil at learning for the sake of providing
themselves with
delight at some time,
and [of men] not seeing the abundance
of all the per-
formances that are
put on in public, nor
the opportunity of taking part in them
constantly, if we wished,
throughout the city, nor attending
to the fact that even over
long periods [it] wearies
one's nature, and quickly
produces surfeit, which is why,
when the contests are drawn out, we often
do something else.
For I pass over the point that
the pleasure is not neces-
sary, while the learning
and practice, in order that we may de-
light ourselves, are laborious
and shut [us] out from the most im-
portant things for prosperity,
and the continual im-
propriety of one who
sings or plays the cithara like a stripling
actively. But concerning
[our] being pleased no more differently
[...] we shall examine later somewhere.
Translator’s note for this stretch
The text is badly damaged throughout. Line 1 begins with a lost word ending in -μαϲιν. In lines 23–25 the construction (ἢ ... ἀφίϲτηϲι) is incomplete, perhaps owing to a lost alternative; the sense is uncertain. Lines 41–42 are largely illegible; θαυμάϲια and πεπιϲτευκότων are restorations.
But when they
say that wealth and reputation
come from the discipline
, let us say that
they are putting forward things common
to many pursuits, and
inferior to more [of them], and [that]
with toil [it] pays
off, and ten thousand times more
for the competitors than for the harmonic
theorists. And being able at drinking parties
and other gatherings to have
something to say and to make the opening offering
is both common to other [pursuits]
and not, as
we have learned, thought worthy by all, but perhaps
even laughed at, if
a philosopher should do it; and the theoretical
part, not understood by most
people and
needing practice in order to be accomplished,
either draws [us] away from the things that lead
towards blessedness
; and [it is] ten thousand times better
to have cheerfulness
either by demonstrating [its] uselessness
or by
accomplishing any of the other things from the detailed exposition.
Having said this much, then,
against what some
have undertaken, I would rightly
maintain [that I have said] as much as,
for their own persuasiveness,
I ought not to have extended to even a tiny fraction,
but because of
the reputation of those who championed [them]
and the joint embellishment
by most
people, and [because of those] who have believed
the speakers [...] marvellous things [...]
[...]