Libanius Declamatio 16 An AI-generated translation of the whole work, checked against the original by a second AI only in samples. No specialist has reviewed it. Codex reviewed samples from the whole-work collection, not every work or line. This page does not claim that every passage here was checked. Source: Translated by Claude (claude-opus-5-5, Anthropic) from the library's tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1, from Open Greek and Latin's First1KGreek (CC BY-SA 4.0), one English line for each line of the original. The whole work is translated. It was chosen because no English translation of it could be found. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0, as its source requires: credit Open Greek and Latin's First1KGreek and this AI translation, and share adaptations under the same licence. Release: v1.3 [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.1.head] Aristophon, [speaking] on the opposing side. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.1.1] Men of Athens, many contests have been held for me before you, and in all of them I have won with justice on my side. So I have high hopes that today too, by the gods' help, I shall find the court just as before, and shall overcome the envy that troubles all who are well regarded, and me most of all, because I seem to have succeeded in the greatest things. It is envy that has driven this man Cephalus here as well. For he is not so simple as to think that he will win the prize as the best man among people who do not even know what country he comes from. Out of spite at my honour he has set himself against me, the last [of my accusers], since he has no charge left, a malicious prosecutor of the prize itself. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.1.2] 2. Now in the earlier contests, men of Athens, each part of my life was examined, and everywhere I was judged a good man and was escorted from the courts with praise. Today, as I submit the whole of it to examination, I ask you to keep to your own verdict, which you have often cast for me as a good and honourable man, and not to inflict on me, after victory, a penalty such as I would not suffer even if convicted: to be judged worse than a man who has never even been tried over how he lives and has conducted himself in public life. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.1.3] 3. That no one untried and unexamined could win any honour, Cephalus himself bears witness by his action: at any rate he has come to have himself judged. And it is remarkable how in a court he disparages the contests held in the courts, and how he now asks for your verdict as the only confirmation of excellence, while, having never obtained a single one, he competes against a man who holds many. I do not blame Cephalus for opposing me; indeed I am almost grateful to him, because he has made it possible for me to receive even the prize not without trial nor as if by chance, but this too through a contest. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.4.1] You have heard this man praising himself vulgarly, something that would make anyone who really has some worth blush even if another said it of him. But I shall not use myself as witness to my own excellence, for the laws do not allow a man to bear witness for himself; I shall use all of you and the other Athenians, of whom there is no one who has not voted that I am a good citizen. And he has not a single witness present, not even an unsworn one, while I have had many sworn jurors, many times over. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.5.1] If, then, never having been tried is worthy of a prize, many private citizens too will lay claim to the honour, men whom the malicious prosecutors do not even know. But if, for those who have chosen their own safety, the freedom from danger that comes with staying out of affairs is a sufficient reward, and Cephalus claims to win the prize as an orator who has handled public affairs all his life (for you heard him boasting of this), then he himself, it seems, neither praises the life of inactivity nor chose it; and he fails to notice that, by as much as he shows himself more deserving than private citizens because he has touched, even slightly, the dangers of public life, by so much he ranks above himself the man who takes part in public life and has never stopped, but has [struggled] in the greatest contests. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.5.2] 6. So even by his account the judgement is not about inactivity but about public life. I suppose some are wondering why, though we both lead the same city, he has not to this day come into any danger, while against me now one accuser, now another has risen. How great the difference in our fortunes is, and what the reason for it is, I shall first make clear to you, so that you may not think him, I will not say better, but even luckier than me. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.5.3] 7. For I myself, men of Athens, would greatly have admired him, not for any excellence but for marvellous good fortune, if, doing the same things as I and holding to public life as intensely, he had met no accuser while I was tried many times. But as it is, neither has he escaped the malicious prosecutors in this way, by conducting public affairs cleanly and blamelessly, as he boasts (for they most of all like to prosecute the innocent and those against whom there is no charge whatever), nor do I draw many opponents on myself by coming near unjust suspicion, as he slandered me. How could that be? For then I would not have been shown in every contest to be clear of all disgrace. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.8.1] What, then, is so great a difference? The road as far as the speaker's platform we have both travelled in common, but the road through affairs each has turned along differently. Cephalus performs public life as a mere formality, to the point of seeming to be an orator. If some great matter arises, whose outcome is unpredictable, where the orator must become guarantor of fortune, and the future is unclear, in the face of these things he sits before you voiceless, as not even one of the private citizens would. But when business is done about sacred matters, and about repairing the roads and whitewashing the battlements, the incidental and small things, he is the first orator to answer the herald. For he seeks speeches, not those that will procure something splendid and great for the public, but those that are without danger to himself. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.9.1] There is a debate about war: no one has readily heard him say that we must go to war; instead he praised our ancestors, counted up the trophies, and stepped down again. And he says much to please, distributions of the festival fund and that sort of thing. He conducts public life holding the pleasure of his listeners as a pledge of his safety. As a result he himself is immortal, so far as safety at your hands goes, while the people have reaped no power, no honour, no glory. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.10.1] And not only does he court the people in this way, but he also keeps flattering the orators themselves; and if some think one thing and others the opposite, he contradicts neither side clearly, but, sitting on the fence, places himself in between and remains a friend to both. He does not bring his proposals written on a tablet from home, as each of us does, but floats talk well in advance, and if no one objects, he has moved [the proposal]; but if someone pushes back even slightly and he foresees an indictment, he throws away the decree and runs off. Some people steal public funds: if [the thief] is an orator able to counter-accuse, he does not see it; but against private citizens, and those by whom there is no fear of being prosecuted, he is formidable. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.10.2] 11. That this man is free of charges and still remains so, you have learned. But I think each person ought to choose one way of life from the start. For example: you are timid and look after your own interests; then simply stay quiet. You cannot bear to be idle or to contribute nothing to the city, and you do not want to live obscurely, buried in darkness; then endure the hazards of public life too, and do not flee the dangers, or else do not pursue the honours either. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.12.1] Having laid down these rules for myself as well (for I considered that I was born not for my parents only, but first of all for my country), I do not take part in public life by halves, judging what should and should not be said by my own safety; I gave myself wholly to public affairs and use an open frankness for what is needed, reckoning no danger to myself: not whether someone prevented from pilfering public funds will one day bear me a grudge and indict me, nor whether someone taking bribes and then convicted will accuse me in return, nor whether, by proposing expeditions and naval missions, I shall then distress the rich who pay the war tax and serve as trierarchs, and the many who go on campaign, nor whether I shall oppose the desires of the whole people (for this too is the duty of an adviser). Instead I have won for the city money, glory, leadership, and for myself accusers, from the day I mounted the platform, having chosen the policy concerned with Greek affairs, making myself accountable to the outcome of war, to fortune, to the moment, to anyone who wished. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.13.1] For this reason they fabricate charges against me, some taking revenge for what I spoke against, others vexed at the honours I hold from you. And I do not blame the malicious prosecutors, for envy grows along with all who are great. Whatever a man does, he will not escape those who want no one to seem better than themselves. Their bringing of indictments out of ill will I rightly hate, but for the outcome I am almost grateful to them, because they have not left my excellence unproven, or disputable, or open to be taken one way by one man and another way by another; applying every test, they have shown it faultless, the opposite of what they sought, being unable to convict me either in public matters or in private, but defeated in everything by the truth. And neither the cleverness of an orator nor the boldness of a prosecutor, no lying of a witness, no fear of the juror, no fabricated rumours proved stronger than my public conduct, and I have been judged in every case always to have lived well. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.14.1] So I have been acknowledged, by the clear verdicts of all the courts, to be a good citizen, while Cephalus cannot produce a single judgement about himself. And this too amazes me: there will not be two trials on the same matters, yet about me, after more trials than anyone could tell, you still need argument. By law you forbade retrying cases except those [...]; what has been decided about me so many times, will you not confirm? And, most absurd of all, will you judge a man you do not know to be better than me, whose character you have clearly learned always and in every pursuit? For what vote was ever cast for this man? He could not say, he who, trusting in an untested reputation, comes to this court for the first time, and now offers no examination of the life he has lived, but takes courage from this alone, that he has not been tried. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.15.1] And how could that seem a judgement of excellence which is no sort of judgement at all? You heard nothing else from him in the whole speech beyond the splendid boast: 'I have never been tried, I have never been examined. I have lived free of charges. You do not know me.' But I [would expect] the opposite words from one who claims to deserve honour: 'I have always been scrutinised before you. You have made every test of me. Nothing of mine is hidden or secret. I have won in all the courts. Those who judged, those who testified, those who stood by me when I was on trial, know my excellence.' This was the part of a man who trusts his conscience: [to face] those who would accuse him, not to run away into obscurity. For once tried, a man who is not honest cannot escape notice, but many wrongdoers too have happened never to be tried. And whether you would have been acquitted if tried is unclear, while I have been shown by test to be clean of what I was charged with. And I [stand] in full light, but your affairs are dark, unwitnessed, whatever you yourself wish to say they are, things to which no proof applies. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.16.1] So when he puts himself before me, he puts nothing else but these before those: unverified opinion before examined truth, inexperience before experience, ignorance before knowledge, unawareness before acquaintance. For my affairs you know, but his you guess at. It belongs to seers to conjecture what is hidden, but to jurors to cast their vote from what they know. It would be like preferring an untested decree to a ratified one, and an invalid law to one enacted by vote, if you prefer an unknown life to one that has been scrutinised. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.17.1] And now, as though by law you must scrutinise them, you demand the lives of us both, and will you prefer the man never tried to the man tried many times? And how could it be right to cast a single vote against so many, and for him to prevail now, if (may it not happen) he persuades you and wins, while my countless victories are no use to me? If I were on trial in another city and produced the verdicts in which I was judged decent (for so perhaps it is least invidious to say it), would I not win wherever the trial was held? Others, then, following you, would vote the man praised by you better than one who never even came to examination, and will you distrust your own judgements? And if I had produced such and such a fellow demesman or tribesman as witness to my character, you would have judged by him, unless someone had charged him with false witness; yet when all the courts testify for me, in which you yourselves sat and judged, will you decide otherwise? For what tribunal did not plead for me? Not the Council of Five Hundred? Not the Areopagus? Not the Heliaea? Not any one could name? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.17.2] 18. And yet he says I was tried not for a prize but for punishment, and about not seeming wicked, not about seeming honest. But if I had contended before you outright for a prize like this, I would have been crowned at once by the first court, and no further examination would have been needed. As it is, even if I have not been shown good in each trial, but only not bad, taken together the verdicts are proofs of excellence. Why? Because when someone escapes one charge, it is not yet clear whether he is such in other things too. For example, the man honest with money might appear violent in other ways. The man moderate here and near the laws is perhaps wicked abroad. One man serves as envoy without taking bribes, but conducts his other public business for pay. One is honest in public affairs, but not the same in private. So acquittal on one charge is not sufficient warrant of complete excellence, since the same man may be thought not guilty of one wrong but guilty of another. But if a man has been tried through all his pursuits, and has been shown wicked neither in private matters nor in his public conduct, not at Athens, not abroad, not willingly, , not by design, convicted as culpable in no respect at all, he is best in everything. For blamelessness in part and in each case adds up to one sum of excellence. Nor is there any other goodness than being free of all vice. Whether among the gods there is some other, more perfect excellence, god knows; but for a human this alone is excellence: to have his life shown faultless in everything. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.17.3] 19. Look at it this way too, examining each point. Whom do you consider just? 'Whoever does no wrong,' you will say. And whom wise? The man ignorant of nothing he ought to know; and temperate, if someone is free of violence and licentiousness. And again, brave is the man who is not cowardly when there is occasion for daring. In a word, one can see all the human excellences turning back at the point of having kept away from their opposites. Wisdom is flight from folly, justice is guarding against an unjust way of life, courage is watchfulness against cowardice, and temperance is being stronger than pleasures. And he is good in everything who is bad in nothing. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.20.1] One could learn this plainly from the men who won the finest titles by their conduct. Why did they call Aristides just towards all men? Not because he spent money from his own house on the city, for he did not even have any, but because he touched none of the public funds; that sufficed him for a reputation for justice. Being ignorant of nothing necessary gave Themistocles his fame for intelligence. Miltiades was brave, for he did not fear the barbarians. Pericles was trustworthy, for he did not hold out his hand for gains. Solon was admired: because no law of his was proved bad, he was named the wisest lawgiver. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.21.1] Each of these, men of Athens, and if one named still more good men, was thought to have succeeded in what he did not do wrong. And rightly. For since mortal nature tends towards the worse, whoever has held himself back from inborn faults is perfect in that excellence which mortal capacity can hold. Nor is there a better way for a city to be inhabited than with no one doing wrong in it. This is the goal of nobility for each man, this is enough for the city's happiness. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.22.1] And it has been decided that I possess the better things by not having the worse: wisdom, as often as the best course was advised by me, the virtue of Themistocles in itself; justice, because I did not touch public property even with a fingertip, the very thing for which alone Aristides was honoured; temperance, as often as you acquitted me when charged with violence. Courage even Cephalus testifies to for me, often calling me a lover of danger, if indeed it belongs to a brave man to seek the public good instead of his own safety, again likewise the excellence of Miltiades. And no one convicted me of bribery any more than the incorruptible Pericles, nor proved a law of mine improperly introduced any more than Solon's. So the things which, one each, won those men an undying reputation for excellence, will they not all together give me testimony of having lived well? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.23.1] 'For you were not judged good.' But not bad. Do you not know that one would find that the other arts or skills too succeed from nowhere else than from making no mistake? That man is the best seer who does not speak falsely, and that archer accurate who does not miss the mark, and that helmsman best who does nothing outside his art. Is not the judgement of an orator the same? Law-abiding is he who is not [lawless] in his policies; and I have escaped every indictment for illegal proposals. Incorruptible is he who has not taken, as I was judged. And what is speaking the truth? Is it not speaking what is not false? When then was I convicted of deceiving? And, simply, I have been acquitted in all the shameful trials together and judged worthy of the noble and just things, unworthy of blame, worthy of praise and a prize. For it would be outrageous if, convicted once, I would have been deprived of my civic rights or my country or my life, but having won so many times I shall not be honoured even once. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.24.1] And the accusers you punished as malicious prosecutors: some of them you fined in addition, and others you even sent away stripped of civic rights. Yet if penalties have fallen on the defeated party in each trial, is the gain from them not to count for glory to the one who has won every trial? For it was not enough for them to fail to win; they were penalised besides. Nor is it enough for me to have escaped the ten [indictments], unless I also receive a reward that matches what I would have suffered if I had lost. For just as penalties belong to wrongdoing, so honours belong to things rightly done. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.25.1] But suppose you impose the extreme punishments on those judged to have conducted policy as they should not have, while to the man recognised as handling public affairs well you grant, by way of favour, only freedom from punishment, the prize Cephalus thinks I deserve. Then take care that you do not one day leave the speaker's platform empty of men willing to say what needs saying. Is the bare fact that a man does not unjustly lose his civic rights, or his life altogether, the reward for just political conduct? Not even close. For just as, had I been proved wicked, missing out on a prize would not have been enough by way of penalty, so for one shown to be good, escaping punishment is not enough. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.26.1] Now if this man had himself been tried on the question of his excellence, and had received the vote as a patriot, the most just of men and outstanding in temperance, and then disparaged my acquittals, reproaching them as mere escapes, he could reasonably claim to be better than one judged not wicked, since he would have been recognised as good. But I have submitted to audits of the life I have lived, and he has not submitted even to a slight one. So to me at least, if nothing else, it has been granted that I have done no wrong; but you have been recognised not merely not as good, but not even as not wicked. What, then, of these clever arguments of yours? Is a man not judged just because he is no thief, and law-abiding because he breaks no law? But you have not received even the vote declaring that you broke no law, nor been acquitted of having committed any other wrong. And if being judged not wicked falls short of being judged plainly good, how much more respectable is it than not even being thought good, compared with being found utterly bad? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.26.2] 27. He even reproached me with the number of charges against me. For it remained only for me to experience Cephalus too as my accuser. He is a worse malicious prosecutor than those who were defeated. For they brought charges that were not real, heaping together abusive names, which is the usual practice; but this man has misrepresented my claims to honour as failings. It is not indictments, Cephalus, that make wrongs exist. Rather, they bring real wrongs to light, and they confirm all the more that wrongs which did not happen did not happen, and they turn unjust slander back upon those who uttered it. For false reproaches become reproaches to those who spoke them, not to those who do no wrong, just as an arrow that strikes something stronger turns back towards the one who shot it, and has often wounded the very man who threw it. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.28.1] So being tried often is no reproach; rather, never once being convicted in so many contests is a ground for praise. And the names that are shameful before the trial, theft and bribery and the like, turn into words of good repute for the one shown liable to none of them. So it comes about that the accusers prove to be praisers, even against their will, of those whom they accused but could not convict. For they themselves showed to be good the men whom they wished to prove wicked. And those against whom no one could even lodge a charge of false witness, to them their enemies bear unwilling witness of excellence. In short, the law courts have been built for the wicked to be caught in them, and for the good to show themselves in them. For where vice is judged, there virtue is judged too, just as the same theatre judges bad music and good. The same judges sit over opposites, since knowing both belongs to one art; and the jurors, having a single expertise in good and bad lives, impose a penalty on those they suspect of being base, send on to honours those who win, and neither punish nor honour those who have not been examined. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.29.1] So too all the laws are resolved to leave no one unexamined. First, they bring all citizens to trial over their descent, even those whom no one has indicted for alien status, holding assemblies by demes and votes on who is a citizen and who has been illegally enrolled. And this scrutiny is undergone even by one of the Eupatrids, an Eteobutad, a Eumolpid, or a former general. So no one shares in the common citizenship without these votes; and shall a man carry off the greatest prize without a vote on whether he is a legitimate holder of the name of excellence, or whether he conducts his public life as a bastard and changeling in a reputation that belongs to others? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.30.1] Next, when they fill the magistracies by lot, on the ground that an equal hope for all is democratic, they do not leave the choice to the chance of the lot alone, but also seat a court and grant a vote on the man's fitness; and if he is unsuitable, his luck in the lot does him no good, and though chosen by lot he goes away a private citizen. So no one will put on the crown of myrtle without scrutiny or without a court's vote; and will you so readily give the crown of excellence to the unscrutinised man in preference to one who has been tried? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.31.1] Again, when they appoint the other officials whom we call elected, generals, cavalry commanders, taxiarchs, they choose them in the elections, as the Athenians chose Aristides; yet a court is filled for these too, to decide whether they were rightly elected. And for them campaigns, labours and dangers bring neither crown; even if they succeed, the honours come late. Where, then, you test by vote the generals, whom events themselves judge, will you elect the orator to the prize without examination? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.32.1] Nor indeed, even when those elected by the people have achieved the greatest things, do they obtain the prize before they have submitted to audit, since the law expressly forbids crowning one who is still liable to audit. You think that treasurers or wall-builders are officials, and that it is not permitted to crown them before they have rendered account; and will you not count us orators as holding the greatest office? First, you call private citizens by contrast to us, as to officials. Then, they serve for a year, we for life. They are called by you; we volunteer ourselves. They each have a different sphere, the general arms, the treasurer funds, the wall-builder the circuit of the walls; but there is nothing whose care is not entrusted to the popular leader. He himself is set over them: he examines the treasurers, he sends out the generals, he alone rules all the rulers. So will you refuse to crown, while unaudited, those who take charge for a set time and of particular parts, yet honour those who serve permanently? And will you leave uncrowned the man from whom you have received an audit at each step, yet give the honour to one who owes an audit for his whole life? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.32.2] 33. And yet if you have managed nothing worth mention, it is no wonder that you have given no accuser grounds for speech either; but then prizes for a life are not given for small things. If, however, as you claim, you have done many great things, how can you ask for a prize for them before rendering account of them? 'Yes, by Zeus, for Solon said nothing about the orators themselves.' And whom does he make so accountable, and wish to give account of their policies almost every single day? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.34.1] You have resolved to bring forward a proposal. 'Submit it first to the Five Hundred,' he says, 'for this is the first judgement.' You have persuaded the Council. 'Go to the people, for the second stage is the show of hands.' Even if you have the majority agreeing with you, you have not yet won: the decision can still be appealed to the court. So of the three bodies, Council, people and court, the court is agreed to be the most exacting. Naturally. The Council and the people cast their votes without an oath, but the court under oath and the most solemn curse. The former decide mostly by shouting, with open anger and favour; the latter cast their opinion in secret. Uproar prevails in the other gatherings; here the speeches are timed by the water-clock. And why mention the rest? Neither the Council nor the people may overturn a court's decision, but the court may overturn both together. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.35.1] Since the court so far surpasses the others in exactness, I have passed through all the bodies: I persuaded the Council no less than Cephalus did, the people ratified a great many of my decrees, and in the third bout, when indicted for illegal proposals over every one of my measures, I persuaded you, who have authority over everything. But his political career is incomplete in its most authoritative part. For the end of all examination is the vote of the court. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.36.1] But you even pride yourself on having come through safe for lack of accusers, not on the strength of a just case, and you fall as far short of me as a man against whom judgement went by default falls short of one who has won after a contested hearing. For he remains unpunished because no one appeared to accuse him, whereas I also refuted the malicious prosecutors who did appear. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.37.1] And the law which he himself has just cited orders the greater number of votes to win; yet he, who has received not a single vote, contends against one who has received them all, and almost more than the number of those who live in the city, since the same men voted on me twice and three times. Now if I had won with some votes and lost with others in equal measure, I would perhaps be a fair match for one neither defeated nor victorious, since I would have shared in fortune both ways, set against one who had tried neither. As it is, never to have been defeated is mine, while he has not once had what I have had many times, a victory. For he says he has not even been charged. One could see this has happened to many private citizens too. Some of those who live out in the demes, for instance, have never even seen the court, and they do not come down from their farms to ask a reward for their hidden life. But who, having faced even a few indictments, has been acquitted on all of them, without in turn winning some and losing others? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.37.2] 38. If, then, he says that prizes belong to outstanding things, which are not shared with others, his staying out of affairs is the lot of most men, and of almost everyone, while my distinction belongs, so far as I know, to no one but me. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.39.1] Moreover, the thing he boasts of, being free from charges, belongs to me more than to him. For a man who has escaped the charges is put back on an equal footing with one never accused at all. And that man is purely free of charge who has been released from the charges by the court; but one never accused might be called untried, not free of charge, nor free of audit, but liable to audit throughout his whole life. Since, then, as to what he glories in, seeming to be beyond all charge, it is uncertain in his case whether some charge does lie beneath but has not met with an accuser, while for me it has been confirmed by many trials; and since having been tried and acquitted cannot be said of him even once, but of me many times, it is right that the man who has both, not the one who has only one of the two, should prevail. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.40.1] And which would you rather pray for: to be put on trial every day, or to be safe from lawsuits? Escaping the notice of malicious prosecutors is good fortune, leading not to glory or any claim to honour, far from it, but to ease and freedom from fear; prizes, though, belong to lives of toil, not of comfort, and are a consolation for dangers and fear to those who come through them. So too with the dangers of war: before they come, anyone would pray to avert them, but once they have come, those who succeed are honoured; and most things are to be shunned before one tries them because the outcome is uncertain, but are envied once one has achieved the end. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.41.1] So too no one would be willing to undergo trials before you, not knowing whether he would be acquitted; but if one of the gods guaranteed victory, who would not pray to show himself a good man? Unless someone is conscious of such deeds in himself that he thinks his only safety lies in not being tried; for it is good for wrongdoers to remain unexposed, but a misfortune for good men to go unnoticed, and the latter take confidence from a clear conscience and from proofs, while criminals take it from going unnoticed. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.41.2] 42. As for his malicious suggestion that the jurors were deceived by me, he was not accusing me but slandering you: if he says you were deceived unwillingly, as fools; if willingly, granting an unjust favour, as perjurers. You have heard him say nothing that is not simply of the worst sort. And then, though among all other men you have long been trusted as the best at judging and making laws, Cephalus convicts of madness the courts in which no prosecutor who lost and no defendant who was convicted has ever found fault with the verdicts. Those who could not convict me keep silent, but this man is indignant over cases in which others indicted me and lost. And, it seems, the gods when defeated at once accepted the votes, but to Cephalus alone you seem not to judge rights precisely, and if you do not grant the prize from the court, he says you judge badly. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.43.1] Now if I had escaped the charges once or twice, someone might have suspected that I had wheedled, that I had cheated, that I had captured the jurors with pity; but if, wherever I have been tried, I win everywhere and every time, the verdict on my virtue is pure. Deceit and craft are strong for a single occasion and at one moment, but time detects the truth. Not even the most foolish of all men, let alone Athenians, could be deceived twice over the same man; and they came at me even more contentiously because I had already won many times, the accusers trying to fight back and saying, 'Will this man alone always escape us?', and the jurors drawn up against my speeches, saying, 'How long shall we let this man off?' Yet they found not even the shadow of a charge against me. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.44.1] Very easy to handle and deceive, the Athenians, of course! You did not spare Miltiades, the man who won the battle at Marathon and freed you from slavery to the Medes. You bound those hands which he stretched out as he gave his orders, and the feet that had run for the Athenians, and he died in his chains before he obtained release. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.45.1] And Themistocles fled to Persia by the road along which he had driven out the King. He deceived the Spartans, clever as they were, and led all men astray with ease; but against the court no work of his intelligence availed him. No pardon was granted to Pericles after Euboea, to Phormio after Naupactus, to Paches after Lesbos, to the ten after Arginusae, whom you condemned to death in a single day. Socrates did not lead the jurors astray by his speech, nor Thrasybulus, who restored the democracy and the courts, nor, most recently, Callistratus, who surpassed the orators in eloquence and whom you sent into exile, speeches and all. Cephalus too mentioned some of these, as if he were not making a solemn speech on my behalf. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.46.1] Then, with the best men of their several times, if they did err, you let your anger at the new charges become, through a change of heart, stronger than the memory of their earlier successes, and you did not save them, though they spoke of sea battles and land battles and pointed to trophies, and that when you had had each of them under your vote only once; naturally, for you do not think that those you praise should offer a half-finished virtue, or use a reputation for justice as licence for injustice. Yet you would have done me the favour in so many indictments? What persuasion or new Siren did I alone discover, with which I enchanted you as jurors, who are always awake, foresee what is going to be said, and put to the account of the accusation much that was never said, when I am neither more intelligent than Themistocles, nor more persuasive than Pericles, nor wiser than Socrates, nor more eloquent than Callistratus, all of whom you overcame? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.47.1] Before such jurors, who suspect everything, I was seen to be beyond suspicion. Do not make trial of them, for you would not escape. 'The Athenians are merciful.' I say so too. When? And toward whom? If ever a city needs an alliance, if a foreigner supplicates, toward them they regard Pity as a god. But if someone accuses one of the citizens, saying, 'Cephalus is the cause of our troubles,' or 'Aristophon,' or whoever of those at hand he may name, they are angry and harsh; whereas if someone from outside supplicates, even an Oedipus, even an Orestes, they pity and save him, not without reason, I think, since you do not expect foreigners, who are neither nobly born nor educated in the best constitution, to be free of error; but if someone who is an Athenian does not surpass all in virtue, you condemn those who are not the best as the worst, whenever you get them here, demanding each man's character according to the common standing of the city, not according to his own; and especially if someone has thought himself fit to lead the Athenians, as I have, you look for a great superiority in excellence from him. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.48.1] Before now, too, when someone has pleaded and called in his weeping children, none of which I do, you have pitied him for once; and, though not provoked at the first vote, you relented in the assessment of the penalty and came down from your anger. But for me there is no time when you lightened the measure of the penalty afterwards; rather, you acquitted me altogether. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.48.2] Nor, then, is it easy to lead a trial on public conduct astray; rather, it is not even possible. The wrongs of private persons, which lie in darkness, you guess at from probabilities, but the political acts of popular leaders could not escape the notice of the same men who sit in the Assembly and on juries. For instance, if the case being tried is an indictment for illegal proposals, the laws have been read out alongside. Whether the wording of the decree contains some conflict [with them], you have learned. If it is the management of money, the judgement is done on the fingers. What loophole is there, then, in this? No one hinted to the accusers that they should drop their cases, or to the witnesses that they should give false testimony, or to the jurors that they should take bribes. I would not be able to buy so many, not even if I possessed the King's wealth, nor would I have escaped notice doing such a wicked thing, I who am put on trial even over things in which I do no wrong. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.50.1] And you too bear witness for me. For if I had been preparing false testimony or corrupting jurors, there are laws about all these things, and death is the penalty; yet you have never indicted any such thing, nor anything else of mine. So I have not even been tried as far as you are concerned. But if one must also suspect what is hidden, someone would sooner accuse you, of creeping up to those who are going to accuse you (and they are not all, nor even very many, who are deterred because they fear the risks, but only those who know of the misdeeds) and persuading those who threaten you in private to drop [the matter]. And it is in every way easier to arrange not to be tried than to secure acquittal once tried; for [jurors] are clever at suspecting arguments made by agreement, and even if the prosecutor's case is deficient, the jurors themselves would take up the accuser's post. And as for not even coming into court, if I had made [the accusers] my friends, I would not have been bargaining for that with the outcome of being tried still uncertain. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.50.2] Well, the clever man thinks he has found something when he asks whether I take you to be malicious and harsh, or foolish and careless, and he leads on to an argument of this sort: 'If they are easily led astray and simple-minded, it is no wonder if you won among such men; but if they are difficult and quick to anger, I was not accused even by such men,' he says. But I will suppose neither of these things about you, for I would be mad; I will tell you how the truth stands. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.52.1] That you are caught in your own sophism is quite plain to everyone, and if I too put a question to you in return, I will be right to ask: do the Athenians seem to you to overlook wrongdoers or to expose them? If to overlook them, that, then, is why they did not indict you; but if to detect them precisely, then I too was acquitted among such men. Well, I will let these points go, since the counter-argument cuts equally both ways, but I will state what admits of no dispute whatever. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.53.1] If we had both been tried before the same jurors, and you had been acquitted while I was convicted, you would reasonably set it out that you had escaped harsh men and that I had been condemned among men quick to anger; but if I have been praised and you have not been tried, then neither is the strictness of the courts sufficient evidence of virtue for you, since you were never examined before them at all, and for me it is a sign of good character that I escaped even these men. For a man who has not even been tried not even the harshest would vote to condemn, but a wrongdoer who is proven [guilty] even the mildest would. So it is no great thing not to be condemned when not accused; but it is great, when facing every charge, to be seen to be within the reach of none. And indeed this is how it is: it is easy for even a wrongdoer to escape notice in so great a city, even if they keep very strict watch, since each man's character is hidden in the size of the community, as pirates are on the great seas — for this is not Cythnos or Siphnos, where through lack of people they know one another; but the man who has once come to trial could not be acquitted unless he clearly showed that he does no wrong. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.53.2] He also declared that those who are often sick and under treatment are worse off than those who are free of illness. Who does not say so? But your example is not to the point. Why? Because if trials were sicknesses of the soul, the man not tried would be healthier than the one acquitted; but the vices of men are the sicknesses, and the courts, as even you say, are their places of healing. If they had seen some wickedness in me, they would certainly have healed it by disenfranchisement or exile, as if by cautery or the knife; but if they sent me away just as I came in, as sound and needing no such medicine, then I was shown by trial to be healthy to the doctors. You, however, have never stripped your life before the jurors nor shown your soul naked, but by covering and wrapping yourself up, like those who suffer from hidden diseases, you are perhaps festering beneath and escaping notice. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.55.1] Nor is it only bodily fitness that, when tested, is better than the untested; the same reasoning holds for everything: nothing that has not been examined is more valued than what has been proved not at random. Not even among the barbarians is untested gold more valued than gold assayed by fire; but gold is tested in fire, and a man's character in a court of law. This is the touchstone for each man, and especially for an orator. From it I have always come out unalloyed, whereas you have not even been proved; nor is a coin legal tender which [the examiners] have not often turned over, just as my life, turned up and down and counted along with the votes, rings pure everywhere; but as for yours, no one could even affirm whether it is part-copper or counterfeit. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.56.1] Let me proceed, if you like, to greater examples too. This is the strength of a wall as well: not one that no enemy has approached, but one that has beaten back many assaults of both soldiers and siege engines, just as my life stands upright though those who undermine it with slanders and malice attack from every side. And a ship's seaworthiness is not shown in a calm. You, then, untried by political danger, have turned out unfit to sail, whereas I have endured many wars and dangers from malicious prosecutors and borne orators blowing against me. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.57.1] And how are animals tested? Who buys a horse without driving it over many courses, not only on smooth ground fit for riding but also on hard ground, uphill and downhill? For this is how horses are judged. And as for young colts, you lead them into the crowded marketplace and into the midst of the din to test whether they are skittish. Cephalus was never led into the marketplace for a trial of his life, nor did he hear the din of a court; but I, having run many courses on my own account, won them all. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.58.1] But if he prefers an untested crown to one that has been sifted, would he also have set up a bronze statue of a general who never put on a breastplate and never even saw the enemy? Then is Miltiades worth nothing because of his battles, or Themistocles, who staked Athens and handed over the decision of the war to an unpredictable element, or Thrasybulus, who seized Phyle with the first forty? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.59.1] I too have set up trophies over the malicious prosecutors in all the courts. Pelted from many sides with charges, I was seen to be truly invulnerable, more so than Ajax, to whom you compared yourself, or Achilles, or Caeneus, or any other nature said to have been proof against wounds. For I have campaigned against the malicious prosecutor and against envy that goes through everything, conquering all. You are proud that you have not been wounded; for what malicious prosecutor ever launched a charge at you? Come, bring into the Prytaneum athletes too who never stripped for the stadium — and who will put up with it? What Glaucus of Carystus, or Polydamas of Scotussa, who bought their crowns with much toil and sweat and stand [there] in bronze? For one must not compare a contestant in public life to a private man, or a spectator to an athlete. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.60.1] The courts are the stadiums of my virtue, and you are the Hellanodicae of these Olympic games; for these athletes too have judges sitting over them. The crown belongs to the victor, not to one who has never competed. The law summons me to the Prytaneum more justly than those who have won an Olympic or Pythian victory. For they contribute to their country only in glory, but my proclamations are good decrees and beneficial laws, sources of revenue, naval expeditions, victories. How many crowns this city has won from my policies! Such-and-such people saved, such-and-such people freed, through my rashness, as Cephalus thinks. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.61.1] It is not the cowardly and trembling, who truly live a hare's life, who set up trophies or keep public affairs upright or receive prizes, and that in Athens. For if I were advising the Phliasians or the Megarians, I would myself venture nothing great and would expect the citizens to measure their resolve by their fortune; but when someone deemed worthy to lead the Athenians mounts the same platform from which Miltiades urged the march out, and Themistocles proposed that they sail with their whole households, and Cimon led [them] on as far as Pamphylia, and Pericles gave Attica up to the Peloponnesians — will the successor of such great orators not inherit their spirit along with the platform? [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.62.1] But what will he do? Will he, as Cephalus [would have it], be wary of the envious and fear the shadows of accusations? Will he imitate your unmanly conduct of public life? Not I. I always conduct public life in contention for first place. For glory and leadership I shrink from no danger. That is why I am always on trial: for I do not look for what, once said, will not incur an accusation, but for what will enlarge the whole city and make the people envied among the Greeks, and me among you, judging what should and should not be said not with regard to myself, but with regard to the common dignity of the Athenians. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.63.1] This must be the measure of policies; and in the same way that actors in plays fit themselves to their masks, and someone suddenly becomes a general or a tyrant, so too the popular leader must wear the mask of the people in order to use its voice. What sort, then, is the people whose speeches we have been taught? Not cautious, not timid, not taking in hand [only] those things from which no danger will arise. For if the people had conducted itself among the Greeks as you do among these men, it would be no more distinguished than the Megarians, and even now it would be shut out from the sea by the Aeginetans. As it is, by taking risks and taking on wars overseas, though not winning every time, it gained first place through its dangers. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.64.1] All land and sea are the people's courts, in which it went to trial against the king of the Persians over Greece, and later over Asia as well, and against the Spartans and, finally, the Thebans over leadership. What opponents did it not draw upon itself, wary of no unreasonable accusation? Indeed, like me, it has often been tried at Sparta, with the Corinthians as accusers. Again, before all the Greeks, with the Thebans bringing malicious charges, a vote was cast concerning the city of the Athenians, as concerning me, and, having escaped the charges, it carried off the honours: its autonomy, its walls, the sea. For of military power it did not choose the infantry, which has more steadiness for safety, but the dangers at sea, as the cause of greater goods in success. For honours are bought with dangers, both by a man and by a people. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.65.1] As leader, then, of such a city, should I not imitate the people's energy rather than your delays? Even Nicias, whom you praised, though he seemed to delay in everything, spoke, acted, served as general, drew up for battle; and was I to fear the battles of malicious prosecutors? If I were a merchant or a shipowner, I would not fear the noise of the waves, with which I would have to live; nor should a public speaker fear the noise of charges, which by nature attend those who speak. Better to be convicted at some point coming to grips with the charges than, out of fear of this, not to speak freely. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.66.1] And if you wish to consider safety within the dangers themselves, look: what war has been proved to have been proposed by me needlessly, or what expedition untimely, or what law useless? Those who voted for my proposals say none. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.66.2] 67. And if, having done no wrong, I faced accusations, gods too have been tried: Ares, over Halirrhothius, and he is not reproached for his victory; and the Eumenides even bore defeat, goddesses beaten by a man, by Orestes. How many trials of courage Heracles underwent, with Eurystheus as judge! Had he not accomplished his many dangers, he would not have carried off the prize of immortality. Dionysus would not be a god had he not been tested by his father's fire. Indeed, not even Zeus himself rules the universe untried: he contended against the Titans and Giants. O Athena Polias, who hold Attica as your choice portion from the gods, not even you found this prize before a trial. An Athenian sat as judge for you too; after the vote of Cecrops you too were crowned with the olive shoot. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.66.3] 68. And I take pride in being tried after Ares, in not being defeated after the Eumenides, in being scrutinised after Heracles, after Zeus, after Athena. Among the sons of Cecrops the olive-shoot wreath follows me, who conquer everything, the victory prize of the goddess. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.66.4] Here follow seven Philippic declamations. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.66.5] Of which let [this one] lead the column TRANSLATOR NOTES [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.1.head] Section 3: the edition's supplement <οὐκ> makes a double negative; translated as the sense requires. Section 5 is badly transmitted (stray letters, an unmatched bracket, gaps): 'the life of inactivity' and '[struggled]' (for a broken ἀλλ’ ...μενον) are conjectural. Section 6: ἅλιος read as ἄλλος, μῆρε as μηδὲ. Section 13: 'οὐ cpf)- μ- λογοποιούμεναι' is garbled; read conjecturally as οὐ φῆμαι λογοποιούμεναι, 'no fabricated rumours'. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.14.1] 14: 'πάντων (xcovy' is garbled, probably ἁπάντων 'all'. The clause 'πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοσαυτάκις...' seems to have a gap; the sense 'except those [...]; what has been decided about me so many times' is conjectural. 15: a verb is missing with 'τοὺς ἐναντίους <ἂν>... λόγους' ('would expect'); 'τοὺς κατηγορήσοντας' also lacks a verb ('to face' supplied). 17.1: stray 'δ’' before δικαστηρίων ignored. 20: stray ']' after θαυμαστός ignored. 23: stray 's' omitted; 'ὁ μὴ ἐν τοῖς πολιτεύμασιν' seems to lack a word such as παράνομος, supplied as '[lawless]'; ἐπίσκοπος taken as 'accurate'. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.24.1] 24.1: 'the ten' (τὰς δέκας) is unclear; presumably ten indictments or trials mentioned earlier in the speech, but the reference is uncertain. 31.1: χήρυγμα read as κήρυγμα (proclamation). 32.1: the sense of ἀντονομάζετε ('you call private citizens by contrast to us, as to officials') is uncertain. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.36.1] 37.1: 'τᾷ' is evidently a scanning error, read as ἂν ἦν ('would be'). 42: the duplicated 'ἐξαπα- ἐξαπατηθέντας' is a scanning error. 46: 'καὶ τούτους … ἐσώσατε' is read as negated by the preceding οὐ ('you did not save them'), as the sense requires. 48: 'εἶτα' is awkward and may be corrupt. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.48.2] Line 48.2/49: 'on the fingers' = by simple reckoning. Line 54: the final words 'ὕπουλος ὢν νεις' are defective; read as ὢν <λανθά>νεις, 'escaping notice'. Line 55: the clause 'ὁ μὴ πολλάκις ἔστρεψαν <οἱ>' is corrupt; 'the examiners' is a conjectural supply. Line 59: 'Σἀοτουσαῖος' read as Σκοτουσσαῖος (Polydamas of Scotussa). Line 60: 'κηρύγμάτα ψηφίς μάτα' read as κηρύγματα ψηφίσματα. Line 61: the stray 'οὐ]' before προῆγεν is disregarded. [urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2200.tlg00516.opp-grc1.62.1] The last two lines are Latin editorial headings from the printed edition, not part of Libanius' text; the second is incomplete. 62: 'ὧς Κέφαλος' taken as ὡς Κέφαλος [βούλεται]; 'ἕξεὰ' read as ἕξει. Earlier 'Κίμων οὐ]' (previous stretch) seems a scanning artefact. 64: the clause 'καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῆς πόλεως> ψῆφος περὶ ἐμοῦ' appears corrupt; translated as 'a vote concerning the city of the Athenians, as concerning me' (likely ὥσπερ περὶ ἐμοῦ). 67: '00 Πολιάς' read as Ὦ Πολιάς. 'ἀνδρίας κρίσεις' rendered 'trials of courage'.