To Demosthenes, on Exemption from Public Services
Translator’s note for this stretch
Line 2.2 'οἷ αὐτῷ' is read as 'to himself'. In 6.1 the bracketed clause about Achilles' divine birth is bracketed in the edition, probably as an interpolated gloss. 'κάτω φρατρίας' ('lower phratry') is an unusual expression; the sense seems to be 'of low birth'.
Anything, men of Athens, I would have expected sooner than that this Demosthenes here would ever come to such a pitch of folly and impropriety as to be led on to advise us for the sake of exemption, and to say that it is something of great value, and that it brings glory to those who granted it no less than to those who received it. Even if anyone else had thought fit to attempt such things, this very man ought to have been the first to try with all his strength to prevent him, not only because this is altogether one of the things unprofitable to the city, as I shall show as my speech proceeds (but he both wishes and prays for the very opposite for it, and in this way he has conducted his politics all
his time, so that he even claims to be persuaded, speaking of himself, that not a single one of all men would judge such things better, and he not only says this but also shows it by his deeds), but also because the greatest harm would arise from this for our affairs, if this should go on in turn through every case. As it is, by the things he argues for in this, and by the fact that he makes more account of these than of all he has ever said or advised, he leaves us to reckon one of two things: either that he did not speak those [earlier things] well, or that these things have not been rightly proposed. Or rather: if these are right, those were boasting and nothing sound; but if the credibility of those rests on your deeds, and not one person, Demosthenes, judging from what you have done, would say that they were not fittingly spoken, then it is quite plain that you have been eager for such things beyond all reason, and before being refuted by anyone at all, you are casting this vote against yourself.
I, men of Athens, did not think this man so clever at mischief as to wish to harm the city in order to lay up a favour with certain people, nor to make their interests weigh more than what is just toward the city, nor, thinking he ought to help them, to wage war on the city itself; but rather that, as was his habit, he would always both plan and do what was going to benefit the community. For when we sometimes, or rather as a rule, disregard even what is truly to our advantage for the city's sake, how is it not plainly absurd to do a favour to someone else at its expense? But he was so far from choosing to act this way now that, as much as he was formerly upright and devoted to the people and a precise student of public affairs, so far has he now departed from his principle, and he handles affairs in the opposite way to before: wishing to persuade us not of what benefits the city but of what benefits the son of Chabrias, or, if you like, himself (for he himself had married this boy's mother after Chabrias' death), all but
shouting in these words: 'I take no account of the city; everything is nonsense to me compared with my family.' Indeed, the law which ought to have been established for the city from the beginning, that none of the citizens either is or may become exempt, has now been well enacted by Leptines, so that all right-thinking men, as is reasonable, praise him and heartily rejoice both with him and with the law, with the one for the public benefit, with the other for having taken thought for it. This man alone, apparently annoyed if we fare well, instead of applauding it and admiring it and arranging that it should be valid for ever, does everything to make it invalid. Not, as one might say, from ignorance of what is advantageous (for who is cleverer than he at such things?), but so that he may reinstate Ctesippus in his father's exemption, not knowing that when the city fares well he too must fare well, but when one wishes the boy to prosper now and the city not, he himself will all but have already experienced the same [misfortunes].
Moreover, Demosthenes, if the law seemed to you not good, and not to achieve its aim in all respects, but to be nonsense and nothing sound, you yourself ought to have been the first to come forward publicly to stop it, to accuse it, to indict it as unconstitutional, not to try to refute it through others, letting loose these men or those from concealment, and to plead with them against it. For you, if anyone, care most about such things. But by thinking it right to keep silent then, and now to slander the law along with them, you confirm both points: that the law is excellent, and that you yourself have been stirred up against it in vain. For, so that you might not seem to champion Ctesippus alone, and to treat the city's interest as
of no account, and then, besides achieving nothing of what you wish, make yourself the cause of what you do not wish, by having roused the people to anger, fearing all this, you devised the cleverest scheme of all, so that you might easily beat off this suspicion and help the son of Chabrias toward what he needs: first by declaring that exemption is greatly to the city's benefit and thereby stealing over the listener, and only then mentioning the boy. Yet when you approach these matters not boldly or freely but fearfully and deceitfully and very much wishing to escape notice, you seem to be the first to find fault with what you say, and to hate it, and for this reason to shape and lead on your speech in this way. Further, if we all know this to be the difference between an accuser and a sycophant, that the latter fabricates what does not exist while the former pounces on evils that exist or appear to, and that the former we sometimes judge worthy of pardon, if not a just pardon, because he puts together nothing of his own invention from his own resources but uses the facts, whereas the latter's wickedness is shameless, to which class do you wish us to assign you? To the moderate one that admits of excuse, or to the most worthless and wicked one, deserving of every hatred, or indeed to both at once, as I think and shall now show? For in wishing to strike out as worthless the law which you ought most to have admired because it benefits the city, abusing it and running it down and sparing no word against it, you get the reputation not only of an accuser but also of a malicious slanderer.
That, in addition to what has been said, men of Athens, he is also shown to be a sycophant by what he uses at the beginning of his speech, I should be ashamed of myself if I tried to prove at great length. For these very things are both sycophancy
manifest and clear proof that he falls short in nothing of sycophancy. For what Leptines would never have thought of, nor, it seems to me, would ever have said even if he had it in mind, since it would not serve what he wished to accomplish, this man, men of Athens, accuses him of as if he had simply said it, doing the same thing as if someone, facing a strong and invincible opponent, thought fit to kill him with poison because he could not do so with his hands. So you too, being unable to refute the law otherwise, fabricate charges without ground, partly acting maliciously and wickedly yourself, and partly also composing and stitching things together out of your own head. So you give us one of two things to suppose: either that you never so much as read the document at all, or, if you allow me to say it, that having read it and admired it, you suffered the same as the envious and were somehow beside yourself with grief because Leptines had taken over and accomplished a task that had long been yours, so that you could not even mention the law cleanly after that. For if Leptines drafted the law so that the city might not be wholly deprived of its public services, seeing them grow scarce through the multitude of exemptions and the city's prosperity as it were giving way as a result, while this man deliberately keeps silent about this and claims that it was enacted because certain unworthy persons had obtained exemption, how does he not confirm what I am saying? And how is he not himself convicted of not telling the truth and, besides, of trying to cheat us as if we were children?
And that in saying this he says nothing true is plain both from what I have said and from the way he himself introduces Leptines, not as having said this, but, it seems, as going to say it later. At any rate he says: 'It is not unclear, men of Athens, that Leptines, and anyone else who speaks for the law, will say nothing just
about it, but will say that certain unworthy people, having obtained exemption, have slipped out of the public services, and he will make most use of this argument.' You see, men of Athens, how he announces that Leptines will say this and will make most use of this argument. Nor did he mention the unworthy without reason, but with a most wicked intention, so that, the unworthy having been cast out of exemption, Ctesippus might seem deserving of it, both on his own account and because of his father Chabrias. But the man's scheme comes to nothing, men of Athens, and he will gain nothing by contriving this, if you do what is just and what most befits the city, and moreover hate those who try to distort the truth. For I myself am so far from being persuaded by this and paying attention to it that I think anything rather than that it is right. For apart from his having contrived this, as I said, and Ctesippus being the reason, I cannot at all consider the point about the unworthy to have been made opportunely and worthily of the matter, however much he himself relies on it. For if an examination of birth were set before us and only the well-born had to be honoured, it would be well to sort out by descent those who are to be rewarded; but if those who have done good must simply receive good, and this is the wage of excellence, and we know exemption to be nothing other than a return for things well achieved, I do not see what sense it makes to mention the unworthy and the not unworthy, where all must be honoured alike for this very thing, whether a man happens to be base and of the lower phratry or descends from Codrus. For how would Achilles have more claim than Thersites to win the gratitude of the Greeks, if both took the Trojans equally? [Since the one was from the gods, and the other not such.] Apart from this, if only the worthy are to share in exemption, nothing will be more against our own interests.
For first, I know well, nobody at all will any longer consent to perform public services and to pay the necessary property taxes, as the law requires, but they will flee from these duties: those who are exempt for that very reason, and those who have not obtained it because it would not be possible for them to obtain it at all. And from this there will be, in the latter, a certain envy toward the former, and jealousy, and constant hostility and hatred of every kind; and for the city, not to say anything harsh, [the result will be] to stay where it is and not advance, because of these men's idleness and strife. Then, even if some do perform public services (and these would be those whom no exemption prevents), everyone knows that this contribution and zeal from them will be small and paltry and worth practically nothing. But let it be, if you wish, fine and fitting and sufficient for the city's affairs: which, then, is finer and more profitable for the city, and more conducive to its growth, to have all men performing public services, or some? To enjoy a common and abundant provision, or to get only some moderate contributors? And both better and worse men, or only the worse? And to have all the rest as men who praise it, or as men who find fault? For my part I think that even the barbarians themselves would rightly resent us, because we chose a single gain in place of a double one, and when we ought to prosper in both respects, we thought we should do so only in part. That some men should be exempt and others not, men of Athens, will be most to blame for the city's harm, not only for none of the things Demosthenes runs through up and down, but for those you heard me speak of just now: of this I think you are all thoroughly persuaded, since you are quick-witted and prepared from home and by nature for judging what is honourable, just and advantageous. But that, under the law, no one at all should be exempt now, nor be allowed to hold this in future, this is a thing of such great worth, so full of hopes and so especially fitting for every city and constitution, that whereas of the other laws some happen to concern the private
Translator’s note for this stretch
Line 7.1: 'εἰσφοράς' rendered 'property taxes'. Line 10.2: 'ἐγνώκειν' taken as first person ('I have not known'). 'ἐλείπεθʼ' read as ἐλείπετο, 'εἱστισοῦν' as ᾑτισοῦν/ὁτῳοῦν ('to anyone'). Line 11.1: 'Καλλιμάχῳ τῷ Πολεμάρχου' is literally 'Callimachus son of Polemarchus'; taken as Callimachus the polemarch at Marathon, the text probably garbled. 'Pausanias son of Cleombrotus' as an Athenian example is odd but is what the text says.
interests of each person and some to be of public concern, this one alone offers us the most common, most profitable, lasting and secure benefit, extending through everything as fully as possible. At any rate, to go on campaign and to serve as trierarch, and to send embassies and to receive them, and besides to deal with allies, to make truces with enemies, to repel enemies, to lay claim to and preserve what is ours, and, by Zeus, to be of one mind with one another and all to be one in judgement, and, to put it briefly, of all that a city needs which is so great and rules over so many peoples and islands, all these things, readily and with great abundance, both to deliberate and to do, will belong to us most finely from this law, after the favour of Athena. And this I shall try, as best I can, to show and make plain to all, so that you may know precisely, men of Athens, and recognise how far the law excels in what is best, and that Leptines, if any man alive, is a friend of the people and good towards the city.
Every constitution and every ruling power, and in general men one by one, consider not only whether they will do something, but whether it will be advantageous to them and, so to speak, in every way in their favour. For they wish, men of Athens, and very much wish, to attain justice in these things and to fall short in nothing in this respect, since this alone is the best course of action; but if both are not possible, to act justly and to their own advantage, they choose to act advantageously rather than justly. Or rather, they do not think they should act at all, when they perceive that what they are about to do is either not to their advantage or against themselves. For the one is plain madness, to choose willingly to act against oneself; the other truly belongs to levity and folly and to the company, so to speak, of Margites: to toil at random and act for nothing and to no purpose. Leptines, then, has introduced a law that is not only just but also advantageous and, besides,
a source of glory for the city, no less than those laid down from the beginning and long ago, if not even greater, since what those passed over this one has discovered and corrected; and worthy of being esteemed not only among us, the nurslings of Athena, but among practically all mankind. It is just, because it compels all alike to perform public services, which is the mark of people truly governed democratically and honouring equality in everything, and not to beg off this necessary and public contribution by means of exemptions, as if we were afraid of being seen to do good to our own city. And yet how is it not absurd and far from what is just, that we should be able to enjoy her benefits equally, but not stand equally in our duties towards her, some performing public services and others not? And that, while we are alike in goodwill towards her, we should flee equality here alone? And that when war comes all should choose to run risks for her and hold to the same zeal, yet in lesser matters, which bring neither any danger nor toil but the greatest benefit to the city and to us, we should then appear, so to speak, half-citizens? And it is advantageous not only because public services are quite simply the foundations of constitutions and wonderful and very great means for advancement, but also because, if no one is exempt, as I said, all will perform public services, whereas if some share in exemption, not a single one will. If, then, what makes the city's affairs worse, and tends more to her ruin than to glory for others, is worthless to use, while what makes her conspicuously greater and better and flourishing in everything must by all necessity be held in very high regard, if we have any concern for ourselves: then it was fitting that no one at all should be exempt, since this is no small harm to our affairs, and the law, being so
most beneficial to us in every way, as if it came from Apollo, would deserve, with full and unanimous consent, to be in force and to prevail over all.
Apart from this, there is no gain whatever for the city from exemption, except that it repays a favour by it; but those who have received it live in luxury, while public services both profit the city itself most of all, building up the means by which it grows, and give those who perform them a personal glory, their zeal for the land that bore them. Moreover, benefactors can be repaid in other ways, but a city preserved without public services I have not known even in myths. Even if it has heroes as its inhabitants, even if good Fortune joins in helping it, it will gain nothing more if this alliance is not present. For if there is no need to lead the people, nor to go on campaign, nor to serve as trierarch, nor to do any of the things which are kinds of public service and truly the foundations of cities, we shall seem like nothing but a body lacking hands and feet and senses besides. For what all these are to the body, being served through the means I mentioned is to the city. Nevertheless, even if no other mode of repayment at all were left to anyone, but everything led to exemption, and this were the only reward for those worthy of good treatment for the zeal they have shown on our behalf, and the city seemed to be harmed not slightly by it, not even so, I think, men of Athens, should we put up with such things, nor, out of favour towards this man or that, become responsible for loss to the city; rather, taking full account of what is just on her behalf and of the common profit, we should reasonably let pass what concerns these men themselves, since they have sufficient reward in having shown themselves benefactors of such a city. For in this way, indeed, it is open to them to be honoured more, by seeming not to have made their excellence something for sale, nor for anything else, but to have displayed it for the sake of their own magnanimity and their goodwill towards
the city, just as befell Themistocles son of Neocles in the Persian War, and Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, and still before them Cynegirus son of Euphorion and Callimachus the polemarch; for none of these, before engaging in battle, took courage for the contest by looking to the greatness of prizes for valour, nor, when they had saved Greece so that she was no longer in danger, did they get what they deserved; but they thought it glory enough for themselves both to have done deeds greater than crowns and to have saved Greece by their own efforts.
Nevertheless, even if we were to grant that there is some advantage in exemption, which I for my part do not think, still, first, it is not as great as the advantage from public service, nor such as even to be compared with it, nor anywhere near. Then, the one reaches the whole city, the other only a few. And the one would do the least damage if neglected, while from people not performing public services cities would suffer the greatest harm. And, by Zeus, the one came into being together with these [cities]: for as soon as there was a city, there was also public service. Or rather, if you examine it precisely, you will find that the very founding of cities at the beginning was outright a public service, and a kind of common contribution of mankind, surely, towards the establishment of the inhabited world; whereas exemption was devised later for some people, according to what opinion judged fit, as a kind of drug for ambition. So the more this [public service] is the greatest and most necessary thing and surpasses everything, the more we too must side with it and exalt it above all else. And indeed, if of all things those are worth more, and praise belongs especially to those, of which gods are the leaders, we should be quick, be sure of it, to rank public service above anything one could name. For do not think, men of Athens, that this, like other things, was invented by us, or had its origin here; rather, if anything among men has fallen from heaven, this too has come from there:
Translator’s note for this stretch
12.2: the full stop before κεχρῆσθαι in the edition appears misplaced (the infinitive depends on ἀξιώσαι in the preceding sentence); translated as printed with a lowercase continuation. The quoted speech attributed to the opponent ('Yes, he says...') seems to run into the opening of 13.1; its exact extent is uncertain. 13.2 'whose framers looked' renders the dative σκοποῦσιν as referring to the ancient lawgivers. 16.1: 'as I do not know what' renders the elliptical ὡς οὐκ οἶδʼ εἴ τι ('more than anything else'); the text here is awkward. 13.1 ἐκσπόνδους: 'outside the treaty' (not party to the treaty).
since the gods and divinities, the lords of all, not only by the means with which they established the universe from the beginning introduced and displayed to life this great and wonderful public service, but also now do this no less, by the way they care so much for us at every moment and are so solicitous that nothing that bears on our existence and preservation should be lacking in any way whatever; rather, they supply their gifts on a scale far greater than one could even expect, showing each of two things through the other: through this untiring and continuous providence, that they have become creators, and again, through having become creators, that they must of necessity care for us at every hour, so that without their providence we may not come to nothing, like a ship without helmsmen.
And yet, Demosthenes, when through exemption the public services gradually drain away, and you yourself are the champion of these [exemptions], how are you not simply waging war on the gods, destroying by your actions what they established well and, as far as in you lies, overturning their gift? If then, by your own argument, the penalty for those who debase the coinage is death, what penalty would you yourself deserve to be assessed by us, through the means by which you cling to exemption, dishonouring what belongs to the gods and corrupting the whole city? 'Yes,' he says, 'for it is on your behalf and on behalf of your affairs that they have exerted themselves, and of the things you enjoy and live by each time; for not a single man any longer, if the law prevails, would think fit to show magnanimity towards the city when circumstances demand it. to employ and to display the generosity that is fitting; but when exemption is abolished, there will surely be abolished along with it anyone's willingness to be zealous for it; and this robs us not only of gain but also of glory, for the sake of which you think one must do and say everything. If then we care
about these things, we shall necessarily care about exemption too.' Now that no one at all, Demosthenes, seems to me to engage in generosity in order to be exempt, as you claim, but for the sake of their own glory and of their zeal and affection for the city, is clear both from those who, after the most lavish generosity, wished to receive nothing whatever at all, but thought this alone sufficient, that their relations with the city stood so; and from those who were judged worthy of something else, there being countless things with which the city rewards those who serve her, but not of exemption. And that, even if this were so, the city's advantage ought to be preferred, of this too he himself is witness, since he always puts advantage before anything whatever and gives it first place; for we also chose the Corcyraeans as our allies, though they were outside the treaty, judging it advantageous, since they were strong.
Perhaps Demosthenes or someone else will also say this: that if it is profitable and especially befitting a constitution that not a single person at all should have a share in exemption, why was this too not laid down along with the rest by the old laws, whose framers looked to the common advantage? As it is, since in going through many fine provisions they did not think this worth a word, they evidently let it pass as unprofitable; if then what these [laws] command must be valued most, it is fitting that we too should not mention what they, though mentioning [other things], did not decide upon, lest in honouring laws we seem to dishonour laws. But, my good sir, first, not everything that is needed has simply been set down in the laws, nor do they extend through everything, so that nothing stands outside their judgement; there are things that escape even them. At any rate, that one may remove from them and add to them, if anything is not well, is stated in these very laws; and this is [the language] of people strongly
insisting that they have not reached to everything. Next, men of Athens, one must examine not whether a single one of the laws has stated this, but whether it is very fine and very just, and cast one's votes accordingly. And it [public service] is always so very fine, both in itself and compared with other things, from what I myself have said and from what long and manifold time has shown, that I fear it may seem more honourable even than the laws themselves, both on this very account and because it is older and was present among men before laws came to be. Further, not everything passed over by them is for that reason at once bad, nor on that account to be counted among things forbidden, but [only] what by its nature plainly harms affairs and makes everyone complain, just as, conversely, [what helps] is worth a great deal; from which gain accrues to us whether the laws say so or not.
If this is so, and the beneficial must be sought everywhere, it would be superfluous, whenever there is an inquiry about anything, to neglect investigating how this stands and then to cite laws. For indeed, men of Athens, one may find some laws that are unprofitable, though otherwise keeping the rank of laws, and some matters that lie outside laws, yet contribute no less than laws to our good fortune; and these must be preferred to legal rules that are not beneficial. For as to farming and planting and practising crafts, it is not because the laws did not originally invent them that we must abstain from them; rather, because these alone hold human life together and contain the resources of our affairs, and without them it is impossible to survive and live at all, for this reason we have thought that we must attend to them above all and not give them up in any way whatever, if indeed we care to be preserved and are not to perish openly. What then, if public service is not written in the laws, just like those things, and moreover
eating and sleeping and all the most common things that are bound by the law of nature? Nevertheless, men of Athens, if anyone examines precisely, he will truly find all the laws so disposed towards public service that not only do they summon others to it with great abundance, through what they recommend on each occasion and through their concern for how the constitution may be at its best, but by doing this they themselves are also ranked, as one might say, among those who perform public service.
And why speak of laws, when Demosthenes himself, who by his concern for exemption makes war on public service, is seen to confirm this more than anyone, now speaking before the people, proposing and advising, now serving as ambassador and as choregus, and performing public service through all these, and never himself having asked for exemption or said a single word about it, except at present on account of Ctesippus here, his own and Chabrias' son. Apart from this, if you think you have a strong point against it, that it is not written in the laws, you fail to notice that you are no less subjecting your own darling to these votes. And how do you accuse this [public service] by this argument any more than your own exemption? For it is not that the one is according to the laws and the other not; both alike stand apart from the laws. And on that account, I think, these are no better or worse, either in themselves or compared with each other; since otherwise public service is so much greater than exemption that they cannot even be compared. For the one is both just and as advantageous as possible to a city, and most responsible for the finest fortune it attains, and moreover has prevailed from the beginning and, surely, throughout all time; whereas exemption was not only discovered just yesterday or the day before, but is nothing at all of that kind as regards the city, except only this, as I said: a benefit to those who use it, but to the city the very opposite; so that all may reasonably declare from this, about them, that the one, being
such, ought, if it were in the laws, to be struck out of the laws once and for all; while the other, being what it is, ought conversely to be written into all the laws and accorded as many decrees as possible, or rather to have become itself a law. What was long fitting, this excellent Leptines here has now, partly moved by the gods, partly yielding to these reasonings, being a patriot beyond all others, paid to the city like some common debt, by proposing that no one at all should share in exemption, even if he were often a benefactor of the city: not only so that the city might also enjoy the contribution from these men and have public service in its entirety, but also because no small fear lurked beneath this, that as time went on and exemption thus spread through everything, public service might fail once and for all. And what good will there be for the city then, when it has been harmed in the greater things, those without which it cannot be preserved? For public service is the soul of a city; and as a body cannot by nature survive and live when the soul is not present, so too, I think, a city cannot when lacking public services. Reasonably so; for if no human beings are free from needs, except the gods, and these [needs] make public services more necessary than anything, I do not know what, then, men of Athens, we shall have no need of public services when we have no needs either; but if we can never be without needs, how we can be without public services I cannot see. And of these the city is in danger of being deprived because of Demosthenes' exemptions.
'But,' he says, 'he ought to have waited for the future and introduced the law then, when there was a shortage of public service. As it is, by legislating before this has happened, he seems to be putting these proposals forward at the wrong time.' What then prevents us too, Demosthenes, from using these same arguments against you in turn, and with more justice than you? That you yourself also ought to have waited for the future, if indeed one should say this at all about things that are most plainly evident already,
Translator’s note for this stretch
17.1: 'ἔπεισι λέγειν' and 'ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν ἄλλο' are rendered as transmitted; the passage is somewhat convoluted. 18.1: 'οἱ δὲ πῶς οἴει' is awkward and may be corrupt; rendered as 'how bitterly, do you think, do we then complain'. 19.1: 'προσαπολοῦσιν καὶ τίσιν' is taken as ending one sentence and beginning a question. 22.1: the final clause ('estranging... no less than establishing') is obscure; translated literally.
and only then attempted to speak against the law; as it is, by prosecuting him before this has happened, you seem to have brought your indictment at the wrong time. And then it occurs to me to wonder, how much do you think, that it occurs to you to say this: not only because you are caught by your own feathers and arguments, which is the most terrible thing of all and a disaster for those who do it, and moreover because you are now trying to persuade us to hold to, as though it were something good, the very thing you yourself especially condemn (I mean taking counsel after the events), but also because, while claiming to be clever, you fail to notice that you are claiming what is impossible. For no one at all, I think, who is in command of his wits, when he could have taken good counsel so as not to suffer harm, would first allow himself to suffer harm and then choose to take counsel about how to get free of it, when perhaps not even this will be possible; nor shall we, who can now put out of the way this exemption (may it perish most wretchedly!), then wait for the future because of your arguments, as though we did not know what it is and therefore needed to learn by experience from that quarter. For apart from this being plainly the height of madness, to let go of what we know best and pursue what we do not know, I cannot even make out the arguments by which one ought to choose this. If, then, you are deferring the matter to time and to later votes on the ground that we as yet know nothing clear about exemption, you seem not to know why we have already raised our arguments against it; but if [you do so] knowing that we understand it, you truly seem to me to be advising nothing other than that we should take thought for ourselves after we have been ruined once and for all. But neither could you yourself, be well assured, if someone killed you, afterwards summon this man to the Areopagus, any more than those who are no longer alive can bring those still alive to trial for wrongdoing; and, once exemption has overturned the city, as I said, there will be no advantage in having resolved to remove it and to save ourselves, but it too must perish along with us, like some
disease that dies together with the body; so that I do not see what sense there is in the argument about the future. Hence we shall lose the present and shall not have that either. For it is not possible, as you yourself say, if one spends what is at hand on what one should not, to have plenty of what is absent for what one should; but while the vessel is safe, whether it is larger or smaller, then the sailor and the helmsman and every man in turn must be zealous and see to it that no one, willingly or unwillingly, capsizes it; but once the sea has overwhelmed it, effort is vain. Reasonably so. At any rate, we think we ought to take medicines and drinks and foods before our body has fallen ill, so as not to fall into that state; but if the disease comes upon us first, how bitterly, do you think, do we then complain of both fortune and ourselves? And yet, Demosthenes, when we take such account of bodies and ships and such things, that they may always be in the best condition, surely for a city so great and so important and so supreme in every respect that even the gods, to say no more, contended with one another over this very city, it is impossible to say how much more we owe.
Further, men of Athens, if it were possible both to lay claim to exemption and for the city to suffer no harm with respect to public service, it would be plain madness to prevent people from choosing these things, which neither injure the community and bring gain to those who share in them. But when, because of favours to individuals, we must incur a common loss, is it better and more advantageous to take account of everyone together or of a certain few? Apart from this, if exemptions are put out of the way there will be no harm whatever to cities, but indeed no small gain, in that public services, from which cities are constituted, would become more numerous as a result; but if the public services
suffer this very thing, the cities will be gone, and gone too will be the rewards that cities give. For not only will they then have nothing from exemptions, but swift ruin will be added to them besides, if indeed safety comes to cities from public services, and the ability to give these [rewards] also depends on these [services] being in good order. Then, this being so, and the difference between the two being so great that the one brings the greatest benefit and the other the very opposite, shall we then, persuaded by Demosthenes or by whoever I should say, choose not what is simply in our favour but what is against us? And the law which ought to have been enacted from the beginning for our own safety and forethought, and which they say we now find of the greatest value, shall we say goodbye to it and regard as highly advantageous the exemption that works for the destruction of the constitution? Through which, as I said, those who want it will no longer be able to keep even this very [exemption], but will lose it as well as themselves. And to whom would we not seem to be wretched, if, knowing better than anything what is advantageous to us, we deliberately do what will destroy us more surely than anything?
In short, if someone were to ask you, men of Athens, which brings greater and more conspicuous glory to those who have it, and nothing at all troublesome to the city: exemption and no longer performing public service, or obtaining statues and being honoured for all time alongside Harmodius and Aristogeiton, I know well that you would say the latter. Reasonably so. For what harm is there to the city if, I do not say this man or that, but all Athenians together, or, if you like, practically all men, receive statues or crowns from it? Rather, the two finest things of all come from this: not only praise and glory both for those so honoured and for the city that honours them, but also there will be a wonderful encouragement to equal deeds. Since, then, it is possible for the city in other ways to show magnanimity towards those it should,
and to suffer no harm at all from anyone, what need is there of exemption and of damaging our own interests by it? So that what Demosthenes puts forward so very splendidly on behalf of exemption, claiming that it is most absurd and unworthy of our magnanimity in all things if we take away what we have given, has in this way turned out empty for him. For we shall not be taking this away from those who received benefits, as he himself supposes, nor will they lose through the law the glory they enjoyed from us; rather they will now obtain it finer and more conspicuous, having received instead of exemption certain wonderful inscriptions and statues, and they will stand publicly for all time to come; so that even later generations may learn clearly how highly the city regarded these men for their goodwill towards it. What exemption is this not greater than? Since the one is not lasting nor comes to be known by all, while the other is immortal, so to speak, and cannot escape anyone's notice, any more than the city can escape anyone's notice. Surely, then, Epicerdes and Leucon and anyone else, if, when the city was honouring them, there had been a choice of two things, to have either exemption or statues, would not, I think, have accepted even to hear of exemption, when they could be honoured with something far greater, something that makes those who receive it seem like the gods. Those, then, who would have been so disposed at that time, and set their whole heart on these things, I know well would now too not only value the honour of the statues more than the exemption they had, both they themselves and their children, if they are not alive, but would also be so pleased as to acknowledge, surely, the greatest gratitude to the city both for having thought of this and for having voted what is advantageous to itself and advantageous also to them.
'But when we give these things,' he says, 'the children of these men, because they will no longer be able to share in them with their fathers, as they did in the exemption, will cry out as though they had suffered the greatest wrongs.' First of all, my good sir, I do not think any of them will be at all aggrieved, since the glory of their fathers attaches very fully to the sons as well; rather they will, as is likely, be content if only they are called the children of such fathers. For just as being conscious of a father's or mother's misdeeds, as the poets say, enslaves even the bold-hearted, so the good repute and splendour of these men makes their descendants exceedingly envied. Next, if those born of benefactors must share in all that the city bestows on benefactors, and these things descend to the offspring like an inheritance, then these men too would seem to speak reasonably when deprived of them; but if this held for exemption alone and for nothing else, and that has now been abolished once and for all, it makes no sense to want to seek such things and to bring up the matter of exemption in other cases too. And besides, it will be much as if someone, being the son of an Olympic victor, then claimed on account of his birth to share the wild olive as well; but such a man will certainly hear that the prizes belong not to birth but to contests, and that whoever desires them must first strip for those contests, and only then proceed to the prizes. If, then, small things of no great account (for what is an olive shoot compared with a statue? Since the one is lasting, while the olive shoot gives its benefit only for the very time it is being received) — if, then, these cannot be obtained by birth without toils going before, how can the greater things be reaped without dust? And indeed, if children then claim to share by birth in the prizes given to their fathers, why do they not claim to share in their misfortunes too, for
this same reason? For they are not children in the best circumstances and no longer children in the worst; rather it is much more there that they must show their kinship, if they are not to fall short of friends, whom misfortunes bring to one's side. But if they would not choose even in dreams to share their misfortunes, at least not willingly, as I believe, how do they think they should enjoy their good fortunes? And how do they not contradict themselves when they make these claims, if in the worst circumstances they deny their kinship, but in prosperous ones make constant play with it up and down? In short, if they put it forward rightly and justly, they must surely hold to it in all cases, and not now yes and now no; but if they take refuge in it only for the sake of gain and in no other way, they fail to notice that they are estranging themselves from it no less than establishing it. So one should not pay any attention to them when they make such claims.
Further, men of Athens, you can see what I am saying most clearly from this too, and that it is necessarily advantageous to legislate that we must do everything else for our benefactors except grant exemption, if we consider what our ancestors were like in these matters, at the time when the city's affairs were flourishing most and when displaying one's zeal for it and striving for honour met with greater ambition and greater preparation. Those men, then, who surpassed all men everywhere in shrewdness, understanding and the other good qualities, and carried in their souls the whole science of political excellence, or rather both seemed and were the very soul of affairs, made it their aim not only that the city should prosper and continue in a manner worthy of itself, but also that it should always and in every way experience greater benefits than those fortune gives. They thought that they themselves must do and say everything on its behalf, neglecting in no way whatever anything that contributes to the happiness of the community; and those who had done it any
Translator’s note for this stretch
In 22.2/23.1 'Ἐρεχθεὺς ὁ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς' is elliptical; rendered 'Athena's [ward]'. In 24.2 the speech of an imagined objector ('he says') is marked with quotation marks; its end is taken at the close of the argument at the start of 25.1. 'τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν ὄρος καὶ κῦμα' echoes the Homeric wish to be swept to a mountain or the sea (Iliad 6.346–8). In 26.2 ἁλίσκει is read as second person (ἁλίσκῃ).
good at all, citizens, I mean, and foreigners alike, and who had come to the aid of affairs at the right moment, they presented with the greatest and most distinguished honours possible, at once repaying their zeal and at the same time urging both them and others for the future towards equal and greater deeds. Some they set up in bronze in the agora, some they established as companions of the gods on the Acropolis, others they deemed worthy of great and wonderful titles, the same as those of the gods, and to some they also gave as much money as possible; for [they gave] plethra of land, some planted and some bare. Others chose public meals or crowns and things of that kind. These were the city's rewards at that time to those who on each occasion proved honourable and good towards it. So it was with Erechtheus, Athena's [ward], so with Harmodius and Aristogeiton; and who in all the world does not know that Pericles son of Xanthippus was called Olympian, just like Zeus? But of exemption, by the gods, there was then no talk at all nor any consideration, nor did they think fit to make their gifts from it, not because they were unaware of it, but because they knew clearly that in giving the things I mentioned there would be no harm whatever to the city, whereas in bringing this man or that into exemption there would be no small loss. For the gradual shortage of public services would, as time went on, do away even with the means of giving the very things I mentioned, once everyone had become exempt. Then they knew this too, and that it is something thoroughly absurd: that some men, on account of the good they had shown towards the city, should become partly responsible for loss to it through exemptions, when, if this was to be the result, they ought never to have been enrolled among benefactors at all. How, then, is it not absurd that the men of old, so disposed, refrained from no excess whatever in their rewards, yet nowhere at all made
any mention of exemption in any way, while we, who love and admire their ways most of all, and regard them as a law of what we must do, should then make use of it and define our honours by it, as though we had condemned them for not perceiving this, or for having rejected it out of envy, though they did perceive it? Yet when we admire these men as the best in every respect, we are also bound to imitate them in every respect, so that what we adorn in words we confirm in deeds; but when we embrace as good what they reasonably rejected as not good, we are caught in one of two faults: either we have erred in our judgements or we have been false in our imitation.
In short, if exemption is something most noble, most profitable and most fitting for a citizen body, then not we alone, men of Athens, but all others too ought to take account of it, as of something of common benefit and extending to all. But if no one up to now except us has been led to this (and may they never be led to it hereafter, lady Athena!), why are we alone of all men sick with such things, unless we alone of all men see fit to hate ourselves? "Surely," he says, "we ought not to be reproached for this either. For if, when all had the same customs and laws, we alone of all men then clung to exemption, we would reasonably be wicked, attempting what was not permitted and governing ourselves against the common law. But if there is a great difference here, and we know that some use these customs and others those, and all simply use whatever they long ago approved, what is so terrible if, while exemption is customary among none of the others, among us alone there is account taken of it? At any rate we cannot reproach
the Lacedaemonians or the Thebans or any others for this, but attribute it to the way things have been from the beginning." Now, Demosthenes, that the various peoples differ from one another in this way I too admit, since they did not have the same lawgivers either, but some had these and others those, as fortune and the time that fell to each had arranged. But I would gladly learn from you whether the things in which they differ are among the profitable things or among those that damage affairs privately and publicly. For if you say they are among the damaging, then first it is rather absurd and shocking to try by these examples to persuade us to the same, and to cure evil with evil, as the saying goes, rather than by the best examples to lead us as far as possible away from this and to bring us as near as possible to those. Next, along with exemption, these things too ought to be removed from life like some Keres, and fittingly sent off to the poets' mountain and wave; for may there be nothing whatever that carries public harm. But if these things were devised for some common gain and so that what is needed can be paid for, while nothing is more hostile to the public services than exemption (and when I say these, I mean the city, since through them it is preserved), why do you reason superfluously and become a sophist where you have no right to, comparing exemption with what you should not, and persuading us on that basis to cling to it as something good? That is downright treacherous, and the work of someone trying to involve the city in the worst evils. For just as no one, by the gods, would deny that to prosecute wrongdoers and to choose to war against them in every way is the mark of one who honours the laws, so if anyone pleads with great abundance on behalf of what damages the city, he gives clear proof of an unsound mind devising the most terrible things against us. And yet, when we turn away from such things because of the harm they bring, what would he reasonably deserve who, through his advocacy of them, is himself of that kind and also urges others to the same? For indeed sycophancy and
bribe-taking and outrageous behaviour and secret dealings with the enemy and the preparing of poisons against anyone, and, by Zeus, bandits and housebreakers and anyone of the base stamp, are more hated and pay a greater penalty when, though they ought to hide their faces and tremble at what they do, they are so proud of it as to want to vaunt it before everyone, being sick, surely, with a double disease, vice and audacity, and understanding neither, but paying this very penalty: that of convicting themselves in public.
Moreover, in the ways you think you escape notice while trying to deceive us otherwise, you are caught no less behaving wickedly, and against yourself rather than against us. For since you cannot show exemption to be something lawful and dependent on the necessity of the laws, nor put forward the laws that speak about it and thereby, as you suppose, refute Leptines, you elaborate and twist your argument in quite another way, so as to seem persuasive on the spot and readily to win over those who have not paid very close attention. "For if the laws," you say, "expressly order that gifts remain secure to the end for those who have received them, and that they not be disturbed in any way whatever, while this man by his legislation now makes void once and for all, both now and hereafter, the exemptions the city has granted to some at every opportunity, how, transgressing the laws in this way and so deserving himself to pay the penalty of lawbreakers, will he then be fit to be trusted by us about what he advises?" Is this not what you say, turning it up and down and constantly asking whether it is not just that those who have been well treated should be well treated to the end and share in the prize for ever? Hold on, then, and consider. The man who laid down the laws ordered that gifts must not be taken away; but of exemption he makes no mention
at all, only simply of gifts, unless you heard him say it yourself in secret. Why, then, do you wrongly snatch at what he did not mention, and speak of what the laws did not decree as if the laws had decreed it, at once slandering them by this and at the same time showing that we know nothing about laws?
But if you say this, that in speaking of gifts he had included this too (for this too is surely a gift), we shall certainly reply that what truly counts as a gift is not that which exalts its recipients privately while it harms the people who gave it in common, but that which brings profit to both the one party and the other; for the former is a gift to those who receive it, but a loss to the city. It is this, indeed, that all the laws call a gift, and they took care that no one should be deprived of it, being common teachers and guardians of what belongs to us. As for exemption, if it benefits the city, let it be called a gift and let it be inalienable from those who hold it; but if it harms and ruins and does every kind of damage, why do you resort to certain fallacies and strive to insert it into the laws like some interpolated and supposititious child? Do you see how you thrust the sword at others through your own body, and, while you think you are striking others, you yourself receive the blows, because the extreme audacity of your judgement and your love of contention leave you unrestrained and unaware of what answer others will make to your arguments? And what of that other point, and this, they say, from the gymnasium! For Demosthenes, it seems, men of Athens, cannot bear to be shown base in one or two respects only, but must be convicted of it in abundance. For in addition to the other charges he chose to use against Leptines, bringing every accusation and being repulsed from all of them by the truth, he also thinks that this man should have been indicted as unconstitutional, a charge in which he himself will now be lying against the truth more than before. For what does he say? "Leptines ought, then,
Translator’s note for this stretch
Diotima, who in Plato's Symposium delays the plague at Athens by ten years, is there 'of Mantinea'; the text here has 'of Miletus'. 'καὶ ταῦτά φασι γυμνασίου' (27.2) is obscure; rendered literally, possibly corrupt. 'νόμων ἐξούλης' (31.2) appears to be a play on the δίκη ἐξούλης (suit of ejectment); rendered 'suit of ejectment from the laws'. In 28.1 the subject 'the lawbreaker is' is supplied for sense.
not to have proposed his own law before he had indicted and repealed this old one; as it is, leaving behind evidence against himself that he is breaking the law, he nevertheless enacted this law, and that although another law orders that a man be liable to indictment on precisely this ground, if his law is contrary to laws already in force." Now, men of Athens, such matters ought, and most of all ought, to be carried through in this way, and this is the manner one should choose for legislating; and the man who has not prepared himself in this way but rushes straight in, I myself would be the first to convict as unconstitutional, because he did not see what was required. But Leptines is not such a man. How could he be? Far from it. For if the law ordered that there be exemption, and he paid no heed, but thought he ought to legislate the opposite even before he had repealed the law and shown that it was badly framed, then he leaves evidence against himself that he is breaking the law. But as it is, there was no law ordering it, nor surely does this man break the law in legislating thus, any more than Solon of old did; but, if one must tell the truth, [the lawbreaker is] the one who thinks the opposite of what is plain, and who, by Zeus, does not consider what preserves the city in common, but devotes all his zeal on behalf of what had been set up for its ruin, and, through being able to use arguments as he pleases, now cites the laws as suits him, now turns what are not laws into laws: just the sort of man you yourself are. So whenever you say these things, Demosthenes, you accuse yourself, not Leptines, since he, not against some established law about exemption but against a custom that, O Zeus, had only yesterday or the day before come reveling into the city, introduced this law on behalf of the constitution, a law everyone would call most excellent and most just; while you, attempting to refute him, do so not by law but by leading us astray with empty arguments and fables, which stand wholly apart from laws and truth and are full of falsehood and lawlessness, even if you yourself insist on them no less than on oracles.
And not only this, but you also slander Leptines most of all in this respect: as if he had made the law out of private enmity towards certain people, not out of forethought for the city. For that the case is so, and that he was not led to this for the reasons you claim, is clear from the following. First, everyone who is angry at someone directs his words against that man alone, and is eager above all to show himself best in every way and the other man utterly abominable and the worst of men, refuting, accusing, slandering, assailing him by every means available, but not, by Zeus, legislating. For these two things cannot go together, a law and an indictment: the one is a refutation and an exposure of wickedness and of someone's being bad, the other a common exhortation towards what is best and a turning away from what is worst, so that one may shun the one and choose the other. How, then, would Leptines have passed over attacking those whom he could have accused, and instead advised them how they might become best, and laid claim, as his dearest companions and friends, to those whom he would most gladly have seen suffer harm? That is not how it is, it is not. And if he, by making a law that no one at all should be exempt, has become the chief cause of pain to those who held exemptions, and you most easily infer hatred from this, it is time for you to pass this verdict on practically all lawgivers too, and to bring a suit for enmity against them, because in treating of temperance and justice and the rest they surely do not please everyone without distinction, but only those of good character; for one cannot even say how displeased the most wicked, and those whose thinking is contrary to established custom, are with them.
Next, if someone were to ask you, Demosthenes, who these people are with whom Leptines was annoyed when he drafted the law, I do not think you would be able to say. You have stated simply that there are some, but who they are
you no longer see fit to say; not because you do not wish to refute Leptines in abundance, but because, having nothing clear to say about them, you would then wish to be refuted in abundance yourself. For if you had been able to mention them by name, you would not have endured keeping silent, nor would you have spared them if present, you who even when they are absent launch into speeches about them as if they were present; not only because you are readier than anyone at such things, but because this too would have helped your case not a little. As it is, with those you have put forward anonymously you not only have everyone unconvinced, but you also give the impression that these people do not exist at all, but have been made up by you. Thus, wishing merely by mentioning them to rub a bad reputation onto Leptines, and again, by not naming them, avoiding refutation yourself, you have unwittingly, Demosthenes, convicted both yourself of not telling the truth and Leptines of having truly introduced the law, and not as one overcome by passion. They say that Diotima of Miletus, when she was able to put off the plague from the city for ten years but proved unable to accomplish the whole, did not think she had accomplished even this, nor that she had served the situation at the right moment, so that she was talked of on two counts, both for being able to do so much and for not being able to do the whole; yet she was as aggrieved as if she had displayed nothing. You, however, seeing the land that bore you sick from exemption for so long a time, neither thought you ought yourself to rid it of this disease and to use the incantations of speech on its behalf, as was fitting, though that was easier than anything, and as for this fine and noble Leptines, who has accomplished it most excellently of all and by the providence of the gods, you would most gladly, if it were possible, have thrust him into the Sicilian craters, trying from every side to drive him out and by every available means
slandering him, so that you might bring it about, O gods and laws, that he pays the penalty, as though by what he proposes he were hostile to the state; and that you might bring exemption back again to the city like some exile banished beyond the borders, toasting Ctesippus with the benefit of it.
"But the addition," he says, "that it shall not be permitted to grant it in future either, or that the man who proposes the contrary shall be liable to the death penalty, not only is like a tyrant's rule, holding this as a matter of course when occasion calls for generosity, but has also taken away the city's freedom of action." Now if Leptines, men of Athens, debars us altogether from magnanimity, so that we can neither repay benefactors with benefits nor at all reward those who deserve to be well treated for what they have done, he would reasonably incur blame for lack of judgement and for being unable to advise anything that is needed, and one ought to bring a suit of ejectment from the laws against this law. But if he says that we are free in everything except exemption, public meals in the Prytaneum, tenement houses, offices, plethra of land and all such things that one may distribute, where is he justly to be accused? It is as if you thought fit to abuse a doctor for ordering complete fasting for the sick because he does not allow them to take what harms them; or as if a farmer seemed to you bad and wholly at war with his fields when he clears away the growth of what harms them. And I also say this: if, Demosthenes, you indict the law as unconstitutional, why are you troubled about the future? For his breaking the law is itself the same as the law's not existing at all; it is therefore pointless to worry about what does not now exist as if it were still going to exist. But if you agree that it is sound, you have no less agreed in addition that it ought no longer to be permitted to repeal it; for surely you will not say that it
is advantageous now but no longer later; rather, it ought to remain the same to the end, if it is truly to preserve its name.
But perhaps you will say this: if justice belongs to the law, and Leptines knows it to be firm and secure, why does he think it also needs security for the future? For none of the lawgivers held this view about the laws they enacted, not even nearly; they thought it enough for themselves if they dealt with everyone in accordance with justice. But now, by the very fact that you alone have such thoughts, you seem not to have formed a good opinion of the law. That the law, then, being the finest, the most just and the most secure of all, is a good of common benefit has become clear, men of Athens, not only from what I have said, but also from what you yourselves showed, in having welcomed it at once with a kind of god-inspired impulse and with your whole heart, so that you judged it worthy even of the customary show of hands and of a common vote. And that it is not without reason that nothing whatever has been added to all the other laws, while to this one alone this has been given in addition, you will not only know clearly, men of Athens, but you will also say, I am sure, that these things ought not to have been otherwise than they are, if you reckon up the reasons on both sides. For Solon and Lycurgus and every other lawgiver came to their laws and their public proposals under no pressing necessity at all, but from a most democratic disposition, whereas Leptines came out of necessity, being no longer able to watch the city endangered by exemption. And they grieved no one at all by what they enacted, for they did not even deprive anyone of privileges; he, quite the contrary, has made enemies for himself of many people of every kind who have been stripped of it because of the law. So neither ought they, since at that time they had no one to oppose them, to have taken any forethought at all for the future;
Translator’s note for this stretch
In 33.1, εἱστισοῦν is evidently corrupt; read as εἴ τισιν οὖν ("if ... by some"). In 33.2, οἷς ὅτι πλέον is awkward and probably corrupt; translated as "because ... more". In 32.2 the phrase "the customary show of hands and a common vote" is translated literally; its exact reference is unclear.
and accordingly they have not taken any; nor ought he, since he has acquired these many [opponents], to have kept silent about the future; and accordingly he has not kept silent. But just as some excellent doctor not only cures diseases but also gives certain remedies for the future, and in addition orders that the patient must never in any way, for the rest of his life, partake of the foods through which the disease came on, so that he may not experience the same things again, so too Leptines, having written that no one is to be exempt, adds that it is not permitted to grant [exemption] in future either, securing once and for all both the present and the time to come, always taking forethought for the city's interests, and also restraining those who in future will be like Demosthenes in such matters. For it is likely, likely, or rather wholly necessary, that for all time there will be both good and worthless men in the city. And if even tyranny was needed by some for the establishing of laws, what is new if Leptines needed security for the future on behalf of what benefits the community? Yet it was not, by the gods, out of fear for the law, as someone might say; for when the law has obtained from you, men of Athens, and from your vote the acknowledgment that it is the best above all, what does it matter against this if so-and-so or so-and-so talks nonsense?
Thus, Demosthenes, what you thought you were saying on your own behalf, you have been found to be saying most excellently on behalf of Leptines; and by the very means with which you hoped to convict him, you have yourself been convicted once and for all. And exemption, for whose sake you thought you must do and say everything, has been seen to be the most ruinous thing of all, while the law which Leptines brought in has been seen to be the most necessary to use. So Leptines might reasonably even be grateful to you, because by this you exalt him more than if you had spoken in his support from the beginning. For then you might perhaps have seemed to be doing him a favour, and someone might have shot an arrow from hiding; but now the testimony is above suspicion that the man is indeed among the best and most beneficial, since even his enemies have voted him this.