Augustine, Saint Viginti Unius Sententiarum An AI-generated translation of the whole work, checked against the original by a second AI only in samples. No specialist has reviewed it. Codex reviewed samples from the whole-work collection, not every work or line. This page does not claim that every passage here was checked. Source: Translated by Claude (claude-opus-5-5, Anthropic) from the library's stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1, from Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina (CC BY-SA 4.0), one English line for each line of the original. The whole work is translated. It was chosen because no English translation of it could be found. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0, as its source requires: credit Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina and this AI translation, and share adaptations under the same licence. Release: v1.3 [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.head] ONE BOOK OF TWENTY-ONE SAYINGS OR QUESTIONS. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.1] FIRST SAYING. — Blessed is he who. Everyone who wishes to live happily is happy if he lives as he wishes; but every human being wishes to live happily; therefore every human being who lives as he wishes is happy. From this it follows that no one who wishes to live shamefully lives as he wishes, because no one who lives shamefully is happy. And he does not live as he wishes for this reason: even if he does many things according to his own will, still more things follow that are against his will. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.2] SAYING II. — On the Jews. Since the Apostle says that all things happened to the Jews in figure (1 Cor. 10:11), and moreover that all past things were shadows, but the body is Christ, I can maintain that the Passover was performed only once, when the body that had been prefigured, Christ, was slain. For if a sheep of the kind the law prescribes for the Passover cannot be found, such that it is from sheep and goats — for the very nature of these animals is at odds with their joining to produce common offspring — how could a true Passover be performed, when that lamb which is the Passover was lacking? But if Christ is born such according to the flesh, from the righteous, that is, sheep, and from sinners, that is, goats, he alone is that lamb which is sought; and since he is slain no more than once, that perfect Passover is shown to have been celebrated in truth no more than once. So, as we have said, at that time there were figures: for a lamb is chosen, to signify simplicity and innocence; a male is required, to attest strength; without blemish, as being without sin; a yearling, as when the time of preaching has been completed; perfect, as being furnished with every kind of virtue; in the first month, so that the whole year may be consecrated from its own beginning; on the fourteenth day of the month, so that when the light of truth has been filled out the night of error may be covered over; at evening, so that the impending setting of the age may be shown; with the leaven cast out, so that the corruption of malice may be removed from the heart of a perverse mind; with the thresholds of the houses smeared with blood, so that the figure of the Lord's passion may be marked on the forehead; roasted with fire, for the Gospel and word of Christ is strong food; and not soaked in water, for it is not to be dissolved in the watery feebleness of a delicate interpretation. Nothing is left out, for nothing at all in Christ is rejected. The bones are not broken, because Christ cannot be crushed, that is, overcome, in anything. Whatever is left over is put on the divine fires; that is, what anyone cannot grasp he refers back to Christ's divine knowledge, intent as a feaster only on those things which are plain, as far as his strength allows. For their eating standing is also a model, lest anyone fall, or lest anyone prostrate himself under compulsion in [the matter of] the Gospel; but rather that, unconquered by the strength of a vigorous mind against the battles of persecutions, he may stand firm, that is, lofty and upright. For the girded loins are a sign of gospel continence, as the place of the seed is restrained and bound; the staffs added [signify] the Holy Spirit, on whom one leans; the feet shod, that is, the slipperiness of error cast off, while by progress towards faith in heavenly things all is fixed in the Gospel as with iron-shod defences, made solid by the firmest truth. They are also in haste: for those fervent in faith are approved, the lukewarm and negligent are rejected and spewed out. They are eaten with unleavened bread: for Christ is received with all the pure simplicity of a simple mind. With bitter herbs: for indeed this Passover turned into the most bitter bitterness for the condemnation of the Jews. It was given only to the circumcised (Exod. 12): for only to those cleansed and purified by the washing of heavenly pardon is the opportunity of receiving the body of Christ, the consecrated food, held out. So what had been prefigured among the Israelites has been made firm in us; and what were images for them are in us the very truths. They imitated keeping the Passover, while they were engaged in likenesses, since only the disciples of Christ were to keep the true Passover. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.3] Not those who handle the heart and liver of cattle, but those whose inmost hearts prudent virtue cleanses, shutting out the stain of vices lying beneath, will be able to pierce heaven with a favouring oar, and now cross the empty upper air on joyful wings. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.4] SAYING III. — On the question of fate and fortune. Since I noticed when I was with you, and have now learned more pleasantly and more surely from your letter, that your mind is not lightly stirred, I owe you a reply of no small volume, etc. I shall, however, be the more eager if your Charity is not reluctant often to remind me by letter, and if you inform me by reply what you think of this letter. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.5] SAYING IV. — On magical miracles. One should not be disturbed when, by magic arts, miracles are done that are often like the miracles done through God's holy servants: as it is written in Exodus that Pharaoh's magicians did some things in the same way as Moses did (Exod. 7 and 8). So one should not wonder at these things, because all things that happen visibly are believed, not unreasonably, to be capable of being done even by the lower powers of this air. But the difference is this: when the saints do such things, the lower creation is commanded in the name of God, the Lord of all things, from higher instruments; but when wicked men work similar things by magic arts, they are given into [the demons'] hands when they are heard by the demons. For they are worthy to be deceived by such a hearing, so that what they seem to obtain as a benefit becomes a punishment for them, when certain powers of the air display miracles to them as if privately, in order to keep them in subjection, by the permission, however, of divine providence, so that to each his own may be allotted according to the deserts of souls. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.6] SAYING V. — On the hundred and fifty-three fishes. If this number is considered, it can also point to the holiness of the Church, etc., where sinners, who belong on the left, are not found. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.7] SAYING VI. — In what respect man is better than the beasts. No one doubts that a human being consists of soul and body, in such a way that the soul is a certain power by which the body is given life; and that they are two, in such a way that, the one being more excellent than the other, the former rules and the latter serves. But again, in the same soul two things are seen: one which, loving divine things, understands and shares in reason, and is called rational; the other which, enjoying sensible things, has [them] in common with the beasts, and is irrational. This again must be observed in two [parts], one of which is that by which it seeks to resist what opposes it, the other that by which [it seeks] to obtain what suits it, which the beasts too plainly do. Gathering these together, it will be clear that a human being consists of soul and body, but with functions differing according to this division. Over all these presides that first part, neighbouring on reason, which, when it delights in itself and what is its own by the power and might of the Maker — not through itself, since of itself it is nothing, but through the kindness of God, through whom it is a soul — by curbing the lower part of nature within itself and drawing it away from temporal things, frees it from the want of pains, the hardship of need, the troubles of diseases, and leads it back by beneficent bounty into its own goods, so that the firmness of justice may remain in it, ruling according to its nature and giving good to the servant; but if its life has delighted in the servant and loved these temporal things, it will be judged not ruling but serving, and not giving good to the inferior but obeying it, and in the end will undergo heavier punishments, abandoned by all those things it loved against God's commands; but by running back to things above and recovering itself wholly by God's benefits, it will be like him by whom it was made, and will be happy, having the likeness of him to which it was made. For so it is written: And God made man to the image of God (Gen. 1:27). That we shall receive this by the very sight [of him] is said thus through the apostle John: Dearest ones, we are children of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is (1 John 3:2). But concerning the division of the soul it has been said: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind (Deut. 6:5, and Matt. 22:37). And the apostle Paul says thus: May the Lord keep safe your spirit, soul and body (1 Thess. 5:23). Therefore a human being is in no way better than the beasts except in that he is an intellectual soul; but he is better than other human beings themselves when he understands God and does not, perverted by vanity, pursue temporal goods. For this too was most truly said: Do not be like the horse and the mule, which have no understanding (Ps. 31:9). And this: Let him who glories, glory in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:31): so he understands that I am the Lord. And this: Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity. What abundance has a man in all his labour which he labours under the sun? (Eccles. 1:2–3). [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.8] SAYING VII — On the resurrection of the body. Apart from the fact, worthy of all belief, that there is nothing God cannot do, it can also be gathered by the following reasoning that it is not against nature for this body to rise again. The whole of body, which is also signified by the name 'heaven and earth' of this sensible world, exists in some mode. But everything that exists in some mode, and yet not in the highest mode, exists, to whatever extent it exists, by participation in that form which exists in the highest mode; and while it is held by this [form], it can undergo any ordered changes. But it is not possible that body should not exist at all. For if body is not to exist at all, either it will be nothing, or something better. But it is not allowed to be nothing, since the form prevails which always abides and truly and supremely is. Nor can something better than body come to be, because the whole of body has a fixed measure, and the number of the things that were made incorporeal does not need to be increased; and there is no need for some new nature to be made, as though either not all things had been made, or another had to be substituted in the place of some one that had perished. For all things have been made perfectly, and they are governed by providence according to the ever-abiding form, so that sensible nature yields to ordered mutability, and through this to a certain abidingness in changing things, and so is held in its own kind and keeps its proper measure. Hence it comes about that every body is now one way and now another, yet does not cease to be body: thus for universal nature all things are preserved which depart from our senses and are thought to perish utterly. So it is not surprising if this body recovers this mode of its own in which it now exists, insofar as it exists, or obtains some better one; since what is called perishing is a departure into other modes, not utter destruction. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.9] SAYING VIII. — On faith, hope and charity. There is faith without hope and charity if you say: I believe that the things to which you call me are true, but I cannot attain them, nor do I want to. There is faith without hope but with charity if you say: I believe that the things to which you call me are true, and I want to obtain them, but I cannot. There is faith with hope but without charity if you say: I believe that the things to which you call me are true, and I can attain them if I wish, but I do not want to. There is charity without hope and faith if someone says that he wants intensely to live for ever without the enticements of his body, but neither believes that there is eternal life nor, if there is, that he can attain it. There is charity with faith but without hope if someone says both that he desires eternal life and that he believes it exists, but denies that he can attain it. But how there could be hope without faith I do not find. For no one hopes that he can attain what he does not believe exists. So all three must be present in the mind, faith, hope and charity: so that it both believes that the things to which it is called are true, and hopes that it can attain them, and loves them wholly. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.10] SAYING IX. — That philosophy is divided into three parts. Philosophy is divided into three parts: moral, natural, rational. Moral [philosophy is divided] into two, knowledge and administration. Knowledge into two, exhortation and the treatment of goods and evils. Administration into two, duty and end: duty, what we ought to do; end, that to which we refer everything we do rightly, while it itself is referred to nothing else. Natural [philosophy] is divided into two parts, corporeal and incorporeal [things]. The division of corporeal things is fivefold: into the cause, which makes something; the matter, from which it makes; the motion, through which it makes; the causation, why it makes; the effect, what it makes. That of incorporeal things is fourfold: into place, for place is not a body but the space occupied by a body; into time; into extremities, for the extremities of bodies are not bodies, since they have no thickness; into sayables, for the sayables which we conceive in the mind in order to express them in words are not bodies. Indeed they are called sayables only if they have been impressed on the mind from things by words. Rational [philosophy] is divided into three parts: the directing part, which lies in the perception of the senses, or is said to be so; the defining part, by which we define whatever a thing is; the discursive part, by which we reason and draw an argument to its conclusion. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.11] SAYING X. — In what state Adam was before he sinned. Before Adam sinned, he was a rational soul, perfect and blessed, having a body not such as we now have, fragile and mortal, but such as befitted such a soul, which had not yet corrupted the likeness of God in itself by a perverse will; such as we too shall have after the resurrection, when the same soul has received the same likeness of God in perfect holiness. But after he sinned, he became a rational soul corrupted by desire, having a body such as we now see in ourselves. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.12] SAYING XI. — On the fall of the one who sins. We are inquiring into the fall of the one who sins, a fall coming from free choice, which no want and no desire was pressing upon. I seem, however, to suspect that it came about from the quality of [his] matter. But there comes to mind the work of God, the perfection of God, by whom he was found worthy to be made such and so great; and this confounds all our reasonings, lest [we suppose] that God, by a better plan, despairing of that matter, gave free choice for this reason: that if sin crept in, he would rightly be free of blame. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.13] SAYING XII. — Care must be taken not to think anything truer than that everything that is, is from that which is through itself. And what [is] supremely is with it and from it; but what is not supremely receives from him who supremely is, out of nothing, that it should be. In this nature, then, nothing can rightly be attributed to God except what it has of being in itself, that is, all its good. But what pertains to sins and death undoubtedly tends towards non-being: wherever this comes from, it certainly is not from that which supremely is, nor from that which exists in some mode. Therefore this is not from God, nor from any work of God. It will therefore be from that which is contrary to that which supremely is. So what you ask, whence it is, has no whence. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.14] SAYING XIII. — What a human being has in common [with other things]. First, living things that are mortal, without sense, without reason, such as trees and the rest, with which a human being has in common growing, generating, being nourished, dying. Second, those mortal, without reason, with sense, such as cattle, with which he has in common growing, generating, being nourished, dying, sensing, desiring, fleeing. Third, those with sense, with reason, mortal, such as human beings. Fourth, those immortal, with sense, with reason, such as the angels, with which he has in common hearing, sensing, understanding. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.15] SAYING XIV. — What will is. Will is a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling it, towards either not losing or obtaining something. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.16] SAYING XV. — Three kinds of virtues. First, the civic [virtues] of statesmen; [second,] the purgative, by which the soul is stripped of vices; [third,] the exemplary, which are now imprinted by God on the contemplating mind, where it lives wholly, where it always lives wholly, where it always lives wholly in blessedness. Intelligibles: things that are understood. God is called intelligible because he is understood; intellect, because he understands through himself. The soul [is called] intelligible because it is understood, intellectual because it too itself understands. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.17] SAYING XVI. — On the beauty of the world. Now, if you please, with fair ears and a pure mind receive the first works of God, which you deny are good; and you cry out that all these things ought not to have been made, because not all things were made supreme, as God is supreme. The first elements of the good world of the Good are four. Fire is light, sharp, and is that which moves above. Opposite to it, the earth is heavy, blunt and sluggish. So these three [qualities] are hostile to the three highest, by right; the two that come in the middle, air and water, bind them to the extremes, again as friendly [to them] as they are to each other. Air joins lightness and mobility with fire; below, water joins blunt weight to the earth; blunt and mobile is the bond by which air and water cling together. But that air above is blunt, it owes to the earth; that water flows mobile to the lowest place, it owes to the flames. The middle ones take two [qualities] each from their neighbours, and from those placed far off each has taken one for itself. So with varied elements this world is squared; so there is discordant concord, so distant things are joined. Thus these are duly tempered in all their motions, so that from unequal numbers there is equal beauty. What each element bears, and what fitting things it begets, I shall tell in measures as I can; listen kindly, so that, when you have seen there too the firm treaties of the world under the law of truth, you may believe these things were made in careful order. In these four elements, air, water, fire, earth, certain living things are created, fitted to their own seat, and having different uses and suitable motions. The walking and the fixed, the double kind we see, are the living things of the last two elements. Come now, look down at the lowest things of the earth, and compare lowest with highest: every tree clings fixed by its roots to the earth, as the fixed stars wheel aloft, firm in the high heaven. Here everything that creeps on the earth leaves tracks; [...] the stars [...]. That which swims in the waves and flies, with motion surrounding the airs, seeking up and down in turn, is the middle [creature], nicely balancing the middle this way and that with effort. Note also another thing, fitting in turn to these twice four: that there is a double contrariety in quality within the elements; I shall teach in few words, for these are not small matters. Thus the first stands to the third as the fourth stands to the second: I want you to discern the contraries in these, and those of each one. Fire, which holds the heights, is hot and dry; water, the third, creeps very cold and wet. Between both comes air, placed between and mixed from both, contrary to the fourth, second to the last, partly equal to both, and wholly unequal. For it melts with the moisture of waters, it seethes with the heat of fire. Earth takes stiffness from the waters, and becomes dry from the sky. So the whole year, bound to itself in four varied turns through the moving seasons, is tempered. Rainy winter wets with waters, and binds water tight with cold. Dry and fiery summer ripens and scorches all things. Spring takes for itself a pleasant temperateness from both of these: it holds a breeze warm with fire and water, softly flowing. Autumn is numb with cold and gapes with dryness. So our bodies are joined from these four. These also temper the space of night and the hours of the days: on one side is the middle of day, a time that burns with fire and is dry; on the other the middle of night, a time stiff and wet with waters. The last parts of night are wet; the first light is already warm. From this side and that the morning is pleasantly tempered for you. The last parts of day are dry; the first shadow grows cold: from both take the law, and [see] the evening tempered. And so many such things, envious one: the shining stars of heaven, heaven and the shape of heaven and its everlasting motions, the whole weight of earth, which is one, fixed in the middle; the grey-green ocean sea, and the rivers, girdles of the kindly world; the clear airs, now cloudy, then soon serene; so many bodies of flying things, painted, pleasing, charming; add the varied grace and brilliance of so many swimming things, the many-formed beauty adorned with so many earth-born things: and, envious one, cry out that you do not want so many such things to be. The swift with the slow, and the wheel running its fixed course with what wanders this way and that; the abiding with the standing; the sparse with the dense, the great with the small; the flaming with the dark, the black with the bright; the perishing with the born, the born with those to be born; the middle with the extremes, these with the middle, and the lowest with the highest: they agree by a law from above, by the law, I say, of truth; they make one song and sing together into one; everything whatsoever seeks one certain thing: it seeks to be. And, envious one, if you dare, cry out that you do not want so many such things to be. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.18] SAYING XVII. — That the experience of evil is a clearer knowledge of good. Likewise, that good things would not be sweet if [people] did not suffer adversity. Likewise, the good which [one] loved less while obeying, [one] loves more ardently by comparing. He will not be great who thinks it a great thing if wood and stones fall and mortals die. But if a craftsman makes from such material something that is better than it, has he not fashioned something better than himself? In no way: for the material cannot be better than the art, nor even equal to it. For the material is thus subject to the craftsman; if it is subject, it must be inferior. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.19] SAYING XVIII. — What it means that the prophet says the Lord disposed all things in measure and number and weight. On the Son. On the one always born. On the Only-begotten. On the Word. Measure can be understood as one, for numbers are measured by it; so that the Father can be understood as measure, and number as the Son himself, [and] weight as the Holy Spirit, for he is love. For he who loves is said [...]. He hangs on love; and whoever hangs is going to come to something. For number will be from measure, and from there order itself follows. From weight (pondus) comes 'he hangs' (pendet). Striving belongs to order. For order can also be taken as weight: weight can be a striving towards a place; striving, or the desire of one striving towards a place, presents itself: weight therefore belongs to order. That this light of the sun is a substance, not a quality, is evident. For a quality is something existing in a body, and where the body is, there the quality is. The body of the sun is in the sky, therefore the quality is there. For a quality is like shape, like colour, like hardness, like softness. But this light stretches all the way to the earth, and [it is] evident that [it is] a body, for it passes from place to place. And these are two in one, the light of the sun and the earth. For a quality moves with that of which it is the quality. Therefore the substances of the light of the sun and of the air, having their own natures, remaining in each other without any constraint or without the expulsion of the other, are so mingled with one another that the one does not change the other: and they are bodies. Now you refer to incorporeal things that are coeval, as light and fire; equal, as man from man: better coeval than not coeval; better equal than not equal. In that nature of the divinity, therefore, [they are] both coeval and coequal. 'With you is the beginning in the day of your power, in the splendours of the saints; from the womb before the morning star I begot you' (Ps. 109:3). The highest good is not unfruitful and sterile. But what is begotten of it is equal to it, in this above all, that it is one from one. And this is the highest measure of generation, [generation] of one, whence 'only-begotten', so that it may be more surely shown to be equal. Measure [is] the limit of each thing. But lest it seem to anyone that the Son too ought to have begotten: if it were so, there would be no limit to begetting. But what is measured is better than what is unmeasured: because of equality, what is measured is more a limit. Two things can be unlimited, even these bodies, such as air and light, which extend through places and do not constrain each other. If, then, [it is so] in bodily things, how much more in spiritual ones? In the Lord nothing ought to be changeable. If he begot in time, he is changeable: a quality is in a changeable substance. In the Wisdom of Solomon: 'All wisdom is from the Lord God, and has been with him always, and is before the ages' (Ecclus. 1:1). Likewise in Solomon: 'For she is a vapour of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of almighty God' (Wisd. 7:25). Again: 'The fountain of wisdom is the word of God on high' (Ecclus. 1:5). Reason going forth is rightly called word. Voice is something; silence is nothing. If the One were alone, it would be in itself, sterile, and would provide nothing; but because it is kind, going forth to make something, it went forth into another, itself. This is the generation of the Only One: for there is he who makes, and there is he through whom he makes, and the two have brought [it] about. For one precedes two; and of these two there is a certain order, and they become three, which is called the Trinity. He who is taken to be the Father is called the hinge of all things. For although the hinge is immovable, yet the motion, which is the Son himself understood, is said to be one, which all the worthy enjoy, but not all in one way. For the man taken up by divine Wisdom, the more divinely he is taken up, the more divinely he understands. For although the body is one, yet not all the members have the same health. The health of the eye is spoken of in one way, of the head in another, of the rest of the body in another. For a man escaping from sin strives to understand; but that [man] was taken up by the same Intellect. But a hand will never be a foot, or a foot an eye: so too a man will never be what he is who was taken up by the Wisdom of God. God is said to be bounded outwardly as far as the soul, inwardly as far as himself: for he contains all things in himself. But the soul is bounded as far as the body, and as far as God. The body too is bounded outwardly as far as nothing, but inwardly it is unbounded: for in dividing [it] is never brought to a limit. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.20] SAYING XIX. — On ideas. Every passage from place to place happens along a line; since every surface is joined to itself by a line, and every body is joined to itself by a line, which line is certainly not a body: so too every passage in the soul, that is, the change or affection by which it is now foolish, now wise, happens through certain lines, as it were, that is, through certain intermediate passages, just as it was itself made from nothing. A man, if he knows the truth, is almost God; God, if he does not know the truth, is not almost but quite a stone. But the mind of man ought to be carried by the best possible motion. By what circuit, then, should it be moved? The best circuit of the mind is rational thought, which, setting out from what is sought, returns to the place more certain through a circle of successive arguments. And therefore likenesses too are suited to the intellect, because they are presented to the mind by that very motion which nature desires. For they as it were carry minds away from what is being discussed, and bring them back there again: but their carrying away works against sluggishness; their bringing back, against error. Hence it pleased the ancient wise men too to signify certain things by images in fables, so that when attention is carried to them and brought back to what they signify, the mind, even while it plays, may by its own motion be exercised in reasoning. Care must be taken that no one lies. Every soul is changed by affections: for it is changeable even in its duties. For God alone is unchangeable, and the angels: therefore they are always unchangeable, when they perform their duties. The worm born from death and taking death on with it: born from rottenness, consuming rottenness. All changeable things change even in a point of time, and especially bodies, which do not remain at all but are renewed through their ages without pause. For every thing has its ages, so that compared with a brief age every greater age is as it were an eternity: since even while still living [things] suffer certain deaths of those very ages, and the last death is in a certain way a greater death, so that the very growths of the ages suffer deaths. And when mountains collapse, and when islands collapse and are born, deaths as it were happen in the universe, so that there is a last death even for the world, which is called the conflagration. For there are three [things]: one always unchangeable, as God; [one] always changeable, as body; a certain middle one, as the soul, so that it can be changeable and can also be unchangeable. But after the change the body is not changed. That alone is true and pure freedom by which it comes about that wherever you are, it is well with you. But God alone is never absent from those for whom he alone is delight. But the merciful Father was making mortal bonds for them. The descent of the soul is such that, when it thinks it is seeking something that would benefit it, it is drawn to other things necessary for this thing: and so that which it wanted is entangled in many [things], and it says, 'Unwilling, I have outrun what I wanted'; but it returns through the grace of God. There are three kinds of virtues: first, the civic [virtues] of statesmen, etc. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.21] SAYING XX. — On evil. For the experience of evil is a clearer knowledge of good for those whose power is inward, so that through teaching they know evil before experience. Good things would not be sweet if [people] did not suffer adversity. Likewise, the good which [one] loved less while observing [it], [one] loves more ardently by comparing. He will not be great who thinks it a great thing if wood and stones fall and mortals die. [The question] whether God is before times according to time or according to excellence. For [he is] not before times according to time: otherwise he begins to precede times in time, and he who precedes them in time no longer precedes times. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.22] SAYING XXI. — On free will. But we, at God's command, do what we will, since we will what we are able [to do], that is, good things only. For evil things are within [our] power which ought not to be within [our] will. And this is both the greatest and the only [thing] in free will: to will most fully everything that you are able to do rightly. If you cannot do what you rightly will to do, see that you will to do what you rightly can. It is evident that one sinning against the Holy Spirit cannot have pardon, for he is punished. For when he is afflicted, in his very penitence he punishes the deed and pays the penalty. Therefore he is not forgiven, because he is punished. TRANSLATOR NOTES [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.head] Section 2: the claim that the Passover lamb is to be 'from sheep and goats' reads Exod. 12:5 ('ex agnis vel haedis') as requiring a hybrid. 'ocosus' read as 'occisus'. Section 3 is a passage of hexameter verse inserted without heading; given as one line. Section 6: heading 'metio' read as 'melior'; the sense of 'liberat dolorum egestate' is awkward and rendered literally. Scripture reference 'Matth. XXII, 57' corrected to 37; 'Eccle. I, i, 5' taken as Eccles. 1:2–3. 'sic intelligit, Quia ego sum Dominus' is obscure, possibly an allusion to Jer. 9:24. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.8] Line 8: 'melius aciem' read as 'melius autem'. Line 10: the names of the three parts of rational philosophy are uncertain; 'differentiam' is taken as 'disserentiam' (the discursive part), and the clause 'vel esse dicitur' is obscure. Line 11: 'incliore' read as 'meliore'; the sentence is difficult and the sense of 'ne ... dederit' uncertain. Line 15: 'Deus intelligibilis dicitur, quia intelligimur' read as 'quia intelligitur'. Line 16: the verse is badly transmitted in this edition. 'Sed hebes quod loquitur alte' read as 'quod ... alta' (air above); 'nimirum/iure' for 'iuras' uncertain; the line 'Globus est ut cuique iLa firmant gressum et astra sei tem' is too corrupt to translate and is marked [...]; 'ungulae' taken as 'cingula' (girdles); 'mododeosas' taken as 'modo nubilosas' (now cloudy); 'Fixa ut sublime' read as 'ut fixa sublime'. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.18] XVIII: 'Nam qui amat dicitor' appears corrupt or truncated; rendered as broken. 'made ipse ordo' read as 'inde'; 'sumanus modus lie generatione unni' read as 'summus modus de generatione unius'; 'Unum duo infinita' read as 'Item duo'; 'loris' read as 'foris'. The 'hinge' passage ('Cardo ... molum ... unus esse dicitur, quem omnes digni fruuntur') is syntactically defective and the rendering is tentative. 'Et ista sunt duo in nita' read as 'in unita'/'in uno', uncertain. The Psalm reference 'Psal. cit, 3' is Ps. 109(110):3. XIX: 'omne latum' read as 'surface' (latum/latus), uncertain; 'Præveni nolens quod volebam' is obscure, rendered literally. In XVII 'obtemperando' versus XX 'observando' kept as each text gives it. [urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa070b.opp-lat1.22] Several scanning errors read silently (antem for autem, juhente for jubente, qn:c for quae, peccan. tem for peccantem, qula for quia); the stray 'a' after 'possis' is taken as a footnote mark. The closing argument about the sin against the Holy Spirit is compressed and its logic obscure: the sense seems to be that this sin is not remitted but expiated through penitential punishment.