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Adversus Lycum

Galen

Greek source · English translation · 9,232 words · about 47 min

English only in this reader. References follow the selected source edition. “Whole work” means every line of that edition, including any gaps or fragments. Author attributions may be uncertain.

Reading sections · 5 starting points

Navigation breaks for easier reading, not new chapter divisions.

  1. From 1.head
  2. From 3.1
  3. From 4.1
  4. From 6.1
  5. From 7.1
1.head

GALEN'S BOOK AGAINST LYCUS.

Translator’s note for this stretch

In 1.1, 'κατὰ τοῦ παλαιοῦ δόγματος' is odd ('against' the ancient doctrine would contradict the sense); rendered as 'trained in the ancient doctrine'; the text may be corrupt. In 'σχολῇ γ’ ἂν οὗτος οὐ τὰς συλλαβὰς' the negative seems superfluous and is not rendered. The sentence 'οὔτε γὰρ ὅσοι... ψέγουσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ δόγματα' is awkwardly constructed and may be corrupt. The passage ends with the edition's note 'λείπει τινά' ('something is missing'), rendered as [...]: there is a lacuna here, and the quotation from Lycus that the next passage refers to is lost.

1.1

No one, surely, can blame Lycus, or anyone else who wishes, for writing against Hippocrates. But I think it is still less blameworthy for those who are able to rebut the charges wrongly brought against him to make their defence, as if in a court of law, before those who will read the writings of both, and above all when the accuser is bold before he has learned what is being said, while the defender has been trained in the ancient doctrine. Now Lycus wrote commentaries explaining the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, but he mutilates the man's doctrines from both sides, both in the things he thinks he is praising and the things he thinks he is blaming among what is said by him, and in the arguments by which he tries to refute him. For the things he praises are Lycus' own fancies, not the doctrines of Hippocrates, and the arguments by which he contradicts him show plainly that he does not know even the elements of Hippocrates' art. And whoever lacks knowledge of the elements would hardly know the syllables of that art, or of what derives from it. Now if I were the first or the only one to say that Hippocrates held that the bodies of animals are composed of hot and cold and wet and dry, I might perhaps be more cautious in charging Lycus with attempting to write explanations of his writings before he knew the elements of Hippocrates' art. For it is not reasonable either for those who have enrolled under opposing doctrines, or for those who do not know even the first useful things of the art, to explain the Aphorisms; rather, as they have learned [them] from childhood, so in turn they praise or censure his doctrines. But Lycus is so ignorant of Hippocrates' art that, I swear by all the gods, when I had read the first explanations in his commentaries on the Aphorisms, I could no longer bear to read the rest of the book, so far did he appear to miss the ancient's meaning. But when one of my companions asked me to listen to what he had written on the aphorism in which [Hippocrates] says, 'Growing beings have the most innate heat', and then many others too urged me to make a defence against the accusations, I was thus compelled to come to this treatise.

2.1

So that those who will judge between us may more easily follow what he says and what I am going to say in reply to it, it will be necessary for me to say a few things first. That there is heat in us is plainly evident to all; but whether it has its origin from the motion in the heart and the arteries, or whether, just as motion itself is innate in the heart, the warmth is so in the same way, is disputed among physicians. But whoever wishes to learn scientifically that the hot and the cold and the dry and the wet are the principles of generation for all animals has a book written by me, in which I explain and demonstrate the view of Hippocrates. This book is entitled On the Elements according to Hippocrates. Following it are other [books] of mine, On Mixtures, in which I show which bodies have a greater share of the hot element in themselves and which a smaller, and how for this very reason some have become hotter by nature and others colder. For in all of us the hot element is innate from the very first beginning, which we have acquired from the seed and the menstrual blood. We differ from one another in being more or less hot; but there are certain limits to this range, and when the mixture goes beyond them we must necessarily either fall ill or perish. For when we are cooled too much we fall into a cold disease, and when heated outside the range of health we are brought into fever. And indeed of fevers themselves some are perfectly dry, such as the true ardent fevers, and some extremely wet, such as those called typhus-like. If anyone does not like these names, or is accustomed to apply the said terms to some other thing, I shall describe in words what sort of fevers I mean by wet. When patients sweat from the first day, and in these sweats are either moderately helped or not at all, these fevers I call wet; and conversely I call dry those fevers in which there is violent thirst, a dry tongue, skin hard like leather, and much parching throughout the whole body. And there are also certain other fevers in which the exhalation of the whole body is distressing to those who touch it, so that they seem to be pricked and bitten; and this too happens in two ways, since what strikes us is sometimes airy and dry, and sometimes appears somehow moist, like a vapour. In such forms the mixtures of healthy people themselves also differ from one another, which we call ill-tempered, and we correct their natural bad mixture as far as possible. For this too is no small part of the art of health. But bodies that are well-tempered by nature show nothing of this kind to those who touch them. For they are exactly balanced, so that their heat is neither deficient, as in old people or those who have been chilled, nor excessive, as in those who have exerted themselves immoderately or spent too long in the summer sun. And still less does their warmth have anything biting or distressing. For clarity in what is being said, it would not be amiss for you to recall baths, in which there is, surely, one kind of the well-tempered, but many bad mixtures. One bad mixture of a bath is when it is colder than is needed, another if it has been heated to the point of discomfort, and a third, in which we blame it neither as too cold nor as too hot, but say it is full of vapour and find fault with it on that account. For who does not know, if he is a human being at all, that water is often well-tempered, and so likewise are air and vapour? So too a stone in the baths themselves becomes well-tempered, so that one can roll about on it without blaming either excessive heat or cold, or dryness, or abundance of moisture. Just as, then, in water and stone and air the heat becomes moderate, so too in vapour; and when it fills the bath while being well-tempered, the bathers are annoyed and find fault with such a bath, but they do not call it colder or hotter; whereas if it does something of that sort as well, they make a double charge against the bath, saying it is cold and full of vapour, just as again [they say it is] immoderately hot with abundant vapour. Let us not, then, forget these things, nor corrupt what is commonly known to all people by the excessive cleverness that some display; but remembering the baths, when we hear someone say of an animal that the heat of this one is well-tempered and of that one ill-tempered, let us not transfer our thought to something else, but to that to which all people who preserve the common notions [transfer it] every day, in many other things and indeed in the baths I have mentioned. They say, at any rate, that a bath is hot or cold, and again full of vapour or dry and parching, meaning by each of the names some particular thing. Besides those mentioned, there is another bath, full of smoke, and, yes, by Zeus, of smoke of the most varied kinds. That from oak wood is one kind, that from fig or olive wood another, and for each tree there is a different one. But I do not yet need the particular differences. It is enough for me at first, embracing this whole class under one name and one concept, to say that the air of the bath is smoky, without here too blaming its heat or cold, or, again, blaming it, if it so happens, on both counts, both as hot and as smoky. Leave the baths now and recall for me what happens to us every day in our houses: sometimes we blame the dampness of the houses we are in, sometimes immoderate cold or heat. Do we, then, blame the air in the house in the same way in the heat of the Dog Days and when it has been filled with smoke? Or here too, as in the baths, do they sometimes differ not at all in heat, yet one of them is just this alone, hot air, and the other is smoky as well? And then hot air never provokes tears, but smoky air always does, even if it is only moderately hot; so that here it is plainly evident that biting heat differs not by heating more but by something else. At any rate, standing very close to a very large smokeless flame we are often heated so much as almost to be burned, yet no one is bitten or weeps from the eyes as from smoke. It is astonishing, then, if someone perceives the difference in the case of smoke and flame, but in our own bodies is insensible to it, there being sometimes a very strong heat like flame, and sometimes a distressing and biting one like smoke. And I am no less astonished if he does not grant that the bad mixtures of heat in animals are analogous to those in baths and houses. As in houses, then, the air of a smoky house is one thing and that of a simply hot one another, in the same way, I think, different from these is plainly the [air] in which there is a multitude of burning lamps or a torch with soot-smoke; and so we call this, as we call the other air smoky, sooty, since it arises from the over-roasting of fuel. For soot-smoke differs from smoke in this, although both are residues of flame, that soot-smoke is an earthy exhalation of thoroughly roasted fuel, while smoke is neither from over-roasted fuel nor earthy, but from half-burned [fuel] and mixed from a moist and an earthy substance. Whoever, then, has been properly trained in Hippocratic doctrines has learned that of what all physicians now customarily call insensible transpiration, by which bodies exhale, one kind is like vapour, another like dry air, and another passes out with perceptible moisture. [...]

3.1

This, then, is the passage from what Lycus wrote to establish that one heat differs in no way from another; it does not wait for refutation from outside, but overthrows itself. For what does he actually say? 'Heat, insofar as it is conceived as heat, has no variation with respect to another heat.' Now if the phrase 'insofar as it is conceived as heat' means nothing in the statement, let it be removed from it entirely. But if it does mean something, it plainly indicates that heat does not differ from heat in this respect, but does differ in some other respect. For if it differs in no way at all, the 'insofar as' has been added superfluously; but if it differs in some other way, though not in this way, then let the differences be understood according to that in which it differs. For if one were to consider each thing only according to what it is called, you will abolish the differences of all things. 'An animal, insofar as it is conceived as an animal, differs in nothing from another animal. A plant, insofar as it is conceived as a plant, differs in nothing from another plant. A tree, insofar as it is conceived as a tree, differs in nothing from another tree.' Are there not, then, differences of animal: winged and footed and swimming, and water-dwelling and land-dwelling and air-dwelling, or mortal and immortal, or rational and irrational, or tame and wild, or cowardly and brave, or each of the others we know? For why should one speak at length? So too among plants one is a tree, another a shrub, another a thorn, another a herb, another a brushwood plant. Or, though all animals, insofar as they are conceived as animals, have no difference, would one not nevertheless truly call all these that have been mentioned, and not a few others besides, differences of animal? And so too with plants. For plant does not differ from plant by one of them being rational and the other irrational, nor by being winged or footed, nor by any other of the differences mentioned; just as animal does not differ from animal by one being a shrub, another a thorn, another a tree, another a herb, another brushwood, another a cedar; rather, such a division belongs within the genus of plants. Moreover, Lycus himself writes of a great many differences of diseases, although disease differs in nothing from disease insofar as it is a disease, just as symptom does not differ from symptom insofar as it is a symptom; but nevertheless Lycus undertakes to write of the differences of these too, as also of those of pleurisy and of each of the other diseases. And yet pleurisy differs in nothing from pleurisy insofar as it is pleurisy; but nevertheless one [pleurisy] has its pain extending to the collarbone, another to the hypochondrium. So too one kind of pleurisy is accompanied by coloured sputum, while another, the opposite of this, is called by some 'without expectoration'; and there are many other differences, according to which the treatment too comes to be varied. But Lycus also tries to teach the differences of fevers themselves. And yet, whether their origin lies in an excess of heat or in the biting character of the quality, there will be no difference of fever from fever insofar as it is a fever. So uneducated, then, is the argument Lycus puts forward that he does not perceive he is abolishing all the arts. For the arts are constituted in the knowledge of the differences of each of the things that exist. And Plato went through this at greatest length in the Philebus, right at the beginning of the work; and Aristotle and Theophrastus, Chrysippus and Mnesitheus kept to his view, and there is no one who did not go through the same argument in his writing on art. The first passage on the constitution of the arts, as stated by Plato, is as follows. Socrates: 'Voice, I suppose, is for us one, passing through the mouth, and again unlimited in multitude, for all and for each.' Protarchus: 'Of course.' Socrates: 'And we are not yet wise by either of these, neither by knowing its unlimitedness nor by knowing its oneness; but knowing how many [sounds] there are and of what sort, that is what makes each of us literate?' Protarchus: 'Most true.' Socrates: 'And indeed what happens to make [one] musical is this same thing.' Protarchus: 'How?' Socrates: 'Voice, I suppose, as regards that art too, is one in it.' Protarchus: 'Of course.' Socrates: 'And let us posit two, low and high, and a third, of equal pitch; or how?' Protarchus: 'So.' Socrates: 'But you would not yet be wise in music knowing only these, while not knowing them you will be, so to speak, worthless in these matters.' Protarchus: 'No indeed.' Socrates: 'But, my friend, when you grasp the intervals of the voice, how many they are in number, in respect of highness and lowness, and of what sort, and the boundaries of the intervals, and how many systems have arisen from them, which those before us discerned and handed down to us, their followers, to call harmonies; and again, in the movements of the body, other such affections arising within, which, measured through numbers, he says we must name rhythms and measures, and at the same time understand that one must thus examine every one and many; for when you have grasped these things in this way, then you have become wise; and when you take hold of any other of the things that exist, examining it in this way, you have thus become intelligent about it.' This much, indeed, heard from Plato, would suffice for hearers who have sense, as a demonstration of the constitution of all arts. For it is not possible to become skilled even about one thing without knowing their differences. But it is no worse that, just as Plato himself was not content with the summary statement alone but added examples for the sake of clarity, grammar and music, so we too should add one more example, from the art of painting, and of the material underlying it, colours. For here too one may surely say that colour differs in nothing from colour insofar as it is colour, and on this ground abolish all the differences among them, which indeed Plato himself has also shown at the beginning of the Philebus. For when Socrates was dividing pleasures, the interlocutor would not grant that they all differ from one another insofar as they are pleasures, asserting that they are most alike; but Socrates meets this argument: 'For colour too, my good man, will differ in no way from colour in this very respect, in all being colour; yet black, we all know, besides being different from white, is actually most opposite to it. And so too figure with figure: in the same way, all is one in genus, but its parts in relation to its parts are some most opposite to one another, while others have, I suppose, countless difference. And we shall find many other things that are so; so do not trust this argument which makes all the most opposite things one.' This is the passage about colours and figures. And that about pleasures is this: 'We say that the licentious man feels pleasure, and that the temperate man also feels pleasure in his very temperance; and again that the senseless man, full of senseless opinions and hopes, feels pleasure, and again that the wise man feels pleasure in his very wisdom; and how could anyone who said that each of these pleasures is like the other not justly appear senseless?' Just as Plato indicated the differences of pleasures briefly in this passage, but went through them at greater length in the whole book, so [he did] those of the arts in two books, the Sophist and the Statesman. Are there, then, many differences of sciences and of pleasures, and of colours and figures and of the pitches in voices, and likewise of ages and seasons and regions and diseases, and of all other things, while in hot things alone there are either none at all or they cannot be known by human beings? And indeed Lycus' argument abolishes the differences of heat, as he thinks, of it alone, but in truth together with all the others, if the force of the argument can be extended in the same way to them. For indeed I shall next say the same about wet things themselves, if he says that these do not differ from one another insofar as they are wet. But the greatest of his errors is that he also abolishes all the arts, which have their constitution in the differences of species. Plato, then, having first stated in summary the constitution of the arts, went through the argument with an example, showing how the art of grammar was constituted once the difference in the sounds of the voice was known. But Lycus' argument plainly abolishes this art, and music likewise, and all the others, claiming that 'insofar as it is conceived' [...] has one difference in it. See, then, how his argument will abolish first the art of letters, and after that all the others too: 'It seems to me impossible and inconceivable that this voice, to one considering it insofar as it is conceived, I mean in its very utterance, should have any variation with respect to another voice, varying by some peculiarity of quality lying in the utterance.' This argument is in every way the same as the one Lycus wrote at the beginning of the passage, and it is carried through with all his very words, with only the one word 'heat' changed to 'voice'; so that if that one is sound, this one is too; but this one is not sound, and so neither is that one, unless, perhaps, the followers of Lycus think that the sound e is not different from o, nor o from ō. But if we agree that these are different from one another, and besides these also a and i and u and all the other letters, these will be twenty-four. And the art that knows their difference is grammar, just as the art of music [knows the difference] concerning highness and lowness in voices; and yet Lycus' argument abolishes these no less. For voice differs in nothing from voice insofar as it is voice; but nevertheless the note of the mesē is higher by a tone than the lichanos of the middle tetrachord, and lower by a tone than the paramesē. And again, of those very notes, that of the lichanos is higher by a tone than the parhypatē of the middle tetrachord, while that of the paramesē is lower by a semitone than the tritē of the disjunct tetrachord. Then again others are higher and lower than these, and then again others than those, until we arrive at the highest and lowest note of all. But the most admirable Lycus does not perceive that he abolishes all these in saying: 'It seems to me impossible and inconceivable that heat, to one considering it insofar as it is conceived, I mean in its very warming, should have variation with respect to another.' Fine, if by saying that colour does not differ from colour insofar as it is colour he abolishes the art of painting, which sets out some red colour and white and black and yellow, and all others of the sort. For surely his argument would be much more plausible if stated about colours in the way it has now been stated about heat: for we say that heat varies from heat, yet is not wholly opposite to it; but colour not only differs from colour, but black is also by nature most opposite to white.

Translator’s note for this stretch

In the Philebus quotation, 'τρίτονον ὁμότονον' is read as 'τρίτον ὁμότονον' ('a third, of equal pitch'). 'ἀλλὰ ἐὰν καὶ ταύτας τῶν πυρετῶν' seems corrupt; translated as if 'ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς τῶν πυρετῶν'. 'τὸ δέ τι μίαν ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ διαφοράν' is obscure and probably corrupt; marked [...]. In 'οὔτε τὴν ε φωνὴν ἑτέραν εἶναι τῆς ο, διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν ο τῆς ω', 'διαφέρειν δὲ' is taken as 'nor ... differ' for the sense. 'Καλὸν εἰ' near the end is read ironically ('Fine, if ...'). The opening 'ᾗ νενόηται' clause is rendered 'insofar as it is conceived'.

4.1

'And how is it possible,' Lycus might say, 'for [a colour] to be opposite to colour in respect of being conceived as colour?' And by the gods he will be speaking the truth, insofar as he holds that, as far as colour goes, one colour does not differ at all from another; but just as this is true, so too is that other [statement], that white not only differs from black but differs so much as to be most opposite to it. 'And how is it possible,' those who champion Lycus' views will perhaps say, 'for [a thing] at once to be the same and at once to be most opposite? And how [is this possible] for white with respect to black?' To them we shall answer just this much: if it is not possible for white to be both opposite to black and the same as it at once, let them choose one of the two. For Plato thinks it possible, as do Aristotle and Theophrastus, for one thing that is the same as another in genus nevertheless to have so great a difference in species as to be most opposite. But if these men do not think that both statements are true, let them choose the more evident one. And the more evident one, inasmuch as it is agreed by all people, is that white is opposite to black. And indeed, if this is true, and they themselves think that both statements cannot be true, both the one asserting that white is opposite to black and the one [asserting that it is] the same, then they will not be right to say that white does not differ at all from black insofar as it is colour. Now the man conversing with Socrates in Plato's writing was perhaps pardonable when he tried to stop Socrates from distinguishing pleasure from pleasure by a difference. For there was then, I suppose, no book teaching such a thing, that it is possible for many things which are the same as many others in genus nevertheless to differ so far as to have a form and nature most opposite to one another. But since the Philebus was written by Plato teaching the truth, if Lycus did not read the book at all, I admire Lycus for his education; if he read it and did not understand, I marvel at his intelligence; and if he understood and was not persuaded, I congratulate him on his judgement. By Zeus, does someone who has not learned even the first elements of dialectic put forward arguments? Is there any Greek, physician or grammarian or rhetorician or philosopher or anyone else at all who lays claim to learning, who has not read Plato's Philebus? And yet why do I speak of the Philebus? For Plato did not teach the argument before us in this [book] alone, but also mentioned it in many other books, of which the most admirable Lycus, who lays claim to scientific reasoning, ought to have read at least one. For it is shameful for one who undertakes to refute Hippocrates and puts forward arguments that he thinks conclusive to appear not to have learned even the first elements of what is taught in the schools of the philosophers. But by Zeus, his example about liquids is marvellous! For he claims this too, that they do not differ at all from one another if they are all liquids; but in the respect in which some are sour, others harsh, others salty, others sweet, in that they vary; yet in saying these things he does not hear himself. For in stating in what way liquids differ, he thinks he is establishing that there is no difference among them at all, and that Hippocrates spoke of a difference in vain, and that Theophrastus wrote a whole treatise on flavour in vain. And yet this very name 'flavour' indicates a certain difference of liquid; and nevertheless, although it is a certain difference of liquid, it is in turn naturally divided into other differences. It is no wonder, however, that Lycus, who has reached such a degree of ignorance as to think that there is an astringent quality in vinegar, dared to write such a counterargument against Hippocrates. For things so evident were known both to Dioscorides of Anazarbus and to all the others who have written treatises on materia medica. At any rate, in these they name some [things] briny, others salty, others bitter, others sweet, others austere, others harsh, others astringent, others pungent, others sour. But the most admirable Lycus either does not know at all that the sour quality differs from the astringent, or his sense of taste is maimed, so that he does not perceive the differences in flavours at all. He seems, then, to perceive vinegar as [he would] pear and medlar and apple and quince, although all people call some apples sour, others astringent, and others sweet, just as, I think, [they call] pomegranates sour and astringent and sweet. In wines, at least, astringency is distinguished from sourness as excellence from defect: for the astringent ones are noble, but none is sour by nature; and if even a little of such a quality comes upon them, we at once suspect their change into vinegar. Perhaps, then, Lycus could not even distinguish sharp dock from dock, or wood sorrel from lettuce, which have not the least of the astringent quality, but both have an abundant share of the sour. It would be marvellous, then, if these are named from the sour quality, while vinegar itself has no share in it. But Lycus, who does not even keep the common senses intact, dares to bring charges against Hippocrates. So again he has known [nothing of] the inquiry among natural philosophers about the number of flavours. For in this respect, it seems, flavour does not differ from flavour, insofar as it is flavour. I would gladly hear, then, of which of the things that exist such differences as sweet, sour, pungent, bitter, salty, briny, harsh, austere, astringent, oily are [differences]. For unless they are perhaps of flavours, they are either of sounds or colours or smells, or of things that come to knowledge through touch; for besides these we have no other sense. But they are five in all: taste and hearing and sight and smell and touch. And just as we distinguish different sensibles with the other [senses], so with taste [we distinguish] flavours. And as the differences in liquids are many, in the same way [they are many] in the senses too. And yet insofar as they are senses, they do not differ; but the most dialectical Lycus will not allow us to say that the differences mentioned are in flavours, nor in the senses, which everyone knows, nor in colours, white and black and grey and yellow and tawny, red and crimson and dark blue. For neither does colour differ from colour insofar as it is colour. All physicians and philosophers are mad, then, in thinking that the differences mentioned are of colours, and that the sour and bitter and pungent, and all the others I mentioned a little earlier, are of flavours, as also [the differences] of the senses themselves. For neither does colour differ from colour insofar as it is colour, as neither does sense from sense nor flavour from flavour, just as neither does fever from fever, because neither does heat from heat. The physicians are mad, then, who have written of many differences of fevers: the ardent fever and the *leipyria* [fever with cold extremities] and the *ēpialos* [fever with shivering] and the typhus-like and the pestilential and the semitertian, the quotidian and the tertian and the quartan. But Lycus himself elsewhere writes of differences of fevers, as indeed of almost all other things.

Translator’s note for this stretch

4.1: 'πάλιν οὖν ἔγνω' is evidently ironic or corrupt; a negative (e.g. οὐκ ἔγνω / ἠγνόησε) seems required, rendered with '[nothing of]'. 'ὃς μηδ’ ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι' read as 'so that he does not perceive'. 'ἔοικεν οὖν ὡς ἀπίου ... τοῦ ὄξους αἰσθάνεσθαι' is elliptical; rendered as perceiving vinegar like (astringent) pear etc. ὀξυλάπαθον rendered 'sharp dock', ὀξυαλίς (= ὀξαλίς) 'wood sorrel'; identifications approximate. 5.1: 'ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἄλλας ὕλας' appears corrupt; rendered 'except in relation to other fuels'. 'ἐνταμίευτον' is odd (lit. 'stored up/reserved'); rendered 'suited', perhaps for ἐπιτήδειον.

5.1

What, then, possessed him that he has now forgotten to divide each of the other things into its proper differences, he who even about the fire kindled from chaff, as goldsmiths customarily use it, thinks there is no difference, except in relation to other fuels? For fire does not differ from fire insofar as it is fire, except by more and less; for it is possible for fire to be strong or weak; and thinking that the fire of chaff is the weakest, he says it is suited for working gold. For [gold], he says, melts away and runs off when it comes near a stronger flame. But, my excellent Lycus, someone might say to him, I think, if you had heard the natural philosophers inquiring how flames are generated, you would, I think, have understood the differences among them. I, then, cutting short as briefly as possible an account that is not small, will explain to you about them. You see, I think, that an exhalation arises from the burning material in particles separated from one another, and some air enclosed between them is of necessity, surely, heated; and it has a very great difference in respect of more and less. But also the intervals between the bodies carried upward are not equal in all flames, just as the nature of the exhalation itself is not, but the particles of the burning material that rush upward have differed from one another in size and smallness, and in density and rarity, and in that some are half-burnt and others as it were wholly burnt, or in general that some are more, others less, set on fire. When, then, these appear to have so great a difference, and the air that has received them is at one time more heated by them, at another less, it is necessary that very great variety, and no small difference of flame, should arise. For the unlikeness of the mixing produces the multitude of differences.

6.1

Just as Lycus spoke ignorantly about fire, so in the same way, I think, [he speaks] when, having said that 'much heat' is understood in three ways, he goes through each of the meanings. He says that 'much heat' is understood in one sense according to substance, in another according to the intensity of the quality, and in another according to the strength of its proper activity. But [he says that] in the growing there is not much heat according to substance, since the bulk of the body is small, nor according to the increase of the quality, for it does not appear hotter than [that] of those in their prime. In the strength of its proper works he grants that the heat of the growing is superior, but [says] that it is not properly called [much]. His statement, by which he will make this clear, is very long. But I think I shall do now as I did with the passage written earlier. For that too was very long, and I did not write it out whole, but picked out only its most pertinent part. Let it be so with this one too, and let the part of it most useful for the matter in hand be written out. 'One of my arguments, then, is now at an end, and I may come to the remaining one; for you will surely remember that at the very beginning I set out two inquiries: one, whether Hippocrates rightly added "innate", and the other, whether he rightly said that the heat in the growing is greatest. Since the one inquiry has been completed, let me now turn to this remaining one and attempt to examine whether it has been rightly said that the heat in the growing is greatest. In examining one heat against another, there happen to be three things that need inquiry, and they are very far apart from one another: first, what it is for one heat to be more than another; second, what it is for one thing to be hotter than another; and third, what it is for one heat to be stronger than another. If, then, someone should ask us what sort of thing it is for one heat to be more than another, we ought to answer analogously to what we would answer someone else who asked what it is for one moist thing to be more than another. For just as there, the question being first put with respect to what was said, it is not right to answer anything else than only this, that [the more] is what exceeds in substance; so one would say, of course, that a full jar is more moist than half [a jar]. So too in the case of heat, if someone should ask this same question, what sort of heat is more than another, we would not rightly answer anything other than that which is more in substance, because it consists, evidently, of more substance and extends over more space. And nothing will prevent the same thing from being both more heat and heat to a lesser degree, just as the moist that is more in substance could be diffused to a lesser degree. To this question, then, one would answer rightly; but to that other one, what sort of thing is hotter than another, the right answer is that which is more intense in warmth, even if it happens to be in less substance. Just as to someone who asks what sort of thing is whiter than another, the right answer is that which is more intense in the quality of whiteness. In this respect at any rate, even if snow happens to be in a small bulk, one would say that it is whiter than any other white thing whatever; just as to someone who asks what sort of thing is moister than another, the right answer is that which is more fluid, as water [is moister] than honey and pitch, even if the water is seen in a very small amount of substance and the honey and the pitch in excess. So too to someone who asks about heat, what sort of thing is hotter than another, the right answer is that which is most intense in warmth, as fire, even if it is seen in a small amount of substance, while some other hot and lukewarm thing compared with it happens to exist in more substance. These, then, are the answers to these questions; but to someone who inquires what sort of heat is stronger than another, the answer is no longer like the previous ones. For we shall answer neither that which is more intense in warmth nor that which is seen in more substance, but that which excels in the accomplishment of the work. What I mean may be established thus: the works of heat are, of course, many. For by it some things are melted, and others are made solid, and very many are changed; and, to speak in detail of our bodies, it digests the food in the stomach and the intestines, and carries what has been worked up into the body, and changes it into body and makes it grow onto our bodies, in nourishment and growth. That heat, then, is stronger than another which will be able to provide these things more. And this is not at all the one that is either more intense in quality or more in substance. For often what is less in substance and what is less in warmth is most effective for the work. For, as we said before, for the performance of its proper works the most intense [heat] is not the stronger, but the most well-proportioned. For heat intensified in its very warmth sometimes even becomes harmful to the works; and the things I went through earlier, speaking about the peculiar nature of heat, are sufficient and most trustworthy proofs of this for me. These things being so, and there being, as I said before, three things to be inquired into in comparing one heat with another, when Hippocrates says here that the growing have the most innate heat, [he means] one of the three: either, using this word properly, he has said something false; or he has used the word badly and has said something false; or, if he is to seem to have said something true, he must have used the word badly. For if he says that the heat in the growing is greatest as in substance, as one might say that the moist is greatest in the jar, not in what is double of it, he will seem to have used the word rightly, but he must have said something very false. For the heat in the growing is not greatest in substance, because neither is the bulk of the body greater in them than in those in their prime and the old; and the innate heat extends through the whole body. If, again, he says that [there is] more [heat] in the growing, and that this warmth is intensified, perhaps [meaning] hotter than [in others], as someone might say, wishing to say that snow is whiter than some other white thing, not that it is whiter or more white, but that its white is more than the white of this [other] white thing, Hippocrates will seem to err in both respects, both in not using the word well and in otherwise saying something false. He would seem to err in not using the word well because he applied this word, which is applied to more substance, wishing to signify that the quality exists more intensified in warmth. And he would seem to have said something false because the heat in the growing is not most intense in quality, [and] not, as it should be, hotter at this age than at any other; yet he said that it is most intense in the growing. That this is false, that heat is most intense in the growing, is easy for anyone to observe. For no sign would be found existing in the body of the growing of the greatest intensity of heat in warmth. For what he said in the treatise On the Nature of Man as evidence that the heat in the growing is greatest is altogether foolish. For he declares that a human being is hotter in the earliest period, judging from the very great growth then accomplished. For the food would not, he says, be carried up by force and against nature, contrary to its own weight, in the growth of the body, unless what compels it were something strong. For such a thing is a sign not that the heat is more intense in warmth, but that it is stronger. And the stronger, as I said a little earlier, was not such as the one most intense in its quality, but the one most well-proportioned to the work. Since, then, these things are so, if Hippocrates says in this way that the growing have the most innate heat, he errs in both respects, both in not using the word well and in otherwise saying something false. But if he speaks as I said in the third [sense], [taking] "the heat in the growing is greatest" as equivalent to "the strongest for the accomplishment of the work", which comes from being most well-proportioned, and not from either being more in substance or being most intense in warmth itself, then he would seem to have used the word well [sic], in that he said the heat is greatest when he ought to have said strongest; what was said, however, would seem to have been said rightly. For as growth comes about through the innate heat, as the argument will say, it is impossible and cannot be that it is not strongest in the growing. And for this purpose the statement from the treatise On the Nature of Man would be well said: for a body that is growing and advancing against force must have its heat strongest.' Such is Lycus' statement, stretched out to great length but expressing nothing more than what I said before. For if Hippocrates, measuring by the bulk of the substance, said that the heat in the growing is more, he thinks he errs, since the body of children is clearly smaller. If [he meant] what is more intense in warmth, he says that again the observed facts conflict with this too. If [he meant] what is stronger in activity, he grants that something true is said, but declares that he has not used the expression well. For the heat of the growing ought to have been called not 'more' but 'stronger', with respect to activity.

Translator’s note for this stretch

Corruptions read as evident: ῾μᾶς = ἡμᾶς; ἀδύναντον = ἀδύνατον; οὐκ ἂν ἐπ’ ὀλίγης taken as κἂν ἐπ’ ὀλίγης ('even if'); ἐν ἴσῳ τοῦ taken as ἐν ἴσῳ τῷ ('equivalent to'). 'τῇ μὲν οὖν φωνῇ δοκοίη ἂν καλῶς κεχρῆσθαι' contradicts its context, which requires 'not well' (οὐ καλῶς); translated as transmitted, marked [sic]. The clause 'πλείονα λέγει ... ἴσως τούτου θερμοτέραν' and 'οὐ δεόντως' are garbled; rendered approximately. The quotation marks around the long extract from Lycus are editorial inferences: Galen announces he will quote the pertinent part, and the first-person passage that follows appears to be Lycus' own words, ending before 'Such is Lycus' statement'; the boundaries are uncertain. 'On the Nature of Man' is the Hippocratic treatise (or possibly Nature of the Child/On Regimen; the cited argument about food rising by force is not certainly identifiable).

7.1

But, my excellent Lycus, someone would, I think, say to him, defending Hippocrates against the abuse he heaps on him, that these statements are not faulty. To begin with, then, heat that is more in substance is not judged simply by the bulk of the whole body, but as Lycus himself said elsewhere, when he said that man has the largest brain, not taking size simply, but according to the proportion of one animal to another. Just as, then, he says that so small a child has a larger brain than the largest elephant, attending not only to the bulk of the body but adding to it the [consideration of] proportion, so he ought to have done in the case of the hot body too, considering what sort of body among those in us is innate, that is, primordial. For he himself knows the name, both written in the Hippocratic books and connected with that body which belongs to those who are begotten from the beginning, that is, from which they had their first generation. Is this, then, anything other than menstrual blood and seed? I for my part know of no third thing; but since the substance of the body of those begotten comes from these principles, the strictly first constitution could be said to consist not of a very great amount of the bodies mentioned, but of them alone. And yet why do I say strictly the first? For if we recall how Hippocrates described the six-day-old seed, we shall clearly see that the innate body still remains in it. For before any nature of bone or vein or artery or nerve or cartilage or ligament appears in the embryo, they have only the innate hot body. For an unformed soft flesh, resembling a clot of blood, succeeds the first form of the embryo, having in it some, as Hippocrates named them, blood-streaks, as it were, from the substance of the seed, the whiteness being present in it; and later, as much alteration continually takes place, an outline of bone and cartilage and ligament and nerve and artery and vein is completed, at which time the innate hot body still remains in the embryos, but is always greatest and more so the more the embryos grow. Their innate hot body, which was blood and seed, becomes less, and a variety of acquired bodies is added. For none of the things mentioned is innate in animals, but all are acquired; and if it were possible for an animal ever to become entirely of bone or of nerve, the innate heat would thereby be destroyed. But this is impossible, though it is possible for the substance of the bones and cartilages and ligaments and nerves and arteries to prevail. At any rate, animals that have reached extreme old age, having very little of the bloody nature, are composed almost of bones alone and nerves, membranes and ligaments, arteries and veins and cartilages. For of all the parts of the animal only the flesh is bloody, and the aged have very little of it, and that poor in blood and hard; of the other parts mentioned none is bloody. So one must not measure the quantity of the connate body, which, from the most active of the qualities in it, has been named innate heat, simply by the bulk of the substance, but must consider the proportion by comparing it with what is not innate. For as we say that in a bath there is much steam, or, by Zeus, smoke or some other such thing, not referring simply to the size of the rooms but to the bath's own air, so in the case of man too we shall say that the substance of the innate heat is either very great or small, comparing it with the bodies that are not innate. For the newborn has everything most full of blood, so that something of this kind shows even in the bones. Conversely, old men have everything most bloodless, even the flesh; for in it too there is very little blood. But blood was the innate hot body; it would follow, then, from this that the innate hot body is greatest in the growing and least in the aged. So too the seed, composed of a whey-like moisture and the pneuma within it, is least in the aged and greatest in the bodies of the growing, and of these most in the youngest, as we demonstrated in the commentaries On Seed. Will you then be puzzled why the body of the growing is easily consumed and flows away? Yet in other things you are not unaware that hot water or oil or some such liquid is wholly dispersed in a very short [time]; but not earth or stone or anything else cold and dry by nature. For in all existing things there are two qualities most suited to dispersal, moisture and heat, and two, conversely, to persistence, dryness and coldness; so it is no wonder if the bodies of children, because of their moisture and heat, transpire easily, while those of old men do not do so easily, since their substance is congealed by dryness and cold. So, my excellent Lycus, you bring charges about the very things for which you ought to have been rebuked. You have shown yourself ignorant of one of the first lessons, of which no one properly instructed is ignorant. For a substance that is simple is judged to be much by the bulk of the body, but one composed of different things by the proportion of the things mixed, as with the brain or any other part. So, at any rate, people mixing wine with water for drinking say either that the wine is more or the water, or neither, when they come to a well-proportioned mixture. No one is so senseless that, having thrown a kotylē of water into a jar of wine, he says there is more water in the jar than in the small cup, when, as it may happen, there are three kyathoi in the latter, one of water and two of wine. Lycus, I suppose, will not say of the remedy called tetrapharmakon [the four-drug salve], made of wax, fat, pitch and resin, all compounded in equal amounts, that it has more pitch if someone puts in double the amount of the others, but [will say] that here too one must consider whether a whole jar is full of the tetrapharmakon remedy or some small dish; and then he will say that the jar has much more pitch than the dish, even if the one is made of the four in equal parts, while in the dish the pitch is double the others. If, then, all such errors belong to people unable to distinguish 'much' in respect of proportion and mixture from 'much' said simply in respect of common measure, [Hippocrates did not err] in the way Lycus charged him with. For the substance of the innate heat is greatest in the growing, in relation to the proportion of the other things, and the quality that goes with it likewise, since the proper qualities are inseparable from the substances, just as the powers are too. So, at any rate, if you put pitch into the tetrapharmakon beyond the proportion of the others, you will say that not only its substance but also its quality and power show themselves greater, and for this reason that the moist [element], whatever belongs to the pitch, has been increased. It is clear, then, that in the three senses of 'much' written down by Lycus, both the pitch will be said to be more in the tetrapharmakon and the innate heat in animals. And still more, in cases where the things mixed are not blended wholly through one another, it is evident that one thing is called more than another in the three ways Lycus mentioned, as with this remedy, which is among the most familiar, composed of iris, birthwort, bitter-vetch flour and frankincense, all equal to one another in weight: one could make one of them double and mix it with the others, which are equal, for example birthwort. It is true, then, to say of their mixture that the birthwort is more, and prevails over the others, in substance, in quality and in activity. One might say the very same of the bath which has in it not only well-tempered air but has also taken on some smoke and steam. For of these sometimes the smoke can be more, sometimes the steam, just as also the bath's natural air. But we do not speak of 'simply' by the 'more' in respect of excess of substance, with which the quality and the activity arising from it must necessarily increase together. Let it be supposed, at any rate, that the substance of the smoke is more than that of the other two: you will then rightly say that the quality of the smoke is more than the quality of the others, and the activity too. It is agreed, however, that one quality does not become more than another, but more vehement, just as also fainter, not less; yet such usage of words is very common in all of life and in all the arts. And why must we mention other things, when we have clear testimony for the argument in fevers themselves, of which everyone says every day that they have sometimes become greater or less than one another, and sometimes that one has fever less or more, this man than that one, or the same man yesterday or today? Since, then, 'more' is admittedly said in respect of quality in this way, it is no wonder to say that in the bath in which there is more substance of smoke, the quality too has become more, and the activity: if we name it properly, strong and more vehement; if loosely, greater and more. For the smoke will obviously sting the eyes in proportion as it increases in substance too, so that, since the qualities and activities proper to substances always increase together with them, one would truly say that in such a bath the smoke is greatest. Let it be supposed again, as we were saying, that there is [some] steam and smoke in the bath, while the bath's own substance of air is greatest in proportion, being and becoming [the analogue] of the innate heat in animals: for now too the proper heat in the bath will be said to be greatest. Do the humours in the animal, then, fall short of this in any way, from whose vaporisation comes the warmth that meets those who touch from outside? For one heat is kindled from blood, another from phlegm, another from yellow or black bile. In children, then, the substance of blood is greatest in proportion to the mixture. For one must always remind of this, as if they were held in lethargy, those who talk such nonsense as Lycus wrote; and the quality that increases with it is wholesome and friendly, not distressing and biting to those who touch, and [so is] the activity by which digestions take place, not smoky-greasy nor sour as in the case of phlegm. In all the ways, then, most noble Lycus, the innate heat is more in the growing, so that Hippocrates erred in nothing; rather you have been convicted of abuse. For you have shown from what you wrote that you were never introduced by teachers to understand anything of the Hippocratic doctrines, and that you openly bring charges about things you do not know at all; and you have been caught making a most ignorant counter-argument, attempting through it to overturn the constitution of every art; and, being ignorant of what Plato wrote on these matters, you often contradict yourself, harming the young who, like you, are untrained in logical theory and do not know how to distinguish true arguments from false. On top of all this you have shown yourself at once most audacious and a babbler, having undertaken to write commentaries on what Hippocrates said without first having learned it.

Translator’s note for this stretch

Several places seem corrupt. Line 1: 'ἐλαχίστῳ' is read as 'in a very short [time]'. The end of the sentence 'πεπηγυῖαν ἐχόντων τὴν οὐσίαν δὲ ὥστ’' is garbled and is translated for sense. 'τῷ' in 'ὥσπερ γε τῷ καὶ' is left out as a stray word. The sentence beginning 'εἴπερ οὖν ἅπαντα' lacks a main clause, supplied in brackets. The final clause about 'the moist' is obscure. Line 2: 'ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ' is read as 'βίῳ', 'in all of life'. The sentence 'τὸ δ’ ἁπλῶς οὐ τῷ πλείονι...' is obscure. The sentence 'ὑποκείσθω δὲ πάλιν...' appears defective, and the bracketed words are conjectural. 'λόχους' is read as 'λόγους'. Here 'χυμοί' means bodily humours, not flavours as in the glossary.

Source and licence

Translation
Adversus Lycum: AI translation (Claude)
Translator / model
Claude (AI-generated) · claude-opus-5-5
Publisher
Classica Codex AI translations, 2026
Source edition
tlg0057.tlg093.1st1K-grc1
Source statement
Translated by Claude (claude-opus-5-5, Anthropic) from the library's tlg0057.tlg093.1st1K-grc1, from Open Greek and Latin's First1KGreek (CC BY-SA 4.0), one English line for each line of the original. The whole work is translated. It was chosen because no English translation of it could be found.
AI disclosure from the release
An AI-generated translation of the whole work, checked against the original by a second AI only in samples. No specialist has reviewed it.
Licence and required credit
CC BY-SA 4.0, as its source requires: credit Open Greek and Latin's First1KGreek and this AI translation, and share adaptations under the same licence.

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Release v1.3 · Translation updated 2026-11-13