Boethius Liber De Diffinitione An AI-generated translation of the whole work, checked against the original by a second AI only in samples. No specialist has reviewed it. Codex reviewed samples from the whole-work collection, not every work or line. This page does not claim that every passage here was checked. Source: Translated by Claude (claude-opus-5-5, Anthropic) from the library's tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1, from Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina (CC BY-SA 4.0), one English line for each line of the original. The whole work is translated. It was chosen because no English translation of it could be found. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0, as its source requires: credit Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina and this AI translation, and share adaptations under the same licence. Release: v1.3 [urn:cts:latinLit:tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1.head] OF AN[ICIUS] MANL[IUS] SEV[ERINUS] BOETHIUS [urn:cts:latinLit:tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1.ab1] BOOK ON DEFINITION. [urn:cts:latinLit:tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1.1] The first speech in speaking and disputing is always (as the authorities on dialectic, and M. Tullius himself, often advise) the one that is called definition. For nothing (that consists in speech, at any rate) can ever be brought into a contest and dispute unless the matter over which the fight will be has first been so fixed in a definition that it can be plain to both of those who are about to enter on that dispute what that is which will be dealt with in the coming question. Hence the power of defining is to be examined not only for its kind of usefulness, because through this speech the matter is always unfolded, and because it is the one that explains what is being asked about, but also because, when it is always applied at the start, it produces the greatest and plainest light on the matter which, brought into opposition, contains the question. For if words either had been known to all, or always kept a single meaning of their own, and did not mislead hearers by an ambiguous or obscure expression, and deceive speakers under differing interpretation, definition would not be thought necessary at all. But since the names imposed on things, and individual words, have been so instituted, according to the judgement of whoever decided that things were to be so called, and so composed by art, that they lead hearers by a kind of mark in signifying things, not by open declaration, I think it quite necessary to know what definition is, and of what species and parts it is made up, so that it may most easily both show the thing that it declares, and, once its modes are known, remove tedium in speaking by its variety. And first, so that we may be seen to keep order in our precepts, a definition must be applied to definition itself. A definition is (as M. Tullius says in the Topics) a speech which explains what the thing it defines is; this is so evident, and must be so understood, that it seems we must declare both in what genus definition is, and what it comprises, and how this same definition has been perfectly defined. Names or words sometimes signify things, sometimes deeds, sometimes single sayings, sometimes speeches; and although what we call a thing seems to be the genus for all these deeds and sayings and speeches, yet a thing, by its proper name and definite meaning, seems to be one thing, a deed another, a saying another, and what is single and one-fold another than a speech. Therefore definition is not the word for a deed, nor for any thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, but is a speech. For such an utterance as expresses what that is which is being asked about is without doubt called a speech, just as the exordium is a speech, and the narration, and the rest that we say are parts of an oration. So then definition too is a speech. But since this is a general name which, as we said, also fits exposition, narration, invocation, prayer, and all the other single things that are certainly said to be speeches, a species has been added, so that what was set down generally can be brought down to the thing being asked about. For we were asking what definition was, and to declare this M. Tullius added "which explains what the thing it defines is": such a speech is nothing but a definition. For narration is indeed a speech, but it does not explain what it defines, but what was done; and likewise the other single speeches, set in their own functions and actions, are something other than this speech which explains what the thing it defines is. So the species was added in such a way that, while the genus above is "speech", the species is "which [explains] what it defines". Finally, however, there is added, so as to declare what was said more certainly and more properly, "explains what it is". For there are other speeches which explain rather of what quality something is, or of what quantity. But this one explains none of these, but only what it is; for the knowledge in this division is different, since it is one thing to know of what quality something is, and another to explain what it is: the latter is contained in grasping the substance of the thing, the former in recognising its quality. And let this be Cicero's definition, as applied. We, however, will set out more plainly by our own explanation what definition is. Everything that is demonstrated by speech is shown either as to whether it is, or what it is, or of what quality it is. When a speech is applied to declare whether some thing is, it is not a definition. Likewise when it is shown by speech of what quality something is, in the same way it will not be a definition. But when it is shown what it is, which is midway between whether it is and of what quality it is (midway, that is, in such a way that there is now no doubt whether it is, and likewise that of what quality it is lies within the knowledge not of the one who inquires but of the one who defines): this middle kind, I say, which shows of the very thing being asked about what it is, is called definition. Every definition has an uncertain matter in question. Every thing, if it is certain, needs no definition; if it is uncertain, it is not [yet] a thing, and seeks to be shown by definition. For every thing, provided it is already a thing, is certain, as we have said. And when it is already certain, and has its qualities by which it is easily grasped, what it is is easily recognised. For what it is can never be understood unless of what quality it is has been grasped. Every definition is adopted either for the sake of proving a thing, or, if the thing is in question, of amplifying it, or, if some thing is already known either to the opponent or to the hearer, of confirming it. Nevertheless definition is applied so that the same thing which is known may be held as certain and fixed. Every definition is either a rhetorical or a dialectical speech. If it is rhetorical, taking its origin from dispute, it will divide itself through the parts of the thing being asked about, and will not stand whole in a single treatment with its own matters; so that, while the full and certain completeness of each thing is known, the speeches of the disputants distribute it among themselves part by part. We hold the violation of a tomb to be a thing certain, full and complete, when in a tomb that has been dug up there is both the intention and the deed of the violator, so that someone is seen to have undertaken this with the purpose of digging up and profaning the shades. Therefore, as we said, the violation of a tomb consists both in intention and in deed, and the thing, a violated tomb, is full from these two: someone opened a tomb in order to carry off its ornaments. If the same man is summoned to court accused of violating a tomb, the case without doubt necessarily calls for a definitional speech and a dispute expressing what the violation of a tomb is; but the orators use single parts of the whole and full deed, so that one sets down the violation of a tomb as the fact that the tomb was opened, while the other on the contrary says that the violation of a tomb is contained in the intention. Thus this treatment of the definitional speech comes about, so that, when the whole that is recognised in the violation of a tomb has been distributed into its parts, and the individual orators have held to those parts, they seem to use definition as a kind of disputing. But such a thing is not rightly called a definition, since it is not certain, not full, not whole; [a definition is that] only when the speech has declared the whole of whatever belongs to the thing asked about, expressing what it is. Rather this is the captious and false, not the certain, definition of the rhetoricians. There is also another, recognised as suited to rhetoricians, which is very far and most completely separated from the power of defining: it shows by comparison not what something is, but concludes in its speech that these things are so from a likeness, though it is something else. As when it is asked what "to receive" is, in the proper, true, certain sense it is nothing else than to take with one's own hand something offered by someone. By comparison M. Tullius defines that Verres received money when his companions, associates and attendants received money. "Those companions", he says, "of yours were your hands." Likewise in another example, when it is asked what an enemy is, we say that an enemy is one who has contrived something evil; and Cicero, using comparison, says: "An enemy is one who acts against the property, the wishes, the honour, the dignity of all." From which we gather that definitions of this kind suit the dispute of orators very well, but are far removed from the power of definition. But these definitions which are fit for orators and poets contain a definite order in the speech by which they are unfolded. On this matter precepts have been laid down by M. Tullius in his Rhetorical works, so that every definition, that is, a speech which explains of the thing asked about what it is, is held together by these members and parts: first, that our speech should briefly contain what the thing asked about is, and this is called the definition; then a proof of that definition is to be added, by which we show this, namely that we prove by the reasoning of arguments that the very thing we set down briefly in the definition is so; then, in the third place, we bring in the application of the same definition to the particular case which is in question and on which the trial has been set up, so that, when we have defined the thing generally and said that the matter asked about is so, and afterwards established through proof that what we define is true, in the third place we show that this is what was done, or that this is the matter asked about; and this part of the speech is called the application of the genus to the species. In the fourth place we shall put in our speech the demolition of the opposing party's definition, that is, that we set out how the opponents defined the very thing on which we established our definition above, and teach that the opponents' definition is faulty; how it is faulty we shall declare later. For it has its own definite, complete parts, of which we refrain from speaking now. There is a brief definition of enmities in M. Tullius, set out thus: "Or do you think enmities are anything greater than opposed wishes of men and unlike pursuits?" This, as we said, is a rhetorical definition, and a speech briefly concluding what enmities are. After this definition the proof is applied: "Can one who thinks good faith and religion most holy in life fail to be the enemy of one who has despoiled all the shrines?" Then the rest that follows; in which indeed one may notice this, that both the proof of the definition and the application of the definition to the species can be joined. For here Marcus Tullius proves that enmities are opposed pursuits and unlike wishes in such a way that he encloses in his words the very particular deed that was being asked about. For the proof could have been made that those are enmities which involve opposed wishes, and, in supplying reasons, such a statement composed as: "When one man keeps faith, another is faithless, there is no doubt that, disposed in such a spirit toward each other, they are believed to be enemies. Likewise an irreligious man is the enemy of a religious man." If, then, other things were said, supplied from differing pursuits and wishes, there would be proof alone, not also application of the genus to the species; but since the statement is now woven thus, "one who thinks good faith most holy in life, you judge that religion must be cultivated, is without doubt the enemy of him who despoiled the shrines, violated all the temples, polluted the sanctuaries", here the very deed of Verres that is in question is so specifically contained and enclosed that it is held shut in together with the proof and the application of the genus to the species. Afterwards there is added, as we said, the demolition of the opposing party's definition, but by concession, that is, of similar things: "If someone had done injury against my property, would I rightly declare myself his enemy?" Let us suppose, then, the opposing party's definition to be such: "Enmities exist when someone has either done or said injury against my property." M. Tullius demolishes this definition in such a way that, granting what was so defined, there are none the less enmities in another way too, when someone acts against the property, honour and dignity of all. Such, then, should the speech always show itself to be concerning rhetorical definition, through four members: that there be the definition, the proof of the definition, the application of the definition to the species, and then lastly the demolition of the opposing party's definition. But this seems suited to rhetoricians, not to philosophers as well. That which is proper to philosophers, however, also suits orators, and the orator joins it to himself both for his material and for the ornament of his own diction. For the orator rightly expresses everything in speaking that belongs to the philosophers. For he uses the true argument, which is proper to philosophers, and he also uses the necessary one. But the philosopher, on the contrary, condemns in his own disputations all things proper to rhetoricians: for he never adds a sign, nor what is called credible, and he utterly excludes everything probable from the power of his discourse. Therefore we shall set out the definition which is proper to philosophers in expressing things, which explains what a thing is, of what quality, and how it ought to be made up of its members. That definitions are the starting points of disputing we have both said above, and M. Tullius shows, both in all his dialogues and also in the book entitled Topics, in which he teaches that the first place of arguments is definition, that is, "from the whole"; to which place, called "from the whole", definition must necessarily be applied, so that thus the place of argument "from the whole" is definition. Further, as we said above, definition is said [to be the means] of unfolding the argument which is from the whole. Therefore by the precepts both of the dialecticians and of all the philosophers we ought to hold this: that there is no definition except that alone which, in the thing we wish to define, declares and shows its substance, before we understand [anything else] of that thing. To make this plainer, we shall teach that there is no definition certain, whole and to be approved except the one which the philosophers call substantial; in Greek it is called ousiōdēs. What "substantial" is, however, must be explained elsewhere. Meanwhile let this be added to [our] understanding: whenever it is asked of something what it is, there can be a certain and substantial definition whenever we set down the genus of the thing asked about, as we said, and then add the rest in the speech by differences. It does not seem out of place to set down an example, and so pass on to the remaining things that are obscure. It is asked what man is; his genus is, of course, animal. When, therefore, in the definition which will explain what man is, I say "animal" and then join on the rest, it will be a substantial definition. For I declared the substance of man when I said "animal". Likewise when I ask what white or black is, if I say "white is a colour", since colour is the genus for this which I am asking about, white or black, it will now be a substantial definition, which begins from the genus and so joins on the rest. This will be said to be substantial, and this proper, and this whole. This has been approved by the philosophers, such that a definition made in any other way is never said to be one; but by some this name is often transferred also to other things that are defined in another way. Therefore this substantial definition is explained by M. Tullius thus: that we ought, having set down the genus of the thing asked about, to add the species, so that we may separate by distinct shared features other things that could be close to it, and keep interposing differences until we arrive at what is proper to the thing asked about, by a marked expression of it. He himself added examples in the Topics. We, however, so that no confusion may arise for the reader from the law in the examples, propose this example: man is an animal, rational, mortal, terrestrial, two-footed, capable of laughter. When "animal" has been said, the substance of man has been declared. For, as we said above, animal is the genus for man, and every genus is a substantial declaration of its species; but here, because "animal" extended widely, the species "terrestrial" was put down, and now what is either of the air or of the water is excluded. "Two-footed" was put because of other animals, which rest on a great many feet. Likewise "rational" because of those that lack reason. "Mortal", however, because of that which God is. When all those animals that could have agreed with the terms set earlier in the speech had been distinguished and shut off, the proper was added in the last place, for laughing belongs to man alone. Thus the definition is complete in every part for declaring man, since, the genus having been set down and everything that could have agreed having been excluded by differences, the speech has arrived at the property of the thing asked about. And this is Tullius' precept: the one who defines ought to keep interposing and adding differences in his speech until the discourse arrives at a property that can no longer be common. But Aristotle says that a perfect and full definition consists of genus and differences. We too taught above that this same thing consists of genus and differences, since the species, once interposed, separated by its difference other things that could be very similar. Some, however, more cautious and fuller in their teaching, set up as it were certain limbs of definition itself, and say that this perfect definition, which I call substantial, ought to consist of five parts, that is, genus, species, difference, accident, proper. But in definition accident counts for least, the proper for most. And they record these things rightly and truly, and they are not to be judged foreign either to Aristotle, the chief of these arts, or to M. Tullius, who handed down precepts about them. For a complete definition does consist of these five parts as of its limbs; indeed Aristotle too, in the books he called Topics, taught what a genus is, what a species, what a difference, what a proper, and what an accident, and very many other philosophers besides have set out the force and power of these things, embracing them in their books. Since we have already discussed these five things too most fully in one book, so that one matter set in the middle of another may not breed obscurity, or we repeat what has been said, we wish the reader, if he has need, to go to the book already written; let him note that what is passed over here is now no hindrance to him. For even when all those things are known, he will keep it by the necessity of the precepts. In this substantial speech we must keep interposing species and differences until, all things that can be the same thing having been shut off, we come to the point where a property that is now certain is held. M. Tullius in the Topics wished to define civil law, and, as was proper, began from the genus: for he said at the beginning, "Civil law is equity"; this is the genus of law. But since equity is sometimes established, sometimes natural, while civil law is equity instituted by men, he therefore added, "Civil law is established equity." Having set down the genus and added a species, he separated off another species, namely the natural. But since the law of nations too is established equity, and yet is not civil, there was added what could separate off the law of nations: "for those", says M. Tullius, "who are of the same city." With this species interposed he described civil law. There is still something that could be common to another, namely this whole that was stated above. For it fits the law of religious observances and of all sacred rites. For the law of religious observances is equity, and established equity, and for all those who are of the same city. But we do not call that law civil which belongs to the pontiffs; so, in order to exclude this and to define civil law right up to its proper, he added: "for obtaining their own property." Let us give another example, set in the speeches, by which the matter may be explained more easily and plainly. M. Tullius defines what glory is, in these words, I think: "Glory", he says, "is the illustrious and widespread fame of right deeds and of very great services, whether toward one's fellow citizens, or toward the commonwealth, or toward the whole race of men." Glory therefore has been defined substantially when "fame" is said. For fame is the genus of glory; and since it is sometimes of bad things, sometimes of good, it is therefore a genus, to which the species "illustrious" has been added, which is praise: for fame that is of good things is praise, and illustrious. By this, then, the worse fame has been excluded. And since this praising fame can be sometimes according to merit, sometimes beyond merit (for often an opinion about someone has spread otherwise than the thing was done), he therefore says "fame of services"; for services are those things which, when we perform them, make us deserve glory. So Cicero, who wished at that time to give glory to Caesar, since he had presided over the commonwealth, therefore divided these deeds or services, set down generally, into species, and added "both toward his citizens, and toward the commonwealth, or toward the whole race of men", namely species of right deeds subjoined so as to fit right up to the property of glory. For now glory has in its parts a certain and true property. For everything we render, we give either as owed or as not owed; when we act rightly, if the deeds are only those that are as it were owed, it is called illustrious fame of deeds. But when we do beyond what is owed, out of goodwill in rendering and kindness in bestowing, these are called services. So he included both kinds of rendering when he said, "illustrious and widespread fame of deeds and of very great things, both toward the commonwealth and toward all citizens, the fame of services." From all this I think it is plain that the definition which ought to be substantial is to be stated thus: that, having set forth the genus of the thing asked about and joined species with a difference, we come right up to its proper, all community being entirely shut out. And if we wish to follow the judgement of truth with the philosophers as authorities, no other will be called a definition. For the rest rather supply an understanding of the thing; they do not most fully declare by the speech applied what that thing is. Nevertheless, since by a transferred name the other speeches too, keeping this same thing in a figurative expression, are called by the same name, so as to be called definitions, I think the remaining species should be set out, so that we may more easily know what the others say, and, the manifold manner of definition being known, the truth of defining may easily be unlocked, as was said above. M. Tullius in the Topics, treating of the first three places, "from the whole", "from the parts", "from the mark", says that when the argument is from the whole, as we taught above, a definition is to be applied, for there the genus is set down by which what the thing asked about itself is may be explained. But when the argument is from the parts, this too is indeed called a definition, but by a transferred name, since, all the parts of the whole having been enumerated, what the whole is is thus recognised; in this matter it makes almost no difference whether we come to know all the parts of the whole from the definition, which is "from the whole", or, having gathered all the parts, grasp what the whole is from the enumeration of the parts. Cicero calls such a definition an enumeration of parts, but assigns it to definition, since the enumeration of parts also shows what the very thing asked about is, and the definition set out above does the same, since the speech that shows what something is is called a definition; hence no one doubts that this too is said to be a definition. So M. Tullius, explaining what a free man is, or on the contrary what a non-free man is, put it thus: since freedom is given by the census, given by the rod, given by will, and these are the parts of giving freedom, "if", he says, "he is free neither by census, nor by rod, nor by will, then he is not free." Thus, having set down the parts by which a free man is made, the denial of freedom follows, if none of these parts has preceded in the giving of freedom. Nor should it trouble you that what a non-free man is is established in the definition, not what [a free man] is. For the reasoning is equal and the power of defining the same, both when what something is not is shown and when what something is is laid bare by applying a definition. Although M. Tullius says otherwise in the same book of the Topics, that there are two kinds of definitions: the first when that which is is defined, the second when that which does not have its own substance is defined, that is, what is not; and he enclosed and thinned out this kind of division in the things I mentioned above. But he meant some things to be those he said are, others those he said are not. For he says those things are which have a body underlying them, as when we define what water is, what fire is. But he wished those things to be understood as not being which seem to have no bodily substance, such as piety, virtue, freedom. But we consider that all these, whether those that are with a body, or those, namely, that are in a body, if they are taken in such a way that they seem either to be by themselves or to be in something, should be counted in one kind, so that all these may be understood to be, since they can all have their own substance, whether those [things] are bodily, or, as is most certain and as they can be called by the right name, qualities. But besides these there is definition when something that is not is shown. For definition is needed so that we can teach what something is not. So if by division, with the parts enumerated, we say what freedom is, by the same division we shall show what freedom is not. There will therefore be definition from the parts too, as if I say: if it is neither male nor female, it is not a human being. Likewise, if it is neither slave nor free, it is not a human being. Here I think it must be pointed out that the parts are often taken for its definition from the very whole that is asked about, often not from that very thing but from what befalls it, so that an enumeration of the parts of an accident can define what the whole is. For when the whole about which it is asked what it is is man, slave and free are not his parts but accidents of man. When their enumeration has been set up, what man is is shown. I think this too must be pointed out here: when a definition is made from the parts, it can happen that sometimes the whole is gathered from all the parts, as we showed above, and sometimes the parts are enumerated in the definition in such a way that the whole is in each one, as in that [case] in the controversies: "to bring aid is to decree it, to set out by sending, to come even if you have not fought, to frighten the enemy so that they do not fight." So M. Tullius treats it in many places, and he himself in the speech for Cornelius, where it is asked what it is to diminish majesty: that he carried a bad law; that by reading the codex he set aside the veto; that he caused sedition. In all these injured majesty is defined. But they are single in such a way that in each single one the whole, that is injured majesty, can be shown. This also holds in the speech for M. Caelius, where, through an enumeration of the wrongs by which malicious fraud is committed, the definition is made in such a way that malicious fraud can be recognised in each single species. Since we understand this to be plainly set down, this too is clear: that in this definition a certain notion is contained, not the thing most fully, and that the definition we set down above far surpasses it, in which, the genus being placed, a speech is brought forward for declaring the thing defined that indicates its substance. I think it must be added that there is no necessity in this enumeration of parts, where there is in a way a definition, if the parts are infinite, or the species very many, by whose division the enumeration is to be made; I say, I think that in this enumeration one need not include everything that is infinite. For it is enough for an enumeration of very many to be made, since among infinite things it is no fault to pass something over: Cicero placed this in the Topics, [saying that] we [need] not define civil law by [a complete] enumeration. Which consists in laws, custom, equity; but not the whole of law has been enumerated, since it is also in decrees of the senate and in plebiscites, it is in edicts and in the commands of emperors, and perhaps in others besides. But when a notion of law has been given by enumerating some parts out of infinite ones, we shall judge what civil law is in similar cases. So this definition we are speaking of is produced by division or partition; for thus too, by definition itself and by the same partition, having enumerated either all, if they are few, or many, if infinite, either of the species or of the parts, we are led to the knowledge and notion of the thing asked about. Let us know, however, that it is definition from the genus when species are enumerated, partition when parts are. Therefore let us define "animal": since its species are infinite in number, as man, ox, horse, lion, fish, and likewise the rest, by enumerating a few species we can declare what animal is. And if I touch those species which are rather differences, which can themselves be three things, of water, of earth, of the sky, by enumerating all these things animal would be defined. You will observe this same thing in the enumeration of parts too, so that if we say, "the world is sea, earth, sky", what the world is has been explained by an enumeration of parts, yet not of all of them. And if we wished to define what the world is by this same thing, with an enumeration applied through other parts that are infinite, since, as M. Tullius says, the enumeration of parts is often rather unlimited, we have that precept, not to believe there is any fault in the enumeration when we pass something over, at least in a matter where the parts are infinite; so we shall be able to say: "The world is sun, moon, stars, air, and all that is in it, that is, earth and the rest", and although we bring these forth stated without the parts enumerated, by the parts mentioned we show what the world is, all things being grasped by the likeness of the parts. In this way, then, definition will also be handled by enumeration of parts; it is a reasonable licence to put parts for species, as whole for genus; yet genus is never named for whole, nor species for part. Every genus of anything is as it were a whole with respect to its species, whence we rightly say whole for genus. And in the same way we shall name parts for species. For if the word "whole" is rightly joined to genus and to that term, there is equal reason to enumerate parts for species, as though under the name of whole. But I wish this to be duly noted: since there are two kinds of things, bodily and bodiless, in both both genus and whole are taken, and in like manner parts and species are named, but separated by the division of their own reasoning, so that when the genus has been named in the manner of a quality, we ought to understand species placed under it. But when [we speak of] a whole, not as one in which its quality is noticed, which is always signified in a genus, but as a sort of substantial body, so that, cut into its parts and distributed, it receives as it were the division of a certain quantity, whether that be a body or (as we said) bodiless, by noticing each relation, which is either in quality or in quantity: if we wish the thing to be named by quality, let us say it is a genus, and that species are placed under it; if we grasp a certain quantity in what is a whole, we rightly and properly say there are parts in the division. Granting that, accepted for use and by licence, so that we may call species by the name of parts and may without fault express by the name of whole the genus itself, which we said concerns quality, yet we shall never put forward genus, which belongs to quality, where whole must be said, nor ever name species under a whole, but always parts. The third definition, and the one said to be "from the mark", is when the force of a word or name, which lies in its composition, designates its thing by a certain separation made [of its elements]. "Good faith (*fides*)", says M. Tullius, "is when what is said is done (*fit*)." Here, then, one may see how a name, as if simple, has been fashioned and compounded, so that it echoes its own things, though by an obscure composition; for from a compound word whose syllables nearly speak its things we come to know, by separating them, what it signifies. But often a simple and pure word, joined by no composition, will be drawn into the definition from the mark, where its force lies in what the Greeks call *etymologia* and Cicero *veriloquium* [true-speaking]. But [its sense] cannot be shown from a separation of the composition, since there is none; rather, by applying an explanation and a derivation of the name, what the thing asked about is can in some way be explained, as "good" from goodness, "bad" from badness, and "wise" from wisdom. For when the thing is known in another name, what is derived from it and in some way named after it easily leads to knowledge, so as to show what it is; as Cicero, against Piso, says that "consul" is named from "consulting" (*consulendo*), "and most of all," he says, "because the force of that name itself prescribes consulting for the state"; and this too must be called a kind of definition. Although M. Tullius in the *Topics* made a place of argument which he named "conjugate", which borders on the place "from the mark", we shall nevertheless, not otherwise nor contrarily but with equal precept, rightly call it definition, keeping the rule that when we understand what a compound name signifies by taking it apart into the things it sounds, the definition is "from the mark"; but when we take up from what a simple word is derived, we have taken an argument from the conjugate, as M. Tullius set it down; yet let us say it is a definition, since it shows what something is, which is proper to definition. These, then, are the three principal substantial definitions now set out by me: that "from the whole", that from the enumeration of parts, and that from the mark; in such a way that the first alone is truly called definition, while these two, by the honour and dignity of the name, because they show what the thing asked about is, will be called definitions, not truly, but still definitions. Now let us return to the definition "from the whole", since it can take on very many forms. Of these we shall divide out those we have been able to gather (for there are perhaps others too), and then we shall state their reasons, differences and examples. The first, then, is the one that in Greek is called *ousiōdēs*, and in Latin can be called substantial. The second is *ennoēmatikē*, which puts forward only a notion. The third is *poiotēs*, which takes its name from quality. The fourth is *hypographikē*, which M. Tullius calls description. The fifth is *kat' antilexin*, which in Latin we can call "word for word". The sixth is *kata diaphoran*, which the Latins call "of the same and of the other", and which can be called "by difference". The seventh is *kata metaphoran*, that is, by transference. The eighth is *kat' aphairesin tou enantiou*, that is, by privation of its contrary. The ninth is *kath' hypotypōsin*, that is, by a kind of image. The tenth is *hōs typos*, in Latin "as". The eleventh is *kat' endeian plērous ek tou autou genous*, that is, by lack of the full from the same genus. The twelfth is *kat' epainon*, that is, by praise. The thirteenth is *kat' analogian*, that is, according to ratio, which is called proportion. The fourteenth is *kata to pros ti*, that is, by what is relative to something. The fifteenth is *aitiōdēs*, assigning a cause. About the first definition a full account was completed above, when we showed what substantial definition is and with what parts it is completed. The second is called *ennoēmatikē*, which we can call "notion", not by a proper but by a common name. For in all the remaining definitions a notion of the thing is put forward, not a substantial explanation set out; but this second one is always produced in this way: when what is to be defined has been proposed, and its genus has not been stated, what the thing asked about is is explained by words that lead the hearer into a sense of the thing. And it is almost habitual to it to define the things proposed through names laid on top, as if I should say: "Man is that which by rational conception and practice is set over all animals"; here I have not said what he is, but by saying what he does I have called him into notice as if by a sign. There are many others in M. Tullius in the *Rhetoric*, such as: "An honourable kind of case is one which the mind of the hearer at once favours without our speaking"; and likewise "the astonishing [kind], from which the mind of those who are to hear is estranged". So too with the other definitions he uses in the second book in setting out the virtues. First, when he says what virtue itself is, he gives its definition: "a habit of mind in harmony with the measure of nature and with reason"; here, since he set down the genus by saying "habit", it is a substantial definition. But when he says, "Memory is that through which the mind recalls what has been", and likewise "Understanding is that through which it regards what is", and in the same way "Foresight is that through which something future is seen", it is clear enough that this is not substantial definition but, as we said, that which in Greek is called *ennoēmatikē*, since the notion of the thing is put forward not as grasped by substantial reasoning but as the thing known by its activity. The third species of definition is that called *poiotēs*; this shows by speaking what sort a thing is; and, as above, we shall put forward our own example, so that it may readily appear that several definitions can be made of one and the same thing: first we defined man substantially; then, in the manner of the second definition, we expressed his notion; now through the third definition we shall explain what man is. Man is [the one] in whom piety, justice, equity, self-control dwell, and again malice, cunning and the other vices; who is strong in talent, powerful in the arts, and by knowledge of things either loves what he ought to do, or by noticing what is useless despises, repudiates and rejects it. By these qualities man is expressed; for no other animal leads its life with these movements of mind which mark quality, but only this animal which is man is filled with qualities placed and established in the mind, as a kind of natural craftsman or helmsman of life. This third and that second may seem to some to be common to one another: for often in either of them it suffices for the definition of the thing asked about that only its proper be named, as if I should say, "Man is that which laughs"; for this is proper to man and to no other animal; when this is said, and all the other things by which man could be shown are left unsaid, he is nonetheless declared by his proper alone. And this, which Cicero said is a kind of definition from property, can be applied to notion, as some think, and can also be applied to this definition which has received the name of quality. Hence some think that these two, separated by no boundary between them, are rather one; though it is clear enough that the former, notion, can be completed with no qualities set down, as we taught above, while the latter, by setting down qualities, can show what the thing is, even with its proper left unsaid. The fourth definition we called *hypographikē*, not placing the number as if proper to it, but, following the order set up, joining a word to the enumeration given, for easier understanding; for the fourth, which is *hypographē*, which we have called description, is not to be called fourth [of its own right]; but because the order of setting out required it, we placed the number's name in this spot. For as the fourth Cicero put the definition "of the same and the other", and so made *hypographikē* the fifth; but we, leaving numbering aside, shall teach by setting out its reason what *hypographikē* is, which by M. Tullius is called description, and [shall teach] by example: it is a speech which does not so much say what [something] is, but by using a roundabout account of words and deeds declares by description what each thing is. This is said to be the descriptive definition, as when it is asked what a miser is, what a cruel man, what a luxurious man, and the whole nature of the miser, the luxurious man, the cruel man is described. This species of definition is called description in the hortatory kind, as: "The luxurious man is one who craves a way of living not necessary but costly and burdensome, who overflows into delights, who is prone to lust." These and other things define the luxurious man, and define him by description; this definition is always suited to the orator. For to him praise is given for speaking by circumlocution, for the sake of dignity, not that more fitting and bounded speech which is as it were native to the definition which we laid down above as substantial. Therefore in many places M. Tullius, when he speaks of defining something, did not prescribe that it be defined substantially, but rather described, and he uses this term, as when he says: "When it is asked what a thief is and what a temple-robber is, it must be shown by its description." The fifth species of definition is the one we called *kat' antilexin*, which in Latin we can call "word for word". This designates the word about whose thing the question is by another single, solitary term, and in a way declares what a thing set down in one word is by one other word, as "to fall silent (*conticescere*) is to be silent (*tacere*)"; likewise "he drains (*haurit*) the open side", that is, "strikes"; likewise when we call a boundary (*terminus*) an end, or interpret "ravaged (*populatas*)" as "laid waste (*vastatas*)"; and in general, when we declare the thing of one word by another, clearer word, this will be the fifth definition of which we speak. M. Tullius used it in the *Topics* when, defining the place of argument, he said it is a seat; thus, by one name, "place", whose thing he was seeking, he showed through definition what it was by another term set word for word, saying "seat". This the Greeks call *kat' antilexin*, as *anēr estin ho anthrōpos* ["a male is the man"]. The sixth species of definition is *kata diaphoran*; this we call "by difference". But the writers of the arts call it "of the same and of the other", as when it is asked what difference there is between a king and a tyrant, and, a difference being added, it is defined what each is. And indeed every definition, as we taught above, expresses what the thing asked about is only by adding differences and grasping its proper; yet this mode of which we now speak will not seem to be the same, since here, when only a difference has been set between two things about which it is asked what they are, each is known. For in the former cases each single thing is defined; here two things, as if known but confused by a certain common sharing between them, are separated by an added difference through which what each is is known, as: "A king is moderate and restrained, but a tyrant cruel." From this [kind] is that saying of Terence: "I think it better to hold children by shame and generosity than by fear; this is the difference between a father and a master." Likewise M. Tullius for Sextus Roscius: "And between this life refined by humanity and that savage one nothing differs so much as law and force." The seventh is *kata metaphoran*, that is, by transference, as Cicero in the *Topics*: "The shore is what the waves wash over." Likewise, "Youth is the flower of age, old age the setting of age." This can be handled in various ways: now to warn, now to designate, now to censure or to praise. To warn: "Nobility is the virtue of the ancestors, a burden on their descendants"; to designate: "The head is the citadel of the body"; to censure: "Riches are long provisions for a short life"; to praise: "Youth is the flower of age." In these and other ways this definition can be put forward; in this kind, however, care must be taken that the transference be neither far-fetched nor foul. A far-fetched transference is, for example, "the trumpet of the state", "the chaos of the laws", which Tullius softened in the speech for Sextus Roscius: "as if it were everlasting night", he says; in which, even if it is "as if", so that it is by likeness, it can be accepted as a definition, taking a softening from the little word of likeness. A foul transference arises in two ways, when we define honourable things by foul ones or foul things by honourable ones; as if someone, defining climax, were to call it the tears of exhausted Venus, which he would better name sweat; or, conversely, someone were to say "Tears are the climax of grief"; to this fault not even the preceding little word gives softening. Therefore we must avoid this carefully. The eighth species of definition is *kat' aphairesin tou enantiou*, that is, by privation of the contrary of what is defined, as "Good is what is not bad"; we ought to use this kind of definition when the contrary is known. For since these two are so understood that one cannot be without the other, how will knowledge of the one come about unless both have been grasped? So when it is asked what one of them is, it surely cannot be grasped by this definition when both are unknown, since they are so naturally bound that they link the necessary knowledge of themselves to the grasping of one. Such a definition is therefore at risk; hence we must know whether its contrary is known, so that by its removal knowledge arises of what is defined. Wherefore it is often better, when we are seeking something to be defined, to define its contrary, and by removing that we shall declare what is sought; as, if good is what profits with honour, what is not such is bad. Cicero in the *Rhetoric*: "Things are demonstrated necessarily which cannot be done or proved otherwise than as they are stated." For let us set necessary and not necessary as contraries, so that you understand that we here posit all contraries by whose removal what is sought is defined. So what is not necessary can be defined thus: what can be done and proved otherwise than as it is stated; when I remove this, I establish the definition of the necessary. So a definition of this sort can rightly be made, but in the way I have taught. And this is what M. Tullius prescribed in the *Partitions*, that one should often define from contraries. Under this definition also fall notions, when accidents are removed, and all other things which are different, and when the contrary of an accident or of a consequent accident is removed: as if someone should say that substance is what is neither quality nor quantity nor the other accidents, when the other things that are different are removed; such is the definition, as if someone defining man should remove all animals, either generally or specifically. By this kind of definition God can be defined. For since we can in no way know what God is, by removal of all existing things, which the Greeks call *onta*, it supplies a knowledge of God, the knowledge of known things being circumscribed and taken away from us: God is neither body, nor any element, nor soul, nor mind, nor sense, nor intellect, nor anything that can be grasped from these. When such things have been removed, what God is can be defined, the more so if you add that God is that which cannot even be defined. When the contrary of an accident or consequent is removed, the definition is such: "To be awake is to use the senses; to sleep is not to use the senses." Such definitions may naturally seem to agree with the definition we called *ennoēmatikē* above. But that consists of the accidents or consequents of the thing we defined, this of contraries; and so from that which is *ennoēmatikē* [a definition] is made from accidents, as M. Tullius shows that Piso was not consul, thus: "Or did anyone in the rest of the time consider you consul? did anyone rise for you as you came into the senate house, did anyone think he should answer you when you consulted [the senate]?" And the speech of this earlier passage rests on the consequent in this definition, by which he sets out in various ways that he was not consul, showing it also through the things that conflict with a consul in words, deeds and thoughts. From consequents he defines a consul thus: "One must be a consul in spirit, in counsel, in good faith, in gravity, in vigilance, in care, in short in the whole duty of the consulship." So far, from consequents. For all these are consequents of what I said, "the duty of the consulship"; hence this will be an *ennoēmatikē* definition. To make this plainer, I shall give another example. M. Tullius in the same [speech]: "What else is it to be mad than not to recognise people, not to recognise the laws, not the senate, not the state, to bloody one's own body?" So to gather consequent accidents belongs to the *ennoēmatikē*, but to remove the contrary of what you will define is the definition we spoke of above as the eighth. The ninth species of definition is *kata hypotypōsin*, that is, through a kind of imagining, as "Aeneas is the son of Venus and Anchises"; this always deals with individuals, which the Greeks call *atoma*. This definition is wanted with names that are homonymous, individuals only, as Ajax son of Oileus and [Ajax son of] Telamon. It also helps in the kind of speech where shame or fear keeps one from naming someone: "Me, clearly," says M. Tullius, "those assassins were describing" from his house, thus. And in the speech for Fundanius thus: "Did you describe his close friend, our competitor, that very man? Now by his zeal and influence this whole accusation has been fortified." It had been a matter of fear to name him, and so he was described. Again, in the speech for Cornelius: "These belong to [the charge of] majesty; read as you were reading; from this you will understand that Cornelius is described or indicated by not the slightest suspicion." So much on proper names; let the other, which we called *hypographikē* above, be a different definition. So from family, homeland, body, deeds, words or fortunes, and from character, we make plain by this kind of definition the one person we do not wish [to name]. The tenth species is *hōs typos*, which we have called "as it were", as if it is asked what an animal is, and the answer is "as a man". So Aristotle says [*zōon estin*] *hōs anthrōpos* [an animal is, as a man]; for the example added makes plain the thing asked about, and this is proper to definition, to make plain what the thing asked about is. The eleventh species of definition is *kat' endeian tou plērous ex autou genous*, that is, by the lack of the whole from the same kind, as if it is asked what a *quadrans* [quarter] is, and the answer is: that which lacks a *dodrans* [three-quarters] to make an *as* [whole]. The twelfth species of definition is *kat' epainon*, that is, by praise, as M. Tullius in the speech for Cluentius: "Law is the mind and the spirit and the counsel and the knowledge of the state"; and we for our part have set out the example in this way so as to show the definition. For M. Tullius, saying this same thing without using the speech of definition, simply put it: "The mind," he says, "and spirit of the state, and its counsel and knowledge are placed in the laws"; and, as we taught above, he meant definition to be nothing else than a speech. So M. Tullius brought forward in a different way what, turned round by us, received in its speech the form of a definition; and this is far removed from the mode that comes about through metaphor, for it is not transference when law is called the mind of the state; nor yet is it a genus, so as to be held substantial (*ousiōdēs*). For it follows that [a definition] may also be set down by blame, but without transference; so it can be seen to be defined by Tullius: "Slavery is the last of evils, to be repelled not only by war but even by death." For although he began thus, "Peace is tranquil liberty," and there is very great difference between peace and slavery, so that it might seem a definition by difference, yet because he did not show briefly the point by which it differed, but defined each thing by its own kind, he showed how they differed rather by comparison, not by the kind of definition by difference. So the former, the definition of peace, will be *ennoēmatikē*, from the consequents of the thing he was defining: "Peace is tranquil liberty." This second is rather by blame; for it is not a consequent of it, or any of the things we assigned to the *ennoēmatikē* definition, but there is only blame, by which slavery is said to be the last of all evils. Nor again is evil taken as a genus of slavery, for evil is a quality, slavery a relation; hence since they are different things, evil cannot be a genus of slavery. Rightly, then, the definition of slavery set out above is said to be made by blame. The thirteenth species of definition is *kat' analogian*, that is, according to ratio, which is called proportion, when something that may be compared with another is said to be what that other is, by reason of likeness; but this happens when a lesser thing is defined by the name of a greater, and when what the lesser is is added to this. The Greeks define thus: *anthrōpos esti mikrokosmos tis*, that is, man is a lesser world. Cicero used this thus: "Those who attribute most to the edict say that the praetor's edict is an annual law." The fourteenth species of definition is *kata pros ti*, that is, in relation to something, as "A father is one who has a son." Cicero in the *Rhetorica*: "Thus a genus is what embraces several parts." Likewise, "A part is what falls under a genus." The fifteenth species is *aitiōdēs*; the Latins call it according to the reason of the thing, as "Day is the sun above the earth; night, the sun beneath the earth": for the cause of its being day or night is the sun being above the earth or beneath it. There are perhaps other species of definition too; but if anyone finds one, let him add it to the number, provided he takes careful heed that what he has found cannot perhaps be joined to one of these species. Nor again let anyone think we have separated so many species to no purpose, because some of them can agree with one another. For if he applies fuller consideration, he will see them all separated from one another by a great distinction; only let him hold to what I have often taught above, that only that is truly called definition which, beginning from the genus, descends to the proper of the thing defined, separating by differences what could have been common. Now let us set out, as was promised, the faults of definition. The substantial definition, which we taught first, and which alone we called definition, admits two principal faults: if the speech that defines either embraces more, or makes plain less than the full thing is. For the defining speech must be so composed in relation to the name whose thing it defines that it offers equal power of expressing as the word itself, and the name and the definition, compared with each other, make each other plain when turned round. As, if you ask what a man is, the right answer is: an animal, terrestrial, rational, mortal, two-footed, capable of laughter. If you turn this round again, "man" will be the best declaration. For to one asking what is an animal terrestrial, rational, mortal, two-footed, capable of laughter, the right answer will be: man. But if you define thus, "man is an animate sensible substance," it is indeed a declaration of man, for man is all these things; but if you turn it round, it will not hold. For an animate sensible substance is not man only; so the definition errs by excess, because it contains more than was asked. And in general a definition errs that sets down a genus that lies beyond itself; for we say that what is above more [broadly] declares the genus. Likewise it errs by containing less than is necessary, as "cupidity is the desire of seeking others' goods," which likewise does not hold when turned round, because it is less comprehensive in definition than the thing of the name required. For cupidity extends widely, and is not avarice alone; so the definition is faulty that embraces less than was asked, as if one said "cupidity is avarice": if this gave an example and directed the hearer to the whole of what cupidity is by setting out a likeness, as "like avarice", it would be that species of defining we placed tenth, *hōs typos*. As it is, it did not direct the example to the whole, but, as if containing the whole, it erred by passing over much of the whole; hence no conversion could be made from the definition to the name. If these two faults are avoided, the definition is sound, and not only this one that is substantial, but the remaining species too. So much on the faults. Cicero, when in the *Rhetorica* he taught that there are three faults, says: a definition is bad when it describes common things, in this way: "A seditious man is one who is a bad and useless citizen." For this does not describe the force of a seditious man more than of an ambitious man, of a false accuser, or of any wicked man. This definition we have said is faulty by excess. He adds another fault, when it says something false, in this manner: "Wisdom is understanding of how to acquire money." This fault Cicero added beside the two I mentioned. For the third he himself set down is what we established as the second. For he says thus, when it contains something neither weighty nor great: "Folly is the desire for boundless glory." This errs because it comprehends less, which M. Tullius expresses thus: "This is indeed folly, but defined from a certain part, not from its whole kind." Besides these, the same M. Tullius in the second book of the *Rhetorica* added two faults: if a definition is either base or useless; and this, as he himself says, is tested from the parts of honour and advantage. We spoke above about base definition when we treated definition by transference; but that fault is in a word, whereas it can happen that a whole speech contains dishonourable things or comprises useless ones. In the *Philippics*, in the first speech, M. Tullius showed that Caesar's acts were being overturned by Antony, and Antony denied it. Each brought a definition, to show what is the act of one who, as a civilian in the toga, conducts himself with power in the state. I taught above that there are four parts to asserting a definition: the first is the definition, the second the proof of the definition, the third the application of the definition to the species, the fourth the demolition of the opposing party's definition. Cicero defines the act of one living in the commonwealth with power as laws; Antony, as handwritten notes. So in his speech Cicero both defines, proves, applies to the species, and demolishes the opposing party's definition. Cicero's definition is this: "And what can so properly be called the act of one who, in the toga, has conducted himself in the commonwealth with power and command, as a law?" Then the proof of this definition is added in this way: "Ask for the acts of Gracchus: the Sempronian laws will be brought forward. Ask for Sulla's: the Cornelian. What of Gnaeus Pompey's third consulship, in what acts does it consist? Surely in laws." This is the proof. Then is added the application of the definition to the species: "If you asked Caesar himself what he had done in the City and in the toga, he would answer that he had carried many excellent laws." There follows the refutation of the opposing party's definition, and it is done in two ways: either something from all those faults is concluded in that refutation, or, granting what the opponents say, we prove by comparison that what we say is more so. Here M. Tullius does both. For he both sets out those things from the faults to show the definition false, and base, and useless; and then, conceding, he confirms his own definition the more and calls it the better. Cicero proves the definition false thus, by examining what is consequent; for a definition is proved false by these: if it does not have its own proper, if it rather has its contrary, if it does not hold its consequent, if it is stated otherwise than it is in common opinion. Here, then, since it is asked what is the act of a citizen in the toga living in the commonwealth with power, and it was said to be nothing other than laws, it must be noted that Antony had said it was handwritten notes; carefully noting the consequents, he shows the definition false thus: he who is in power is in the commonwealth; when he has done something, he cannot change the act; this fits a law, that once carried it is never changed by its proposer. But handwritten notes, because they are a private act, have this consequence, that they may be changed and often are not produced. So M. Tullius refutes [the claim] that handwritten notes are an act, because they do not have the consequents of an act, saying: "Handwritten notes he would either change or not give; or if he had given them, he would not call those things among his acts." But because [he refutes] by concession: "But even these I concede, and in some matters I even shut my eyes; but in the greatest matters, that is, in laws, I do not think Caesar's acts should be allowed to be dissolved." After this he adds a refutation likewise twofold: one from the faults, so as to call the definition both base and useless; then he concedes, meaning to conclude from comparison that his own is better, saying that in such a statement what is base and useless is this: "unless, perhaps, if he entered anything in a notebook for memory's sake, that will be counted among his acts." And although it is unjust and useless, it is defended. Equity is a virtue; virtue itself is honourable; therefore injustice is base, because baseness is contrary to honour. So he refutes the definition as base and useless in these very words. Then he added that last [point] by concession in this way: "What he carried before the people in the centuriate assembly, that will not be counted among Caesar's acts." These things I have thought enough even for a sharp [reader]. TRANSLATOR NOTES [urn:cts:latinLit:tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1.head] Despite the heading naming Boethius, the work is generally attributed to Marius Victorinus. The scanned text has many run-together words and misprints (e.g. "etipsoM.Tuilio", "probanda':)", "noc" for hoc, "essr-" for esse); these have been read in their evident sense. "augendae" (amplifying) may stand for "arguendae" (refuting). "ex jure" is taken as referring to the legal examples in Cicero's Topics. In the second passage, "per concessionem, id est similium" is obscure and possibly corrupt. In the Cicero quotation about faith and religion, the text's "religionem colendam esse existimatis" seems garbled; it is rendered literally. "abjecta species" in the last sentence is read as "adjecta". [urn:cts:latinLit:tmp1032.tmp1032.opp-lat1.1] Several passages are garbled in the scan. 'nec vos moveat quod quid non sit liber ... non quid sit': the sense '[what a free man] is' is supplied. 'non nos jus civile enumeratione diffinire' appears corrupt (a verb such as 'debere' or 'posse' and a qualifier seem lost); rendered by sense with bracketed supplements. 'pro M. Caelio' on dolus malus may be an error for another speech (e.g. pro Caecina); left as given. The 'controversies' example on bringing aid and the pro Cornelio items are rendered literally; 'legendo codicem intercessionem sustulit' refers to Cornelius reading out the bill himself despite a tribune's veto. The quotation on glory (cf. pro Marcello) is given as this text has it. The Greek terms are badly garbled in the scan and have been restored from the Latin glosses: ποιότης, ὑπογραφική, κατ' ἀντίλεξιν, κατὰ διαφοράν, κατὰ μεταφοράν, κατ' ἀφαίρεσιν τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς τύπος, κατ' ἔπαινον, κατ' ἀναλογίαν, κατὰ τὸ πρός τι, ὄντα; 'ὁav0pto7ro?' read as ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 'tuaba' read as tuba ('trumpet'). 'mellus' read as melius. 'Heptnua' read as Septima. 'quas sonat' etc. follow the evident sense. The Terence quotation is from Adelphoe 57–58; 'quam jus atque vis' from Pro Sexto Roscio. 'quasi sempiterna nox' attributed to Pro Roscio by the author. The passage on the eleventh to fifteenth species is listed but not yet treated here. Much of the Greek is garbled by scanning; restored readings: κατὰ ὑποτύπωσιν, ἄτομα, ὡς τύπος (tenth species, confirmed later in the text; the Greek after 'Sic Aristoteles dicit' is uncertain, perhaps ζῷόν ἐστιν ὡς ἄνθρωπος), κατ' ἔνδειαν τοῦ πλήρους ἐξ αὐτοῦ γένους, κατ' ἔπαινον, ἄνθρωπός ἐστι μικρόκοσμός τις, κατὰ πρός τι. 'praeter edictum legem animam' read as 'praetoris edictum legem annuam'. 'sicarii illi describebant ide domo sua sic' is obscure and probably corrupt. 'a novis' read as 'a nobis'. 'quod supra est genus magis declarat' is obscure. The closing account of Cicero's refutation of Antony is confused in the text, and the translation follows it closely.